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Introduction 
 
This essay analyses some aspects of the relationship between divine presence and au-
thority in the work of Karl Barth and Eberhard Jüngel. It takes a semiotic and herme-
neutic approach to this issue and investigates how divine presence and authority can be 
thought of together with the perspectival and interpretative character of all human 
communication.  
In the first part the philosophical framework is set out within which this question is 
tackled. Human processes of signification are examined with respect to their synchronic 
and diachronic dimension. The synchronic approach to sign-production focuses on de-
cision-making and examines how the concatenation of signs can be terminated at a par-
ticular point in time, thus enabling the interpreter to act. If no further signs are required 
to explain ‘what something is’, i.e. if the meaning of the ‘last’ sign becomes evident, the 
interpreter can carry out an action. The diachronic approach however analyses how the 
successive links in a chain of signs can represent a particular object ever more accu-
rately – without resorting to a naïve realism. Both aspects of sign-production presup-
pose the perspectival character of all human interpretations of the world. This idea is 
connected with the the notion of different ‘worlds of interpretation’ (G. Abel).  
 The second and the third part of this essay relate the above insights to Christian the-
ology. On the one hand, a consistently Trinitarian theology needs to emphasise that di-
vine presence is always mediated by the contingent, i.e. by creaturely signs and human 
communication. On the other hand, divine presence is that which enables human beings 
to make non-arbitrary decisions within the contingent, which correspond to God’s will 
and salvific intention for the world. In both Barth and Jüngel, it is the concept of divine 
speech, mediated by human speech, which is supposed to hold these two aspects to-
gether.  
Due to insights provided by the Continental and Analytical tradition alike, the phi-
losophical understanding of speech and intentionality underwent major changes in the 
twentieth century.1 The conception of meaning as an intentional content that can be 
self-identically conveyed from the speaker to the hearer, is no longer plausible. Since 
any theory of meaning and communication must take into account the context and the 
interpretative practice within which an utterance occurs, it is now primarily concepts 
such as language-game, life-world, tradition, narrative and culture, which are consid-
ered the intellectually most fruitful thought-categories.  
Two different conclusions can be drawn from this, which are mutually not exclusive. 
So far as Barth is concerned, it is evident that his preference for divine speech is moti-
vated by the aforementioned ideal of immediacy (which, according to Derrida, the phi-
losophical tradition associated with oral communication). Yet this immediacy proved an 
illusion. Oral communication may well have specific features that other types of com-
munication lack, but it is nonetheless subject to the contingency which is characteristic 
of all human discourse. Phonic signifiers are not ideal but are produced and received 
 
1 See H. Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida. 
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under spatio-temporal conditions – like any other kind of signifiers. Thus on the one 
hand one can argue that, because of this insight, contemporary Protestantism may wish 
to reconsider its strong emphasis on oral proclamation. And to a certain extent, this is 
what happened in the last decades: divine speech has ceased to be the exclusive focus in 
contemporary Protestant theology and philosophy of religion.2 On the other hand, one 
can hold that Protestantism’s preference for oral communication has quite other roots 
and is not intrinsically connected with what Derrida calls a ‘metaphysics of presence’. It 
then needs to be shown what genuinely unique function orality fulfils with respect to the 
idea of divine presence.  
A great deal of recent communication theory is informed by aesthetics and rhetoric: 
“according to this view the creative function is a universal quality of language and po-
etic language is regarded as the most typical manifestation of language as such”.3 Thus 
the stress is no longer on ideality and the conveyance of self-identically conceived 
meanings, but on the creative and active character of both the encoding and the decod-
ing of the message. Protestant theology followed suit and the writings of the proponents 
of Hermeneutical Theology are to some degree already informed by this new paradigm. 
This also applies to the work of Eberhard Jüngel, aspects of which will be discussed in 
part III of this essay.4
Yet the above remarks only scratch the surface of a much deeper question. If the 
paradigm of active reception is taken seriously, i.e. if speech is interpreted in an ‘aes-
thetic’ or ‘poetic’ sense, how far does that undermine the very heart of Barth’s and 
Jüngel’s thought? How far does that undermine the very heart of Reformation thought? 
For is not the ideal of passive reception closely connected with the formulas solus chris-
tus, sola fide, sola gratia and sola scriptura?5 Is it possible to isolate divine speech 
from the overall structure of Protestant theology and to confine the shift from active to 
passive reception to the theological discipline of homiletics, without calling into ques-
tion this structure altogether? These are questions which cannot be dismissed out of 
hand.  
In fact, there can be no doubt that the idea of active reception is interrelated with a 
number of other important theological issues. First of all, active reception of the divine 
Word is impossible if it is believed that there is total discontinuity between old and new 
creation, between (fallen) creation and grace. But both Barth and Jüngel fully espouse 
this view. Put differently, for active reception to be possible, it is a prerequisite that na-
ture is already graced so that one can at best distinguish between different modes of 
grace. Otherwise there would be no theological basis for an active human response. 
Such an approach by no means leads to a liberal Kulturprotestantismus, as Barth feared, 
which only insufficiently calls into question the prevailing ideology of a culture. Quite 
the reverse: provided it is coupled with the idea of an infinite perfectibility of the re-
sponse (and the respondent), it also has an infinite critical potential. But this critical 
 
2 Cf. I.U. Dalferth, Die Wirklichkeit des Möglichen, 506-515; M. Moxter, Kultur als Lebenswelt; P. 
Stoellger, Metapher und Lebenswelt. 
3 Y. Lotman, Universe of the Mind, 17. 
4 See also the discussion in U. Körtner, Theologie des Wortes Gottes. 
5 See M. Beintker, Was ist das Reformatorische? 
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potential can only be actualised in the course of time, i.e. in that the response is con-
stantly improved.  
It is Barth’s theory of total discontinuity, as set out for instance in KD II/1 § 27, 
which leaves everything as it is. Whereas the Kulturprotestantismus developed by his 
predecessors more or less identifies nature and grace in the sense of a univocity, Barth’s 
revelatory positivism stresses the complete discontinuity between nature and grace and 
is hence based on equivocity. Christologically speaking, the former approach is a kind 
of Arianism, the latter falls into the category of Monophysitism. Both variants fail to do 
justice to the doctrine of the two natures of Christ as set out by the Council of Chal-
cedon (AD 451), which allows for a ‘third’ between identity and difference. For this 
reason deification is at the same time humanisation, i.e. by participating in God, man 
does not lose but realises his human nature, and God, by unifying himself with creation 
does not lose but preserves his divine transcendence.  
It is this theological framework within which divine and human action can be con-
ceived together in a non-competitive way; and it is this framework which is the precon-
dition for active reception on the part of the human addressee. Barth lacks a ‘middle-
voiced’ approach and his theology consists of “dualities without mediation” such as that 
between nature and grace, reason and revelation and finite and infinite.6 How deep-
seated this ideal of passive reception is in Reformation thought can be exemplified by 
Ebeling’s attempt to apply the category of pure receptivity to the event of the Reforma-
tion itself. In his view, Luther’s greatness consists in the fact that at the decisive point, 
he did not do anything, but in his indefatigable readiness to listen to the Gospel, let the 
important thing happen to himself.7  
It is therefore appropriate to say that the privileging of oral communication by Barth 
and many of his predecessors serves the purpose of thinking God as the sole agent in the 
divine-human encounter. But what if one follows the ‘aesthetic’ approach to orality 
mentioned above, which does allow for active reception? Have not many contemporary 
Protestant theologians distanced themselves from Barth and chosen this apparently 
more promising alternative? Are there any serious theological obstacles to such a shift 
of emphasis? 
In order to answer this question, it is helpful to distinguish between different types of 
speech, which fulfil different hermeneutical functions.  
a) In a situation of mission, as it is characteristic for instance in the New Testament 
writings, oral proclamation aims at providing basic ‘knowledge’ about the life, death 
and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Without such basic knowledge, no one can call himself 
a Christian, even if this knowledge alone is not yet faith. However, it is not necessary 
that faith is evoked at the very moment the Gospel message is heard – though such a 
 
6 C. Pickstock, Duns Scotus, 554. According to Pickstock, the historical roots of these problems can be 
traced back to the late Middle Ages: “The position of the analogical, as a third medium between identity 
and difference, whereby something can be like something else in its very unlikeness according to an inef-
fable co-belonging, is rejected by Scotus because it does not seem to be rationally thinkable”, ibid., 547). 
And one could add that in contemporary philosophy and semiotics, it is (again) possible to think that 
‘something is like something else in its very unlikeness’. There is a ‘third’ between identity and differ-
ence (tertium datur). 
7 G. Ebeling, Luther, 58-78. 
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coincidence may occur (Acts 10:44). Thus the reason why oral proclamation plays such 
an important role in the New Testament is largely due to the fact that it was simply the 
only means to spread the Gospel in antiquity. Nonetheless, it has been pointed out for 
instance that in oral communication the sender and the addressee are co-present in the 
sense that the addressee cannot not react to the sender’s address. This is not the case to 
the same degree if the addressee faces a written text, which is detached from its author.8 
But, one wonders, if this particular feature of the pragmatic dimension of speech is un-
derlined, why not pay attention to other aspects too? To put it semiotically, every 
speaker cannot not communicate a great deal more than just the meaning of the words 
he utters, for his whole ‘way of life’, as it were, his facial expression, gestures, clothes, 
as well as the context which he chooses for his speech, signify too. These aspects may 
either support the content of his words or contradict it. Perhaps this does not equally 
apply to all types of oral communication, but it is certainly relevant to missionary work.  
For the itinerant preachers in the New Testament, proclaiming the kingdom of God 
which is at hand, their whole existence as wandering charismatics is an essential part of 
their message:9 they are sent out “two by two” (Lk 10:1; Mk 6:7) and receive “power 
and authority over all demons and to cure diseases” (Lk 9:1; cf. Mt 10:1; Mk 6:7), but 
“like lambs into the midst of wolves” (Lk 10:3); they are told neither to take gold nor 
silver, nor copper in their belts; no bag for their journey, nor two tunics, nor sandals, nor 
staff (Mt 10:9f; cf. Mk 6:8f; Lk 9:3, cf. also 2 Cor 11:27f). Jesus primarily called into 
being a movement of itinerants rather than local communities. This was by no means 
merely a marginal phenomenon, but decisively shaped the first generations of Chris-
tians. Being directly influenced by Jesus’ own life and that of his disciples, the charac-
teristic features of their missionary activity were homelessness (cf. Mk 1:16; 10:28ff), 
lack of family (cf. Mk 1:20; 10:29; Mt 8:22), lack of possession (cf. Mt 6:19; 10:10; Mk 
10:17ff; 10:25; Lk 6:24; Acts 4:36ff) and lack of protection (Mt 5:38f; 5:41; 10:17ff).10 
What Jesus had taught them in word and deed, and what his disciples/apostles had 
handed down to their contemporaries and the next generation, was not only to be retold, 
but essentially to be relived. When St Paul’s personal credibility was gravely challenged 
by the Galatians, he embarked on a rather lengthy description of his life, paying particu-
lar attention to the event outside Damascus. This biographical report occupies almost 
half of the letter to the Galatians and is supposed to provide the authoritative basis for 
the theological instructions in the second part. Thus Paul’s (re)interpretation of his 
whole life in the light of this event is the way in which his calling becomes part of the 
message he proclaims. In other words, there is no clear demarcation between apostle 
and Gospel: “As the gospel is the manifestation of God’s acting, so is the apostle”.11  
This type of speech will not be further analysed, but it is important to mark it off 
from the following two types, which fulfil a very different hermeneutical function.  
 
8 I.U. Dalferth, Jenseits von Mythos und Logos, 247-257. Dalferth elaborates on a quotation from N. 
Luhmann’s, Soziale Systeme, 561f. 
9 U. Luz, Das Evangelium nach Matthäus, 102-104. 
10 G. Theissen, Soziologie der Jesusbewegung, ch. 2. 
11 J. Schütz, Paul and the Anatomy of Apostolic Authority, 232. 
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b) Speech, or speech-acts, can terminate the chain of signs in the sense that they in-
terpret ‘something as something’. This is what I shall call the ‘literal understanding’ of 
speech. The nature of this type of communication, which will be further delineated in 
the course of the essay, can be characterised by the following formula: s (= sender) in-
terprets (or sets) x as y to a (= addressee) in the context c. In part II, I shall try to inter-
pret Barth’s understanding of divine speech in the Prolegomena to the Church Dogmat-
ics in terms of this ‘literal understanding’. Although this might not be the only possible 
way of reading Barth, let alone the most plausible interpretation of his idea of divine 
speech, there is evidence enough in support of such a construal.  
The hermeneutical function of this type of speech is the greatest possible determina-
tion, for it aims at determining what a particular x is. As regards this understanding of 
communication, the ‘aesthetic’ approach (which places the stress on underdetermina-
tion) does not seem to be suitable, although the question needs to be answered of how 
determination can be thought of without reverting to a metaphysical theory of meaning. 
This leads to a number of interrelated issues which will be discussed in some detail: 
Firstly, how far can Barth’s idea of speech do justice to contemporary philosophical 
insights in hermeneutics and semiotics? Secondly, how is the relationship between di-
vine and human speech to be thought of? This question becomes particularly pressing 
with respect to the issue of how divine and human authority are interrelated. For al-
though divine speech, according to Barth, is always mediated by human speech, the 
divine will and the perverted will of (fallen) human beings must be strictly kept apart. 
Thirdly, which is the Sitz im Leben of the aforementioned termination of the chain of 
singnifiers? Although the starting point of this investigation is oral proclamation in the 
Church service, speech which fulfils the function of terminating the concatenation of 
signs in the way outlined above, is not characteristic of the Church service. Fourthly, 
how is the competence/authority which the sender needs to possess in order to perform 
reliable acts of interpretation to be thought of? On the one hand there is the question of 
how various different acts of interpretation can be shaped by the one Christian Logos: 
Jesus Christ. This leads to questions discussed in the third part. On the other hand the 
variety of different acts of interpretation needs to be categorised. This leads to the ques-
tion of differentiation. That is to say, it is crucial to distinguish between different fields 
of interpretation and competence.   
c) The third part is dedicated to what I call the ‘non-literal’ understanding of divine 
speech, whose purpose is to introduce into the Christian perspective on the world and to 
initiate the addressee into a Christian interpretative practice. Its function is not to termi-
nate the chain of signifiers in the sense that a particular x is interpreted as y, but to help 
the addressee acquire a new interpretative habit, which enables him to interpret every x 
in a specifically Christian way. It thus concerns the ‘as-structure’ of all acts of interpre-
tation.  
The starting point of these considerations is Eberhard Jüngel’s conception of divine 
speech, for which he coined the phrase ‘experience with experience’ (Erfahrung mit der 
Erfahrung). As indicated above, Jüngel takes an ‘aesthetic’ approach to speech insofar 
as his conception of oral communication is informed by the rhetorical tradition and in-
sofar as he understands parables as ‘narrative metaphors’. Barth’s extreme actualism is 
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thus mitigated. This to some degree opens up the possibility of active response on the 
part of the addressee. Nonetheless, Jüngel too, has been criticised for developing a the-
ory of “Redemption without Actuality”.12 Like Barth, he does not allow for a dia-
chronic mode of divine presence. To be sure, the ‘experience with experience’ is not 
just a specifically religious experience among other non-religious experiences, but an 
‘experience’ that establishes a framework within which human experiences can be in-
terpreted. But Jüngel nonetheless compares this ‘experience with experience’ to the 
point of a joke, a highly actualistic thought-model, and scarcely reflects on how the di-
vine address institutes a new interpretative practice. His approach thus largely remains 
caught in a dichotomy between divine action and human passivity. His idea of redemp-
tion thus remains without actuality.   
In actual fact, Christian theology has no problem to think together divine presence 
and action with human action, i.e. God also acts in and through the human response. Put 
differently, one could say that man is still acted upon by God when he is most active – 
without losing his freedom. It follows from this that human action can assume a sacra-
mental character and that human beings take part in the ‘working out’ of salvation. Yet 
the sacramentality of human action depends on the quality of the human response, i.e. 
whether it corresponds to the divine will or not. Moreover, there are degrees of appro-
priateness, which means that an action does not either fully represent divine presence or 
not at all.   
These insights open up new possibilities for the ‘non-literal’ understanding of divine 
speech. Firstly, there is no longer need to resort to actualistic thought-categories. Since 
human beings can receive grace at the very moment they perform an action, or carry out 
interpretative labour, Umberto Eco’s conception of the ‘aesthetic text’ appears to be a 
useful hermeneutical tool. Its main function is to change ‘the way we see the world’. 
But such a change can only come about through man’s active interpretative endeavour. 
Secondly, the ‘aesthetic text’ is a semiotic, not merely a linguistic model. And because a 
one-sided privileging of phonic signifiers is no longer plausible without the ideal of 
passive reception – although speech may still fulfil a unique function – there is now 
room for other ‘channels’ as well. That is to say, the Christian Logos can be represented 
by sign-vehicles made of various materials. This opens up the possibility of Christian 
art and a liturgical enactment of the Gospel narrative. Thirdly, as the acquisition of an 
interpretative habit now stands at the centre, the idea of the point of the parable, which 
dominates Jüngel’s approach, gives way to, or is at least supplemented by concepts such 
as reiteration and inculcation. Even if a human being is most active, he is at the same 
time in a state of reception. These are the main issues addressed in part III. 
It seems that Barth and a great deal of the Protestant tradition to a certain extent conflate 
these three types of speech. This is due to the fact that the epistemic problems which the 
Protestant notion of ‘divine speech’ is supposed to solve are paid so much attention to. 
However, these epistemic problems, which once dominated philosophy and (Protestant) 
theology alike, have long ceased to be at the centre of contemporary debates. For this 
reason it is now possible to more subtly distinguish between the specific hermeneutical 
 
12 Thus the title of an article by R. Spjuth. 
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functions which these different types of communication fulfil. This is not to say that 
they cannot partly overlap.  
To sum up: communication in a situation of mission aims at familiarising the ad-
dressees with the content of Christian faith. Its focus is on a context-sensitive retelling 
of the Gospel narrative which tries to elicit faith. But it is by no means required that the 
occurrence of faith coincides with the performance of the speech-act. On the other hand, 
the form of this retelling must be shaped by its content.13 The primary goal of the 
Church service, however, is to inculcate the addressee with the Gospel narrative in or-
der to effect the acquisition of an interpretative habit. Although for inculcation to be 
effective, originality, innovation and a high degree of context-sensitivity are required 
too, the main aim is not the conveyance of ‘new’ meanings. Rather, basic knowledge of 
the Gospel narrative and of the content of Christian faith is presupposed. It is the in 
principle infinite process of an active appropriation of the Gospel narrative which takes 
centre stage. Since this is not merely an intellectual endeavour, but also comprises the 
education of desire, non-verbal communication and reiteration play an important role. 
Semiotically speaking, it is Eco’s idea of the ‘aesthetic text’ which encompasses most 
of these aspects: inexhaustible depth of meaning; appropriation through interpretative 
labour; and communication on the basis of non-verbal messages. Finally, processes of 
decision-making aim at terminating the chain of signifiers. Their Sitz im Leben is not the 
Church service but the diverse situations of everyday life, independent of whether the 
decisions are of a personal or institutional kind. Prototypically, these terminations occur 
in dialogues rather than monologues. 
In all three types of communication, speech may play an important role, but none of 
them presupposes that oral communication conveys self-identical meanings.  
So far as the structure of this essay is concerned, the philosophical part precedes the 
theological analyses. Yet it is not the aim of this investigation to check whether Barth 
and Jüngel do justice to the philosophical theories set out in part I. Rather, these models 
are used to make a theological point and therefore lead to a dialogue with other theo-
logical thinkers and traditions (cf. part II and III).  
  
 
13 Cf. J.-L. Marion, Dieu sans l’être, 259-277. 
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Part I: The Art of Sign-Making 
1 Diachrony and synchrony, realism and pluralism 
Post-modern thought, in the continental and analytic tradition alike, emphasises the per-
spectival and interpretative character of all notions of reality. Language, we are told, not 
only represents or depicts an already existing, language-independent world, but is rather 
reality-constitutive. This is not to say that there is no extra-linguistic reality, but only 
makes clear that our knowledge of objects is always already mediated by language. 
However, the impossibility of checking from an external standpoint whether linguistic 
phenomena do correspond to an extra-linguistic reality renders problematic the tradi-
tional understanding of truth as adaequatio intellectus ad rem.  
In his Philosophy of the Sign, Josef Simon attempts to reinterpret traditional philoso-
phical concepts such as ‘truth’, ‘reality’, or ‘reference’ within the framework of Peirce’s 
Pragmaticism.1 According to Simon, a sign is that which we understand. Insofar as we 
understand it, we do not ask what it means.2 If we do ask about the meaning of a sign, 
we understand something as a sign, and therefore also something about it, but we do not 
understand it entirely. However, if we did not understand anything about it, we could 
not ask about its meaning. Thus the minimal requirement is that we recognise a sign as 
a sign, i.e. its partly understood meaning must govern our question about its ‘full’ mean-
ing. But since we cannot step outside the network of sign-making, the answer to the 
question about the meaning of a sign is itself a sign. It is the sign that is capable of an-
swering our question about the meaning of the preceding sign, and therefore its inter-
pretation. In other words, the difference between sign and meaning becomes only tan-
gible in a situation of non-understanding. We then start dividing up a sign, distinguish-
ing between what we understand about it and what not. That aspect which eludes imme-
diate understanding enters into consciousness as something and is henceforth regarded 
as a predicate of a posited subject which grammatically precedes this predicate.3 It fol-
lows that the internal relation between the sign that has not been fully understood and 
its meaning (i.e., the sign that replaces it) consists in that part of the (first) sign which 
has been understood. This part does not ‘appear’ in consciousness, precisely because it 
has been understood right from the beginning, and thus holds together the latter and the 
former sign.4 In other words, the sign-relation connects the sign that is under investiga-
tion with the sign that explains the one that is under investigation. The explanation thus 
forms a proposition, with the former being its theme and the latter its rhema. And the 
completed proposition is itself a sign, for it clarifies the meaning of the old sign that was 
not understood fully, the theme. If the proposition suffices as an answer, no further ex-
 
1 J. Simon, Philosophie des Zeichens. Other major influences are Nietzsche, Kant, Hegel and Wittgen-
stein. 
2 Ibid., 39f. 
3 Ibid., 44. 
4 Ibid., 53. 
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planations are needed, even if under different circumstances, a new question may be 
raised.  
A sign, which we do not understand fully, is an imperfect sign with an imperfect 
meaning and requires interpretation to overcome this lack of understanding. In perfect 
understanding, by contrast, the question about how to understand something does not 
arise, i.e. the sign and its interpretation are one. For instance, we read a text ‘without 
interpretation’.5 It is only when we do not understand something in the text that we 
pause and ask about the meaning of a sign, thereby trying to replace the sign at issue by 
another one, in order to explain it. What is needed, then, is more text or some explana-
tory discourse in order to overcome this lack of understanding. Yet, according to Simon, 
it would be nonsensical to say that ‘a sign could have different meanings’, depending on 
the interpretation of the reader. For a sign is only recognised as a sign in the act of read-
ing. It only exists as part of semiosis and cannot be identified outside of a concrete em-
ployment. 
That part of a sign which is not understood enters into consciousness as something 
that needs further elucidation. Consciousness is thus “the attempt at the interpretation, at 
the explanation, of one sign by another on. It is work on signs …” or the space of this 
endeavour to clarify and explicate that which remained unclear.6 This implies that a 
sign which is not immediately understood, only manifests itself in the question about its 
meaning, that is to say, it only exists as a sign if this question arises. Consequently, 
thinking begins where our interpretations of perceptions remain vague and uncertain, 
i.e. where our sensations resist easy assimilation. Perceiving as such, however, is the 
kind of interpretation that is altogether certain so that no interpretative labour is re-
quired. In principle, it is nonsensical to call it ‘interpretation’ at all; at least so long as 
no other possible ways of construing it crosses the mind of the interpreter. Thinking 
only occurs if there are doubts about what something is, if there is an interpretation that 
needs to be rendered certain.7  
If this process of interpretation is successfully carried out, the sign that could not be 
understood is replaced by another that is more fitting, i.e. which we understand immedi-
ately. The ‘new’ sign is then the meaning of the ‘old’ sign. It can only have one mean-
ing, namely the one that is satisfactory at this very moment and in this particular con-
text. If this is not the case, it must be replaced by a third one and so on, until a sign is 
immediately comprehensible and the chain of signifiers comes to a close. To continue 
asking about the meaning of a sign which was ‘fully’ understood is nonsensical. But it 
is very well possible that at a later point in time, the given explanation – i.e., the substi-
tuting sign – will become unintelligible itself, thus prolonging the process of interpreta-
tion indefinitely, until a satisfactory interpretation can be found. Although the replacing 
sign is the meaning of the replaced sign, it is also correct to say that the old and the new 
sign have the same meaning. After all, it is the first sign that we want to understand by 
means of the second one. 
 
5 Ibid., 39. 
6 Ibid., 41. 
7 Ibid., 79. 
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But how does this pragmatic approach bear on Simon’s understanding of philosophi-
cal concepts such as ‘reality’, ‘reference’ and ‘truth’? This question can be answered in 
two different ways, depending on whether the focus is on the diachronic or synchronic 
aspect of sign-production.8  
A) Diachrony 
The question about the meaning of a sign can come up with every sign, even with those 
that have, as meaning-signs, already answered the question about the meaning of a pre-
ceding sign. This leads in principle to an infinite regress. From a diachronic perspective, 
‘realism’ is thus the belief that the transition from one sign to other signs approximates 
truth asymptotically, even if the latter lies in infinity “so that there cannot be any final 
and definitely true sign”.9 Hence truth must be understood as the better version of signs, 
and not as the transcendence of the signs to a thing itself.10 The meaning of a sign is the 
sign that appears to be better than the preceding one at a particular time. Thus philoso-
phy does not produce ‘concepts’ ad esse but only ad melius esse, i.e. there is no tran-
scendental signified.11 Put differently, the truth lies in the ‘goodness’ of the particular 
transition itself and therefore remains without an external standard. The rules we follow 
in moving from one sign to another regulate and restrict our choices, but only pertain to 
one particular ‘language’. And the question about which of the many ‘languages’ is 
nearer to truth cannot be answered by means of a comparison between them and an ex-
tra-linguistic truth. Moreover, such transitions are at times considered ‘good’, even if 
they do not follow the prevailing rules but rather violate them. In other words, it turns 
out that a genuine approximation to truth may only be achieved by virtue of a radical 
change of the ‘language’.12 But although there is no external standard to assess a series 
of transitions, the replacement of one sign by other signs nonetheless does not only 
serve individual purposes. Rather, the ‘new’ signs are always considered to be generally 
better than the one that was considered in need of interpretation. There is a social di-
mension to all processes of clarification since all meaning-signs produced are directed at 
a particular community (CP 5.353-5.356).13 In order to get a clearer grasp of such di-
rected serialisations, which presuppose the common sense of a community, some as-
pects of Peirce’s philosophy must be discussed in greater detail. This can be done best 
by marking off his understanding of unlimited semiosis from alternative approaches 
which seem to be close to Peirce at first glance. Following Eco, I shall briefly look at 
the Hermetic tradition and Deconstruction, and then return to Peirce’s own approach. 
a) Renaissance Hermetism and Deconstruction 
The pivot of Renaissance Hermetism was the principle of “universal analogy and sym-
pathy”.14 Every item of the sublunar world stands in a relation of similitude or resem-
 
8 Simon does not use the terms synchronic and diachronic at this point of his argument. 
9 Ibid., 237. 
10 Ibid., 236. 
11 Ibid., 143. Cf. I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 759 fn. 
12 J. Simon, Philosophie des Zeichens, 237. 
13 Ibid., 232. 
14 U. Eco, The Limits of Interpretation, 24. 
blance to (m)any other element(s) in this sublunar world, as well as to (m)any other 
element(s) in the superior world. As a result, everything can be connected with every-
thing and every element can become the expression or the content of any other element. 
Yet Hermetic semiosis does not deny the existence of a univocal, universal and tran-
scendental meaning. Rather, the similarities that can be discovered in the universe are 
grounded in the Neo-platonic One that constitutes the transcendent subject and which is 
the site of the coincidentia oppositorum, holding together all the seemingly disparate 
entities. And although Renaissance Hermetism aims at identifying in every text, as well 
as in the text of the world, the fullness of signification, rather than its absence, it none-
theless leads to an infinite shift and deferral of all meanings. Since the meaning of every 
word or thing is always another word or another thing, every utterance is reduced to an 
ambiguous allusion to something else. Accordingly, an interpretation cannot be tested 
for its reliability but defies any definitive assessment, and the final content of every ex-
pression remains a mystery that will never be exhaustively resolved. Therefore Eco calls 
this particular understanding of unlimited semiosis Hermetic drift or connotative neo-
plasma.15 For the ‘rules’ by means of which connections are established between words 
and/or things entail a wide variety of different criteria (metaphorical, metonymical, 
phonetic, etc.) and hence remain extremely vague and unrestrictive. Eco gives the fol-
lowing example in which an interpreter moves from the term ‘peg’ to the term ‘Plato’ in 
only six steps: “Peg – pig – bristle – brush – Mannerism – Idea – Plato”.16  
The concept ‘connotation’ was introduced by the semiotician Hjelmslev and proved a 
useful tool for the study of myth in the work of Roland Barthes. According to Barthes, 
every system of signification consists of E, expressions (or signifiers), C, contents (or 
signifieds), and the relations between E and C, R. ERC thus forms the primary sign-
system. This primary sign-system can be pressed into the service of a second, more 
comprehensive sign-system so that Barthes speaks of “staggered” systems.17 In the case 
of connotation, the primary system (E1R1C1) turns into the expression of the secondary 
system: E2 (= E1R1C1) R2C2. The first level is that of denotation, the second that of con-
notation (see Figure A).18  
 
Figure A      E C 
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Barthes’s best-known example for such ‘staggered systems’ stems from his Mytholo-
gies, in which he analyses the cover photo of the French magazine Paris-match. On the 
level of denotation, the photo (E1), an assemblage of black and white patches or marks, 
shows a young black African in a French uniform, his eyes uplifted and probably fixed 
on the tricolour (C1). On the level of connotation however, the denotative sign (E1R1C1) 
connotes the implicit content (C2) that “France is a great empire, that all of its sons, 
 
15 Ibid., 29. 
16 Ibid., 27. 
17 R. Barthes, Elements of Semiology, 89. The helpful abbreviations are borrowed from W. Nöth, Hand-
book of Semiotics, 310f. 
18 Figures A-C are taken from U. Eco, The Limits of Interpretation, 30-32. 
without distinction in colour, serve faithfully under its flag and that there is no better 
answer to the detractors of an alleged colonialism than the zeal of this black [man] to 
serve his alleged oppressors”.19 The content C2 thus forms part of a new connotative 
sign whose expression (E2) is identical with the whole of the denotative sign (E1R1C1). 
Yet Eco points out that even if a connotation has become culturally recorded, it is al-
ways dependent on a particular context. Thus, in a different situation, it would be more 
plausible to regard the black man in a French uniform as a spy who in actual fact fights 
for the liberation of Algeria (or any other French ex-colony).  
Now as far as the neoplastic growth of the Hermetic tradition is concerned, no con-
textual constraints regulate the free associations of the interpreter so that even mere 
phonetic similarity at times serves to connect two utterly disparate elements (Figure B).    
 
Figure B:  
E 
E C
C 
C E 
 
 
 
 
Hermetism has often been compared to the drift of Deconstruction, as set out in the 
writings of Jacques Derrida. In the second chapter of his Grammatology, Derrida turns 
to Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics and tries to show that linguistics too is un-
der the spell of the logocentric metaphysics of presence that allegedly dominates the 
entire history of philosophy in the West.20 Saussure distinguishes between the signifier 
(image acustique/signifiant) and the signified (concept/signifié), which are both mental 
entities and arbitrarily associated, i.e. there is no iconicity between the signifier and the 
signified. This explicitly dyadic character of the sign implies that there is no referential 
object outside the sign-system which is part of semiosis. Rather, Saussure’s semiologi-
cal approach conceives of meaning in terms of the semantic value a concept has within 
the whole system of language (langue). These semantic values form a web of structural 
relations so that meaning is not constituted by the concepts as such but by the differ-
ences and oppositions between them.21  
However, as Derrida points out, like Aristotle, Rousseau and Hegel, Saussure regards 
writing as phonetic writing, i.e. the written sign is subordinated to the phonic sign of 
spoken language. Saussure writes: “Language and writing are two distinct systems of 
signs; the second exists for the sole purpose of representing the first”.22 Writing is con-
sidered the ‘outside’, the exterior representation of language. However, Derrida sees an 
inconsistency between Saussure’s statement that writing and graphic signs are (mere) 
images, representations, or figurations of the phonic signs, and his assertion that the 
signifier is always arbitrarily associated with the signified.23
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19 R. Barthes, Mythologies, 223. 
20 J. Derrida, De la grammatologie, 42ff, esp. 65ff.
21 F. de Saussure, Course de linguistique générale, 98-101, 114ff, 150ff, 158-169. 
22 Ibid., 45. 
23 Yet, according to Saussure, this arbitrariness only concerns the relationship between the signifier and 
the idea which it represents, but not the use of signifiers by a linguistic community. On the level of lan-
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Yet, for Saussure, writing does not only constitute an external image of the internal 
‘real language’ (orality), but corrupts and distorts the purity of speech. Writing veils the 
appearance of language, it is a disguise rather than a guise for language. Originally, 
there was a ‘natural bond’, i.e. a kind of iconicity between the phonic signifier and the 
signified to which the visible image of writing was subordinated. But this relationship 
of subordination was inversed “by the original sin of writing”.24 The graphic signs of 
writing and their seeming stability and permanence came to be seen as better suited to 
guarantee the diachronic unity of language. Yet, according to Saussure, the superficial 
bond of writing could only constitute a fictitious unity, and led to a problematic devel-
opment; for henceforth more attention was paid to the visual image than to the original 
object itself (i.e. the phonic signifier).    
Derrida, by contrast, argues that if one takes the thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign 
seriously, and applies it to the spoken as well as to the written word, it is no longer ten-
able to subordinate the graphic to the phonic signifier. He thus to a certain extent re-
verses the hierarchy between speech and writing and points out that the notion of an 
arbitrary institution of the sign “is unthinkable before the possibility of writing and out-
side of its horizon”.25 Derrida argues that if one follows Saussure’s thesis of arbitrari-
ness, which in principle allows for a conventional relationship between the phonic and 
the graphic signifier, how can one still call writing an ‘image’ or a ‘representation’ of 
speech, something ‘external’ to real language? He therefore questions in the very name 
of the arbitrariness of the sign Saussure’s understanding of writing as ‘image’ or ‘natu-
ral symbol’ of language. His critique is further supported by the fact that Saussure him-
self regards the phoneme as something utterly unimaginable so that nothing visible can 
stand in a relation of resemblance to it.  
From Derrida’s grammatological point of view, by contrast, writing is at once more 
exterior to speech than Saussure has it – for the former is not just the latter’s ‘image’ or 
‘symbol’, and more interior to speech – for speech is always already in itself writing. 
Put differently, the graphic signifier, like all signifiers, only refers to the phonic signi-
fier through a web of interrelations with other signifiers that form a ‘total system’. Thus 
the concept of writing implies the notion of the instituted trace (trace instituée) “as the 
possibility common to all systems of signification”.26 Yet both concepts, institution as 
well as trace, need to be detached from the philosophical tradition from which they are 
taken. The French word trace, which also carries implications of ‘track’, ‘footprint’ and 
‘imprint’, can be understood as a synonym of other Derridian terms such as archi-
écriture or différance. It reminds us that word, thing or thought, can never become one. 
Meaning and reference are not based on a one-to-one correlation between thought, word 
and object, but are constituted by the relationship of difference between the signs. The 
graphic as well as the phonic sign is a structure of difference, which is determined by 
the trace of that ‘other’ which is forever absent. The ‘trace’ thus denotes the aspect of 
 
guage usage, the signifiers are immutable and cannot be modified in any way by an individual – even if a 
language-system can of course undergo alterations in the course of time. 
24 J. Derrida, De la grammatologie, 53. 
25 Ibid., 65. 
26 Ibid., 68, emphasis mine. 
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the radically other within the structure of difference, which is the sign. Accordingly, the 
oppositions between convention and nature, sign and symbol (in Saussure’s sense) are 
only meaningful after the possibility of the trace. Derrida argues that the unmotivated 
character of the sign “requires a synthesis in which the wholly other announces itself as 
such (comme tel) – without any simplicity, any identity, any resemblance or continuity – 
within what is not it”.27 In other words, this presentation of ‘the other as such’ entails a 
dissimulation of its ‘as such’ that has always already begun so that no structure of being 
escapes it, and which does away with the metaphysical understanding of being as being-
present (étant-present). The trace must be conceived before being.  
It follows that the notion of the trace transcends both motivation and arbitrariness. 
One can thus say that “the trace is indefinitely its own becoming-unmotivated” (deve-
nir-immotivée).28 Accordingly, it is impossible to distinguish between two different 
classes of signs, symbols (motivated in Saussure’s usage) and signs (unmotivated in 
Saussure’s usage), since there is only a becoming-sign (devenir-signe) of the symbol. 
This implies that the trace is neither more cultural nor natural, but rather that starting 
from which the becoming-unmotivated of the sign – and with it the above distinction 
between natural and cultural – is made possible.  
After his critique of Saussure, Derrida turns to Peirce, in whose semiotics he claims 
to have discovered a similar process of becoming-unmotivated. Derrida approvingly 
quotes the following passage from Peirce’s Elements of logic: “Symbols grow. They 
come into being by development out of other signs, particularly from icons, or from 
mixed signs partaking of the nature of icons and symbols” (CP 2.302). In order to un-
derstand Derrida’s argument, we have to keep in mind that the motivated sign, Saus-
sure’s symbol, (more or less) corresponds to Peirce’s icon, and that the Peircian symbol 
is the rough equivalent to what the Swiss linguist calls the arbitrary or unmotivated 
sign. In other words, unlike Saussure – who remains largely entangled in Western logo-
centrism – Peirce seems to have anticipated the logic of the trace. That is to say, he is 
aware that the symbolic (Saussure’s arbitrary sign) is rooted in the non-symbolic (Saus-
sure’s symbol). Derrida thus states that Peirce “goes very far in the direction of a de-
construction of the transcendental signified …”.29 Similar to Derrida’s own work, there 
is the notion of an indefiniteness of reference which excludes the idea of a ‘thing itself’ 
outside semiosis. Since every signified is always already a sign as well, there is no such 
thing as intuitive evidence of objects. The sign gives rise to an interpretant, which itself 
becomes a sign and so forth ad infinitum. Accordingly, the self-identity of the signified 
remains concealed and is always on the move. Derrida concludes: “Il n’y a donc que des 
signes dès lors qu’il y a du sens”.30  
 
27 Ibid., 69. 
28 Ibid. 
29 “Peirce va très loin dans la direction de ce que nous avons appelé plus haut la dé-construction du signi-
fié transcendental, lequel, à un moment ou à un autre, mettrait un terme rassurant au renvoi de signe à 
signe”, J. Derrida, De la grammatologie, 71. 
30 Ibid., 73. 
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b) Different readings of C.S. Peirce  
Although Umberto Eco does not equate Hermetic drift with Deconstruction, he nonethe-
less sees a very close link between these two traditions.31 But it is questionable whether 
the diagram which is supposed to illustrate the nature of neo-plastic growth (Figure B) 
does really justice to Derrida’s Deconstruction. For instance, the French philosopher has 
been accused of being a nihilist and relativist, often in connection with his famous dic-
tum il n’y a pas de hors-texte.32 Yet, as he himself has pointed out, this statement 
should not be naively construed in terms of a suspension and denial of all referents. 
Rather, it simply means that all reality bears the structure of a differential trace so that 
we cannot refer to ‘reality’ without an interpretative experience.33 In other words, the 
above dictum wants to call attention to the unavoidability and importance of the notion 
of context for our understanding of meaning: “One of the definitions of what is called 
deconstruction would be […] to pay the sharpest and broadest attention possible to con-
text, and thus to an incessant movement of recontextualization”.34 Derrida’s formula, il 
n’y a pas de hors-texte, must therefore be interpreted as “there is nothing outside con-
text”.35 According to Eco, however, one characteristic of Hermetism is precisely that it 
is free of all contextual restrictions.36
Yet what is of interest here is primarily the relationship between Derrida and 
Peirce’s understanding of unlimited semiosis – and not that between Hermetism and 
Deconstruction. And it has been pointed out by various commentators that there are 
significant differences between these two thinkers.37 The most important difference 
between Peirce and Derrida is without doubt the teleological character of Peircian Prag-
maticism38, which is strikingly absent in Deconstruction. Peirce writes: “[A] sign is 
something by knowing which we know something more” (CP 8.332). That is to say, the 
sign becomes extensionally as well as intentionally more and more determined in the 
sequence of interpretations and asymptotically approaches its ultimate or logical inter-
pretant (as Peirce also calls it). But before I elaborate on this, let me introduce the basic 
terminology of his approach. According to Peirce, semiosis can be defined as follows: 
A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or ca-
pacity. It addresses somebody, that is, it creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a 
more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for 
something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I 
have sometimes called the ground of the representation (CP 2.228). 
The term representamen denotes the perceptible object of the sign and corresponds to 
what Morris calls ‘sign-vehicle’ or Hjelmslev ‘expression’ (CP 2.228, 2.230). It is a 
 
31 U. Eco, The Limits of Interpretation, 32. 
32 Cf. C. Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism, 155-165. 
33 J. Derrida, Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion, 148. 
34 Ibid., 136. 
35 Ibid., italics mine. 
36 U. Eco, The Limits of Interpretation, 30. 
37 I am following ibid, 34ff and K. Oehler, Über die Grenzen der Interpretation aus der Sicht des semi-
otischen Pragmatismus. The relationship between Peirce and Derrida is also discussed in S.B. Rosenthal, 
Sign, time and the viability of trace: Derrida and Peirce; S. Maras, A Semiotics of the Proxy. 
38 In an essay called What Pragmatism Is (CP 5.411-437), published in 1905, Peirce called his own phi-
losophical project Pragmaticism in order to mark it off from William James’s Pragmatism. 
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vehicle that conveys to the mind of the interpreter something from outside (CP 1.339). 
Signs may be analysed as they are in “their own material nature”, as regards “their rela-
tions to their objects”, or with respect to their “relations to their interpretants” (CP 
8.333). And the term representamen denotes the sign only with regard to the first aspect, 
i.e. “[a]s it is in itself” (CP 8.334). Consequently, it is only the first correlate of the sign 
and cannot be equated with the sign as such, which has a triadic character. Yet as far as 
terminology is concerned, Peirce is not altogether consistent and at times uses the term 
sign instead of representamen.39    
Protology 
Furthermore, Peirce distinguishes between the immediate and the mediate or dynamical 
object. “… [W]e have to distinguish the Immediate Object, which is the Object as the 
Sign itself represents it, and whose Being is thus dependent upon the Representation of 
it in the Sign, from the Dynamical Object, which is the Reality which by some means 
contrives to determine the Sign to its Representation” (CP 4.536). In other words, it is 
the dynamical object that determines the interpreter’s production of interpretants, al-
though it is never immediately present but only known through the immediate object. 
Put differently, the latter is a mental representation of an object.  
According to Eco, the dynamical object cannot be an physical entity in the world, but 
is rather a mental element such as a thought, an emotion or a belief, etc. He even goes 
so far as to say that the dynamic object can be a merely fictive idea in the human 
mind.40 Accordingly, Eco does not identify, for instance, a text produced by an author 
with the dynamical object. Rather, it is the intention of the author who produced the text 
or that which motivated him to write it in this rather than another way, which constitutes 
the dynamical object; although he does not deny that a text can also be interpreted inde-
pendent of its author’s intent.41  
For Oehler, by contrast, the dynamical object can but need not be a physical entity. 
Accordingly, it is possible to identify the (external object of the) text with the dynamical 
object insofar as it initiates a process of interpretation and renders the person in front of 
the text an interpreter.42 And the interpretation which results from this process, pro-
duces or rather is the immediate object that correlates with the dynamical object. Oehler 
emphasises that the object of the text already exists before the process of interpretation 
unfolds, i.e. the resulting interpretations must be regarded as something that stands in 
relation to the object that is being interpreted. Yet in the course of semiosis, there is a 
kind of metamorphosis taking place, in which the dynamical object is transformed into 
the immediate object – i.e. for the interpreter. The dynamical object diminishes and 
gives way to the unfolding interpretation. It is thus only present in the mode of absence. 
That which has been initiated, leaves behind the initiating object; but never fully, since 
without the latter, the former would never have come into existence.43  
 
39 W. Nöth, Handbook of Semiotics, 42. 
40 U. Eco, The Limits of Interpretation, 39. 
41 Ibid., 38f. 
42 K. Oehler, Über Grenzen der Interpretation aus der Sicht des semiotischen Pragmatismus, 61f. 
43 Ibid., 62. 
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Once again, according to Oehler, it is possible to identify the text as an external ob-
ject (der Text als äußerer Gegenstand) with the dynamical object, insofar as the former 
initiates a process of interpretation. He thus calls the dynamical object “a source of ef-
fects”.44 By contrast, Eco holds that even before the process of interpretation com-
mences, the dynamical object was not an object: “For Peirce, when the sign is produced 
the Dynamic Object is no more there (and before the sign was produced it was not an 
object at all)”.45 The reason why Eco and Oehler interpret Peirce in different ways is 
due to the fact that they pursue disparate philosophical projects. Eco thinks of meaning 
in terms of cultural units and separates it radically from questions of reference and ex-
tension. According to him, the latter only becomes relevant with respect to a theory of 
mentions or when we are concerned with the truth-value of a statement.46 Oehler, by 
contrast, tends to a ‘metaphysical’ reading of Peirce, since he wants to uphold the unity 
of our world(s) of interpretation and action. I shall come back to this issue in a moment.  
So far I have only discussed Peirce’s use of the term representamen and the differ-
ence between the immediate and the dynamical object. But how are these concepts re-
lated to those aspects of semiosis which Peirce calls ground, meaning and interpretant 
(cf. CP 2.228)? In principle it is possible to equate ground, meaning and interpretant, 
since these three terms basically denote one and the same thing with respect to different 
points of view.47 Considering the proposition ‘this stove is black’, we can say that the 
quality or general attribute ‘black’ is attributed to a particular stove. Following the Sco-
tist tradition, Peirce regards ‘black(ness)’ as an individual or a monad insofar as it is 
predicated of something, but as a universal or abstraction insofar as it is perceived by 
the intellect. For a quality is a general idea or an “imputed character” (CP 1.559). As a 
“general attribute” (CP 1.551) it is the quality that has been selected among many other 
possible general attributes in order to regard the object (here the stove) in some respect. 
Thus one can say that the ground is an attribute of the object insofar as it has been cho-
sen in a particular way so that only some of its (possible) attributes are made pertinent. 
This selection does in turn constitute the immediate object of the sign and is represented 
by the interpretant. For this reason, the ground should not be equated with the total 
meaning of the object but is rather a meaning component. But both ground and meaning 
must be regarded as ‘ideas’ in the sense that signs always stand for their objects in some 
respect, rather than in all respects. Accordingly, the term ‘idea’ is not to be taken in the 
manner of Plato but rather in a pragmatic way, e.g. when we say that somebody catches 
somebody else’s idea (cf. CP 2.228). Thus the ground is that of an object which can be 
understood and conveyed under a certain aspect and therefore corresponds to the con-
tent of an expression. Hence it can be identified with meaning, or a meaning compo-
nent. Similarly, there is no profound difference between the meaning of a sign – which 
is in principle the sum total of all possible grounds – and the interpretant, for the inter-
pretant is nothing other than the idea to which a sign gives rise in the mind of the inter-
preter. In other words, meanings become only tangible by means of interpretants which 
 
44 K. Oehler, Sachen und Zeichen, 73. 
45 U. Eco, The Limits of Interpretation, 39. 
46 U. Eco, A Theory of Semiotics, 58-68. 
47 U. Eco, The Role of the Reader, 184. 
represent them in some respect. “The interpretant is a way to represent, by means of 
another sign […] what the representamen in fact selects of a given object (its 
ground)”.48  
Eschatology 
Peirce’s protology is supplemented by his eschatology: “The object of representation 
can be nothing but a representation of which the first representation is the interpretant. 
But an endless series of representations, each representing the one behind it, may be 
conceived to have an absolute object as its limit” (CP 1.339). That is to say, there is 
apart from the immediate object that only occurs within semiosis, a final interpretant 
which brings the interpretative process to an end. This ideal limit, which lies in infinity, 
manifests itself in everyday life as an interpretative habit and can be viewed as an an-
ticipation of this end. Peirce defines it as “a tendency […] to behave in a similar way 
under similar circumstances in the future” (CP 5.487). Eco clearly identifies the habit 
with the final interpretant.49 The habit consists of patterns of interpretation and action 
that bring consistency and order into our lives. It thus enables us – as I shall further ana-
lyse below – to temporarily interrupt the chain of interpretations and to carry out certain 
actions. Eco suggest illustrating this ‘directed serialisation’ as follows (Figure C): 
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Figure C: 
 
 
 
      
 
In the absence of a transcendental signified, the habit, which as we have seen, consti-
tutes a disposition to act upon the world, requires something that legitimises it and at the 
same time serves as a corrective. This function is fulfilled by the community, which can 
be regarded as an “intersubjective guarantee of a nonintuitive, nonnaively realistic, but 
rather conjectural, notion of truth”.50 Only thus can be explained how an infinite series 
of representations can gradually approximate the truth without resorting to the idea of 
an immediate access to an extra-linguistic reality (cf. CP 1.339). Hence an interpretation 
comes to a temporary end when certain members of an interpretative community, who 
are considered to be competent in this respect, reach a consensus about a particular issue 
– although every single interpretation remains subject to the principle of fallibility. If a 
statement about something is considered to be true by an interpretative community, then 
this statement refers precisely to that which stood at the beginning of the chain of inter-
pretants and initiated the process of interpretation.  
Yet there are again significant differences between Umberto Eco’s and Josef Simon’s 
interpretation of Peirce on the one hand, and Oehler’s construal of Peircian Pragmati-
cism on the other. All of them agree that Peirce’s triadic understanding of the sign tran-
 
48 Ibid., 183. 
49 U. Eco, The Limits of Interpretation, 39; The Role of the Reader, 192. 
50 U. Eco, The Limits of Interpretation, 39. 
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scends the traditional dichotomy between realism and idealism. To put it crudely, there 
is always something that is experienced (the ‘realist aspect’), but this something is with-
out exception perceived as something (the ‘idealist aspect’). But even if the traditional 
dichotomy between realism and idealism is overcome, Oehler, unlike Eco and Simon, 
clings to the notion of an extra-linguistic reality to which the social consensus of the 
interpretative community corresponds. For Oehler, the habit is only a provisory antici-
pation of the final interpretant. That is to say, the social dimension of Peirce’s “semiotic 
meliorism” as such, which manifests itself in the conviction of a directedness of the 
infinite series of interpretants, does not lead – not even in the long run – to an “ontology 
of the real”.51 In other words, a general consensus alone cannot guarantee that there is 
really a correspondence to reality. According to Oehler, Peirce does not regard the tran-
sition from one sign to better signs as a merely ‘immanent clarification’ of concepts for 
which the ‘real’ remains a utopian fiction. Rather, as Oehler’s argues, Peirce emphati-
cally rejects such a view, which he considers a nominalistic ‘idealism of the sign’ that 
unfortunately dominated much of modernity’s philosophy. Above all, the American 
philosopher sees this theory as incapable of accounting for the phenomenon of science 
and its obvious progress. In full agreement with (this interpretation of) Peirce, Oehler 
underlines that no way leads from an idealistic or immanentist understanding of semio-
sis to knowledge of the real which is determined by signs: “The true signification differs 
from the wrong one in that it not only has a fundamentum in mente, but also a funda-
mentum in re”.52 Oehler here once again points to the differentiation between the im-
mediate and the dynamical or mediate object. The immediate object is the object “as the 
Sign itself represents it, and whose Being is thus dependent upon the Representation of 
it in the Sign …” (CP 4.536). It is the idea or thought of an entity on which the sign is 
immediately based. The real or dynamical object however, is the real thing or the real 
situation, on which this idea or thought rests like on a ‘bedrock’. It is that aspect of the 
object which is independent of all subjectivity and which corresponds to the immediate 
object. For Peirce clearly says that the real or mediate object must be seen as that which 
truly possesses certain qualities wholly independent of whether somebody thinks that 
these qualities can or cannot be attributed to this entity. Nonetheless, even the real or 
dynamical object remains in a certain sense dependent on human subjectivity insofar as 
it is only manifest in and through the immediate object – although the former is never 
exhaustively present in the latter.  
Oehler admits that there is no one-to-one correlation between sign and external ob-
ject since the immediate object is itself a sign whose meaning requires clarification by 
means of further signs. Yet this does not mean, he argues, that the immediate object is 
only given in a chain of interpretants that can be arbitrarily extended. Rather, in the case 
of semiotic truth, it is ontically grounded in the real or dynamical object which Peirce 
calls the ‘bedrock’. It is therefore only a half-truth to say that signs always refer to other 
signs. According to Oehler, the truth-value of a statement which asserts that a transition 
from one sign to another is true, depends on a fundamentum in re which is not merely a 
 
51 K. Oehler, Über Grenzen der Interpretation aus der Sicht des semiotischen Pragmatismus, 64. 
52 Ibid., 64f. 
 
 
20
                                                
sign but rather an entity that we conceive in the mode of signs. This approach is to be 
marked off from the notion that interpretation is just a clarification of something in ever 
new signs whereas the thing that is being thematized remains unfixed.53 Elsewhere 
Peirce writes that although there are no ‘things as such’ that are not relative to the hu-
man mind, they nonetheless exist independently of this relation. “There is nothing […] 
to prevent our knowing outward things as they really are, and it is most likely that we 
do thus know them in numberless cases, although we can never be absolutely certain of 
doing so in any special case” (CP 5.311).  
The following quotation sums up nicely Oehler’s understanding of Peirce’s Prag-
maticism, which he clearly interprets in terms of a pragmatic realism.54
Dieser semiotische Pragmatismus […] ist ein pragmatischer Realismus, für den die unbezweifelbare tra-
gende Gemeinsamkeit unserer Handlungswelt ein fundamentum in re hat, diesseits aller möglichen Ver-
schiedenheiten des Welterlebens in je eigenen »Interpretationswelten«. In seiner radikalisierten Form 
führt der Ansatz je eigener, gegeneinander isolierter, beziehungsloser »Interpretationswelten« zu einem 
extremen Relativismus der Interpretation, der keine Verbindung mehr zur Lebenswirklichkeit der Men-
schen hat und in diesem Sinne durch eine auffällige Weltfremdheit gekennzeichnet ist, eine Art von no-
minalistisch-idealistischem Narzißmus, der nicht frei ist von Manieriertheit.  
Oehler thus stresses that philosophical concepts such as ‘truth’ and ‘reference’ must in 
the first place be interpreted on the semantic level.55 And there are other notable Peirce 
scholars who construe Peirce’s philosophy along similar lines. Like Oehler, Robert 
Almeder finds a sophisticated theory of correspondence in Peirce: “The opinion reached 
in the final opinion unlike opinions reached earlier, shall never be overthrown although 
the degree to which the final opinion corresponds to fact admits of indefinite (but not 
substantial) refinement”.56  
As can be seen in the above quotation, Oehler regards Peirce’s realism not just as an 
abstract postulate. Rather, he believes that this theory does do justice to our experiences 
on the empirical level, which reveal that we all meet with the ‘same’ resistance, inde-
pendent of our world-view and practice of interpretation. Accordingly, he not only talks 
of a fundamentum in re but also assumes that there is a unity to our world of action 
(singular): that which he calls die unbezweifelbare tragende Gemeinsamkeit unserer 
Handlungswelt.  
 In what follows I shall investigate whether such a view is convincing, and if so, how 
this unity-in-difference can be thought of.  
B) Günter Abel’s internal pluralism 
In order to answer this question, it is advisable to heuristically distinguish between dif-
ferent levels of interpretation, as Oehler’s colleagues Günter Abel and Hans Lenk sug-
gest.57 According to Abel, our (differing) notions of reality must be understood as reali-
 
53 Ibid., 66. 
54 Ibid., 70. 
55 The term semantics is not used here in its general sense as the discipline dealing with meaning but 
denotes that branch of semiotics which studies “the relations of signs to the objects to which the signs are 
applicable”, Ch.W. Morris, Foundations of the Theory of Signs, 6. 
56 R. Almeder, The Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce, 52, my emphasis. 
57 G. Abel, Sprache, Zeichen, Interpretation, 26-39; Interpretationswelten, 14-19, 41, 45, 474-477, etc.; 
H. Lenk, Interpretationskonstrukte als Interpretationskonstrukte, 52; Interpretation und Realität.  
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ties of interpretation. Every concept of reality is shaped by the specific grammar and 
rules of the (linguistic and non-linguistic) system of symbolising signs of interpretation 
which we use and understand. We are thus always already located in an interpretative 
horizon and participate in an interpretative practice. Consequently, the boundary of our 
interpretation constitutes the boundary of meaning and of our world.58  
Abel differentiates between three different levels of interpretation all of which mani-
fest different worlds of interpretation – even though in a different way:  
- The first level, which he calls interpretations3, comprises construing-appropriating 
interpretations, such as the formation of hypotheses, theories, and the activity of ex-
plaining and reasoning.  
- The second level, interpretations2, consists of acquired interpretative habits, i.e. con-
ventions and culturally and socially conditioned practices and competences.  
- The third level, interpretations1, encompasses those aspects of our language and use of 
signs that are category-forming and which have an individuating function. On this most 
fundamental level we find, for instance, the logical concepts of ‘existence’ or ‘object’, 
and the principles of spatio-temporal localisation and individuation.  
The organisation of our experience is always based on interpretations1. Accordingly, the 
horizon and practice of interpretation1 determines what really exists in a particular 
world of interpretation and what is being recognised as an entity, an object or event, and 
what not. The mastery of a particular language thus locates the interpreter in a specific 
world of interpretation that is ultimately contingent, since the category-forming con-
cepts as well as the principles of individuation vary from one world of interpretation to 
another. On the one hand, a world of interpretation opens up specific possibilities of 
perception, understanding and action, but at the same time imposes interpretative limits. 
Due to the fundamental character of this first level of interpretation, the creative-active 
dimension of interpretation1 is implicit rather than explicit, and becomes only manifest 
when a particular world of interpretation is related to (an) other world(s) of interpreta-
tion.  
As far as this last aspect is concerned, Simon is more consistently pragmatically ori-
entated than Abel, for he refrains from making general statements about the interpreta-
tive nature of reality. It is only in a particular situation in which a hitherto unquestioned 
use of signs becomes problematic – due to the experience of other possibilities of inter-
pretation – that we can really talk of two different interpretations, and therefore of signs 
and interpretation. Abel however, boldly extrapolates from human experiences of dis-
agreement and cultural differences we meet in everyday life to a transcendental sys-
tematics of (three) interpretative levels. He thus goes beyond (the more modest claims 
of) a genuinely pragmatic or phenomenological approach, and to a certain extent tries to 
revive and reinterpret thought-models of the philosophical tradition such as the catego-
ries or apriorische Anschauugsformen within his philosophy of interpretation. In any 
way, Abel’s distinction between three different levels of interpretation is a rather specu-
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lative attempt at systematising the elusive character of interpretative processes of human 
life. But despite this reserve, it proves a useful tool for the issues discussed in this essay.   
As long as the reasoning, explaining and construing on the plane of interpretations3 is 
successful and comprehensible, there is no need to take recourse to interpretations1+2, 
since these latter levels are implied in the conversation and presupposed by all inter-
locutors. It is only if a particular argument, which was supposed to explain something, 
is not immediately understandable that one has to resort to the level of interpreta-
tions1+2; for the addressee will then ask questions about the meaning of certain signs 
used in the explanation. And these questions can only be answered by making explicit 
some of the presuppositions that governed the elucidation.  
Furthermore, the relationship between these three levels of interpretation and the 
‘world’ is different in each case. Interpretations3, for instance scientific hypotheses, can 
directly fail due to the resistance of the world, thus compelling us to find more appro-
priate ones. Yet the replacement of one theory or hypothesis by another does not change 
the world but only our interpretations of it. Hence interpretations3 are dependent on that 
which they interpret. Similarly, if the interpretations2 vary, our world does not auto-
matically alter. And even if the world changes in the sense that we come across new and 
hitherto unrecognised phenomena, this second level may not immediately lead to a 
modification of our world. Rather, what is characteristic of this second level are as-
signments of interpretations and worlds (Zuweisungen). If there is a shift on the plane of 
interpretations1, however, our world changes too. As a result, it is not possible to con-
ceive a language-independent world that remains entirely detached from our processes 
of interpretation1, which amounts to saying that there is not just one world, but a plural-
ity of worlds. Abel uses the term ‘world’ – echoing Kant’s understanding of world, self 
and god as regulative ideas – in terms of a limit concept that is not accessible in the way 
we grasp phenomena within the world. Rather, it is the structure that orders these phe-
nomena with regard to a certain purpose.59  
In spite of the aforementioned differences, Abel’s internal pluralism is in line with 
Josef Simon’s approach. The underlying principle governing his explication of plural-
ism can be summarised as follows: “plurality occurs at the inside of the use of signs in 
the form of possible alterity”.60 It is unintelligible to ascribe to finite minds the ability to 
have an external, comprehensive overview over a wide variety of different worlds of 
interpretation. Rather, Abel advocates an internal pluralism, since the list of possible 
meanings of a sign is not once and for all fixed but in principle indefinitely modifiable 
and unlimited. Consequently, there is never just one right way of interpreting or trans-
lating a sign into other signs. Yet this is not to say that any interpretation is equally 
valid. Rather, the range of alterity is restricted by the pragmatic criterion of whether 
communication between the interlocutors is successful, i.e. if it leads to mutual under-
standing or not. This criterion can only be met if there is an interpreter who is suffi-
ciently acquainted with his own language. He must be able to creatively produce, in a 
particular context, fitting and clarifying signs, which explain the sign that is at issue to 
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the respective addressee. And since not all transitions meet this criterion, there is no 
arbitrariness.61 Yet it is not possible to establish rules on the basis of successful inter-
pretative moves, for the relationship between the first and the consecutive or explana-
tory sign eludes any systematisation and formalisation. The relationship between inter-
pretandum and interpretans is not determined and predictable but remains free. And it 
is this freedom which constitutes the basis for an internal pluralism. For the various 
ways of producing equally satisfactory but nonetheless irreconcilably different answer-
signs with regard to a proceeding sign, manifest different worlds of interpretation. That 
is to say – as Abel explicitly points out – these conflicting transitions should not be 
viewed as different interpretations of one and the same world, but rather reveal different 
worlds.62  
Nonetheless, Abel does not abandon the idea of the unity of the world, although he 
does distance himself clearly from the realist interpretation of Peirce. How then is this 
unity to be thought of? With respect to our ‘being-in-the-world’, he points out, and as 
regards certain presuppositions in our speaking, thinking and acting, it does make sense 
to talk about the world. Yet there is no criterion by means of which we can establish the 
identity between two or more different worlds which is independent of a particular prac-
tice of interpretation. Although every actual performance of thought, word and action 
necessarily implies the notion of ‘one and the same world’ (on the level of interpreta-
tions1) – for otherwise we could not make sense of our lives – this does not mean that 
the world that is presupposed ‘really exists’ (in the sense of a philosophical realism). 
Rather, it would be unintelligible to draw a distinction between our interpretations1 and 
the ‘world itself’. Consequently, the positing of a single world is not necessitated de re 
but de interpretatione. To put this in other words, the fact that there are facts is itself not 
a fact that can be checked against a pre-interpretative world, but is essentially an inter-
pration.63    
From all this it follows that Abel leaves more room for a plurality of worlds than 
Oehler. The former explicitly rejects the view – which he associates with Peirce – that 
an appropriate and right interpretation is conditioned by a pre-interpretative entity, and 
that the chain of interpretation comes in the long run to an end when the ‘thing itself’ is 
arrived at.64
C) Klaus Oehler’s unity of our ‘world of action’ 
As mentioned above, Oehler clings to the notion of a unity of our world of action. 
Hence he has to answer the question what he means exactly when he talks of the un-
bezweifelbare und tragende Gemeinsamkeit unserer Handlungswelt. More precisely, the 
 
61 Abel comments on the above considerations: “Diese Überlegung gilt übrigens nicht nur für das Ver-
hältnis von fraglich gewordenen Zeichen und es interpretierendem Folgezeichen. Sie gilt generell für das 
Verhältnis von Zeichen und anschließendem, fortsetzendem, abweichendem oder abbrechendem Folge-
zeichen“, ibid., 246. Does this statement imply a critique of Simon, who emphasises that the distinction 
between a sign and its meaning only makes sense in situation of non-understanding? In order to answer 
this question one needs to define what ‘non-understanding’ actually means, and how it can be distin-
guished from other types of sign-transitions. 
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following issues need to be addressed: What kind of community has access to this real-
ity? By means of which method does this infinite progress of knowledge approximate a 
true conception of reality? What kind of objects will this general and final consensus be 
about?  
a) Community 
Oehler’s realist interpretation of Peirce tends to emphasise those aspects of his philoso-
phy that mark him out as a nineteenth century thinker. For instance, Peirce incorporates 
into his approach elements of the theory of evolution and positivism. He undertakes a 
painstaking attempt at justifying scientific method, which is for him tantamount to a 
justification of induction and hypothesis. Accordingly, scientific research aims at articu-
lating a comprehensive and conclusive system of true sentences which correspond to 
reality – even if such an ultimate consensus, as we have seen, will be based on convic-
tion rather than proof and inevitably assumes an eschatological character.65 As a result, 
the body of empirical scientists is elevated to the status of a community of truth-seekers, 
whose orientation has a ‘religious’ dimension. The general consensus which constitutes 
truth can neither be limited to the earthly life of human beings nor to the human species 
but rather comprises the total community of spirits, including those that might have 
quite different senses than us (CP 8.13). There is a sacred community of spirits that is in 
communion with God and which does not shy away from sacrificing its own limited 
views and beliefs to the communal project of achieving ultimate and general truth. For 
what is ‘real’ is not the individual’s idiosyncrasy but the common beliefs which survive 
the process of elimination and refinement in the long run, and thus lead to the ideal per-
fection of knowledge (CP 5.356). Peirce further points out that although we hope to 
achieve an ultimate meaning about every question, this will not be possible within a 
finite period of time.66    
Moreover, the idea of an indefinite community and its correlate, the consensus ca-
tholicus, is inspired by the notion of the Catholic Church and betrays Peirce’s interest in 
medieval scholasticism, most notably Scotist realism. As mentioned in the last para-
graph, the infinite community of interpreters transcends the finite individual as well as 
the finite community in order to fulfil its task – “the knowledge of the infinitely know-
able real”.67 According to Peirce, all claims to truth are universal in scope and must in 
principle be publicly accessible and testable. And this ideal of universality is only real-
isable on the basis of a generally valid standard of rationality that renders all kinds of 
truth-claims which are merely grounded in the authority of an individual or a group un-
acceptable. For Peirce, the procedure by means of which universality and public acces-
sibility can be safeguarded is that of the empirical method – although he understands it 
in a very broad sense so that it is applicable to all sorts of objects of investigation. In our 
scientific enquiries, we address certain questions and try to answer them by forming 
hypotheses. We then proceed by means of deductions and draw inferences which can be 
checked against the backdrop of the present circumstances. In other words, the meaning 
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of a hypothesis can be explicated by the development of its practical consequences. That 
is to say its meaning takes on the form of actions and events. Accordingly, in order to 
test a hypothesis, we have to check to what extent our assumptions can stand up to ex-
perimental tests. This procedure can in principle be applied to every object, although the 
degree of accuracy will vary with the kind of entity that is under consideration. There is 
thus no qualitative difference between an empirical investigation into the nature of 
prayer and a scientific analysis of electric or magnetic phenomena.68  
b) Method 
In the 1860s Peirce still presumes that there is only one method according to which we 
can think and equates thinking with inferring, i.e. induction. In the 1870s however, he 
allows for further methods in the formation of beliefs so that induction is henceforth 
only one method among others (namely deduction and abduction). The selection of the 
appropriate method is determined by the scientific goals that we try to reach, i.e. 
whether a method allows us to effectively form convictions. But since the scientific goal 
is everywhere identical, all researchers will finally adapt the same method. This implies 
that all other methods will be left behind since they prove to be inadequate, and the 
‘real’ is that on which everybody will finally agree.69 In spite of the relativity of our 
sense experience we are capable of discovering how things really are. Accordingly, real-
ity is to be thought of as the coincidence with the ultimate opinion, the final belief, or 
the ideal perfection of knowledge, which will be of universal validity – although the 
process of approximation will theoretically never come to an end (CP 5.311, 5.356). In 
other words, there are definite opinions about everything on which enquirers would 
agree if their enquiry would go on long enough. This ideal perfection of knowledge is to 
be thought of as a system of sentences which represents the ultimate result of scientific 
research. Accordingly, the general consensus remains the privilege of a small group of 
scientists who remain faithful to the empirical method by means of which it can be 
reached. Objective knowledge about the real world can only be gained in that all preju-
dices and subjective distortions in our perception of the real are successively elimi-
nated.70  
c) Object 
As already indicated, the application of the empirical method, along with the principles 
of corrigibility and fallibilism, is relevant to all aspects of human life and by no means 
restricted to the sciences. So far as the history of ideas is concerned, even ideologies, i.e. 
all-comprehensive perspectives on the world are allegedly falsifiable insofar as they 
may fail to order reality successfully in the long run. This also gives us a clearer idea of 
what Oehler has in mind when he talks about the unbezweifelbare tragende Gemein-
samkeit unserer Handlungswelt. For Oehler makes the highly problematic assertion that 
the biologistic-racist ideology of National Socialism and the Marxist ideology of Social-
ism-Communism have been refuted by the reality of the human life-world itself. Ac-
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cording to him, the end of our historical and social utopia and the grand ideologies does 
not just negatively lead to disillusionment and disenchantment but is also a sign of intel-
lectual maturity and social progress. Finally, Oehler fully approves of Peirce’s attempt 
at furnishing his pragmatic maxim with a biblical underpinning: “It has been said to be a 
sceptical and materialistic principle. But it is only an application of the sole principle of 
logic which was recommended by Jesus; “Ye may know them by their fruits,” and it is 
very intimately allied with the ideas of the gospel” (CP 5.402, fn 2).71 It goes without 
saying that this is bad theology and one wonders why, if one follows Oehler, the secu-
larization of the Western world could not also be interpreted in terms of a refutation of 
Christianity.  
As we have seen, Simon’s interpretation of Peirce is in line with Abel’s internal plu-
ralism. A sign that is understood is true and does reach reality, which is not to say that 
external objects only exist because of our interpretations. However, the question is not 
how signs can really refer to the world. Rather, we make the puzzling experience that 
reference to reality is always already given in a successful use of signs within a func-
tioning interpretative praxis. Accordingly, we are not in a situation in which we still 
have to establish reference to reality and the world.72 Moreover, Simon does not hesi-
tate to talk about different and incompatible ‘languages’ for which there is no point of 
comparison. Yet as we have seen in Abel, this is not to say that different and incompati-
ble worlds of interpretation exist in isolation. Rather, they are always already interre-
lated. I shall come back to this issue in chapter 3.  
D) A pluralist reading of Peirce 
It is not entirely clear whether Simon’s radically pluralist reading of Peirce can really be 
exegetically substantiated. Yet there is no need for such a justification because Simon’s 
philosophy of the sign is not in the first place an interpretation of Peirce’s work. Rather, 
he develops a philosophy in his own right, into which he incorporates insights from 
Peirce as well as other thinkers such as Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, Kant, etc. But one eas-
ily finds commentators whose interpretations of Peirce point in the same direction. In 
what follows I shall briefly discuss a pluralist reading of Peirce that can be regarded as 
an exegetical commentary (on some aspects of his work). However, it will become clear 
that this pluralist reading differs somewhat from Simon’s philosophy of the sign or 
Abel’s internal pluralism.   
Sandra B. Rosenthal emphasises the perspectival character of truth in Peirce, for 
“even the ideal of convergence to a final ultimate opinion, to perfect knowledge, is al-
ways convergence within an accepted framework or perspective”.73 She argues that 
even ideally true knowledge could not be conceived of in terms of correspondence since 
the way we relate to the world is always mediated by conceptual structures. Although 
the questions we pose can be answered on the basis of reality, the answers we get are 
partially dependent on the questions we ask. More precisely, Rosenthal tries to show 
that Peirce holds at once that, first, the perceived world is the real world (CP 3.527), 
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secondly, that the real world exists independently of the human mind, and thirdly, that 
the perceived world is still partially dependent on the noetic act and thus always relative 
to the human mind. These seemingly contradictory statements can only be held together 
if one abandons the traditional dichotomy between realism and idealism and realism and 
non-realism. The fact that Peirce’s philosophy transcends both alternatives is borne out 
by his distinction between two different kinds of possibilities, which determine which 
experiences are possible and which not.  
On the one hand, ‘possible’ means consistently thinkable. That which can occur in 
the sensible or real world is made possible but also limited by the ideal world which 
forms a system of ideas (CP 3.527). Everything that takes place in the sensible or real 
world must be possible and conform to the standards laid down by the ideal world, but 
not vice versa. More concretely, this means that what is held to be true cannot be self-
contradictory and must be consistent with everything else we know about the real world. 
Hence we know in advance of experience that certain things are a priori not true since 
they are impossible even in the ideal world. On the other hand there is the independ-
ently real which determines what is metaphysically possible within the real world. In 
other words, there is a reality that is independent of our thinking and which exerts an 
influence on how we think and talk about it, although the facts and objects it entails are 
partially dependent on the conceptual framework of the world we inhabit. Now all de-
pends on how these two restrictive factors which constitute reality, the consistently 
thinkable and the metaphysically possible, are interrelated.  
Peirce’s differentiation between occurrences and facts helps to clarify what is at 
stake. An occurrence is necessarily real but “can never be known or even imagined in 
all its infinite detail. A Fact, on the other hand is so much of the real Universe as can be 
represented in a Proposition …”.74 Accordingly, the realm of the consistently thinkable 
constitutes a subset of the metaphysically possible which is a more general category. 
This at least seems to follow from Rosenthal’s interpretation of Peirce. She points out 
that the real world is, metaphysically speaking, the independently real. Yet a world is 
also, epistemically speaking, dependent on the meaning system which allows only for a 
very limited range of facts and objects. In other words, a world is that aspect of an infi-
nitely rich reality that has been ‘carved out’ by the organising structure of ideas: 
“Knowledge is abstractive and selective”.75 Therefore, alternative systems are always 
possible and will give rise to different possibilities within reality, thus constituting dif-
ferent worlds. Facts, once again, are selected aspects or portions of the broader and 
more general continuum of occurrences, which makes clear that the relationship be-
tween facts and occurrences must be thought of in terms of a part-whole relation. As we 
will see in a moment, it is for this reason that Rosenthal’s pluralist interpretation of 
Peirce cannot be equated with Abel’s internal pluralism.  
Thus, according to Rosenthal, a world is a delineated realm within which a limited 
range of facts and experiences can occur. On the one hand, it is rooted in the independ-
ently real and the possibilities this reality presents, on the other hand, its contours are 
 
74 Quoted in ibid., 5 [(MS 647, 8) = The Microfilm Edition of the Peirce Papers, Houghton Library, Har-
vard University (manuscript and page number)]. My emphasis. 
75 Ibid., 7. 
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shaped by the mode by means of which we have access to the independently real and 
the possibilities this approach opens up. As a consequence, truth must be thought of as 
perspectival and convergence only occurs within a common world we have partly cre-
ated ourselves (cf. CP 5.566). Even the achievement of perfect knowledge, the arrival at 
a final ultimate opinion and general consensus is still a convergence within a specific 
and limited framework or perspective.  
This also has consequences for Peirce’s understanding of science and scientific ‘pro-
gress’. He points out that we never test claims in isolation but always against a back-
ground of other beliefs which we do not question at the same time (CP 5.265). Emerg-
ing discrepancies between a theory and observation can either be interpreted as an ob-
servational error or as an indication that the theory needs to be altered (CP 1.132, 1.73). 
Thus the interconnected meanings of conceptual structure determine what can con-
ceivably be detected in empirical research, but empirical research can nonetheless lead 
to the abandonment or alteration of a set of meanings. No belief we hold is immune 
from change in the face of emerging counter-evidence, yet every belief can be retained 
despite this counter-evidence by changing other parts of the meaning structure. 
“Whether we change empirical generalizations in the face of disconfirming facts or re-
structure a set of meanings to allow the emergence of new facts is not itself dictated by 
the evidence, but is a pragmatic “decision” operative within the context of the encom-
passing intentional unity of humans and their world”.76    
Scientific revolutions are good examples of the emergence of new conceptual struc-
tures and new meanings which regulate what can be conceived and perceived as a fact. 
Peirce’s uses the term cataclysmal evolution, which – unlike Darwinian and Lamarckian 
evolution – denotes a development with radical breaks that are nonetheless not haphaz-
ard. As indicated above, these breaks either occur due to some new observational data 
or because of a new way of reasoning (CP 1.109). This understanding of evolution is by 
no means limited to the biological sphere. Peirce explicitly writes: “This mode of evolu-
tion, by external forces and the breaking up of habits […] has been the chief factor in 
the historical evolution of institutions as in that of ideas” (CP 6.17). Furthermore, Peirce 
by no means ontologically privileges science but rather regards it as a second-order ab-
straction which is grounded in the world of common sense (CP 5.522). Peirce even goes 
so far as to say that “the instinctive result of human experience ought to have so vastly 
more weight than any scientific result …” (CP 5.522). Yet the truths held in the com-
mon sense world remain relatively vague compared to scientific truths and are therefore 
also less prone to be overthrown. For this reason the incommensurable scientific worlds 
share a common meaningfulness which is rooted in the common sense world.   
Provided a community is operating within a common conceptual framework, it is in-
deed possible that the investigation of a particular object may tend toward an ideal con-
vergence. Yet if there are incompatible structures of meaning in use among the investi-
gators, this will lead to experiences of different facts and a convergence cannot occur. 
The only criterion for adequacy is workability, and workability can only be established 
within a particular network of beliefs. For this reason there may well be a plurality of 
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different views among interpreters on one and the same issue. Yet these differing and 
incompatible presuppositions are not always manifest so that the lines of demarcation 
between incommensurable worlds remain hidden. Hence the illusion may arise that a 
general consensus can be reached by collecting ‘facts’ which lead to indubitable evi-
dence for one position rather than another. Yet such a view overlooks the essentially 
pluralistic character of all scientific endeavours. Furthermore, there might not only be 
incommensurable perspectives as regards the conceptual framework but also differing 
methods, standards, criteria and kinds of problems that are considered worth being tack-
led.  
Rosenthal here sees parallels between Peirce’s pragmatic pluralism and Kuhn’s idea 
of incommensurability as set out in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: the “diver-
gent perspectives have indeed carved out divergent worlds – be they divergent scientific 
worlds or divergent ways of life encompassing not just differing facts but differing 
goals, differing problems of importance, and differing criteria for resolving differ-
ences”.77 This is clearly to read Peirce against those interpreters who see him as a pro-
ponent of a cumulative-convergence theory. The latter approach is diametrically op-
posed to Kuhn’s thesis of arbitrary change and incommensurability.  
E) Conclusions 
The main aim of this last section was to adduce further evidence for the legitimacy of a 
pluralist interpretation of Peirce. As regards Rosenthal’s pre-reflective foundation, there 
may be parallels with Oehler’s emphasis on the indubitable common ground of our 
world of action. Nonetheless, in Rosenthal, as in Simon, there is considerably more 
room for a plurality of worlds than in Oehler, whose interpretation comes close to the 
cumulative-convergence approach rejected by Rosenthal.  
What solely matters here, however, is to find an interpretation of Peirce that renders 
his Pragmaticism suitable for the theological considerations of this essay. The precise 
way in which this will be carried out shall become clear in the course of the argument. 
For the present moment it suffices to draw the following preliminary and tentative con-
clusions: In order to keep Christian theology free from any kind of metaphysical foun-
dationalism, a pluralist reading of Peirce is preferable to Oehler’s interpretation.  
Whereas Abel construes Peirce similar to Oehler – and rejects him for exactly this 
reason78, Simon’s reading of Peirce does allow for a plurality of different ‘languages’ 
(or worlds) that do not converge but which are internally related and comes thus close to 
Abel’s internal pluralism. As far as Rosenthal’s interpretation is concerned, there are 
similarities as well as differences to Abel’s model. The notion of a ‘world’, which 
Rosenthal understands as a system of concepts (or a structure of meanings) that is con-
stitutive of the facts and objects occurring within it, resembles Abel’s level of interpre-
tation1. The system of interpretation1 is most fundamental in the sense that we cannot 
alter it voluntarily. Hence the objects emerging within it are neither subject to our will 
nor generated by our interpretations2+3. In other words, these objects and facts do have 
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an interpretative character but are at the same time independent of conscious human 
decision and deliberation. For this reason Abel calls them empirically real and empha-
sise that the philosophy of interpretation is compatible with an empirical realism.79  
On the other hand there seems to be a decisive difference between Abel and Rosen-
thal’s interpretation of Peirce as regards the question of a world of worlds. Both at times 
use a similar terminology and point out that our interpretations (Abel’s interpretation1) 
carve out different worlds – a verb that clearly implies that alternative ‘cuts’ are possi-
ble and that no framework does exhaustively describe reality.80 Yet this is where the 
similarities end. For Rosenthal finds in Peirce the concept of the metaphysically possi-
ble or the independently real, which must be regarded as the reality encompassing all 
perspectival sections of reality carved out by various communities of interpreters. By 
contrast, Abel’s internal pluralism does not allow for such a metaphysical grounding, 
although he does not want to dispense with the notion of a unity of the world either. 
According to him, the idea of the one world must be understood syncategorematically, 
i.e. it is a posited world of interpretation of worlds of interpretations that is itself an 
interpretation – though practically and theoretically indispensable and always already 
related to plurality. 
F) Synchrony 
The starting point of these considerations was the question of the diachronic transition 
of signs to other signs. Yet, these brief reflections on realism and pluralism are equally 
relevant to the synchronic termination of the chain of interpretants. Thus, in this chap-
ter, the insights of the above discussion are presupposed. But there are also a number of 
questions which specifically pertain to the synchronic dimension of sign production. To 
these I shall turn now. 
From a synchronic perspective, the chain of interpretations comes temporarily to a 
close when we make a decision at a particular point in time, resulting in an action. The 
process of replacing a not fully understood sign by another one, which may itself be in 
need of a further explanatory sign and so forth, terminates, since there is finally nothing 
more that is not understood, i.e. the ‘last’ sign is immediately understandable. At this 
point a particular x is interpreted as a rather than as b or c or d etc., and the “interpreta-
tion of something as something becomes, “for the moment” […] ontologically hard”.81 
The process of decision-making is brought to an end and all speculations and opinions 
as to what x may be are left behind. Yet at the next moment this may change again. For 
instance, the action-sign generates further ‘signs of consequences’, indicating to the 
interpreter ‘what’ he has done. These new insights may well lead him to re-consider the 
previous decision and to resume the process of interpretation.  
From Simon’s pragmatic perspective, ‘reference to reality’ coincides with the suc-
cessful interpretation of a sign at a particular time, i.e. when immediate understanding is 
achieved. The final interpretation reaches reality and is therefore true. By contrast, signs 
 
79 G. Abel, Interpretationswelten, 519. 
80 Cf. “Jedes Aussortieren, wie gut auch jeweils begründet, kann als das Legen von Interpretations-
Schnitten angesehen werden”, ibid., 497. 
81 J. Simon, Philosophie des Zeichens, 283f. 
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whose meanings are still ambiguous do stand at a distance from ‘reality’. There are two 
different ways in which the concatenation of interpretations can be terminated, although 
this differentiation is implied in Simon’s differentiation rather then explicitly stated.  
a) The chain of signs comes to an end because a sign is comprehensible to such an 
extent that an action, i.e. the production of an action-sign, can be reasonably risked. In 
other words, not the time factor but the degree of comprehensibility precipitates the in-
terpreter into action. For instance, John and Jane only get married when both of them 
manage to ‘interpret’ their fiancé(e) ‘continuously’ as their future spouse, and there is in 
principle no time limit to this process of clarification apart from social convention and 
their own patience.  
It goes without saying that there is a diachronic dimension to this process of deci-
sion-making, even if it is here discussed under the heading of synchrony. Nonetheless, 
the decision itself, often made after a long and complex procedure, involving various 
people, is to be thought of as a punctual event, taking place at one particular moment in 
time. For this reason it seems appropriate to analyse it from a synchronic perspective.  
Now common experience reveals that the kind of existential-pragmatic certainty re-
quired to enter into marriage does occur occasionally. And it would be absurd to seek 
‘absolute’ certainty beyond the consent arrived at on the cognitive and emotional level. 
But, recalling what was said in the preceding chapters, this certainty can of course only 
occur if it is aimed at and regarded as desirable by a particular culture – as it is the case 
with Christian faith.  
b) The chain of interpretation comes necessarily to a conclusion because there is no 
time (left) for individual reflection, dialogue with other people, and the consultations of 
experts. That is to say, it is the pressure of time which ends the chain of interpretation. 
In this second case, human finitude is to a certain degree experienced as a lack or a defi-
ciency with which we have to come to terms. Typical examples of this second mode of 
decision-making are the judgments required of drivers, pilots, managers, sportspeople 
and military strategists. Once again, in both cases the interpreter does not reach “a final 
end of all reflection” in the sense of a definitive “concept of things themselves”.82 
Rather, his decision can ‘only’ be pragmatically justified.  
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2 The interpretant 
As already indicated, the interpretant is that which the sign produces in the interpreter. 
In accordance with his triadic understanding of the sign, Peirce also distinguishes be-
tween three main types of interpretants.  
First there is the immediate interpretant, which he takes to be “the Quality of the Im-
pression that a sign is fit to produce, not to any actual reaction” (CP 8.315). In other 
words, the immediate interpretant falls into the category of ‘firstness’ and is therefore a 
semantic potentiality. It is the effect a sign has on the interpreter if we abstract from all 
analyses and interpretations to which it may give rise or to which it may be expected to 
give rise. The immediate interpretant is spontaneously generated without any reflection 
by the interpreter. Secondly, the dynamical interpretant denotes the actual and direct 
effect a sign has on its interpreter and which occurs in each act of interpretation. Each 
dynamical interpretant differs from every other. Thirdly, the final interpretant, an ex-
pression of ‘thirdness’, is associated with the concepts of habit and law, and is defined 
as “that which would finally be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of 
the matter were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached” (CP 8.184).  
 According to Eco, the idea of an interpretant coupled with the notion of unlimited 
semiosis frees a theory of signification from its attachment to a metaphysics of the ref-
erent and allows a definition of meaning as cultural unit. That is to say, the meaning of 
meaning can be thought of without taking resort to reference and extension. As Eco puts 
it: “Every time there is the possibility of lying, there is a sign-function: which is to sig-
nify (and then to communicate) something to which no real state of things corre-
sponds”.83 The study of meanings thus leads to an examination of the linguistic and 
non-linguistic sedimentations of a culture, its texts, artefacts and technical achievements 
so that the entirety of human production can be viewed as a text to be interpreted. If a 
single term or object is under consideration, one has to take into account the total dia-
chronic and synchronic accumulation of meanings, which it acquired in the course of 
time. In other words, an encyclopaedic understanding of meaning is preferable to that of 
a dictionary. Whereas the latter is based on the ideal competence of an ideal sign user, 
the former tries to take into account all the living contradictions and ambiguities that 
mark a semiotic system, which can only be disentangled and disambiguated by circum-
stantial and contextual factors.84 This difference roughly corresponds to what has been 
called the transition from an ideal language philosophy to that of an ordinary language 
philosophy.  
Now the shift from a representamen to an interpretant, which turns itself into a repre-
sentamen and so forth,  does of course always involve human beings who perform these 
interpretative moves. Yet as Simon and Abel argue, this does not imply that the inter-
preter is always actively and consciously engaged in a process of decision-making about 
how a particular object should be interpreted. Rather, most of the time we simply reiter-
ate an interpretative pattern which we have internalised with our upbringing and modi-
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fied or refined by virtue of our own ideological, ethical, religious or other choices and 
preferences. This is what Peirce calls the habit. Nonetheless, we are often faced with 
unprecedented occurrences and unfamiliar situations in which active and conscious in-
terpretative labour is required. As we have seen, it is possible to heuristically differenti-
ate between various levels of interpretation. That is to say, some of our interpretations 
are most fundamental, i.e. reality-constitutive, and accordingly almost unchangeable, 
while others can and must be continually altered in order to do justice to the changing 
circumstances. Thus Abel distinguishes between three, Lenk even between six different 
levels of interpretation that can be correlated to each other.85  
Keeping these sophisticated approaches in mind, it is possible to distinguish between 
two types of interpretative ‘newness’, which are related to different hermeneutical situa-
tions. The first type encompasses signs that are not fully comprehensible and which 
therefore need to be translated into further signs so as to incorporate them into our own 
interpretative perspective. Consequently, it is the interpretandum itself which is (to a 
certain degree) ‘new’ and therefore defies immediate appropriation. In the second case, 
there is a change of perspective, i.e. an object that has already been interpreted in a par-
ticular way is for some reason construed differently; i.e. it is seen in a new light. And if 
the interpreter finds this new way of interpreting more convincing and more appealing 
than the interpretative practice he so far adhered to, he might start to interpret every-
thing within this new framework. The interpretative framework or horizon itself, how-
ever, is never given in its entirety but rather gradually emerges the more entities the 
interpreter comes to see in its light.    
In both types of hermeneutical newness, object and interpretative framework cannot 
be separated. On the one hand, in order to interpret a ‘new object’, i.e. a not fully com-
prehensible sign, I need to understand something about it; otherwise there will be no 
process of interpretation whatsoever. Put differently, unless we are right from the be-
ginning able to partly symbolise a novel object within the world of interpretation which 
we are already familiar with, it cannot be appropriated. Thus even a new object to a cer-
tain degree always already emerges within the interpretative framework of the inter-
preter who faces this newness. On the other hand, every transition from one interpreta-
tive perspective on the world to another is inevitably mediated by a new perception and 
interpretation of a particular object, or a group of particular objects. Thus the idea of 
absolute newness, be it an absolutely new object, or an absolutely new perspective on 
the world is unintelligible.  
A) Types of interpretants 
It is not the aim of this chapter to tackle the immensely complex issue of how the shift 
from one all-comprehensive perspective on the world to another can be conceptualised. 
Rather, the focus will be on the transition from one interpretant to another, particularly 
if the act of interpretation entails heteromaterial sign-vehicles. In other words, the pro-
duction of interpretants by the interpreter, motivated by a sign, may require various 
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kinds and degrees of competence and creativity. Eco distinguishes between the follow-
ing cases:86  
a) The interpretant can be an equivalent sign-vehicle in another semiotic system. For 
instance, the word /dog/87 is ‘translated’ into a drawing of a dog. Evidently, this transi-
tion involves a creative act on the part of the interpreter that requires great interpretative 
labour.  
b) Or the interpretant can be an index which denotes a single object. Interestingly, 
Eco is convinced that even indices have semantic markers and therefore do signify al-
ready before they are used in a particular context and under certain circumstances. In a 
subtle analysis he tries to show that not only terms like /this/ and /that/ but even non-
verbal devices such as a pointing finger can be semantically explicated. For according to 
Eco, linguistic meaning, even that of syncategorematic terms, is utterly independent of 
the question of reference. It is only when the focus is on an extensional semantics, i.e. 
on the truth-value of an expression that the issue of reference must be taken into ac-
count.88  
c) The interpretant may also assume the form of a scientific definition of a word 
within the same semiotic system. For instance, a scientist explains that the word /salt/ 
signifies «sodium chloride». Needless to say that this interpretation too requires a highly 
specific competence, namely the ability to carry out, or at least to understand, certain 
experiments which show that the substance called salt reacts under such and such cir-
cumstances in such and such a way. It is only against the backdrop of these experimen-
tal results that the definition of salt as sodium chloride becomes meaningful. For each 
time salt is called sodium chloride, all this background knowledge is implied. The fact 
that the (scientific) meanings of an object must be seen as the sum of the ways it reacts 
in various experimental contexts is well illustrated in Peirce’s famous example of the 
chemical-physical definition of lithium:  
If you look into a textbook of chemistry for a definition of lithium you may be told that it is that element 
whose atomic weight is 7 very nearly. But if the author has a more logical mind he will tell you that if you 
search among minerals that are vitreous, translucent, grey or white, very hard, brittle, and insoluble, for 
one which imparts a crimson tinge to an unluminous flame, this mineral being triturated with lime or 
witherite rats-bane, and then fused, can be partly dissolved in muriatic acid; and if this solution be evapo-
rated, and the residue be extracted with sulphuric acid, and duly purified, it can be converted by ordinary 
methods into a chloride, which being obtained in the solid state, fused, and electrolyzed with half a dozen 
powerful cells, will yield a globule of a pinkish silvery metal that will float on gasolene; and the material 
of that is a specimen of lithium” (CP 2.330). 
d) The interpretant can be an emotive association which may come to be regarded by 
a culture as a firmly established connotation. For instance, the word /dog/ signifies «fi-
delity». 
e) But the interpretant may also be a translation of a word into another language, 
such as from English, /dog/, into German, «Hund». Or it is simply a substitution by a 
synonym, e.g. when we replace the word /computer/ by «word processor».  
 
86 U. Eco, A Theory of Semiotics, 70. 
87 Following Eco, single slashes /xxx/ indicate that a term is considered as a sign-vehicle (expression), 
whereas guillemets «xxx» show that a term is taken as content. 
88 Ibid., 58-68, 115-121, 163-165. 
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However, besides the fact that the above list constitutes only a small selection of 
types of interpretants, it would be inadequate to reduce the interpretant simply to the 
entire range of denotations and connotations – for this would impoverish Peirce’s un-
derstanding of semiosis. According to him, not only translations, but also complex dis-
courses such as inferences fall into the category of the interpretant. In fact, the interpre-
tant, as the meaning of the sign that is interpreted, comprises all the possible contexts 
into which it can be potentially inserted. It is worth recalling here Peirce’s trichotomy 
between the rheme, the dicent and the argument which is organised according to the 
categories of ‘Firstness’, ‘Secondness’ and ‘Thirdness’.  
The rheme corresponds to what the logical tradition called ‘term’ and is “any sign 
that is not true nor false, like almost any single word except ‘yes’ or ‘no’ …” (CP 
8.337). It is a simple or substitutive sign (CP 2.309) that represents “such and such a 
kind of possible Object. Any Rheme, perhaps, will afford some information; but it is not 
interpreted as doing so” (CP 2.250). A dicent corresponds to what the tradition called 
proposition and is an informational sign (CP 2.309) but does not assert anything (CP 
8.337). It is either true or false but does not adduce any reasons for being so (CP 2.310). 
Finally, there is the argument which Peirce calls “a Sign of law” (CP 2.252) which 
states “that the passage from all such premises to such conclusions tends to the truth” 
(CP 2.263).  
Now everything that can be said of a dicent or argument is potentially present in the 
rheme which constitutes them so that the content of a term assumes an encyclopaedic 
character. For instance, the rheme ‘man’ can be interpreted as ‘mortal’ – among many 
other possibilities of course – and may therefore be regarded as a component of the 
dicent ‘all men are mortal’. Yet it can also be taken as an element of the syllogism ‘all 
men are mortal, Socrates is a man, hence Socrates is mortal’ and is then part of an ar-
gument. Both examples must be seen as interpretants and therefore meanings of the 
rheme ‘man’ (cf. CP 2.342, 2.344). Put differently, the intension of a sign is the sum 
total of all synthetic propositions in which a sign can figure as a subject or predicate. 
And in increasing our knowledge of an object, its semantic features gradually grow in 
the sense of a snowball effect, although it may in the same process also discard certain 
meanings that were hitherto attributed to it (CP 2.222). 
B) The final interpretant or habit 
Let me once again turn to the final interpretant, whose function is of utmost importance 
to understand Peirce’s semiosis.89 A naïve realism presupposes that there can be a one-
to-one correlation between a sign and the object which it stands for. In Peirce, however, 
this possibility is excluded right from the beginning, since any recognition of an object 
requires previous experience of it so that no ‘immediate contact’ can be established (CP 
8.181, 2.231). Thus there is the question as to how the dynamic object, which belongs to 
the ‘external world’, can be represented by a sign. For as Peirce himself remarks, the 
sign can only be a sign of an object “in so far as that object is itself of the nature of a 
sign or thought …” (CP 1.538). In order to answer this question, Eco refers to the end 
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of Peirce’s definition of lithium where he writes: “The peculiarity of this definition […] 
is that it tells you what the word lithium denotes by prescribing what you are to do in 
order to gain a perceptual acquaintance with the object of the word” (CP 2.330). It fol-
lows that within Peirce’s pragmatic framework, the meaning of a sign leads to the per-
formance of a set of actions which will give rise to certain perceptible effects. In other 
words, the idea of meaning cannot be separated from the notion of purpose, which ren-
ders reality a result rather than a datum (cf. CP 5.166).  
A sign calls forth a series of immediate responses in the interpreter which gradually 
develop into a habit, i.e. a certain pattern of behaviour. As we have seen, Peirce defines 
the habit as “a tendency […] to behave in a similar way under similar circumstances in 
the future” (CP 5.487) and identifies it with the logical (or final) interpretant (CP 
5.491). This amounts to saying that the link between the representamen and its (final) 
interpretant consists in a law (of behaviour). Accordingly, to understand the meaning of 
a sign entails the skills to carry out those actions which constitute a situation that allows 
one to have the experiences of the object which the sign stands for. Generally speaking, 
the term habit denotes “an ordered and regulated way of being”.90 All things exhibit a 
tendency to assume habits so that even natural laws can be viewed as the result of ‘habit 
taking’.  
Eco rejects the idea that the distinction between the immediate, the dynamical and 
the final interpretant corresponds to the differentiation between the emotional, the ener-
getic and the logical one. According to him, Peirce did not provide us with a systematic 
classification of interpretants. Eco’s own understanding of the emotional and the ener-
getic interpretant can be summarised as follows. If we listen to a piece of music, its en-
chanting power will normally motivate us to produce emotional interpretants, but it may 
also induce energetic interpretants in the form of a muscular or mental effort. An ener-
getic interpretant, Eco presumes, does not need to be interpreted but rather produces, in 
the case of further repetitions, a change of habit. In other words, after we have been 
exposed to a series of signs, and after we have interpreted them in a wide variety of dif-
ferent ways, our way of acting is temporarily or permanently changed, and this new 
attitude, this new interpretative habit is the final (or logical) interpretant (CP 5.476). It 
follows from this that the habit resolves the problem of how the gap between semiosis 
and the physical world can be bridged. As we have seen, a simple one-to-one correlation 
between sign and object is no longer a viable option for Peirce’s triadic understanding 
of semiosis. Rather, it is now human action that establishes the link between semiosis 
and the physical world. This means that Eco, unlike Oehler, but similar to Simon, does 
not consider the habit to be merely a preliminary stage that will finally be superseded by 
a set of propositions on which a community of researchers unanimously agrees (even if 
the principle of corrigibility and fallibilism can never be discarded). Rather, reference 
and correspondence no longer figure as factors which are meaning-constitutive, for in 
order to grasp the meaning of a term we have to take recourse to human action.  
Moreover, it is worth noticing that Peirce distinguishes between single actions and 
the habit as a general rule: “The habit alone, which though it may be a sign in some 
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other way, is not a sign in that way in which that sign of which it is the logical interpre-
tant is the sign. The habit conjoined with the motive and the conditions has the action 
for its energetic interpretant; but the action cannot be a logical interpretant, because it 
lacks generality” (CP 5.491).  
However, semiosis does not really end with the final/logical interpretant. As we have 
seen in the above quotation, individual action lacks generality. But habitually and con-
sistently repeated action forming a habit, can be examined and described in general 
terms. Yet in order to do so we have to establish further precepts which will lead to fur-
ther actions. As a result, the final interpretant or habit, which consists in the repeated 
actions of an interpreter who responds to a given sign, turns itself into a representamen 
that will generate further interpretants and thus re-initiate the process of interpretation. 
Hence the “Peircean notion of interpretant takes into account, not only the synchronic 
structure of semiotic systems, but also the diachronic destructuralization and restruc-
turalization of those systems”.91  
The process of such a de- and restructuralization has been described by Roland 
Barthes. 
C) The destructuralization and restructuralization of semiotic 
systems 
In an early collection of essays published in 1957, Mythologies, Barthes expresses his 
unease “at the sight of the naturalness with which newspapers, art and common sense 
constantly dress up a reality which, even though it is the one we live in, is undoubtedly 
determined by history”.92 What is presented as the reality is in truth a historically condi-
tioned world-view, which is misleadingly identified with nature itself. This confusion 
between nature and history, resulting in an “ideological abuse”, Barthes calls myth.93  
He defines it further as “language”94, “a type of speech”, “a system of communica-
tion”, “a message”, or “a mode of signification”.95 But whereas in his earlier book, 
Writing Degree Zero (1953), Barthes’s object of investigation was the literature of 
French classicism, he now turns to explicitly non-linguistic phenomena such as the face 
of Greta Garbo, wrestling, the Tour de France, or wine production in North Africa. The 
range of semiology (or semiotics), a term borrowed from Saussure, is no longer con-
fined to oral or written discourse, but comprises photographs, cinema, reporting, sport, 
shows, publicity etc.  
According to him, myth is a semiological system which is parasitic upon another 
one, i.e. it is “a second-order semiological system”.96 In a later work which is more di-
rectly concerned with semiotic issues than Mythologies, systems of secondary meaning 
are interpreted in terms of connotative semiotics. Barthes’s theory of connotation has 
already been outlined above and is the key concept in his understanding of myth.  
 
91 U. Eco, The Role of the Reader, 195. 
92 R. Barthes, Mythologies, 7. 
93 Ibid., 7f. 
94 Ibid., 7. 
95 Ibid., 215. 
96 Ibid., 114. 
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Every system of signification consists of E, expressions (or signifiers), C, contents 
(or signifieds), and the relations between E and C, R.97 ERC thus forms the primary 
sign-system. This primary sign-system can be pressed into the service of a second, more 
comprehensive sign-system so that Barthes speaks of ‘staggered systems’. There are 
two fundamentally different ways in which the first and the second system can be re-
lated to each other, depending on the “point of insertion”, as Barthes calls it.98 In the 
first case, the primary system (E1R1C1) turns into the expression of the secondary sys-
tem: E2 (=E1R1C1) R2C2. The first level is that of denotation, the second that of connota-
tion. In the second case, the first system (E1R1C1), called object-language, becomes the 
content of the second one: E2R2C2 (=E1R1C1) which is the meta-language of the object-
language.99
In the first part of his Mythologies, Barthes presents the results of his own meta-
linguistic analysis of various phenomena of modern society. That is to say, he works as 
a mythologist and takes the primary sign (E1R1C1) to be the content (C2) of a new ex-
pression (E2). Inspired by the ‘masters of suspicion’ Nietzsche, Marx and Freud, he tries 
to decipher the secret codes of the bourgeoisie. The unmasking of the illusion of objec-
tive innocence and naturalness is clearly a political, and more specifically, a left-wing 
undertaking.100 Put differently, the “bourgeoisie conceals itself as bourgeoisie and 
thereby produces myth”.101 Revolution, however, makes itself openly known as revolu-
tion and thus abolishes myth. Yet when left-wing politics loses its revolutionary charac-
ter, it may well degenerate into myth too. More importantly, Barthes does not view 
Marxism as the ultimate ‘master code’, which brings all interpretive endeavours to a 
definitive end.102 Rather, the ‘objectivity’ gained by the mythologist who unmasks the 
false descriptive objectivity of bourgeois myth is only relative and provisional, as each 
layer of meaning contains “the seeds of its own death …”.103 In other words, every 
meta-language can in principle become the object-language of a new meta-language, 
which will again turn into an object-language and so forth ad infinitum. Accordingly, 
Barthes speaks of a “diachrony of meta-languages” which can be historically recon-
structed.104
 
97 The helpful abbreviations are borrowed from W. Nöth, Handbook of Semiotics, 310f. 
98 R. Barthes, Elements of Semiology, 89. 
99 Ibid., 89-94. 
100 R. Barthes, Mythologies, 41f, 86, 189-191. 
101 R. Barthes, Mythologies, 255. 
102 Although in Mythologies (published in 1957) there are still tendencies in this direction, cf. 254-257. 
103 R. Barthes, Elements of Semiology, 93. 
104 Ibid. 
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3 Interpretative perspectives – worlds of interpreta-
tion  
A) Levels of generality 
Now let us look at these processes of diachronic and synchronic sign-production from a 
different angle. The meaning-signs that we generate when we are faced with not fully 
comprehended signs, as well as the questions which precipitate this sign-production, 
reveal the interpreter’s world-view, the interpretative perspective or the world of inter-
pretation he inhabits. For an interpreter with a different world-view, being confronted 
with the ‘same’ object105, would either ask different questions, or answer the same 
questions in a different way, or not raise any questions at all. Furthermore, he would 
probably pause and start pondering on issues the first interpreter passed over, since 
there was nothing that struck him. It is possible to distinguish between different degrees 
of generality as regards the question of interpretative differences.   
a) There is the level of individual interpretative practices that differ from person to 
person, but which are only comprehensible against the background of a shared lan-
guage. After all, there is no such thing as a private language. This is in principle the 
level of pragmatics (in the narrow sense), for the polysemy of a term can ultimately only 
be disambiguated by circumstantial and contextual factors which depend on a particular 
situation in space and time. In Abel’s terminology, the individual usage of signs as well 
as the interpretation of individual signs and expressions, for instance when we try to 
understand the meaning of the words uttered by a speaker, are located on the level of 
interpretation3.106 Under certain circumstances, although by no means under all circum-
stances, it suffices to focus on the individual differences between the interpretative hori-
zons and practices of the interlocutors. This is not to revert to the much-criticised notion 
“that the isolated individual subject … [is] … the fount and origin of all meaning …”, 
thereby ignoring that language is much less our product than we are the product of lan-
guage.107 Rather, what is needed is a pragmatically motivated sensitivity as to which 
level of generality is really relevant in order to settle a particular problem or dispute. 
This does not call in question the current trend in contemporary philosophy and theol-
ogy to regard thought-categories such as ‘tradition’, ‘life-world’, ‘culture’ or ‘world of 
interpretation’ as the intellectually most fruitful ones.  
Joseph Simon, for instance, in an essay examining the relation between Kant’s tran-
scendental philosophy and his own philosophy of the sign, focuses almost exclusively 
 
105 Since, within this Peircian framework, an object comes always already interpreted, it is inaccurate to 
speak of the ‘same’ object. Rather, the ‘common’ object only emerges when two or more interpretative 
perspectives overlap diachronically or synchronically. An accumulation of interpretations from different 
perspectives intensifies the web of determination (of an intended object) so that they gain gradually a 
common referent. It thus enables us to distinguish between object and interpretation within this combina-
tion of perspectives. 
106 G. Abel, Sprache, Zeichen, Interpretation, 72. 
107 T. Eagleton, Literary Theory, 93. 
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on individual criteria of comprehensibility and ‘fittingness’.108 When and for what rea-
son a particular explanation is satisfactory, differs from subject to subject, since their 
viewpoints and interests vary, resulting in different needs of explanation. Whereas one 
person is perfectly satisfied with a particular elucidation, another one may require (a) 
further explanation(s) in order to establish a link between the not fully understood sign 
and his or her own interpretative framework (Abel’s interpretation1+2). If this move is 
successful, the answer-sign produced by the interpreter in order to interpret the not fully 
understood sign does not itself require a further explanatory sign but is ‘self-effacing’ 
insofar as it brings the process of (conscious) interpretation to an end. We can then say 
that the interpretation of a sign has given way to its auto-semantic performance, result-
ing in understanding and action.109  
b) Yet these individual differences of the first level must be seen against a shared in-
terpretative background. For in order to form and decode specific messages, to say 
something new and unprecedented, or to react creatively and constructively to innova-
tive statements, certain transpersonal communicational skills are required. In other 
words, the interpretative activity characterised under a) is enabled and (logically) pre-
ceded by the interlocutors’ adherence to a common language or sign-system that in-
volves familiarity with its codes and other linguistic rules and conventions. Thus dis-
course is only possible if the dialogue partners are able to form semantically and syntac-
tically correct sentences. This second level can be interpreted in terms of Abel’s inter-
pretation2. Furthermore, on this plane, it is still possible to translate meaningful sen-
tences into another language or sign-system without altering the ‘world’, even if the 
creative aspect of the process of translation should not be underestimated. This second 
level comprises, for instance, different languages, such as German, English or Italian. 
On the one hand, they are indispensable for the interpretative activity described under 
a), on the other hand they are less general than that which will be discussed in c).  
c) Neither the mastery of a common language nor the absence of disagreement suf-
fices to explain how mutual understanding is possible. Rather, comprehensibility is de-
pendent on other complex factors such as a shared life-form, shared patterns of behav-
iour, a similar horizon of experience, discursive agreement, etc.110  
As we have seen, the horizon and practice of interpretation1 constitutes the most 
fundamental level of human reality in that they determine what exists, what counts as an 
object or event, and what not. Each world, with such and such a topography, is always 
already structured by the principles of individuation and the category-forming concepts 
of the level of interpretation1. But what kind of ordering structures are built up by this 
most basic level of interpretation? Abel gives two examples, both of which are re-
interpretations of Kantian principles from the transcendental analytic within the 
framework of his philosophy of interpretation. In the analytic of principles Kant em-
barks on an analysis of how the link between concepts and intuition is established in the 
act of knowledge. The manifold intuitions must be subsumed under general concepts 
and it is the apriorische Anschauungsform des inneren Sinns, namely time, that relates 
 
108 J. Simon, Zeichenphilosphie und Transzendentalphilosophie, 73ff. 
109 G. Abel, Sprache, Zeichen, Interpretation, 83. 
110 Ibid., 84f. 
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them to each other. Kant’s principles lay down under what conditions experience is 
possible and are the most general rules of ‘nature’, i.e. the aprioristic presuppositions of 
all scientific experience. The third principle is dedicated to the analogies of experience 
and encompasses a discussion of substance (permanence of Substance) and causality 
(succession in time).111 Abel incorporates these two concepts into his own approach. 
Due to the schematising and category-forming function of the horizon and praxis of 
interpretation1, the sense data to which the interpreter is exposed are structured by 
means of the interpretative schemes substance and causality.112 In other words, Kant’s 
idealistic basis of the categories is replaced by a linguistic foundation. As a result, the 
notions of substance and causality take on an interpretative and perspectival character 
and are hence contingent.  
B) The relationship between different interpretative perspec-
tives 
In this last chapter of the introductory part, I shall address the question of how differing 
interpretative perspectives or worlds of interpretation are interrelated with each other. 
Although this is not an essay on political philosophy or theology, the following discus-
sion will touch upon political issues in order to give it a more concrete character.  
Abel’s reflections on this matter are based on his key ideas of internal pluralism and 
internal alterity.113 Although he does not deny that in principle every interpretation (at 
least on the level of interpretation1) must be believed to be capable of possessing the 
“‘whole truth’”114, the pivot around which his political and ethical considerations re-
volve is the notion of tolerance. The philosophy of interpretation allows others to have 
their other interpretations, but also allows me to have my interpretations as well as my 
interpretations of the others’ interpretations. It thus comes as no surprise that Abel sees 
affinities between his philosophy of interpretation and liberal democracy.115 In fact, his 
philosophical approach is supposed to provide a new intellectual justification for this 
political theory. Due to the fundamentally interpretative character of reality, Abel sees 
liberal democracy as the only alternative to metaphysical foundationalism (leading to 
political absolutism, dogmatism, fanaticism or even terror), and post-modern relativism 
(e.g. J.-F. Lyotard).  
According to him, metaphysical foundationalism must be rejected since there is no 
‘god’s-eye view’ that would allow us to check our interpretations against ‘reality itself’. 
Every sign whose meaning is at issue, is always already located in a network of multiple 
interpretations and an individual’s or a community’s specific interpretation of a sign is 
unintelligible without this polysemic background. The reason for Abel’s insistence on 
the importance of tolerance is thus the conviction that our own specific views and inter-
pretations are inconceivable without an internal relation to other views and interpreta-
 
111 I. Kant, Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, B 225- 256. 
112 G. Abel, Sprache, Zeichen, Interpretation, 51-57. 
113 Ibid., 65f, 243ff. 
114 G. Abel, Interpretationswelten, 524. 
115 G. Abel, Sprach, Zeichen, Interpretation, 340ff. 
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tions. That is to say, one single person ‘cannot be individual’ on his own, since others 
are always already involved.  
Post-modern relativism, on the other hand, fails to see that the end of metaphysical 
foundationalism does not mean that our speaking, thinking and acting is void of any 
regularity and order. Even the idea of the ‘play’, which post-modern thinkers often re-
sort to in order to highlight that our processes of interpretation are free and without ex-
ternal purpose, implies the instantiation of rules. The playing of a game is also based on 
a practice of interpretation; otherwise it could not be marked off from other modes of 
discourse such as purpose-orientated or strategic behaviour. Yet the rules of a practice 
of interpretation are embodied in it and are not to be conceived of as something exter-
nal. It is therefore inappropriate to believe that the only alternative to metaphysical 
foundationalism is complete arbitrariness, for such a view remains caught in a dualism 
between foundationalims and relativism. As Abel points out, philosophy of interpreta-
tion does not lead to the end of reason but simply tries to do justice to the finite charac-
ter of human reason.116   
It is only liberal democracy that is able to avoid both impasses and which takes into 
account the finitude of human existence and all our processes of interpretation. As a 
consequence, the political order and the form of the political system are no longer re-
garded as an order of truth and knowledge, but as an order of beliefs and convictions.117 
Due to the interpretative character of all human speaking, thinking and acting, no finite 
– and therefore interpretative – mind can possess ‘the one metaphysical truth’ and/or 
‘the one, definitive and generally binding explanation’, nor can anybody possess a privi-
leged strategy to gain access to such a truth or explanation. This first of all excludes the 
philosophical sanctioning of any kind of fanaticism. A critical approach must – as re-
gards practice as well as theory – emphatically reject the notion of a metaphysically 
legitimated, definitive and universal authority that forcibly brings the differing interpre-
tative horizon of other people under its own sway. In a spirit of freedom and tolerance, 
the diverse interpreters mutually accept their differences, interpretative habits, idiosyn-
crasies and oppositions, and refrain from a violent subsumption of the other under their 
own practice of interpretation. An ethics of interpretation is thus an ethics that respects 
the freedom of the other. Consequently, Abel returns to the fundamental principles of 
liberal democracy, freedom and equality, which he considers implications of his phi-
losophy of interpretation.  
Yet it is questionable whether the political system of liberal democracy does neces-
sarily follow from Abel’s reflections on the interpretative nature of reality. Rather, his 
philosophy of interpretation seems at this point to relapse itself into a foundationalism. 
It is, paradoxically, the ‘normativity’ of his very ideal of tolerance that proves too re-
strictive.   
Abel seeks to avoid the weaknesses of both metaphysical absolutism and post-
modern relativism, but his own reasoning is still based on the very presuppositions he 
calls into question. In line with Kant, he argues as follows: every universal and material 
 
116 Ibid., 346f. 
117 Abel discusses the meaning of these terms in ibid., 304ff. 
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truth-claim implies a metaphysical position; metaphysical positions have become phi-
losophically implausible; hence there can be no claim to truth that is universal as well as 
material.118 Yet he does not consider the possibility of material truth-claims that are 
universal but not based on a metaphysical position. Abel fails to question the idea that 
universality coupled with materiality necessitates metaphysics and therefore problem-
atically universalises the non-universalisability of material truth-claims. For this reason, 
the negative conclusions he draws are still based on the view that universality and 
metaphysics are inextricably linked up.    
 Since there is never conclusive philosophical evidence to be part of this rather than 
another interpretative community, Abel argues, we must allow for a radical, internal 
pluralism. Yet, as he explicitly points out, this does not lead to arbitrariness in the sense 
that we have no criteria to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ interpretations. For, 
first, the various worlds of interpretation all have their own specific logos, and sec-
ondly, every sign whose meaning is at issue is always already located in a complex 
network of different, but interrelated worlds of interpretation. As a result, the range of 
possible meanings of a sign is limited by the rules of transformation which structure 
these worlds – even if these rules elude exhaustive description and objectifications and 
only become manifest in and through the interpretative practice itself. In other words, 
there must always be a horizon and practice of interpretation within which a particular 
interpretation of a sign makes sense. Yet, since there are no philosophical criteria (un-
derstood in a foundationlist sense) to decide which of the various interpretative practices 
is preferable, he resorts to a kind of super-grammar.119 This super-grammar is not a set 
of rules that transcends the particular and conflicting grammars of the various worlds of 
interpretation. Rather, he seeks to integrate these various grammars in their totality into 
a complex and comprehensive network so that x can now be interpreted as a or b or c or 
d, etc., without contradiction, provided each of these interpretations ‘fits into’ a corre-
sponding interpretative horizon and practice, i.e. provided it leads to understanding.  
What Abel does not consider is the universalisation of a particular perspective in a 
non-foundationalist way, which constitutes a fourth option besides metaphysical abso-
lutism, post-modern relativism and liberalism. Abel’s perspectivism rightly criticises the 
notion of a common, material order which is based on ‘pure reason’. But it is not possi-
ble to infer from this that a perspective which is philosophically speaking one among 
others cannot be universalised. Rather, the critical aspect of Abel’s philosophy of inter-
pretation needs to be taken further than he does himself. An approach to reality on the 
basis of ‘pure reason’ must be considered less restrictive than on his account. Thus 
Abel’s attempt at universalising the non-universalisability of material truth-claims al-
ready goes too far. The fact that every sign has a wide range of meanings because it is 
part of a complex network of different, but interrelated worlds of interpretation, and the 
insight that the resulting plurality is the precondition for signification and processes of 
interpretation (under finite conditions) does not mean that all of these possible interpre-
 
118 I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 82ff. 
119 Abel himself does not use the term ‘super-grammar’. 
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tations must exist all the time. Nor is the disappearance of certain interpretative options 
necessarily due to coercion.  
Any prolegomena to Christian political theology must take into account the follow-
ing insights: (i) Christian faith is an all-comprehensive perspective on the world and 
there is no realm that can be thought of without reference to divine presence. Accord-
ingly, it is not possible not to reflect on political questions. (ii) This is not to say that 
there is one political system which Christian faith must adhere to throughout the centu-
ries and under all socio-cultural conditions. There is always an eschatological reserve 
which makes it impossible to view a specific order as the Christian model par excel-
lence. Yet this should neither hinder Christians from commenting on individual political 
events and decisions nor to reflect on political theory. (iii) Nobody can be forced to be-
lieve in the Christian God. This leads to the perennial theological question as to whether 
‘Constantinianism’, the notion of a Christian empire or state is a contradiction in terms. 
As has been argued, even in a situation in which the majority of people are Christians, it 
is not legitimate to impose a Christian way of life on the minority.   
It follows from this that Christian faith aims at a non-coercive universalisation of its 
perspective on the world. Accordingly, Christian cultural work such as the development 
of a political theory is always an invitation to reconsider and question the prevailing 
order. In other words, even if it does not aim at the conversion of individuals, it is a kind 
of mission. As regards liberalism, Christian faith tries to entice people to freely relin-
quish the absolutisation of human freedom.  
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Part II: Divine speech in Karl Barth: the 
‘literal understanding’ 
In line with the reformers of the sixteenth century, but in a completely different intel-
lectual climate, Barth puts the Word of God, which he interprets as Dei loquentis 
persona, at the centre of his theology (KD I/1, 141). In the Prolegomena to the 
Church Dogmatics, he develops his well-known doctrine of the threefold form of the 
Word of God, distinguishing between the revealed, the written and the preached 
word, which form an indivisible unity (KD I/1, 89ff). First, on the level of the 
preached word, the fallible human words of the ecclesiastical proclamation become, 
mediated by the authoritative vicariate of Christ, God’s own speech (KD I/1, 95, 97). 
Speech is thereby to be understood as address, and is directed at particular human 
beings in order to evoke faith. Secondly, the written word, Scripture, even if the in-
dispensable basis for all proclamation, cannot be equated with God’s revelation in 
the past. Rather, it is the “concrete means by which the Church recollects God’s past 
revelation, is called to expectation of his future revelation, and is thus summoned and 
guided to proclamation and empowered by it” (KD I/1, 114). Scripture thus becomes 
the Word of God, in that God addresses a human being in the context of proclama-
tion. Accordingly, the unity between Scripture and revelation is to be thought of in 
terms of an event (KD I/1, 116). Finally, unlike Scripture and proclamation, which 
only become the Word of God by virtue of a divine (re)actualisation, in Jesus Christ, 
God has spoken (Deus dixit) once and for all and we can only look back to this past 
event of revelation.  
In what follows the focus will be primarily on the last link of this chain, preach-
ing, the oral proclamation of the Church. As regards the question of authority, there 
are various ways of interpreting Barth’s account of divine speech. On the one hand, 
Barth seems to understand divine speech ‘literally’, when he writes:  
… [W]e have no reason not to take the concept of ‘God’s Word’ primarily in its literal sense. ‘God’s 
Word’ means: God speaks. ‘Speaking’ is not a symbol. It is not a designation and description which 
on the basis of his own assessment of its symbolic force man has chosen for something very different 
from and quite alien to this expression […] We might will be of the opinion that it would have been 
finer and better if God had not spoken and did not speak with such ‘intellectualism’, and that it would 
be more appropriate to God if ‘God’s word’ meant all kinds of other things apart from the fact that 
‘God speaks’. But is this private opinion of ours so important, resting as it does on a philosophy? (KD 
I/1, 137)  
In accordance with this ‘literal’ understanding, he emphasises that divine speech is 
always concrete. God’s word possesses a purposive character, which he calls its 
pertinence and relatedness. Divine speech is thus always address (KD I/1, 144). 
Barth writes:  
… [W]herever and whenever God speaks to man its content [i.e. the content of God’s Word] is a con-
cretissimum. God always has something specific to say to each man, something that applies alone to 
him and to him alone (KD I/1, 145).  
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And reflecting on the ethical implications of his Word of God theology, Barth writes 
about the divine commands:1  
Nothing can be made of these commands if we try to generalise and transform them into universally 
valid principles […] Their content is purely concrete and related to this or that particular man in this 
or that particular situation (KD II/2, 750, cf. 741). 
Barth further points out that although God’s Word transcends the usual dualism be-
tween idealism and realism, its spirituality is of particular importance (KD I/1, 
138ff). To put this semiotically, Barth wants to place the stress on the (immaterial) 
meaning conveyed by the speech-act, even if he does not deny that this meaning can 
only be communicated by a (material) sign-vehicle. As is well-known, a large part of 
the Prolegomena is dedicated to precisely this question: how can the “‘infinite quali-
tative difference’ of time and eternity” (Röm II, XX) be bridged in the act of revela-
tion (KD I/1, 168ff)?2   
To be sure, Barth’s account of divine speech allows for a wide variety of different 
interpretations. That is to say, it would be interesting to relate his reflections on 
God’s Word to the various modes of speech analysed by linguists and philosophers. 
Yet a comprehensive investigation that tries to cover the most important types of 
speech is not possible within the scope of this essay. Hence only one mode of speech 
will be considered, which is particularly interesting as regards the question of author-
ity.  
a) I shall first try to show what is meant by the term ‘literal understanding’ or 
‘concrete act of interpretation’. The inverted commas are a reminder that these terms 
are not to be understood in the sense of a metaphysical theory of meaning: ‘literal’ 
does not mean that there is a one-to-one correlation between the sign and that which 
it stands for. Such a view implies the implausible notion of an external standpoint 
from which the correspondence between signifier and signified can be ‘observed’. 
Rather, recalling the first chapter of this essay, I take ‘literal speech’ or ‘concrete act 
of interpretation’ to be that type of speech which terminates the chain of interpreta-
tion on the synchronic level – even if the diachronic dimension must be taken into 
account as well.  
In Simon, as we have seen, the synchronic termination of the chain of signs is not 
necessarily tied to speech and verbal communication. After all, he develops a phi-
losophy of the sign – which comprises linguistic as well as non-linguistic phenom-
ena. Nor does he say that there is always a sender who provides an addressee with 
the ‘fitting’ sign, i.e. the sign that is needed in order to bring the chain of interpre-
tants to an end. But it cannot be denied that it often is another person who helps us 
find the missing link which leads to comprehension. This is the case, for instance, in 
a dialogue between teacher and pupil. Yet it is worth noticing that ecclesiastical 
proclamation, as conceived by Barth, does not have a dialogical character in the 
above sense. I later shall come back to this issue. 
 
1 Cf. S. Hauerwas, Character and the Christian Life, 136-157. 
2 Barth further reflects on divine speech as the act of God (KD I/1, 148ff) and as the mystery of God 
(KD I/1, 168ff). However, I will not give a comprehensive account of this analysis here, since the 
relevant passages will be discussed in the following chapters. 
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It follows from this that my definition of ‘literal speech’ constitutes to a certain 
extent a sub-category of that which Simon calls the termination of the chain of inter-
pretation. In Abel’s terminology, these phenomena fall into the category of interpre-
tation3 – although the level of interpretation3 can strictly speaking never be separated 
from the levels of interpretation1+2. Rather, as pointed out in the first part, the latter 
levels remain often hidden, insofar as an act of interpretation3 may be immediately 
understandable so that no further clarifications are needed. On the level of interpreta-
tion3, knowledge3 is to be interpreted in the narrow, propositional sense: “A knows 
that p”.3 For instance, “Peter knows that uncle Paul is in Munich this week”.4 
Equally, action3 must be interpreted in the narrow, consciously chosen, intentional 
and purposive sense. For instance, “Peter buys a bottle of red wine”.5 A further ex-
ample illustrates the interconnection between knowledge3 and action3: “Peter knows 
that the proof ABC is correct. Peter carries out the corresponding operation” (knowl-
edge3 + action3).6  
However, it has been argued by some scholars that it is exactly this ‘literal’ under-
standing of speech that cannot be found in the Prolegomena. Nicholas Wolterstorff 
writes about Barth’s understanding of divine speech: “That which God said in Jesus 
Christ and is presented to me by Scripture and contemporary proclamation – that 
must be made “to grab me”. God must so act on me that I am “grabbed” by the con-
tent of what God has already said. I see no reason to call this action “speech””.7 A 
similar view is held by Bernhard Rothen: “Vom „Reden Gottes“ scheint Barth nur zu 
sprechen, weil im göttlichen Tun eine Anrede und Aussage enthalten ist, weil Gottes 
Handeln einen Sinn und eine Adresse hat. An ein Sprechen im menschlichen Sinn zu 
denken sollte man sich aber dadurch nicht verleiten lassen“.8
I am not trying to show in this essay that these commentators are wrong. There are 
certainly many statements in the Prolegomena and Barth’s earlier and later work that 
cannot be interpreted in terms of the ‘literal understanding’ outlined above, and 
which clearly point in the direction of an alternative notion of ‘speech’. I shall turn to 
this issue in part III. However, I think it wiser not to exclude the ‘literal understand-
ing’ too quickly, in spite of the theological and philosophical problems that such an 
interpretation may entail. Rather, I would insist that the passages from the Church 
Dogmatics quoted above (and many others), render a ‘literal reading’ at least possi-
ble.  
Moreover, even if the ‘literal reading’ is not compatible with Barth’s notion of di-
vine speech, this mode of communication nonetheless remains extremely relevant to 
the question of authority. This is the main reason why this ‘thought-experiment’ is 
carried out and also accounts for the fact why the following reflections go far beyond 
the scope of what is normally considered ecclesiastical practice. Indeed, as I shall try 
 
3 G. Abel, Sprache, Zeichen, Interpretation, 329. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., 332. The relationship between interpretation and knowledge and action is discussed in ibid., 
299-339. 
7 N. Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 72. 
8 B. Rothen, Die Klarheit der Schrift, 139. 
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to show, it is not plausible to regard this type of speech as representative of Church 
proclamation. Rather, the Christian acts of interpretation3 can be informed by a 
Christian practice of interpretation1+2 – even if they fall outside the boundary of 
Church practice in the narrow sense. As far as the structure of this essay is con-
cerned, a definition of what is meant by ‘literal speech’, as well as reflections on the 
relationship between speech and authority are followed by a more exegetically orien-
tated investigation into the Prolegomena.  
 b) I shall tackle the more immediately theological question of how ‘fallible’ hu-
man speech is related to ‘infallible’ divine speech: an issue which is for obvious rea-
sons of utmost importance to the question of authority.9 For as we have seen, in 
Barth, divine speech is always based on and mediated by human speech. In accor-
dance with his dialectical approach, Barth at times places the stress on the difference, 
and at other times on the correspondence between divine and human speech. I shall 
discuss these two variants in chapter 2 and 3 respectively. First, however, at least 
some aspects of the relationship between speech and authority need to be explored. 
The starting point of this examination is J. L. Austin’s speech-act theory.  
 
9 Here too, the inverted commas indicate that it is far from clear what these terms actually mean. That 
is to say, divine ‘infallibility’ and human ‘fallibility’ need to be reinterpreted within the framework of 
a philosophy of interpretation. 
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1 Speech and authority 
A) J.L. Austin’s speech-act theory 
It was the work of ‘ordinary language philosophers’ such as Austin, Strawson, Grice 
and the later Wittgenstein that gave rise to the development of pragmatics in twenti-
eth century analytic philosophy. Speech-act theory is a sub-discipline of pragmatics 
which seeks to highlight the non-propositional aspects of communication. In the 
eighth chapter of his William James Lectures of 1955, J.L. Austin famously analysed 
speech-acts into locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. Whereas the locu-
tionary act consists in saying something, the illocutionary act encompasses commu-
nicational aspects such as the issuing of orders, the asking of questions or the making 
of promises etc. and the perlocutionary act causes something to happen by saying 
something. In other words, the locutionary act has a meaning (comprising sense and 
reference), the illocutionary act a force, and the perlocutionary act achieves certain 
effects.10 Whereas propositions are either true or false, illocutionary acts are either 
‘happy’ or ‘unhappy’, i.e. they need to meet certain felicity conditions in order to be 
successful. These felicity conditions Austin formulated in the second lecture. At this 
early stage of his lecture series, however, Austin was still working with the opposi-
tion of constative vs. performative utterances, or simply ‘constatives’ vs. ‘performa-
tives’, which does not fully correspond to his later distinction between locutionary 
and illocutionary acts. I shall come back to this issue in a moment. For a performa-
tive utterance to be ‘happy’, the following criteria need to be met:11
(A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conven-
tional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain 
persons in certain circumstances, and further, 
(A.2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for 
the invocation of the particular procedure invoked. 
(B.1)  The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and  
(B.2)  completely. 
(Γ.1)  Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain 
thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on 
the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the 
procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must 
intend so to conduct themselves, and further 
(Γ.2)  must actually so conduct themselves subsequently. 
Obviously, the conditions A.1/2 and B.1/2 concern the ‘external’ course of the proce-
dure whereas Γ. 1/2 are criteria for the ‘internal’ attitude of the speaker towards his 
utterance. Transgression of the former rules leads to misfire, i.e. the act is purported 
but void, and disregard of the second conditions results in an abuse, i.e. the act is pro-
 
10 J.L. Austin, How to do things with words, 94ff. 
11 Ibid., 14ff. 
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fessed but hollow.12 As already mentioned, the above felicity conditions originally 
applied to what Austin called performative utterances, which he tried to distinguish 
from constative utterances. Constatives describe, report and constate; they are either 
true or false. In performative utterances, by contrast, “the uttering of a sentence is, or 
is a part of, the doing of an action, which […] would not normally be described as, or 
as ‘just’, saying something”.13 Initially, Austin sought to isolate performatives be-
cause he was convinced that utterances were either performatives or constatives, and 
did not allow for the idea that every utterance could encompass both aspects.14 First, 
he was looking for grammatical criteria to distinguish between these two categories, 
then turned to vocabulary, and finally suggested a combination of both factors.15 Yet 
these attempts failed as he realised that the very same sentence can be used as a per-
formative or a constative utterance, depending on the context, and concluded that no 
rules can be established if we leave utterances as they stand. He thus proposed filter-
ing out performatives by testing whether an utterance could be reduced to what he 
called explicit performatives – which are always in ‘first person indicative present’. 
But this second attempt failed too, and he did not manage to put together a list of per-
formative verbs, as he had intended to do.16 A fresh start was required that finally led 
him to analyse every speech act into three sub-acts, i.e. a locutionary, an illocutionary 
and a perlocutionary act.  
B) Archetypical performatives 
Yet there is a certain ambiguity in Austin’s understanding of performatives which is 
relevant to the question of authority.17 The above account of the felicity conditions of 
performatives reveals that they should not primarily (or exclusively) be viewed as 
oral or linguistic phenomena. Rather, they constitute the rules of a conventional pro-
cedure, which generates conventional effects. In other words, language only plays a 
role in these procedures insofar as it comes to an actualisation of a standardised text 
that is part of a recognised ritual in which a person with an officially recognised 
function performs under highly specific circumstances certain acts with pre-fixed 
and foreseeable consequences.18 Indeed, Austin himself states that in “very many 
cases it is possible to perform a[n] [performative] act of exactly the same kind not by 
uttering words, whether written or spoken, but in some other way”.19  
 
12 Ibid., ch. III & IV. 
13 Ibid., 5. 
14 In fact, Austin, using his later terminology, more cautiously writes: “To perform a locutionary act is 
in general, we may say, also and eo ipso to perform an illocutionary act, as I propose to call it”, ibid., 
98, first italics mine). As regards the relationship between the different terminologies used before and 
after the eights lecture, Austin writes: “The doctrine of the performative/constative distinction stands 
to the doctrine of locutionary and illocutionary acts in the total speech-act as the special theory to the 
general theory”, ibid., 148. 
15 Ibid., ch. V. 
16 Ibid., ch. VI & VII. 
17 I am following I.U. Dalferth, Religiöse Rede von Gott, 182-196. 
18 Ibid., 186. 
19 J.L. Austin, How to do things with words, 8, cf. 25. 
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If the stress is placed on this non-linguistic aspect of Austin’s performatives, one 
moves in the direction of what Furberg calls archetypical performatives.20 Good ex-
amples of archetypical performatives are liturgical formulas. In a wedding service, 
for instance, a standardised text is recited each time in exactly the same way, apart 
from a few slots where the names of the bride and the bridegroom are inserted. The 
following example is taken from the Eastern Orthodox betrothal service which con-
stitutes the canonical marriage contract:21  
Then taking the rings, the priest blesses the bridal pair, making the sign of the cross with the ring of 
the bride over the bridegroom, and with that of the bridegroom over the bride, saying to the man: The 
servant of God, —— , is betrothed to the handmaiden of God, —— , in the name of the Father, and of 
the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. 
And to the woman: The handmaiden of God, —— , is betrothed to the servant of God, —— , in the 
name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. 
Now as far as archetypical performatives are concerned, the conditions A.1/2 and 
B.1/2 are either fully met or not met at all (tertium non datur), whereas the rules 
Γ.1/2 do not apply. Austin explicitly says that not “every ritual is liable to every form 
of infelicity …”.22 For on this institutional level, the personal attitude of the speaker 
(in the above example the priest) towards his utterance – be it emotional or intellec-
tual – is of no concern (Γ.1). The couple is married even if the priest does not ap-
prove of their decision. Similarly, his conduct after the wedding ceremony cannot 
undo the conjugal bond between the bridal pair in any way (Γ.2). As Furman puts it: 
“Their performer shoulders no obligations for the future. He has as it were pressed a 
button in a social machine. Thenceforward the machine works without his interfer-
ence – or if it does not work, it is not necessarily his business to put it aright”.23 I 
here deliberately disregard the possible pastoral function the priest may very well 
exercise after the ceremony. Thus for the marriage to be canonically binding it suf-
fices that:  
–  there is an ecclesiastically recognised canonical betrothal/wedding service 
leading to betrothal/marriage by virtue of certain words spoken to the bridal pair 
(A.1).24
–  the recital of the liturgy is part of a proper Church service, the pair meets the 
canonical requirements for wedding candidates and the priest is really an ordained 
priest   (A.2) 
–  the betrothal/wedding service is performed correctly (B.1) and completely 
(B.2) 
Against the background of such conventional procedures, Austin’s attempt to articu-
late strict felicity conditions according to which it can be decided whether or not a 
 
20 I.U. Dalferth, Religiöse Rede von Gott, 184, 187, drawing on M. Furberg, Saying and Meaning. 
21 J. Meyendorff, Marriage, 115, cf. 33. 
22 J.L. Austin, How to do things with words, 19. 
23 M. Furberg, Saying and Meaning, 280. 
24 According to Furberg, archetypical perfomatives only have a ‘grammatical’ but not a ‘real’ ad-
dressee: “Think of the ‘addressee’s’ role in the naming of a ship or the baptism of an infant! The per-
formative is, so to speak, directed to the society at large”. Yet wedding services also rank among his 
examples and to a certain degree are directed to the ‘society at large’, ibid., 281. 
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performative utterance has been ‘happy’ makes perfectly sense. However, the prob-
lem is that Austin did not focus exclusively upon cases of conventional and institu-
tionalised re-actualisations of standardised texts, but shifted in the course of his lec-
tures to ‘proper’ ordinary language philosophy. Already in the chapter on ‘abuses’, 
which discusses the conditions Γ.1/2, Austin had to examine different examples, 
since – as already mentioned – archetypical performatives hardly meet the criteria 
Γ.1/2. He thus turned to utterances such as ‘I promise’, ‘I apologise’ etc., which are 
‘proper’ speech-acts in the sense that they can be analysed into (what he from chap-
ter eight onwards called) locutionary and illocutionary acts. In other words, these 
latter examples are genuinely linguistic utterances and no longer archetypical per-
formatives. 
When his programme to draw a clear boundary between constatives and perfor-
matives proved unrealisable, he replaced the opposition performative/constative by 
the distinction between the locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary act within 
every utterance. More precisely, what he had earlier called performative was now 
regarded as the illocutionary act (besides the locutionary and the perlocutionary act), 
i.e. as a sub-act of a comprehensive speech-act: “The total speech-act in the total 
speech-situation is the only actual phenomenon which, in the last resort, we are en-
gaged in elucidating”.25 This major modification had far-reaching consequences in-
sofar as the illocutionary act did no longer cover archetypical performatives such as 
lawsuits, absolutions and so forth.  
C) Tautegoric speech 
Moreover, as Dalferth points out, there is a third mode of speech which was origi-
nally implied by Austin’s understanding of performatives but then got lost due to his 
‘fresh start’: causative speech. Whereas illocutionary force is an aspect of all utter-
ances and pertains to non-normative communication, causativity more specifically 
concerns speech that is reality- and norm-constitutive, i.e. which institutes new rules 
on the basis of old ones and introduces new state of affairs. Compared to archetypical 
performatives, causative speech is more genuinely innovative insofar as it does not 
just establish non-normative state of affairs by instigating pre-existing proceedings 
but also institutes new norms on the basis of old ones.26 In other words, causative 
speech neither has a merely descriptive function in the sense that it only says what is 
(already) the case, nor does it simply express what should be the case. Rather, what it 
says is the case because of and through what it says.27 Yet the newly instituted social 
facts are necessarily based on preceding norms insofar as the person who initiates 
them must exercise an officially recognised authority. That is to say, the new state of 
affairs derives from an already existing norm or set of norms. For this reason, even if 
causative speech itself is a linguistic phenomenon, it is to a high degree dependent 
 
25 J.L. Austin, How to do things with words, 148. 
26 I.U. Dalferth, Religiöse Rede von Gott, 192f. 
27 Ibid., 424. Dalferth’s discussion of causative speech falls into two sections, ibid., 182-197, 204-207 
and 424-427. The first part gives an account of causative speech and the second one of causative ad-
dress. In spite of this slight shift of emphasis I take speech and address to be synonyms here. 
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upon a non-linguistic background. This background consists of what Searle calls 
institutional facts, which he defines as follows: “They are indeed facts; but their exis-
tence, unlike the existence of brute facts, presupposes the existence of certain human 
institutions […] These “institutions” are systems of constitutive rules. Every institu-
tional fact is underlain by a (system of) rule(s) of the form “X counts as Y in context 
C””.28 But since causative speech institutes such facts, one could also say that they 
effect that X is Y in the context C.29  
Dalferth further differentiates within the category of causative speech between 
tautegoric, authorising and legislating speech (or address). The first type ascribes to 
X a new reality, the second one a new ability and the third one a new obligation. In 
what follows I shall confine myself to the first sub-class: tautegoric speech. In taute-
goric speech, the sender sets a new reality insofar as X henceforth counts as Y 
whereas X can be an object/event, a predicator or a proposition. In the case of objects 
and events, tautegoric speech assigns to them a new quality, for instance by naming 
or classifying them so that they can be integrated into a semiotic system. As regards 
human beings, tautegoric speech can take on the form of a self-introduction (e.g. ‘I 
am Y’) or a proclamation (‘you are Y’). The same holds for predicators or proposi-
tions. Either a particular behaviour is approved or disapproved of by means of a 
predicator, such as in the case of a washing that takes on a propitiatory meaning, or a 
set of propositions is instituted as a binding law.30  
A good example of causative speech is the forensic judgement. For instance, the 
judge announces at the end of the court session: “You are sentenced to life impris-
onment”. If one views causative speech against the background of the above felicity 
conditions, one could again say that – as in the case of archetypical performatives –  
A.1/2 and B.1/2 must be either fully met or not met at all (tertium non datur), 
whereas the rules Γ.1/2 do not apply. The convict is sent to Siberia even if the judge 
knows that he is innocent but nonetheless sentences him to life imprisonment – e.g. 
because he poses a potential threat to his own marriage plans (Γ.2). Similarly, the 
conduct of the judge after he has passed judgment on the case does not affect the fate 
of the prisoner – unless somebody lodges an appeal against the severity of the sen-
tence, leading to a reconsideration of the case (Γ.2). Thus for the verdict delivered by 
the jury and the judgment pronounced by the justice to be legally binding it suffices 
that:  
– there is an institution which is officially recognized by a trans-national commu-
nity, a nation state, a county or a province, as a law court dealing with judicial mat-
ters (A.1) 
– the people involved in the case were legally elected representatives of the state 
or county and the session did take place in an official law court (A.2) 
– the court procedures leading to this sentence were lawfully (B.1) and completely 
carried out (B.2) 
 
28 J.R. Searle, Speech Acts, 51f. Dalferth draws on Searle’s understanding of institutional facts. 
29 Cf. I.U. Dalferth, Religiöse Rede von Gott, 424. 
30 Ibid., 424-427. 
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D) Two types of authority 
It should have become clear by now that the difference between archetypical perfor-
matives and causative/tautegorical speech is very subtle indeed. For instance, foren-
sic judgements are, according to Dalferth, representative of tautegoric speech,31 but 
at the same time figure in Furman’s list of examples of archetypical performatives. 
Nonetheless, the above definitions make the difference between these two types of 
speech very clear. In what follows, I shall attempt to briefly delineate two different 
types of competence and authority which these two modes of speech correspond to.   
a) In the case of archetypical performatives, the carrying out of the ritual itself, 
i.e. the actualisation of a standardised text, does not require any special skills. In 
principle, everybody who is able to recite the text and to re-produce the prescribed 
sound-patterns could carry out the ritual. But, first, not everybody has the authority, 
i.e. is entitled to perform it, and secondly, the person conducting the ritual very often 
has other responsibilities which may well require additional expertise. Thus the per-
formance of the ritual must be seen in the light of this wider field of activities. How-
ever, leaving this latter aspect aside, the type of authority corresponding to arche-
typical performatives is that of institutional authority.  
b) By contrast, tautegoric speech, such as the passing of a forensic judgement, is 
definitely an act that can only be performed by an expert. The judge has to know the 
law, needs to be informed about the verdict of the jury and the crime allegedly com-
mitted by the accused, and must skilfully relate these pieces of information in order 
to pronounce the final judgement. But as we have seen, the performance of a taute-
goric speech-act is restricted to people who have been officially authorised to do so. 
That is to say, authorisation and not expertise is the decisive factor in determining 
whether a tautegoric utterance is acceptable or not. However, for the purpose of this 
essay, I shall place the stress rather on the latter aspect: the expertise or competence 
that is required to perform a tautegoric speech-act – although this does not exclude 
the possibility that the interpreter holds a publicly recognised office. After all, there 
is no contradiction between possessing competence and being an officially acknowl-
edge authority. Furthermore, as we have seen above, tautegoric speech is genuinely 
innovative and does not just repeat standardised procedures – even if it is dependent 
on institutional facts. This makes it abundantly clear that not just expert knowledge 
but also a high degree of creativity is required to perform tautegoric speech-acts. 
This type of authority I shall call expert authority.  
The following considerations are related to this second type of authority: expert 
authority. That is to say, there is a connection between expert authority and ‘literal 
speech’ or ‘concrete acts of interpretation’. Now in the first half of part II, the focus 
will be on speech, rather than authority. Only towards the end of part II, the question 
of authority will be resumed.  
 
31 Ibid., 204ff. 
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E) Definition of ‘literal speech’ and ‘concrete act of inter-
pretation’ 
I am now in a position to define what is meant by ‘literal speech’ or a ‘concrete act 
of interpretation’. The following formula may illustrate its basic structure:  
s (= sender) interprets (or sets) x as y to a (= addressee) in the context c 
Evidently, this formula and the stress on competence rather than authority clearly 
deviate from the original definition of tautegoric speech. Further modifications will 
follow in this chapter. Hence I shall no longer call it tautegoric speech. Nonetheless, 
in order to follow the argument of this essay, it is important to keep in mind that (my 
definition of) ‘literal speech’ and tautegoric speech are closely related to each other. 
Recalling what was set out in the first part, we can now say that the chain of signifi-
ers comes to an end on the synchronic level in that s interprets x as y to a in the con-
text c. This is the basic formula on the basis of which Barth’s understanding of divine 
speech will now be analysed. In chapter two, the focus will be on those passages in 
which Barth places the stress on the difference between divine and human speech. 
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2 The ‘voluntaristic approach’: emphasising the 
difference between divine and human speech 
Emphasising the difference between divine and human speech, Barth points out that 
God says or is able to say something completely different than the preacher – even if, 
once again, divine speech remains mediated by human speech and is always based 
on Scripture. “What God said and what God will say is always quite different from 
what we can and must say to ourselves and others about its content” [i.e. the content 
of the Word of God] (KD I/1, 145). Human proclamation as such, the delivery of the 
sermon, cannot be equated with the concrete fullness of the Word of God, but is only 
a pointer to that fullness (ibid). Due to the fall, human existence constantly under-
goes a divine judgment which divorces profanity from holiness, sin from grace and 
obedience from disobedience. This divorce also applies to human speech, but cannot 
be equated with the difference between ‘worldly’ and ‘religious’ talk, which is still a 
differentiation within the profane realm: “Neither the object nor the intention makes 
human speech sanctified talk about God, just as conversely it does not have to be 
secular because it does not have this object or intention” (KD I/1, 48, emphases 
mine). The differentiation between ‘worldly’ and ‘religious’ talk is, as every human 
attempt to distinguish between faith and non-belief, a necessary but at the same time 
highly ambiguous symptom of the real and definitive divorce between profanity and 
holiness. Nonetheless, it is a necessary symptom: “The constantly consummated 
event of the final divorce, of the event in which God is the actor, casts its shadow 
before in the event of this preliminary divorce in which man acts” (KD I/1, 48).32  
A) A diachronic-pneumatological or an actualistic-
theocentric eschatology? 
There is an obvious tension in this last quotation between what could be called a dia-
chronic-pneumatological and an actualistic-theocentric eschatology, which is char-
acteristic of Barth’s whole dialectical theology. For even if Barth uses temporal ad-
verbs, what is actually at stake here, is not the temporal sequence of events but the 
relationship between divine and human action, and the eschatological qualification 
of the latter by the former. On the one hand, there is the realm of divine action: God 
brings about a final divorce between the profane and the holy. Yet this final divorce 
is not something that will take place ‘at a later point in time’, or ‘at the end of time’ 
(whatever that would mean), but is rather a continual event in time. Now if this de-
finitive divine divorce is something that occurs within the spatio-temporal realm, 
how is it related to the preliminary human divorce between ‘worldly’ and ‘religious’, 
which Barth calls a necessary but ambiguous symptom of the divine separation?  
 
32 The German texts reads: “Das immer wieder sich vollziehende Ereignis jener endgültigen Schei-
dung, jenes Ereignis, in dem Gott der Handelnde ist, wirf in dem Ereignis dieser vorläufigen Schei-
dung, in welchem der Mensch handelt, seinen Schatten voraus“ (KD I/1, 48). 
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Barth says that the definitive divine judgement casts its shadow before in the pre-
liminary human divorce. Yet this expression still allows for various readings since it 
remains unclear in what way the human divorce can be regarded as a pointer to the 
divine divorce. The following statement only increases the confusion as regards the 
relationship between divine and human action: “Jenes Ereignis, in welchem Gott 
handelt, besteht nämlich ebenfalls durchaus darin, dass Menschen von Gott sichtbar 
zum Sein in der sichtbaren Kirche erweckt, ausgesondert und versammelt werden“ 
(KD I/1, 49, emphases mine).33  
The question that needs to be answered is whether there is a contrast between the 
divine and the human divorce between ‘worldly’ and ‘religious’ (both of which are 
visual in the spatio-temporal realm), or whether these two divorces coincide (phe-
nomenologically). Both answers raise further questions which are related to the issue 
of divine and human agency. If the former is the case, how can the divine divorce – 
which ‘also’ has a ‘visual’ character – be thought of without human involvement and 
without reducing God to an ontic agent among others? If the latter is the case, how 
are we to conceive the relationship between divine and human action? More con-
cretely, to what extent has the divine divorce criteriological priority over the human 
separation? Barth continues:34  
A visible opposition between religious and worldly, arising within the profane realm, is now con-
firmed (bestätigt) and preserved (bewährt), not of itself but in this event of divine election, and is 
thereby marked out (ausgezeichnet) as a genuine indication of the opposition between judgment and 
grace, in which it is not a case of this man or that acting against others, but of God acting on men (KD 
I/1, 49, emphases mine). 
This statement clearly points in the direction of the second option mentioned above, 
i.e. the human and the divine divorce seem to coincide. But the crucial question is 
what this divine confirmation (Bestätigung) of the inner-worldly human divorce be-
tween ‘worldly’ and ‘religious’ is supposed to mean. Does it mean that the human 
divorce is perfectly appropriate as it stands and is only sanctioned or authorised by 
God? But if that is so, what does this divine authorisation consist in? Moreover, one 
has to keep in mind that the divinely authorised human divorce between judgment 
and grace is still only a pointer to the real contrast between judgement and grace in 
which God alone acts.  
Before I shall make an attempt to answer these questions, let us return to the issue 
of worldly and religious speech which was the starting point of these reflections. 
Barth concludes: “In the same sense there is human talk distinguished genuinely and 
concretely from other human talk as talk about God; certainly not in and for itself, 
but in virtue of divine confirmation and preservation – divine confirmation and pres-
ervation of what genuinely and concretely distinguishes it from other human talk” 
(KD I/1, 49, italics mine).  
 
33 For exegetical reasons it seems wiser not to translate this complex sentence. 
34 The German text reads: “Ein innerhalb des profanen Bereichs aufspringender sichtbarer Gegensatz 
von „religiös“ und „weltlich“ ist jetzt, nicht an sich, aber in diesem Ereignis göttlicher Erwählung 
bestätigt and bewährt und damit ausgezeichnet als echter Hinweis auf den Gegensatz von Gericht und 
Gnade, in welchem nicht dieser und dieser Mensch anderen gegenüber, wohl aber Gott an den Men-
schen handelt“ (KD I/1, 49). 
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It follows from this that human religious talk within the profane realm is the nec-
essary but not sufficient condition for divine speech to occur. As Barth himself puts 
it, human religious talk is necessary but ambiguous (KD I/1, 48). This leads us back 
to the question of how we are to conceive of what Barth calls the divine confirmation 
of religious talk (occurring within the profane realm). Obviously, this confirmation is 
supposed to disambiguate the necessary, but ambiguous human talk; but in what 
way? And, as Barth makes entirely clear, it is a confirmation of a type of speech that 
is already distinct from other human speech without this divine confirmation. Thus I 
shall try to answer the following questions: a) what marks religious speech off from 
worldly speech and b) what does divine confirmation mean? 
B) Religious speech and worldly speech 
According to Barth, religious speech is Church proclamation: “i.e. the attempt, es-
sayed by one called thereto in the Church, to express in his own words in the form of 
an exposition of a portion of the Biblical testimony to revelation, and to make com-
prehensible to men of his day, the promise of God’s revelation, reconciliation and 
calling, as they are to be expected here and now” (KD I/1, 56). That is to say, what 
marks religious speech off from worldly speech is: the speaker (he must be called), 
the context (Church service), the content (Gospel narratives, Jesus Christ) and the 
way this content is talked about (proclamation aiming to evoke faith).  
Yet the fact that religious talk as such still belongs exclusively to the profane 
realm, even if it meets all the above criteria, reveals a problematic dualism in Barth’s 
theology. God’s action is something additional and external to human speech. A 
genuinely incarnational and Trinitarian theology, however, would conceive of God 
as internally related to human processes of signification. What mediates between the 
postlapsarian, ‘profane’ and the redeemed or ‘religious’ practice of interpretation is a 
diachronic transformation and not a series of punctual events. The reality of God 
must be thought of as a negative or limit concept (see I, 1) that keeps our interpreta-
tive processes and actions going since none of our present convictions and interpreta-
tions can be regarded as the final meanings of signs. Similarly, divine truth is the 
(non-foundationalist) belief in the infinite improvability of our interpretations and 
interpretative strategies. The transition from profane to religious speech must there-
fore be seen as the production of ever better versions of signs, i.e. in terms of a di-
rected serialisation. What is unintelligible, however, is the idea that a sign or a string 
of signs could, by virtue of a mysterious meaning-bestowing act, assume all of a 
sudden its full and ultimate meaning – for it would then cease to be a sign. It follows 
from this that if s interprets x as y from a Christian perspective, the difference be-
tween ‘profane’ and ‘religious’ – not that between God and creation! – is always 
already ‘blurred’. But at the same time, there is room for an infinite progress. 
Barth himself talks of the twofold indirectness of divine revelation (KD I/1, 174). 
According to him, what separates us from God is, first, our createdness, and sec-
ondly, our fallenness. The first difference has been bridged by the incarnation, but 
cannot and must not be overcome. This issue is famously discussed by Barth in terms 
of the dialectic between God’s veiling and unveiling. A Christian understanding of 
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revelation relies on the mediatory function of creaturely signs and thus transcends the 
traditional dualism between idealism and realism which Barth relates to the short-
comings of the neo-Protestant and the Catholic tradition respectively (KD I/1, 168-
194). In other words, the primary sacrament Jesus Christ on the one hand constitutes 
the condition of possibility of human God-talk insofar as the man Jesus of Nazareth 
is itself a creaturely sign-vehicle carrying (a) divine meaning(s). On the other hand, 
Jesus Christ, or more precisely, the first document that reports about the life of Jesus 
from a Christian, i.e. post-Easter perspective, the Gospel narratives, is also the condi-
tion of possibility of appropriate God-talk, since it is itself the first example of truth-
ful talk about God.  
This second aspect concerns the meaning of the signs we generate in our religious 
speech and not just the fact that we use signs whose sign-vehicles are taken from the 
creaturely realm. It is on this second level that the boundary between ‘profane’ and 
‘religious’ is blurred, provided somebody really tries to interpret a particular x from 
the Christian perspective. More precisely, this means that the interpretation of x as y 
is a Christian interpretation to exactly the extent to which it really is a Christian in-
terpretation. This is of course a truism. But it is supposed to make clear that that 
there are degrees of adequacy. It follows from this that s’s interpretation of x as y is 
not the final interpretation of x but must give rise to further acts of interpretation of 
the kind x is y2 and so forth. Thus divine presence manifests itself in the transition 
from the interpretation x is y to x is y2, y3, y4 …, all of which remain human interpre-
tations, but all of which are informed by the primary and secondary sacrament of the 
Christian tradition.35    
C) Divine confirmation 
Barth, however, takes a completely different approach. In the above quotations from 
the Church Dogmatics, divine confirmation can be interpreted in two different ways, 
both of which are equally problematic.  
a) Verification  
Either this confirmation – which Barth calls an event of divine election – merely con-
firms the meaning of the signs produced by a human being without altering their 
meaning. This raises the question of how such a confirmation can be analysed semi-
otically or hermeneutically. If one follows this paradigm, the addressee first knows 
that x is y and then, by virtue of the divine confirmation, knows that the sentence x is 
y is true. Yet this model does not do justice to Peirce’s triadic understanding of the 
sign and ignores the creative and innovative character of every act of knowledge: “A 
sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in 
some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, it creates in the mind of that 
person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it cre-
ates I call the interpretant of the first sign” (CP 2.228).  
 
35 As mentioned in the first chapter, x is not an externally or metaphysically given object which we 
can directly access. Rather, the continuity of the identity of x is internally construed, i.e. itself an act 
of interpretation. 
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Now if one stresses that the representamen creates an equivalent sign in the mind 
of the addressee, one’s focus is on the personal appropriation of the representamen. 
The interpretant is an equivalent sign since it stands for the same object as the repre-
sentamen but replaces the latter in order to make the object semiotically accessible to 
the addressee (in some respect). One could therefore say that equivalence, the fact 
that a sign has the same value as another one, is a synchronic-contextual category. 
What matters is that the addressee understands the sign in his specific context, but 
not that he understands it better than the sender. 
If one emphasises that the sign produced in the mind of the addressee is a more 
developed sign, the focus is on the diachronic-teleological aspect of sign-production. 
The interpretant has a higher value than the representamen, insofar as it is a more 
adequate representation of the (dynamical) object. Nonetheless, in both cases, the 
appropriation of a sign is a creative act leading to an accumulation of meanings (and 
in the latter case even to an improvement of meaning).  
Barth’s understanding of confirmation, however, which I tried to characterise in 
terms of a transition from ‘I know that x is y’ to ‘I know that x is y is true’ is a kind 
of verification. There is no change with regard to content (x is y) but an epistemic 
authentication brought about by God himself. Yet Barth does not see this shift as the 
transition from fides to visio, but rather as the difference between non-belief and 
faith. However, the notion of an unreserved divine authorisation of a fallible human 
statement is outright dangerous. Although the interpretation of x as y may well be 
informed by the primary/secondary sacrament, it is still a human interpretation and 
therefore fallible. Put differently, it is only one interpretation of x in a directed seri-
alisation that needs to be infinitely improved. For this reason, God’s presence should 
not be conceived of in terms of a miraculous intervention that externally authorises 
human utterances. Rather, divine presence is located in the transition from one inter-
pretant to another and leads to an infinite series of interpretations. It thus reveals the 
inexhaustible semantic depth of every object as well the infinite transformability of 
the interpreter who mediates between creator and creation.  
b) Difference-in-unity 
However, in the context of the whole Prolegomena, the above interpretation (i.e. 
confirmation as verification) does hardly do justice to Barth’s understanding of reve-
lation. Rather, divine intervention is thought of as an act that alters the meaning of 
the creaturely signs. What is at stake here, is the question of how a sign-vehicle 
which is part of  the semiotic system of a culture can assume a divine meaning (in the 
act of revelation) in addition to its immanent meanings (KD I/2, 243ff, II/1 § 27). 
This issue concerns all three forms of the Word of God: the man Jesus of Nazareth, 
the Biblical text and human speech in the act of proclamation. And Barth goes to 
great pains in the Prolegomena to show that the question of how this transformation 
takes place must be answered in each of these three cases individually (KD I/2, §§ 
13-15; 19-21; 22-24). In this chapter, however, the discussion will be confined to the 
issue of how the phonic signs produced in the proclamation assume an additional 
meaning. As already indicated, Barth often emphasises the difference between that 
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which the preacher says and that which God says, although divine speech remains 
based on and mediated by human speech (KD I/1,145). Hence what needs to be ex-
plained is how this difference-in-unity is to be thought of. 
Now in the passages quoted above, religious speech already has a distinct charac-
ter ‘before’ the divine intervention (KD I/1, 47, cf. I/2, 855). That is to say, the mean-
ings of the signs produced by the human preacher are of importance, even if they 
have to undergo a sort of ‘transformation’. But how can this transformation be 
thought of? Clearly, the difference in meaning that occurs must be analysed in terms 
of a receiver/addressee-related pragmatics. For it would be a very crude anthropo-
morphism to ascribe to God the generation of sound units – in addition to the ones 
produced by the human proclaimer. Consequently, this ‘surplus’ of meaning must be 
related to the act of reception.   
Approaching this problem from a Trinitarian perspective, I shall elaborate on the 
above distinction between a synchronic-contextual a) and a diachronic-teleological 
b) interpretation.  
a) From a pragmatic point of view, it is trivial to say that one and the same speech 
can and always will be decoded in many different ways, even if one focuses solely 
on the synchronic aspect of interpretation. For each of the addressees has to a certain 
extent a different interpretative horizon even if they are all co-present with the 
speaker so that they share a common context. The notion of a totally univocal mean-
ing that is identically imposed on all recipients is by no means required for success-
ful and non-arbitrary communication – and apart from that, utterly unintelligible. 
And although there is nothing specifically theological about this pragmatic insight, it 
is possible to interpret it within a Trinitarian framework. The sermon composed by 
the preacher can be regarded as the prolongation of the Logos aspect of revelation: 
certain creaturely signs assume “along with what they are and mean within this 
world, in themselves, and from the standpoint of immanence […] another nature and 
meaning from the side of the objective reality of revelation, i.e., from the side of the 
incarnation or the Word” (KD I/2, 243). The Pneuma aspect, however, stands for the 
dissemination of the Logos, the multiple receptions of the Word on the part of the 
addressees. If one argues along these lines, Barth’s statement that God can say some-
thing completely different than the human preacher would simply amount to empha-
sising the Pneuma aspect – not necessarily at the expense of the Logos aspect. As he 
writes himself: “[T]he Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Father and also of the Son. He 
is not a Spirit beside the Word. He is the Spirit of the Word itself who brings to our 
ears the Word and nothing but the Word” (KD I/2, 261, cf. 258). And the pragmatic 
function of the Spirit is complete if we recall that when God speaks, he “always has 
something very specific to say to each man, something that applies alone to him and 
to him alone” (KD I/1, 145). So if we interpret Barth as favourably as possible, we 
could say that he tries to take into account the Logos aspect as well as the Pneuma 
aspect, but simply at times places the stress on the latter rather than the former. I call 
this interpretation synchronic-contextual since differences in meaning occur primar-
ily on the synchronic level and exist due to the different interpretative horizons of the 
addressees.  
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b) The diachronic-teleological interpretation of the difference-in-unity model, 
however, accentuates the innovative and teleological aspect of the work of the Spirit. 
As mentioned above, the reality of God is thought of as a limit concept that keeps our 
interpretative processes and actions going, since none of our present convictions and 
interpretations can be regarded as the final meaning of a sign. Accordingly, the tran-
sition from profane to religious speech must be understood as the production of ever 
better versions of signs, i.e. in terms of a directed serialisation. Now if s interprets x 
as y to a in the context c, this cannot be the ultimate interpretation of x but must give 
rise to further acts of interpretation of the kind x is y2, y3 and so forth, all of which 
remain human interpretations, but all of which are informed by the primary sacra-
ment through the secondary sacrament. Thus the diachronic-teleological interpreta-
tion highlights this innovative aspect of the reception of the Word but to a certain 
extent abstracts from the different interpretative horizons of the addressees. That is to 
say, difference is primarily thought of in diachronic terms, as a series of perspectival 
but directed interpretations, which lead to an ever deeper understanding of the object 
of interpretation. It goes without saying that not every reception of an act of interpre-
tation of the kind s interprets x as y to a in the context c will automatically lead to an 
increase in knowledge. Nonetheless, it may lead – under certain circumstances – to a 
refined perception of x and thus constitute a real progress. Furthermore, it is impor-
tant to notice that the two different interpretations a) and b) are not mutually exclu-
sive but can be combined.  
Yet it is very questionable whether interpretation b) is compatible with the basic 
structure of Barth’s theology as set out in the Prolegomena. As is well-known, Barth 
hardly allows for any continuity as far as the reception of the divine Word is con-
cerned but rather thinks of faith in terms of a series of individual events. Even if it 
cannot be denied that in the event of faith, the believer may well be aware that he 
believed before and will again believe in the future, this state of believing, which 
embraces past, present and future, is not identical with faith: “… [A]s distinct from it 
[i.e. faith], it is never something which is there already. It is always a gift which has 
to be seized again and again …” (KD I/2, 791). Yet the diachronic-teleological model 
sketched above does require a certain continuity-in-discontinuity and is therefore 
scarcely compatible with Barth’s understanding of faith.  
There is another aspect that clearly separates Barth’s understanding of revelation 
from a diachronic-teleological model. As we have seen above, even if there is a di-
vine election and confirmation of religious speech within the profane realm, this is 
still only a “genuine indication (Hinweis) of the opposition between judgement and 
grace, in which it is not a case of this man or that acting against others, but of God 
acting on men” (KD I/1, 49, italics mine). This statement plays off divine and human 
agency against each other and amounts to saying that finally, the relationship be-
tween human beings and God will no longer be mediated by signs; for human action 
is inextricably linked up with processes of signification and time.  
Let me return to what I called the difference-in-unity model. In the above discus-
sion, particularly in a), it was emphasised that divine election and confirmation con-
cerns a type of human speech that is already marked off as religious speech within 
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the profane realm. Yet there are other statements in the Prolegomena which under-
mine the balanced Trinitarian approach sketched in a) and reinforce certain volun-
taristic tendencies in Barth’s thought.  
c) Voluntarism 
To begin with, let me return to the quotation that served as the starting point for this 
discussion: “Neither the subject nor the intention makes human speech sanctified talk 
about God, just as conversely it does not have to be secular because it does not have 
this subject or intention” (KD I/1, 48, italics mine). To be sure, taken in isolation, 
this second part of the sentence can be read in many different ways. For instance, the 
formula that is supposed to represent what I called ‘literal speech’, allows for an un-
derstanding of religious talk that dispenses to a certain extent with explicitly reli-
gious terms such as God, creation, etc. Rather, the Christian dimension of an act of 
interpretation is hidden in the as-structure of ‘s interprets x as y to a in the context c’. 
In other words, one could read the above quotation in the sense that we do not need 
to talk about God (interpretation3) in order to talk as Christians, for it suffices that 
our acts of communication are informed by a Christian practice of interpretation1, 
which may remain ‘hidden’. In the context of the Prolegomena and its stress on 
Church proclamation, however, this interpretation is not plausible. Rather, the differ-
ence between divine and human speech is envisaged in a different way and points in 
the direction of a voluntarism.  
Before I conclude this chapter, let me sum up the above analyses by distinguish-
ing between four different degrees of difference between divine and human speech 
(the paragraphs c) and d) are based on material that has not been discussed yet and 
provide further evidence for Barth’s voluntaristic tendencies). 
a) Coincidence: Divine and human speech ‘coincide’. This is not to say, of course, 
that either God becomes man, or man God in the sense of an ontological identity. 
Rather, speech is taken to be a human phenomenon (and only a human phenomenon) 
that can be more or less informed by a Christian understanding of reality.  
b) Relative independence: There are a number of statements in the Prolegomena 
that emphasise the relative independence of divine from human speech. As Barth 
points out, formal and material perfection is not required, since even the highest pos-
sible perfection would not make human talk proclamation, nor could the least perfec-
tion prevent it from being proclamation (KD I/1, 53). Such statements seem to sug-
gest that for divine speech to occur, humanly produced speech nonetheless needs to 
have a distinct character and a certain quality, even if the difference between divine 
and human speech is emphasised. It is only that formal or material perfection is not 
required, and that even the least perfection need not be an insurmountable obstacle 
for real proclamation to be possible.36 For this reason, there is no qualitative but only 
a gradual difference between a) and b); both allow for difference-in-unity.     
 
36 In fact, Barth introduces another criterion. The whole passage reads: “Verkündigung ist also nicht 
nach ihrer formellen oder inhaltlichen Vollkommenheit gefragt – höchste Vollkommenheit würde 
menschliche Rede noch nicht zur Verkündigung machen und geringste könnte sie noch nicht hindern, 
Verkündigung zu sein – wohl aber danach, ob sie Dienst ist, ob sie Auftrag habe (KD I/1, 53, cf. 57-
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c) Mild voluntarism: At times, Barth goes a step further, when he contends that 
divine speech is not restricted to the proclamation of the Church, even if it is still tied 
to creaturely signs. What is different in c) compared to a) and b), is that the meaning 
of the signs by means of which God communicates are more or less insignificant for 
divine speech to occur. But here too, one has to be careful not to misread Barth. To 
be sure, he does say that God’s Word is not restricted to the Church’s proclamation: 
“He [i.e. God] can establish Church directly and newly, when and wherever he 
likes”, and “God may speak to us through Russian Communism, a flute concerto, a 
blossoming shrub, or a dead dog” (KD I/1, 54f, cf. 60). In principle, this kind of ad-
dress can be viewed as an interpretation of the world in the light of the ‘primary sac-
rament’. The Christian reads the divine presence, mediated by Scripture, ‘into’ the 
world. Even experiences such as ‘being addressed by God through a dead dog’ etc., 
in which the addressee appears to be only passively involved, can very well fall into 
this category, for it is not required that the addressee be aware of an act of interpreta-
tion. Furthermore, the Christian construal of an experience can also occur with some 
delay, in the sense that the interpretative skills acquired at a later point in time enable 
me to discern new possibilities of sense in a past event.37  
The reason why this is possible is due to the fact that Russian Communism and 
flute concertos project worlds (though in very different ways) that can be related to a 
Christian understanding of reality. Even a non-liberal understanding of theology will 
not operate with a dualism that only distinguishes between the Christian and the 
secular realm. Rather, it is possible to discriminate – from the Christian perspective – 
within the non-Christian perspectives between logoi that are ‘closer’ or ‘further 
away’ from the Christian Logos. In other words, there are degrees of similarity. One 
even has to go a step further. Since the Christian perspective is not something that is 
already fully given (synchronically and diachronically), even the most radical atheist 
critique of Christianity may (under certain circumstances), turn out to be an appro-
priate ‘remedy’ for Christian theology, which purges it from its non-Christian con-
taminations. Therefore these non-Christian perspectives can be critically and con-
structively related to, or even combined with the Christian Logos, without denying 
the latter’s criteriological priority or absoluteness. Nonetheless, if such a self-critical 
process of interpretation takes place, it is the Christian theologian and/or the Church 
which decides whether an external and critical interpretation of Christianity needs to 
be accepted or not. 
The only problem is that such an interpretative competence or gift of discernment 
– which is to a certain extent ‘possessed’ by human beings – is hardly compatible 
with Barth’s understanding of revelation as developed in the Prolegomena. This is 
not to deny that there are certain hints that point in the direction of an understanding 
of faith as interpretative skill (cf. KD I/1, 58). Nonetheless, the negative statements 
undoubtedly have a greater weight. For this reason one is almost compelled to inter-
 
59, italics mine). Yet does this really constitute an additional criterion? Rather, if these conditions are 
fulfilled, it must be manifest in the text or speech produced by the human preacher. That is, human 
speech must have distinct features that can be examined and assessed by a qualified authority. 
37 This is not to say that there cannot be new experiences to which we react linguistically. 
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pret the above passages in terms of a voluntarism that tends to bypass God’s Trinitar-
ian self-revelation – which otherwise plays an important role in Barth’s theology.   
d) Strong voluntarism: In c), creaturely sign-vehicles are still indispensable. Even 
if they are – at least in extreme cases – stripped of all the meanings they represent. 
Now the most radical version of difference consists in what could be called a fully 
developed voluntarism that even does away with ‘empty’ sign-vehicles. In other 
words, it is believed that meanings can be immediately apprehended by the human 
mind, without the mediation of signs, i.e. by intuition.  
From a Trinitarian perspective, one could say that the third person of the Trinity 
operates wholly independently of the second person. To be sure, this model does not 
play an important role in the Prolegomena. Nonetheless, Barth explicitly mentions 
this possibility. He approvingly quotes from a Reformed Synod of 1624, which dis-
tinguishes between the external (Word and sacrament) and the internal (Holy Spirit) 
aspect of a human being’s calling. But, as he points out, not every conversion can be 
analysed into an objective and a subjective element. In some rare cases, God may 
call somebody merely interno tantum Spiritus sancti lumine ac numine absque ex-
terno verbi sui ministerio ad se vocat. This internal enlightenment is sufficient to 
achieve salvation, even if it is not God’s usual way of evoking faith. Accordingly, the 
author of the Confession admits that this type of conversion, by an internal testimony 
of the Spirit alone, is not only extraordinary (extraordinarius), but also unknown to 
us (nobisque incognitus).38 Nonetheless, God may act in this way any time he wants 
to. However, due to his theocentric orientation, Barth emphatically points out that 
this inner testimony of the Spirit is neither to be confused with the notion of innate 
ideas, nor with the idea of an internal light that is part of human nature. Rather, even 
if the objective aspect of revelation is abandoned, it is still God who acts and bestows 
the gift of the Spirit upon a particular person.  
The origin of this model of revelation lies in the Middle Ages. According to the 
late medieval notion of God’s potentia absoluta, there is the possibility of notitia 
intuitiva of non-existents: „cognitio intuitiva potest esse per potentiam divinam de 
obiecto non existente“.39 Ockham claims that God is able to produce the effects of 
secondary causes even if the latter are absent so that everything can be attributed to 
his omnipotence, provided it does not entail anything self-contradictory. As a result, 
divine action not only bypasses the ‘primary sacrament’ Jesus Christ, and thereby 
loses its Trinitarian character, but also cancels out all mediation by creaturely 
signs.40   
 
38 Synopsis Purioris Theologiæ (1624), Disp. 30, 32-33. 
39 W. of Ockham, Quodlibeta Septem, VI, q. 6. My italics. 
40 Cf. H. Obermann, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, 30-56. 
 
 
66
3 The ‘soteriological approach’: the correspon-
dence between divine and human speech 
A great deal of what Barth writes in the Prolegomena, however, points in the direc-
tion of a possible correspondence between divine and human speech. Already in the 
first volume of the Church Dogmatics, the time-eternity dualism which dominated 
the early stage of his theology – and which also accounts for the problems in connec-
tion with the difference-in-unity model discussed above – at times gives way to a 
theologically more convincing soteriological model. What hinders human beings 
from talking appropriately about God and the world is not their finitude but their 
fallenness. The focus is no longer on the fact that God acts in a creaturely reality, but 
that he acts in a creaturely reality that contradicts him (cf. KD I/1, 174). Accordingly, 
the problem is not that our communicative acts need to rely on creaturely signs, but 
only that we do not use these signs in a theologically appropriate way. Barth writes: 
“We will not say: finitum, but we will say: homo peccator non capax – and we will 
not continue: infiniti, but verbi Domini” (KD I/1, 231). This opens up space for a true 
being-together (Beieinandersein) or union (Einssein) of the divine and the human 
Logos (KD I/1, 255). “The miracle of real proclamation does not consist in the fact 
that the willing and doing of proclaiming man with all its conditioning and in all its 
problems is set aside, that in some way a disappearance takes place and a gap arises 
in the reality of nature, and that in some way there steps into this gap naked divine 
reality […] God and the human element are not two co-existing and co-operating 
factors. The human element is what God created. Only in a state of disobedience is it 
a factor standing over against God. In the state of obedience it is service of God” 
(KD I/1, 95f). Thus the soteriological approach underlines the finite character of 
creation but at the same time emphasises that human beings are rendered capable by 
God’s salvific intervention to construe reality in a way that reveals the world as 
God’s good creation.  
The soteriological approach therefore raises the question of how the nature of this 
being-together (Beieinandersein) or union (Einssein) between the divine and the hu-
man Logos is to be thought of. In other words, it needs to be examined how we are to 
conceive divine presence within the spatio-temporal realm. To put this semiotically, 
the following analysis will investigate how far Barth’s conception of divine revela-
tion is grounded in a triadic understanding of the sign. For as outlined in part one, it 
is precisely the triadic theory of the sign which tries to do justice to the finite condi-
tions under which all our processes of signification and communication take place. A 
genuinely incarnational theology cannot ignore this philosophical insight but at the 
same time faces the task of elucidating how the presence of the infinite in the finite 
can be thought of.  
The idea of divine speech will remain the pivot around which this examination re-
volves. In chapter A) I shall take a ‘bottom-up’ approach to divine speech, which 
means that revelation is analysed from the anthropological perspective of faith. This 
investigation will lead to an understanding of faith as meaning-fulfilment and (to a 
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certain extent) to a theory of meaning as reference or semantics. Divine speech is 
that factor in this process which precipitates meaning-fulfilment or which (re-
)establishes the revelatory meaning of a term.  
In chapter B), by contrast, I shall take a ‘top-down’ approach to divine speech, in 
the sense that the analysis will be based on a sender-related pragmatic theory.41 This 
attempt proves useful since Barth’s theocentric theology stresses the agency of the 
sender at the expense of that of the addressee. However, as the formula which serves 
as the hermeneutical paradigm in the second part of this essay suggests – s interprets 
x as y to a in the context c – there are receiver-related pragmatic factors that need to 
be taken into account as well. For communication to be successful, both the codes 
and sub-codes of the sender and those of the addressee must be paid attention to – 
even if they only emerge in the course of communication. And it is primarily the 
receiver-related pragmatic factors which are neglected by Barth. There is an imbal-
ance insofar as Barth (for theological reasons) disregards the codes that are always 
already assigned to a sign-vehicle and the specific position it occupies in the semiotic 
system of a culture. Barth’s ideal is that the revelatory meaning which the sign-
vehicle comes to signify is exclusively based on the meaning-bestowing act of the 
sender. But as I shall try to show, this neglection of receiver-related pragmatic fac-
tors has far-reaching consequences for the question of authority.  
In any case, the following analyses of divine speech on the basis of a ‘bottom-up’ 
and a ‘top-down’ approach make abundantly clear that Barth’s conception of divine 
revelation is not informed by a triadic understanding of the sign.  
A) A ‘bottom-up’ approach to divine speech 
a) The noetic aspect and pragmatics  
It has been pointed out most recently that Barth’s notion of divine revelation is based 
on a triadic understanding of semiosis.42 But can this claim really be substantiated? 
Barth distinguishes between God’s primary and secondary objectivity (Gegen-
ständlichkeit) (KD II/1, 15-18). As God first and foremost knows himself in his intra-
divine life, he is also first and foremost objective to himself (primary objectivity). 
Only secondarily God becomes an object of knowledge for creation as well (secon-
dary objectivity). The latter is only possible since God lets himself be known by us 
as he knows himself. However, there is a fundamental difference between these two 
modes of knowledge. Whereas God knows himself immediately, our knowledge of 
God is always mediated by creaturely signs, which are as such non-divine, i.e. differ-
ent from God. Nonetheless, this indirect knowledge of God is real knowledge of him 
and it is only real if it is indirect. Accordingly, human beings stand directly before a 
creaturely object, one of the series of all other creaturely objects, but only indirectly 
before God. The objectivity of this object stands for God’s objectivity. In perceiving 
(wahrnehmen), considering (anschauen) and comprehending (begreifen) this object, 
 
41 E. v. Savigny, Zeichen, 1792-1794. 
42 M. Moxter, Kultur als Lebenswelt, 267. 
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human beings perceive, consider and comprehend God – without blurring the fun-
damental difference between creation and creator. To identify the creaturely object 
itself with the divine, i.e. to abstract from its revelatory framework, would amount to 
idolatry. No contingent-historical entity can be equated with the content of revela-
tion. The subject as well as the content of revelation is only God himself. Thus the 
attempt to elevate the historical figure Jesus of Nazareth to an object of worship 
comes down to an idolisation of creation.43  
According to Barth, creaturely objects only become signs of divine presence due 
to God’s foundation and institution. An essential aspect of Barth’s critique of the 
Catholic analogia entis is to emphasise that these objects do signify divine presence 
because God presses them into service and not by virtue of an inherent capacity. In 
their original context, these creaturely objects do not signify God, nor are they apt to 
become testimonies to revelation. Rather, this foundation and institution is accom-
plished by the “omnipotence of the divine will” (KD I/2, 244; cf. II/1, 260). As Mox-
ter puts it, Barth’s concept of the sign is not “ontologically grounded” but “pragmati-
cally interpreted”.44 Yet it is not entirely clear what the difference between ‘onto-
logical’ and ‘pragmatical’ in this context really consists in. For even if particular 
attention is paid to the pragmatic dimension of meaning, this need not necessarily be 
a hindrance to developing an ontology. If one translates Moxter’s use of the term 
‘ontological’ into semiotic idiom, one could perhaps say that there is no iconicity 
between the creaturely object and what it stands for.45 This interpretation will at least 
serve as the starting point for the following discussion.  
Moxter believes that there is only one exception to the above principle in Barth’s 
theology, which concerns the relationship between the miracle of the virgin birth and 
the mystery of the incarnation.46 That is to say, here we do find a relation of iconicity 
since the virgin birth (signifier) does ‘resemble’ the incarnation (signified).47 Ac-
cording to Barth, the virgin birth can only signify the incarnation as there is a noetic 
and ontic analogy between the two relata.48 What does this analogy consist in? Barth 
answers in the following way: The virgin birth denotes the mystery of revelation (in-
carnation), i.e. God, and only God, stands at the beginning of revelation, and not the 
arbitrary abilities of a human being; God reveals himself in Jesus Christ out of the 
hiddennes of his divinity; God reveals himself by veiling himself. And it is a noetic 
 
43 K. Barth, Unterricht in der christlichen Religion, 108-110. Since the discipline of history is per-
spectival too, one must speak of a plurality of historical disciplines. What Barth has in mind here, 
however, is the picture of the ‘historical Jesus’ which dominated his time. Barth’s critique is inaccu-
rate as he seems to think that revelation is something in addition to this (supposedly) ‘neutral’ histori-
cal Jesus.  
44 M. Moxter, Kultur als Lebenswelt, 260. 
45 Peirce provides various definitions of iconicity. For instance, the sign resembles that which it stands 
for (CP 3.362), or it takes part in the characters of the object (CP 4.531). For a critique of the tradi-
tional understanding of iconicity see U. Eco, A Theory of Semiotics, 191ff. 
46 M. Moxter, Kultur als Lebenswelt, 260, fn 384. 
47 In fact, there is at least one more ‘exception’, namely the relation between the tomb and the mystery 
of revelation. For Barth, the virgin birth and the empty tomb belong together and form one single sign 
(KD I/2, 199). 
48 „A sign must, of course, signify. To do so it must have in itself something of the kind of thing it 
signifies; it must be in analogy with it noetically and ontically“ (KD I/2, 198). 
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and ontic analogy since, like God’s Trinitarian revelation (in Christ and Spirit), also 
the virgin birth consists of an objective and a subjective aspect, i.e. it has an ontic as 
well as a noetic dimension. Accordingly, there are two different ways in which its 
miraculous character can be misinterpreted. On the subjective level, it may be re-
garded as an error, illusion, fiction, etc., and on the objective level it can be viewed 
as a hitherto unexplained creaturely mystery that is in principle explainable without 
recourse to God  (KD I/2, 198).   
In what follows I will make an attempt to reinterpret Moxter’s distinction between 
an ‘ontological’ and a ‘pragmatic’ understanding of the sign. First, I shall try to show 
that it is possible to construe Barth’s understanding of the sign in ontological terms – 
provided one takes the whole process of revelation or divine semiosis into account. 
The second point concerns the relationship between the miracle of the virgin birth 
and the mystery of incarnation. At first glance, there seems indeed to be a kind of 
(‘horizontal’) iconicity between the sign (virgin birth) and what it stands for (incar-
nation). However, a closer look reveals that what really connects these two events is 
their common (‘vertical’) divine grounding. More precisely, they both only signify 
their revelatory meanings insofar as they are part of a divine act of communication. 
In this sense, it is correct to say that there is an ontological bond between them.  
a) Barth’s insistence that both events (i.e. the virgin birth and the incarnation) can 
only be grasped if one takes the noetic as well as the ontic aspect into account can be 
interpreted in terms of a semiotic (or triadic) understanding of ‘being’. For this rea-
son, one should not establish too quickly a contrast between an ontological founda-
tion of the sign and a pragmatic interpretation. Already in the 1920s Barth develops a 
theory of revelation which transcends the traditional divide between realism and ide-
alism.49 Yet what he calls the “real reality” (Röm I, 87) or the “most real” (KD IV/1, 
88) denotes first and foremost the eschatological reality of the risen Christ. Hence the 
world only ‘is’ insofar as it participates in this reality, and what mediates between 
these two realms is Barth’s an- and enhypostatic Christology.50 This eschatological 
reality of the risen Christ is always already disclosed and directed at a human subject 
(KD IV/2, 136). On the other hand, even in the act of revelation, God remains the 
non-given. He is the self-revealing subject and can only be known in and through 
himself.51 But in freely revealing himself to us God does become the object of our 
experience – which always consists of an external (ontic) and an internal (noetic) 
aspect.52 In other words, the eschatological reality of the risen Christ is only present 
to us in that God addresses human beings through creaturely signs which come to 
convey a divine content. This leads us back to the ontic and noetic analogy between 
the miracle of the virgin birth and the mystery of incarnation.  
Although Barth develops an explicitly theological understanding of reality, the 
formal aspect of his theory to a certain extent parallels issues that are discussed in 
 
49 Cf. Röm II, 88, 144; Schicksal und Idee in der Theologie, 360f. 
50 Cf. K. Barth, Unterricht in der christlichen Religion, 191ff. 
51 Ibid., 105f. 
52 K. Barth, Schicksal und Idee in der Theologie, 360f. 
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contemporary philosophy.53 Simon tries to develop a general ontology within the 
framework of his philosophy of the sign. From this perspective, the philosophical 
discipline of ontology amounts to an interpretation of the sign ‘being’. If somebody 
says in a particular context and to a certain addressee, ‘x is y’, without there being a 
need to replace the word ‘is’ by another, more concrete sign, ‘is’ can be regarded as a 
copula which immediately leads to acceptance: “‘Being’ means that the passage from 
the subject to the predicate, as an explication of the subject, is understood ‘immedi-
ately’, thus without detour via a further contextual sign, and therefore without detour 
via a sign more concrete in comparison with ‘is’. ‘Being’ is the sign for such an 
‘immediately’ successful outcome […] so that nothing more is to be said about it 
…”.54  
b) Once again, on a formal level there are indeed similarities to Barth’s theology, 
insofar as both approaches transcend the dichotomy between realism and idealism. 
But Barth is not at all concerned with establishing criteria for a general ontology. 
This is also the reason why there cannot be a merely formal analogy between the 
virgin birth and the incarnation. Rather, there is an ontological bond between these 
events since both of them are grounded in the same divine reality. More precisely, 
what renders Barth’s ontology a theological ontology, or a theocentric ontology, is 
the fact that God selects the sign-vehicle (ontic aspect) out of a great number of pos-
sible sign-vehicles, and also provides the (new) meaning of this sign-vehicle (noetic 
aspect). Only thus does God’s action in the world comprise the totality of creaturely 
reality (cf. KD I/2, 198). According to Barth’s model, the incarnation and the virgin 
birth are not signs that denote a pre-linguistic divine realm. Rather, God figures as 
the subject of a speech-act that interprets something as something to somebody and 
thus brings the chain of interpretation to an end. And the ‘is’ in the statement ‘x is y’ 
stands exactly for this termination, i.e. an immediate understanding is accomplished 
so that no further signs are required. In the Prolegomena, Barth hardly ever deploys 
explicitly ontological terminology. But there are nonetheless a number of statements 
that clearly support such an interpretation: “‘God’s Word’ means: God speaks […] It 
is the truth as it is God’s speaking person, Dei loquentis persona […] It is the objec-
tive reality, in that it is also the subjective, the subjective that is God” (KD I/1, 141).  
It follows from this that Barth’s theocentric ontology entails a pragmatic dimen-
sion (the noetic aspect) so that there cannot be a (direct) contrast between an onto-
logical and a pragmatic understanding of the sign. Thus the sign of the virgin birth 
and its iconic relation to the incarnation via the ontic and noetic aspect of divine 
revelation is not an exception. Rather, this Trinitarian structure is the paradigm of 
divine action par excellence. However, it goes without saying that this extremely 
tentative interpretation of Barth’s idea of revelation on the basis of Simon’s philoso-
phical ontology does not lead to a satisfactory theological ontology. In actual fact, 
 
53 Cf. „Realismus und Idealismus sind keine absoluten Gegensätze, keine einander ausschließenden 
dogmatischen Möglichkeiten mehr, sondern sie sind auf vielfältige Weise miteinander verzwickt – 
jedenfalls, was den Prozeß der Erkenntnisbildung und -strukturierung angeht“, H. Lenk, Interpretation 
und Realität, 258. 
54 J. Simon, Philosophie des Zeichens, 123. 
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the result is an actualistic ontology. A more sophisticated theory would have to take 
into account the diachronic aspect as well. But this project cannot be pursued here. 
The differentiation between the ontic and the noetic aspect raises a further ques-
tion: Every creaturely sign-vehicle can assume a range of different meanings which 
is delineated by the semiotic system of a particular culture. But how are we to think 
the relationship between these possible meanings and the meaning(s) the sign-vehicle 
takes on in the act of revelation? A merely pragmatic understanding of the sign – 
what Moxter calls the ‘normal’ case in Barth and which is opposed to the alleged 
‘exception’ discussed above – would amount to overemphasising the noetic at the 
expense of the ontic aspect. Put differently, the divine selection of sign-vehicles from 
the creaturely realm would then be viewed as something completely arbitrary. This 
would again lead to a kind of ‘semi-voluntarism’.  
However, the reason why the notion of an arbitrary selection of a sign-vehicle is 
unintelligible is not due to the fact that there is an iconic relationship between the 
signifier and the signified. That is to say, the restrictions as regards the selection are 
due to the meanings a sign-vehicle may represent in a given semiotic system. Al-
ready Saussure emphasised that the bond between the signifier and the signified is 
utterly arbitrary and bestows on the whole language system (langue) a conventional 
character. But although the signifiers are apparently freely chosen with respect to the 
ideas they represent, they are nonetheless immutable with respect to the linguistic 
community that uses them. Yet Saussure of course allows for a diachronic change of 
meanings, for such shifts of meaning can easily be detected if one analyses languages 
historically.  
Accordingly, for divine revelation to be meaningful, God’s parole must take the 
culturally determined codes of a particular langue into account, otherwise it will re-
main unintelligible and devoid of any transformative power. This has of course con-
sequences for the perennial theological debate about the relationship between nature 
and grace (cf. III, 1, B, e). 
b) Semantics 
Nonetheless, even if there cannot be a direct contrast between a pragmatic and an 
ontological understanding of the sign, Barth’s use of the ontic and noetic aspect is to 
a certain extent asymmetrical or unbalanced. In spite of the fact that the notion of an 
‘arbitrary’ selection of a sign-vehicle is unintelligible, Barth’s understanding of reve-
lation comes close to such a view and is therefore not informed by triadic semiosis. 
This imbalance or asymmetry now needs to be further investigated. However, it is 
not my intention to find one single theory of meaning that matches Barth’s under-
standing of revelation best. Rather, as indicated above, I shall look at his model of 
divine speech from different angles and accordingly select in each case that theory of 
meaning which is best suited to shed light on the point at issue. In this chapter, reve-
lation will be analysed from the anthropological perspective of faith, leading to three 
different, though interrelated hermeneutical models: faith as meaning fulfilment, 
(revelatory) meaning as reference and a narrative approach to meaning. These three 
approaches to divine revelation are grouped under the heading ‘semantics’ since they 
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primarily deal with the relationship between the sign and that which it stands for, 
whereas the syntactic and pragmatic dimensions of meaning recede into the back-
ground.   
To begin with, I shall investigate Barth’s understanding of faith in comparison 
with Husserl’s theory of evidence or meaning-fulfilment.55    
Knowledge and faith as meaning-fulfilment 
Moxter holds that Barth’s concept of revelation is based on the idea of representa-
tion. Since knowledge of God is always mediated by signs, Barth’s theology tran-
scends a naïve realism as well as a naïve constructivism. To further explore this tenet 
of Barth’s approach, he draws a comparison between divine revelation in Barth and 
Husserl’s theory of representation.56  
According to Willard, Husserl’s work on knowledge (Erkenntnis) can be divided 
into three mains stages: the first phase spans the time up until 1894 which culminates 
in the articulation of the pivotal concept of fulfilment. The second stage ends in the 
fifth Logical Investigation where he eliminates the ‘immanent object’ and develops a 
theory of intentionality in which fulfilment establishes a real relationship between 
the representation and a mind-independent object. The third stage terminates in the 
sixth Logical Investigation where he characterises knowledge as a higher-order act: 
“The actual union of the conceptualizing act with the object, on the basis of a corre-
sponding intuition of that object together with a recognition of the identity of the 
object of the concept and of the perception, is what knowledge is as an act”.57 
Husserl’s early essay of 1894, Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic, which 
belongs to the first phase of his work, will serve as the starting point for the intended 
comparison.58  
According to Husserl, it is possible to draw a distinction between presentations 
(Vorstellungen) which are intuitions (Anschauungen) and those which are representa-
tions (Repräsentationen).59 Representations do no include their objects in themselves 
as immanent contents, i.e. the objects are not present within consciousness but are 
merely intended. That is to say, a content that is not in consciousness is aimed at, 
minded or referred to with understanding (mit Verständnis hindeuten), by means of 
some contents which are given in consciousness.  
 
55 At least as far as Husserl is concerned, it is somewhat misleading to discuss it under the title Seman-
tics. As Simons writes: “One indisputable effect of the transcendental turn on Husserl’s semantics is 
that questions of actual truth and reference are among those “bracketed” in the phenomenological 
reductions, so a fully-fledged semantics, a theory designed to explicate the relationship between lan-
guage and extra-linguistic reality, cannot find a place within transcendental phenomenology”, P. 
Simons, Meaning and language, 126. Yet there is nonetheless a semantic dimension to Husserl’s 
philosophy provided one focuses on the terms evidence and meaning-fulfilment. 
56 M. Moxter, Kultur als Lebenswelt, 263-273. Moxter draws on Adriaanse’s 1974 doctoral thesis 
which explores the relationship between Barth’s and Husserl’s early thought: see H.J. Adriaanse, Zu 
den Sachen selbst. The latest works Adriaanse takes into account are Barth’s Röm II of 1922 and 
Husserl’s Logical Investigations of 1900/01 (2nd Ed. 1913/22). 
57 D. Willard, Knowledge, 152. 
58 E. Husserl, Psychologische Studien zur Elementaren Logik. 
59 Ibid., 107f. 
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Intuitions, by contrast, are presentations or psychic experiences that do not merely 
intend their objects but which really include those in themselves as their immanent 
contents. Now each representation points, directly or indirectly, in the direction of an 
intuition that corresponds to it but which is not actual.60 By contrast, not every intui-
tion is based on a preceding representation. Yet if there does occur a transition from 
a representation to an intuition, the intention of the intending subject is fulfilled.  
Husserl gives the following example to illustrate the above distinction. Suppose I 
stand in front of ‘our theatre’ and perceive it. An ‘ordinary consciousness’, as 
Husserl calls it, believes to have an intuition of the theatre as such. This idea Husserl 
rejects as mere illusion, for as he points out, only “a small part of that which we here 
presume to intuit is really intuited”.61 Accordingly, the theatre in its totality cannot 
be the content of our consciousness. Hence it would be inappropriate to equate per-
ception (Wahrnehmung) – which Husserl also interprets etymologically as ‘holding-
to-be-so’ (Fürwahrnehmen) – with intuition. Rather, perception presupposes an in-
tentional act that goes beyond intuition and which is therefore based on representa-
tion. If we perceive the façade of the theatre, our intentional act furnishes it with two 
side-walls, a back-wall, a ceiling, etc. However, our intention can be converted into 
intuition when we walk around the theatre and look at the building from all sides. If 
this happens, the intention has been fulfilled, representation has passed over into in-
tuition, and perception and intuition coincide.62 Yet we cannot gain an intuition of 
everything that we represent conceptually. This is either due to a de facto inability or 
an evident impossibility. Examples of conceptual representations which fall into the 
latter category are the well-known ‘round square’ or ‘wooden iron’. But the fact that 
these examples are necessarily non-intuitional does not mean that they are meaning-
less. On the contrary, Husserl stresses that they have a wholly determinate and well-
understood intention, although one that cannot be fulfilled since it is directed towards 
something impossible.63 It follows from this that the range of representations is not 
restricted to sense perception. 
Furthermore, it would be inappropriate to call a representation an intuition in view 
of its immanent content. The sharp distinction Husserl draws between intuition and 
representation does not spring from the fact that a certain intentional act simply intu-
its some contents without intuiting others. For this would amount to saying that rep-
resentations simply focus on a selection of possible contents. In the above example, 
we would then direct our attention, for instance, to the windows of the theatre while 
neglecting other aspects of the building. By contrast, intuition and representation are 
different modes of consciousness. A further example illustrates well the sharpness of 
this distinction. Suppose we look at certain figures or arabesques from a purely aes-
thetical perspective and then, all of a sudden, come to realise that they could be sym-
bols or word-signs representing meanings.64 In that very moment, the figure or ara-
 
60 But Husserl also says that there are representations which are “necessarily non-intuitional” (see 
below and ibid., 104) 
61 Ibid., 102f. 
62 H.J. Adriaanse, Zu den Sachen selbst, 37. 
63 E. Husserl, Psychologische Studien zur Elementaren Logik, 104. 
64 Ibid., 114f. 
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besque has become a sign, i.e. a representing content. And although we still ‘see’ the 
sign, we no longer focus upon nor intuit it.65  
Following Adriaanse, Moxter points out that Barth’s distinction between ‘religion 
proper’ and ‘religion improper’, between Christian faith and religion as a merely 
human projection can be grasped on the basis of this distinction. As we have seen, 
Barth’s understanding of revelation is based on a dialectical interplay between God’s 
veiling and unveiling. Revelation is always mediated by signs but we miss it and 
commit an act of idolatry if we direct our attention to the signs themselves, rather 
than referring them to that which they stand for, i.e. to that which they represent. In 
other words, Christian faith is a mode of consciousness in which consciousness is not 
directed to its immanent content, the creaturely signs, but reaches out to the object by 
means of these signs.66 Whereas Christian faith understands the sign as a sign, ‘relig-
ion improper’ mistakes the sign for the object itself.67  
In Barth, this character of intentionality is more developed in Röm II (1922) than 
in Röm I (1919), even if he of course does not use Husserl’s phenomenological ter-
minology.68 For instance, in Röm II, Barth talks of the form of a content: “Immer ist 
die göttliche, die sinngebende, die erfüllende Form diesen seelisch-geschichtlichen 
Inhalten gegenüber ein Jenseitiges, ein unverwischbar Anderes“ (Röm II, 114). The 
contents as such do not have a meaning with regard to revelation, which is the actual 
object of faith. It is only when human beings construe this psychically and histori-
cally given content within the interpretative framework of faith that revelation really 
takes place. Thus, on the sensual-empirical level, there is no difference between 
Christian baptism and the initiation rites of the mystery-religions (Röm II, 187). In 
both cases the sensually given content is the submersion in water. It is only the be-
stowal of faith by divine grace – that is never simply at one’s disposal – which en-
ables human beings to comprehend it as a Christian act. Moxter emphasises the sig-
nificance of the concept of intentionality for a proper understanding of faith, as the 
object cannot be separated from its mode of givenness. However, his comparison of 
Barth and Husserl tends to play down the importance of the concept of fulfilment in 
the thought of both Husserl and Barth.69  
Edmund Husserl 
As far as Husserl is concerned, at least up until 1913, when he completed the fourth 
section of his Ideas, his main philosophical interest was the clarification of the con-
cept of knowledge (Erkenntnis).70 There can be no doubt that during this period, for 
him knowledge of an object coincides with the fulfilment of the meaning of the in-
 
65 Ibid., 116. 
66 H.J. Adriaanse, Zu den Sachen selbst, 51f. 
67 „Der Offenbarungsbegriff ruht also auf einem Begriff der Zeichenrepräsentation auf […] Der reli-
giöse Vollzug, der sich nicht als Wahrnehmungsakt, sondern als Repräsentation aufbaut, bleibt in 
Barths Offenbarungstheologie auf eine Differenzstruktur bezogen, in der er seine Kritik und seine 
Erfüllung findet“, M. Moxter, Kultur als Lebenswelt, 265. 
68 H.J. Adriaanse , Zu den Sachen selbst, 140-143. 
69 Cf. M. Moxter, Kultur als Lebenswelt, 264, fn 404; 265, fn 409. 
70 D. Willard, Knowledge, 138ff. 
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tention upon this object. “Talk about knowledge of an object, and talk about fulfilling 
a meaning-intention, therefore expresses the same fact, merely from differing stand-
points” (LU VI, § 8).  
Thus, as Jaako Hintikka points out, the question arises of what it is that fulfils a 
noema. Is it something that belongs to the sphere of objects or to the sphere of a 
noemata? If the former is the case, one has to recall that the factual existence of an 
object has been bracketed in the phenomenological reductions. Accordingly, the phe-
nomenon of fulfilment would defy any phenomenological analysis. If the latter is the 
case, it remains unclear how the fulfilling act can establish a correlation between the 
noemata and reality.71  
Hintikka opts for the first possibility. What constitutes the phenomenological 
element in Husserl’s philosophy, he contends, is his aim to find a basis for our con-
ceptual world in immediate experience. The centre of Husserl’s (earlier) thought 
therefore consists in the conviction that that which is immediately given to me is at 
once part of an external, i.e. mind-independent reality and an element of my con-
sciousness. Hence fulfilment and knowledge consist in a real correspondence be-
tween consciousness and reality. Consequently, Hintikka regards the phenomenol-
ogical reductions which bracket the factual existence of objects and direct our atten-
tion to the conceptual world of noemata merely as a prerequisite for Husserl’s overall 
phenomenological project.  
The pivot of Husserl’s thought, however, is the insight that real knowledge re-
quires “an actual interface or overlap of my consciousness and reality”.72 A name, 
for instance, designates a particular object insofar as it means it. Now if the object is 
not intuitively present, we only have to do with meaning. Yet if the originally empty 
meaning-intention is fulfilled, a real relation is established between name and object 
named. Accordingly, one has to draw a distinction between meaning-intentions that 
are void of intuition and those which are fulfilled by intuition. Thus on the one hand 
there are meaning-conferring acts or meaning-intentions, i.e. verbal sounds infused 
with sense (expressions). On the other hand, there are acts which are not essential to 
the expression but which fulfil those meaning-intentions more or less adequately by 
realising the relations to the corresponding objects. These acts are called meaning-
fulfilling acts. In the case of knowledge and fulfilment, the latter fuse with the mean-
ing-conferring acts (LU I, § 9). It is thus possible to draw a clear distinction between 
meaning and object. At the same time these two aspects are closely related to each 
other in every expression, for an expression can only refer to an objective correlate 
because it carries a certain meaning. It thus signifies the object through its meaning. 
However, several expressions may have the same meaning but different objects or 
they may have different meanings but the same object. For instance, two names can 
differ in meaning but nonetheless have the same object. Thus the names ‘the victor at 
Jena’ and ‘the vanquished at Waterloo’ certainly have different meanings even if the 
same object is meant. Conversely, Husserl contends, the expression ‘horse’ has the 
 
71 J. Hintikka, The phenomenological dimension, 81. 
72 Ibid., 82. 
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same meaning in whatever context it is used. But if we say ‘Bucephalus is a horse’ 
and on a different occasion ‘That cart-horse is a horse’, the object is obviously dif-
ferent. But there is of course also the possibility that two expressions differ, or agree, 
in both respects. Examples of an agreement between expressions regarding meaning 
and object are synonymous expressions in different languages such as ‘zwei’ and 
‘deux’, or ‘London’ and ‘Londres’ (LU I, § 12).  
Phenomenological reduction can be understood in terms of an elimination of eve-
rything that falls outside the sphere of things that are purely self-given. For only what 
is self-given bridges the gap between what is merely intended and the extra-mental 
reality. And the medium of self-givenness is intuition (Anschauung): something is 
immediately given to us in experience.73 Hence it is not correct to say that phenome-
nology is exclusively concerned with the noetic-noematic correlation, for it also in-
vestigates the relation between noemata and their objects.  
However, the key term intuition does not just apply to sense perception and em-
pirical intuition but must be understood in the broadest possible sense. Put differ-
ently, Husserl allows for non-sensuous intuitions, i.e. there are non-sensuous kinds of 
immediate givenness.74 Yet, more importantly, what is (self-)given in an immediate 
experience (intuition) is not the noema (‘the object as intended’) but the object it-
self.75 As Hintikka points out, the ‘phenomenological residuum’, i.e. that which sur-
vives the transcendental reduction “possesses a dual citizenship” insofar as it belongs 
at once to human consciousness and to the real world.76 For this reason, there cannot 
be an absolute end point in the phenomenological reduction. Whatever becomes the 
object of a phenomenological reflection “has already been structured by a form-
giving noesis”.77 It follows from this that no phenomenological reduction will lead 
us to mind-independent objects that are “conceptually self-given”.78 Yet it would be 
wrong to overemphasise this ‘idealist’ aspect for in intuition we nonetheless do per-
ceive a mind-independent reality.  
Karl Barth 
As far as Barth is concerned, Adriaanse indeed emphasises the intentional character 
of Christian faith: “In the act of faith, the object is only minded (bedeutet); there is 
no fulfilling intuition”.79 But he also says that the representational or signitive aspect 
of faith can give way to intentional fulfilment and intuition, to use Husserl’s termi-
nology. The object which is merely intended in faith can also be given in faith.80 At 
first glance it might seem as if Barth in Röm II entirely abandons his understanding 
of faith as a kind of intuition which dominates Röm I. But Adriaanse argues that this 
is not the case. To be sure, that which faith intends cannot be fulfilled on the level of 
 
73 Cf. E. Husserl, Ideen I, § 24. 
74 Ibid., § 19. 
75 Ibid., § 43, 48. 
76 J. Hintikka, The phenomenological dimension, 90. 
77 Ibid., 98. 
78 Ibid. 
79 H.J. Adriaanse, Zu den Sachen selbst, 151. 
80 Ibid., 151-153. 
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sensual perception (sinnliche Anschauung). Nonetheless, even if God never is or be-
comes an object but always remains the non-given, the non-given can give himself, 
and from an anthropocentric perspective this event can be construed in terms of an 
intuition or meaning-fulfilment. Yet it is important to notice that the move from rep-
resentation to fulfilment and intuition in Röm II must not be understood as a transi-
tion from ‘mere faith’ to a superior visio which leads beyond faith. Faith, although it 
presses towards and leads to vision, is also faith without vision, and where it finds its 
fulfilment in vision, remains faith (Röm II, 139, 143, but see 82). Thus faith has a 
dynamical character: ™k p…stewj e„j p…st…n (Rom 1:17). Furthermore, the question 
arises under which circumstances the transition from representation to intuition is 
achieved. Barth’s answer is clear: This happens in preaching, the oral proclamation 
of the Word.81 This of course leads back to Barth’s understanding of God as persona 
loquens, which will be analysed at length in chaper B) from the perspective of a 
speaker (or sender)-related pragmatic approach.  
For the present moment it suffices to point out that the Husserlian category of in-
tuition and meaning-fulfilment is also relevant to understand Barth’s later theology. 
In § 6 of the Church Dogmatics which is devoted to the knowability of God, Barth 
writes:  
By the knowledge (Erkenntnis) of an object by men we understand confirmation (Bewährung) of their 
acquaintance with its reality in respect of its existence (hinsichtlich seines Daseins oder seiner Exis-
tenz) and its nature (hinsichtlich seines Soseins oder seines Wesens). But ‘confirmation of their ac-
quaintance’ means: the reality of the object concerned, its existence and its nature, being true in them-
selves, now becomes in some way, and with some degree of clarity and distinctness, true for men […] 
This event, this confirmation we call, in contrast to mere cognizance (Kenntnis), knowledge (Er-
kenntnis). Cognizance turns into knowledge when man becomes a responsible witness to its content” 
(KD I/1, 195f, cf. 239, 250, 256).  
From ‘meaning as reference’ to narrativity 
Meaning as reference 
In § 27 of the Church Dogmatics, Barth discusses the limits of the knowledge of God 
from a consistently theocentric perspective. Here too, God is thought of as the sub-
ject (primary agent) in the divine-human encounter and not simply as an object of 
human perception. Yet the notion of divine speech recedes into the background. 
Barth here rather examines how divine revelation transforms and redeems the post-
lapsarian use of human language, often focusing on the meaning of single words. 
Despite the theocentric character of this section, I shall analyse § 27 from an anthro-
pocentric perspective – as in the preceding chapter. More concretely, I suggest inter-
preting § 27 on the basis of a theory of meaning as reference – even if one has to 
clarify immediately what kind of ‘referent’ is at stake. According to Barth, empirical 
objects are no possible candidates for the theological referents and ‘redeemed’ mean-
ings of linguistic terms. Nonetheless, an interpretation of revelation on the basis of a 
theory of ‘meaning as reference’ seems legitimate due to the sharp distinction Barth 
draws between the revelatory meaning of a word and its worldly pre-understanding. 
 
81 Cf. K. Barth, Fides quaerens intellectum, 18f. 
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That is to say, the event of revelation and the new meanings introduced by it can be 
interpreted in terms of a change of referents. Once again, I do not claim that a theory 
of meaning as reference is the best possible way of approaching Barth’s theology. 
But it is nonetheless an apt tool to shed light on some aspects of his understanding of 
revelation.  
According to Barth, our words are not our properties but God’s. Due to divine 
revelation we come to see that we use them in the postlapsarian state improperly and 
pictorially. Barth writes: “When we apply them [our words] to God, they are not 
alienated from their original object and therefore from their truth, but, on the con-
trary: restored to it” (KD II/1, 259). It is only through the divine act of revelation that 
the terms (re)assume their original, non-figurative and appropriate meaning in that 
they signify God and his acts respectively. This Christologically mediated re-
institution not only concerns explicitly theological or spiritual terms such as ‘father’, 
‘son’, ‘dominion’, ‘patience’, ‘love’ etc., but also words which in everyday use de-
note body parts such as ‘arm’ or ‘mouth’. According to Barth, there is a radical dis-
continuity between the postlapsarian and the redeemed meanings of these terms. 
Consequently, no clarification of the meaning and understanding of our postlapsarian 
human words will lead to a provisional meaning (Vorsinn) and understanding 
(Vorverständnis) with regard to the divine meaning. Rather, the provisional meaning 
and understanding that can be arrived at by means of such an analysis is the provi-
sional meaning and understanding of our understanding of the world and of our self-
understanding. In no way, however, does such an investigation precipitate an en-
counter with the Christian God (KD II/1, 260). The doctrine of analogia fidei thus 
emphasises that the analogical character of language is accomplished by God’s Trini-
tarian revelation alone and not a fact that human beings can discover in the world. 
For instance, no idea of ‘lord’ or ‘lordship’ will ever lead us to an understanding of 
God as our Lord, “even if we extend it infinitely” (KD II/1, 82). 
For this reason, Barth’s theology has been characterised at once as non-realism 
and as realism.82 Graham Ward tries to reduce the extremely complex discussion 
about realism to two fundamental axioms: first, the belief in an “immediacy of ex-
perience”, and secondly, its correlate, the conviction that “language mirrors the 
world”.83 The idea of an ‘immediate experience’ is related to the notion of represen-
tation. A naïve realist holds that sense perception leads to mental ideas which are 
finally expressed in linguistic concepts. The relationship between concepts and ideas 
and between ideas and objects is thereby considered as stable and unchangeable. 
Now Barth’s theology can be called non-realist insofar as he rejects these two axioms 
as regards postlapsarian language. Consequently, human consciousness is thought of 
as historically, culturally and linguistically conditioned. The notion of a realistic 
naturalism, which claims to have objective access to reality on the basis of sense data 
is rejected.  
 
82 G. Ward, Barth, modernity, and postmodernity, 284-287. 
83 Ibid., 286. 
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In Barth’s language, human cognition (Erkennen) is fulfilled in views (An-
schauungen) and concepts (Begriffen). Views are thereby the images (Bilder) in 
which we perceive objects (Gegenstände) as such. Concepts, however, are the 
counter-images (Gegenbilder) by means of which we appropriate those images of 
perception (Wahrnehmungsbilder) in that we think them and order them. This en-
ables us to articulate (aussprechen) those images of perception and those objects. 
Now if human beings can speak of God, they must first be able to view (anschauen) 
and conceive (begreifen), i.e. to perceive (wahrnehmen) and think (denken) God. 
Otherwise they would not know him (KD II/1, 202f). Yet, in accordance with the 
tradition, Barth emphasises that God can only be known by God. Hence the above 
reflections on human cognitive capacity do not allow us to conclude that we can also 
know God by our views (Anschauungen) and concepts (Begriffe). To be sure, our 
human capacity for receiving images and creating counter-images is used instrumen-
tally in the act of knowledge of God. Yet what must be contested is the view that 
there is an innate capacity for truthfully receiving images and creating counter-
images with respect to God. Rather, it is God himself who ordained and created fel-
lowship between himself and us. Surely, our viewing as such is undoubtedly capable 
of receiving divine images (Götterbilder). Likewise, our conceiving as such is capa-
ble of creating idolatrous pictures (Götzenbilder). But in both cases we have to do 
with “projections of our own glory” (KD II/1, 204).  
We resemble, we master and we are originally and properly one with that which 
we can apprehend. That is to say, we resemble, master and are one with the world 
and everything in it. We can form views and concepts of the world and everything in 
it. In viewing and conceiving the world and what is in it, we encompass the world 
and what is in it. And we are superior to, and spiritual masters of what we can en-
compass. Furthermore, to apprehend also means to possess. Yet possession is un-
thinkable without original and proper unity between the possessor and the possessed. 
It is this unity on which our capacity to apprehend the world and everything in it is 
based. But all this does not apply to the relationship between God and man: “Be-
tween God and man, as between God and the creature in general, there consists an 
irrevocable otherness” (KD II/1, 212). Thus our knowledge of God inevitably begins 
with the knowledge of God’s hiddenness. Yet, according to Barth, this last point 
should not be read as a statement about the general limitations of human cognition. 
Rather, the “hiddenness of God is the content of a statement of faith” (KD II/1, 206). 
The hiddenness of God is God’s hiddenness, i.e. one of his properties.  
This hiddenness of God remains even in the event of genuine knowledge of God. 
Our images of perception, thought and words as such are not images of God. But 
they become images of God and thus become true. Yet the capacity to receive divine 
truth does not reside in those images themselves but is bestowed upon them by their 
object (Gegenstand). God is no longer only the object (Object) of his own cognition, 
but also of that of man (KD II/1, 218, 230). On the basis of revelation, our human 
views and concepts, which are as such impotent, can and will participate in truth, i.e. 
in the knowledge of God. According to Barth’s epistemology, it is possible to draw a 
difference between human cognition and human language. This accounts for the fact 
 
 
80
                                                
that Barth frequently operates in § 27 with the dyad ‘views and concepts’ and later 
on with the triad ‘views, concepts, words’. As Ward states, the fact that Barth first 
analyses human cognition and then moves on to examine human language is no coin-
cidence. Rather, the aforementioned triad constitutes three successive stages leading 
from perceptions (Anschauungen), to concepts (Begriffe) and finally linguistic ex-
pressions (Worte). At least in § 27 of the Church Dogmatics, Barth’s is a correspon-
dence theory of truth. Single words84 stand for ideas which in turn represent lan-
guage-independent, external objects. Consequently, truth is conceived of in terms of 
an adequate correspondence between those words, ideas and objects.85   
 Under postlapsarian conditions, however, there is no true correspondence be-
tween words, ideas and objects, i.e. we use our words inappropriately and pictorially. 
This happens “when we apply them within the confines of what is appropriate to us 
as creatures” (KD II/1, 259). But since the relationship between words, ideas and 
referents (objects) is not fixed once and for all, divine revelation can break it up and 
introduce new referents. Only the words qua sign-vehicles remain the same. Even the 
true meanings of simple words such as ‘arm’ and ‘mouth’ become only manifest if 
they refer to the arm and mouth of God. In other words, the semantic agnosticism 
and non-realism which is characteristic of the postlapsarian state, does not lead to 
nihilism and/or relativism but rather opens up space for Barth’s eschatological real-
ism. Barth thus holds that the eschatological reality of the risen Christ has “ontologi-
cal and criteriological priority” over our common “experiential reality”.86  
Reflecting upon the transition from the postlapsarian to the divinely reconstituted 
state of language, Ward contends that “Barth adopts a nomenclatural or passive-copy 
theory of language as the model for the correspondence between perception, concep-
tion and language in the act of revelation whilst simultaneously rejecting such a the-
ory of language as a description of discourse outside the act of revelation”.87 As far 
as the former theory is concerned, “God’s language is a direct and immediate trans-
ferral of meaning from object to word, the proper adequation of signifier and signi-
fied”.88 Yet this statement needs be supplemented by Barth’s insistence that even if 
God does claim our views, concepts and words in the act of revelation, we cannot 
confine ourselves to a single reconstitution between views, concepts and words. It is 
not possible simply to repeat certain “concepts and words to attain and express again 
the knowledge of God” (KD II/1, 240f, cf. KD I/1, 10ff). Barth’s eschatological real-
ism is therefore rather to be interpreted in terms of a critical realism.89  
Yet here too, the question arises as to how the dynamic and teleological character 
of this epistemic progress – as it is characteristic of a critical realism – is to be 
 
84 However, even in § 27 of the Church Dogmatics, Barth does not exclusively focus on the new 
meanings assumed by single words but at times stresses that Scripture in its totality points to God (KD 
II/1, 120). This opens up space for a narrative theology. I shall come back to this issue in a moment. 
85 Cf. G. Ward, Barth, Derrida and the Language of Theology, 26ff. 
86 I.U. Dalferth, Karl Barth’s eschatological realism, 22. 
87 G. Ward, Barth, Derrida and Language of Theology, 28. 
88 Ibid. 
89 I.U. Dalferth, Karl Barth’s eschatological realism, 16-18. Dalferth does not use the term critical 
realism explicitly.  But see B.L. McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology. 
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thought of in Barth’s theology. For instance, Barth writes that “any goal that is at-
tained becomes the point of departure for a new journey on this way, on which the 
revelation of God and its veracity are always future to us” (KD II/1, 241). However, 
this quotation leaves unclear whether there really is room for a ‘directed serialisa-
tion’ in Peirce’s sense, which would require a certain continuity-in-discontinuity. 
Although Barth calls dogma an “‘eschatological concept’” (KD I/1, 284), the main 
thrust of his argument precisely excludes the possibility of such a continuity-in-
discontinuity model.  
Pondering on human involvement and linguistic sedimentation in the act of recep-
tion of the Word of God, Barth insists that “[n]ot for a moment or in any respect will 
he [i.e. a human being] want to come back (zurückkommen) to his involvement or 
cling to it (daran sich halten) or build upon it (darauf weiterbauen) …” (KD I/1, 
231). Barth certainly does allow for the fact that the reception of divine revelation 
takes place in ever new contexts and situations. But this as such does not imply the 
existence of a teleological principle governing the series of conceptualisations and 
linguistic manifestations that come with these various contexts and situations. Or, if 
there is such a principle in Barth’s theology, it has a theocentric character, i.e. it re-
mains hidden and can only be posited by human beings – by an act of faith.90  
A narrative approach to meaning 
However, there is much in § 27 (and the rest) of the Church Dogmatics that renders 
the above interpretation of ‘meaning as reference’ problematic. For it remains to a 
certain extent unclear in KD II/1, which linguistic units assume (or have assumed) an 
analogical character in and through the act of revelation. On the one hand – as shown 
above – Barth’s focus is on the (new) meanings of single terms. On the other hand, 
Scripture in its totality points to God, which leads to a narrative theology.91 What 
takes centre stage is not single words or sentences but the narrative of God’s cove-
nant with Israel and its fulfilment in the New Testament (KD II/1, 120). Yet these 
two different hermeneutical strategies are by no means mutually exclusive but rather 
turn out to be interdependent. Consistently adhering to his Trinitarian approach, 
Barth highlights the narrative (Logos) as well as the perspectival or self-involving 
(Pneuma) character of theologically reconstituted linguistic meaning.  
For instance, the true meaning of the word ‘love’ can only be grasped in the light 
of the relationship between Father and Son through the Holy Spirit, of which we only 
know since God loved the world by sending his Son (KD II/1, 259). That is to say, 
there is a proportion between the relationship in God himself and his relationship to 
the word (KD III/1, 52). Every attempt to think God’s being must thus clarify the 
relationship between his being-for-himself and his being-for-us. As Jüngel has 
pointed out, Barth’s understanding of God transcends the classical concept of sub-
 
90 It goes without saying that if this last statement really applies to the Prolegomena, it is very difficult 
to see how the obvious linguistic manifestness of such a series is supposed to be compatible with the 
hiddenness of its teleological structure. 
91 As is well-known, this narrative approach constitutes the very centre of KD IV, and served as the 
starting point for the Yale school. Cf. D. Ford, Barth and God’s story; M.I. Wallace, The second na-
iveté: Barth, Ricœur, and the new Yale theology. 
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stance as well as that of relational being.92 According to Aristotle, first substances 
are neither as a whole nor in parts to be understood as relational being, i.e. they are 
not necessarily related to something else, but can be related to something else. Rela-
tional being, by contrast, (mutually) presupposes the other to which it is related. Both 
thought-models are inappropriate to spell out the relationship between God and the 
world. If God is conceived as substance, his being-in-relation is not sufficiently 
taken into account, and if he is understood as relational being, there is the danger of 
functionalising his relation to the world, thus making him dependent on the world.  
In order to overcome this impasse, Barth tries to think of the freedom of God’s be-
ing-for-himself on the basis of the revelation of God’s being-for-us. Due to revela-
tion, i.e. God’s being-for-us, God’s being is thought of as an event. The nature of 
God’s independent being must be inferred from the event of revelation, i.e. God’s 
independent being must be thought of as that event which makes the event of revela-
tion possible. God’s being-for-us is thus a repetition of his self-referentiality in his 
inner-Trinitarian being (as Father, Son and Holy Spirit).  
On the basis of this analogia relationis, Jüngel interprets God’s repetition in his 
revelation as a self-interpretation. God is towards the other, without being dependent 
on it.93 According to the modus essendi, God’s love in himself precedes ontologi-
cally his economic love, but according to the modus cognoscendi, we only come to 
know it in and through his work in space and time (KD I/2, § 12). It is this corre-
spondence which allows us to interpret the meaning of the term ‘love’ narratively. In 
order to understand what it means that God loved the word (ºg£phsen), we have to 
(re-)tell the story of a unique event, the event of God’s love (cf. Joh 3:16); the story 
of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ (KD IV/1, 75).  
Yet according to Barth, this narrative meaning of the term ‘love’ is not a generally 
observable fact. God is not only the author of the narrative itself but also imparts to 
human beings the ability to recognise this narrative as the ultimate paradigm for any 
understanding of love. Here too, the ontic aspect cannot be divorced from the noetic 
aspect. And it is Barth’s narrative unfolding of the ontic aspect and the perspectival 
and self-involving character of the noetic aspect that strictly speaking do away with a 
theory of ‘meaning as reference’. Narrativity (ontic aspect) is a syntactic/syntagmatic 
though-category and Barth’s understanding of the perspectival and self-involving 
character of the noetic aspect adds a pragmatic dimension to his theory of linguistic 
meaning.  
In order to grasp the account of meaning set out in KD II, it is helpful to distin-
guish between the transition from the postlapsarian (pre-)understanding of a term to 
its reconstituted theological meaning a), and its transformative reintegration into the 
semantic system of a culture b). This differentiation seems legitimate insofar as the 
establishment of a ‘new’ tradition first requires the selection of a limited range of 
terms out of an already existing semantic system, which assume new meanings and 
subsequently lead to a wider transformation. This hermeneutical process originated 
 
92 E. Jüngel, Gottes Sein ist im Werden, 103ff. 
93 Ibid. 
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in the oral tradition of the post-Easter era and roughly terminated after the formation 
of the Canon (ca. 400 AD). The second phase however, is open-ended insofar as its 
ultimate eschatological goal is the comprehensive penetration and refiguration of the 
prevailing symbol system(s), i.e. the initiation of new cultural paradigms.   
a) Barth’s view that the postlapsarian (pre-)understanding of a word is utterly ir-
relevant in order to grasp its true, theologically reconstituted meaning, is unintelligi-
ble since it leads to a dualistic agnosticism, rather than any positive knowledge about 
God. If there were such an absolute (and therefore unintelligible) semantic break 
between the old and the new (theological) meaning, as Barth seems to suggest, God’s 
attitude towards the world as disclosed in his salvific intervention in Christ, could 
have equally been called ‘hatred’, or ‘indifference’, antonyms of ‘love’(¢g£ph). For 
in order to assume its new meaning, the sign ‘love’ had first to be completely 
stripped of its original meanings. As a result, the only link between the postlapsarian 
and the reconstituted, theological meaning were an identical sign-vehicle. And since 
Barth emphatically points out that the revelatory meaning is the only appropriate 
meaning, postlapsarian language would give way to an ideal divine language, rather 
than be transformed by it.  
In the later volumes of the Church Dogmatics, this extreme contrast is at least 
mitigated.94 Jüngel even devotes a whole paragraph to developing a ‘general’ idea of 
love, which he regards a prerequisite for a biblical, i.e. Christological and Trinitarian 
understanding of love.95 According to him, it would be “hermeneutical nonsense”96 
to believe that the word ‘love’ could be arbitrarily supplanted by another one on the 
grounds that its true meaning can only be established with reference to God’s salvific 
intervention in Jesus Christ. Rather, what is at issue is a radical change of meaning 
(Bedeutungswandel), which necessarily requires a particular pre-understanding of 
love. In other words, although the sentence “God is love” (1 Joh 4:8) can indeed only 
be comprehended with reference to God’s being and action, it is imperative to clarify 
the “essential meaning” (wesentliche Bedeutung) of the term love independently of 
its specifically Christological use.97   
However, as far as Jüngel is concerned, one is tempted to ask why exactly this 
particular – i.e. the elaborate but ‘general’ picture of love he paints in this essay – is 
supposed to be the indispensable precondition for understanding the specifically 
Christian ¢g£ph. For is the pre-Christian understanding of love, beautifully outlined 
by Jüngel, the result of a phenomenological analysis of the prevailing (secular?) lin-
guistic practice? Or is it a highly specific notion of love that is to a certain degree 
already informed by Christian thought? Jüngel’s answers to these questions remain 
 
94 Compare for instance Barth’s discussion about the meaning of ‘love’ in KD II/1, 259f with KD 
IV/2, 825-853. Although Barth does not jettison the basic ideas of his theocentric theology, there is 
nonetheless a certain shift of emphasis. For instance, in KD IV/2, he pays much more attention to the 
postlapsarian pre-understanding of love (agapē and eros), even though the christological and trinitar-
ian understanding eventually alters its meaning radically so that no synthesis is possible. 
95 E. Jüngel, Gott als Geheimnis der Welt, 430-453. 
96 Ibid., 434. 
97 Ibid. 
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ambiguous.98 He admits that the idea of love set out in the preceding chapters of God 
as the mystery of the world was developed within a theological context but nonethe-
less lays claim to general evidence. Formally, love is defined “als Ereignis einer in-
mitten noch so grosser und mit Recht noch so grosser Selbstbezogenheit immer noch 
grösseren Selbstlosigkeit”, and materially as „die sich ereignende Einheit von Leben 
und Tod zugunsten des Lebens“.99 The following analysis Jüngel views as a devel-
opment of these basic statements. But are these definitions not already highly theo-
logical? Are they not just more abstract formulas which are supposed to sum up the 
very kernel of the Gospel narratives? If that is really the case, what does the afore-
mentioned change of meaning (Bedeutungswandel) consist in? As far as this last 
question is concerned, Jüngel seems – in spite of certain reservations – to repeat the 
traditional Protestant dichotomy between eros and agapē. For the only evident shift 
of meaning which occurs in the course of his enquiry (i.e. in § 20) is that from need-
love to gift-love and from a reciprocal understanding of love to a non-reciprocal 
one.100  
In any case, what is required is an asymmetrical reciprocity between the non-
Christian pre-understanding of a term and its theological meaning. On the one hand, 
the latter meaning is inextricably intertwined with and to a certain extent based on 
the former meaning. On the other hand, the newly acquired (narrative) meaning 
henceforth serves as the ultimate standard by which all ‘further uses’ of this word 
must be judged. This leads to the second aspect mentioned above, the issue of how 
this transformative reintegration into everyday language is to be thought of.  
b) It seems that despite the narrative and self-involving character of meaning, a 
transformative reintegration is a priori excluded. On the diachronic level, Barth fails 
to locate the narrator himself in a narrative. His notion of re-telling the Gospel narra-
tives comes close to an identical repetition. According to him, the narrative meaning 
of a particular term is not a generally observable ‘fact’ but requires a perspectival 
disclosure which can only be accomplished by God himself. But the problem is that 
he treats narratives almost like ‘propositions’ insofar as his idea of self-involvement 
has a very intellectualist character. Thus the appropriation of a narrative basically 
makes the narrators conscientes.101 At least on this hermeneutical level, Barth shows 
 
98 A he himself points out, his reflections are informed by J. Pieper’s, Über die Liebe. 
99 E. Jüngel, Gott als Geheimnis der Welt, 434. 
100 Ibid., 435-437. To be sure, Jüngel’s formal definition of love as ‘inmitten noch so grosser und mit 
Recht noch so grosser Selbstbezogenheit immer noch grösseren Selbstlosigkeit’ is supposed to tran-
scend the traditional dichotomy between eros and agapē. As he explicitly points out, love without 
some kind of self-referentiality would be a distortion of love ‘from above’. Likewise, love in which 
selflessness does not prevail over self-referentiality would be a distortion ‘from below’. In the first 
case, the nature of love is threatened by a moral castration, i.e. it is forgotten that love is a phenome-
non of being rather than a moral imperative. In the second case, there is the danger of sexually violat-
ing the nature of love since it is disregarded that love transforms the dimension of willing, insofar as 
the loving ‘I’ must be willing to subordinate his willing to the beloved ‘Thou’, ibid., 436f, fn 15. 
101 They are those who “know themselves […] those who do not only reflect on it but think it them-
selves”; they “think it from inner impulse and necessity […] appropriation means … the contempora-
neity, homogeneity and indirect identification of the reader and hearer of Scripture with the witness of 
revelation” (KD I/2, 826).  What matters is “our share in the great acts of God in his revelation” (KD 
I/2, 794). 
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little interest in the Wirkungsgeschichte of the biblical text. However, all evaluative 
endeavours that aim at developing an appropriate understanding of agapē for the 
present time, must perforce take into account this vast historical material. Further-
more, the insight that the retelling of the story is fundamentally creative, demands 
interpretative criteria which cannot compete with the text’s status as the final arbiter. 
On the synchronic level, the question arises of how the biblical paradigm of agapē 
can be linguistically brought to bear on the wide variety of human cultural phenom-
ena. This requires a kind of ‘extension’ of the Christian narrative; a project which is 
undertaken in KD IV and taken up by the Yale school in connection with Lindbeck’s 
key term intratextuality.102
c) Syntactics  
As Moxter points out, Barth’s conception of revelation also entails a syntactic aspect, 
which is related to (one of) the central term(s) of his theology: the covenant. It is the 
covenant that interconnects the Old with the New Testament.103 In the Old Testa-
ment, the election of the people of Israel (KD I/2, 245), “the king, the priest, the law, 
sacrifice, the tabernacle, the temple, the holy land: all of them have to be acknowl-
edged as a coherent circle of signs pointing to a common centre” (KD I/2, 247, my 
emphasis). According to Moxter, what links these signs up and gives them continu-
ity, is there respective difference to this centre which is never directly given but 
eludes immediate grasp. This difference constitutes the condition under which a sign 
can be added to another one. God’s sovereignty and superior freedom as regards all 
signs manifests itself exactly in the fact that signs always occur in a series of signs, 
i.e. every sign points beyond itself to other signs (KD I/2, 245; II/1, 57). Signs do not 
signify God by virtue of an inherent quality, but because they are being used theo-
logically. God constitutes signs as signs by negating them through other signs.104  
With the appearance of Christ, however, the world of the Old Testament signs 
disappears in a flash, or is at least “prolonged in the New Testament Church by only 
a small number of new signs, which merely indicate, as it were, the indispensability 
of the signs and also their continuity with the ancient sign-world” (KD I/2, 247). The 
sign-world of the Old Testament is superseded by the Church, with its apostles, its 
kerygma, baptism and the Lord’s supper, “for that is really all there is to be said 
about the Church and its visibility” (KD I/2, 247). Yet it is precisely this transition 
from the sign-world of the Old to that of the New Testament which manifests a num-
ber of idiosyncrasies in the ‘syntactic order’ of signs. 
a) Barth’s syntactics of the signs of revelation has a hierarchical character. First, 
at the top of this hierarchy stands the human nature of Christ. More precisely, the 
human being Jesus of Nazareth is a sign-vehicle, signifying (a) divine meaning(s). 
The second plane comprises the witness of the apostles and prophets as recorded in 
Scripture. Although Barth calls Scripture a sign too (KD I/1, 275), it is on a higher 
 
102 But see J. Milbank’s critique in Theology and Social Theory, 382ff. 
103 „Jesus Christus ist Gott, Gott als Mensch und so „Gott mit uns“ Menschen, Gott im Werk der Ver-
söhnung aber ist die Erfüllung des Bundes zwischen Gott und Mensch” (KD IV/1, 22). 
104 M. Moxter, Kultur als Lebenswelt, 261. 
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level as mere interpretations of the Bible. That is to say, Scripture shows a represen-
tative closeness to what it witnesses to which differs qualitatively from all further 
interpretations (KD I/2, 524, 607). This also drives a wedge between the original 
interpreters, i.e. the apostles and prophets, and all further interpreters, whose inter-
pretative endeavours are based on the work of the apostles and prophets (KD I/2, 
604f). This leads to the third level, which comprises interpretations of Scripture pro-
duced after the apostolic period, such as ecclesiastical confessions, to which Barth 
pays particular attention. Provided one keeps in mind the derivative character of all 
linguistic third-level sedimentations produced by the Church throughout the centu-
ries, it is tenable to say that they form part of the objective revelation of Jesus Christ 
(KD I/2, 247f). Oral proclamation, however, occupies a special place on this third 
level, since it leads to a new kind of immediacy (see chapter B) of part II).   
To put this the other way round, any interpretation of Scripture points to the origi-
nal witness of the apostles and evangelists, which is itself a pointer, pointing back-
wards to the primary sign (or primary sacrament) Jesus Christ (KD I/1, 277f). His-
torically, the sign Jesus Christ is preceded by the signs of the Old Testament, but 
theologically the Christ-sign nonetheless constitutes the condition of possibility for 
all other signs to take on a revelatory meaning. Accordingly, Barth is not primarily 
interested in the syntactic order of signs but rather focuses on the relation of the 
many signs to the one ‘sign’ Jesus Christ. For as we have seen, the many signs form 
“a coherent circle pointing to a common centre” (KD I/2, 247, emphasis mine).105 
Yet neither on the level of langue nor on the level of parole can one sign be directly 
related to all other signs. According to Saussure, for instance, meaning is conceived 
of in terms of the semantic value a concept has within the whole system of language. 
These semantic values form a network of structural relations so that meaning is con-
stituted by the differences and oppositions between them.106 Only in this indirect 
sense is it tenable to say that one sign is related to all other signs. But this is evi-
dently not what Barth has in mind, for the image of the circle and its centre would 
not be an apt illustration of Saussure’s understanding of meaning.  
It follows from this that the ‘sign’ Jesus Christ cannot be regarded as simply a 
sign among other signs. Rather, it must be seen as a sort of hub around which every-
thing revolves, as the meaning-bestowing centre in the light of which all signs take 
on new meanings. This leads even further away from what I called a ‘literal under-
standing’ of divine speech and points to issues that will be discussed in part III. 
Jüngel calls this ‘hermeneutical hub’ ground metaphor (Grundmetapher), which he 
understands as the identification of the risen Christ with the crucified human being 
Jesus of Nazareth.107 Far from being just one sign among other signs, this ground 
metaphor leads to “an experience with experience”108, i.e. it brings about a renewal 
 
105 It is certainly legitimate to read this statement christologically, even if Barth does not explicitly 
identify the centre with Christ. 
106 F. de Saussure, Course de linguistique générale, 158-169. 
107 E. Jüngel, Metaphorische Wahrheit, 152. 
108 Ibid., 156. 
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and extension of our familiar (linguistically mediated) world.109 Metaphors (and par-
ables) are thus an “absolutely new way of dealing with what exists …”.110
b) The transition from the sign-world of the Old to that of the New Testament is 
concomitant with a quantitative decrease of signs. The sign-world of the Old Testa-
ment “is prolonged in the New Testament Church by only a small number of new 
signs, which merely indicate, as it were, the indispensability of the signs and also 
their continuity with the ancient sign-world” (KD I/2 247, italics mine). Yet it seems 
advisable to interpret this statement in a descriptive, rather than normative sense. To 
be sure, it cannot be denied that the New Testament in many respects lacks the rich-
ness and comprehensiveness of the Old Testament. For instance, the Old Testament 
undoubtedly encompasses a wider variety of literary genres than the New Testament. 
Moreover, compared to Christianity’s impact on the Roman Empire in the first centu-
ries, there is a much more radical permeation of the socio-cultural sphere in Israel. 
This is mainly due to the fact that the Old Testament covers a much longer period of 
history than the New Testament – which also accounts for the greater development of 
the synchronic level mentioned above. Yet this seeming impoverishment as regards 
linguistic and cultural sedimentation, and the relatively early completion of the New 
Testament canon in the fourth century at the same time entails a positive hermeneuti-
cal potential which is absent from the Old Testament. In the Old Testament, diversity 
is mainly a diachronic matter, i.e. it occurs primarily throughout the different stages 
of the history of Israel and not so much synchronically. Furthermore, the universal, 
trans-ethnical dimension of the Old Testament notion of salvation, though undoubt-
edly an ingredient of Old Testament faith, is basically something that is hoped for but 
only marginally realised in the time up until the appearance of Christ. The New Tes-
tament however, allows for diachronic and synchronic diversity. First, it is a collec-
tion of writings that witnesses to the (non-arbitrary) plurality of different understand-
ings of faith which was right from the beginning characteristic of the Christian tradi-
tion. For instance, the Church adopted four divergent accounts of the life of Jesus 
Christ; certainly not because the Church was not aware of the different theological 
outlooks which governed their authors, but rather because this linguistic dissemina-
tion of the Logos was considered an essential part of Christianity. Secondly, the New 
Testament not only gives an account of different traditions within the one tradition 
but exhibits itself a high degree of transferability, i.e. it can be re-contextualised in 
ever new times and places, precisely because of its fragmentary character. Put differ-
ently, the New Testament does not in the first place provide direction and guidelines 
for concrete aspects of human life such as politics, family, sexuality, etc., as the Old 
Testament does, but only supplies the basic framework within which these issues can 
be tackled. Consequently, the quantitatively impoverished sign-world of the New 
Testament at the same time serves at the basis for a new generation of signs which by 
far exceeds that of the Old Testament qualitatively (Jesus Christ) and quantitatively 
 
109 Ibid., 154, 157. 
110 E. Jüngel, Gott als Geheimnis der Welt, 396. In Jüngel, the use of metaphor is closely connected 
with the notion of orality, event, address, innovation and renewal, and seems therefore to be primarily 
a phenomenon on the level of parole, cf. E. Jüngel, Metaphorische Wahrheit, 140, 143, 145, 155. 
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(universalism). It is the second aspect which remains underdeveloped in Barth. For 
him, the reduced sign-world of the New Testament merely indicates the “indispensa-
bility of the signs” (KD I/2, 247): “Into the whole ancient sign-world steps the 
Church with its apostles and its kerygma, with baptism and the Lord’s supper; for 
that is really all there is to be said about the Church and its visibility” (ibid).  
B) A ‘top-down’ approach to divine speech 
a) The sender 
As already indicated, I understand ‘concrete acts of interpretation’ in terms of the 
formula s interprets (or sets) x as y to a in the context c. The aim of the sender (and 
the addressee) is thereby the termination of the chain of interpretation, which may 
lead to an action. In this chapter, the focus shall be on the ‘as’ in the formula s inter-
prets (or sets) x as y.  
Since this is not in the first place an essay on text hermeneutics but on ‘world-
interpretation’, as it were, the object of interpretation x is not to be identified with the 
biblical text. Rather, as already outlined above, x is a variable standing for a particu-
lar entity in the world. But as it is primarily the Christian narratives that shape the 
‘topography’ of the Christian perspective on the world, it is also those narratives 
which inform the sender’s (often unconscious) interpretative choices, that which 
makes him or her interpret x as y rather than z (provided one abstracts from the vari-
ability of all the other factors, namely s, a and c). In other words, Scripture comes 
into play in the as-structure of the interpretative act. There is an enormously com-
plex process of interpretation mediating between the biblical text and statements of 
the kind x is y that cannot be analysed in detail in this essay. Hence a few hints must 
suffice.  
Strictly speaking, the Christian narratives fulfil two different yet interconnected 
hermeneutical functions in such acts of interpretation. First, one has to keep in mind 
that it is never simply an individual interpreter that establishes a link between the 
Christian narratives and a particular x. Rather, the most basic interpretative practices 
always have a communal character and concern the very identity of a community. 
Yet this identity is itself the result of an internalisation of the Christian narratives. 
That is to say, ‘before’111 any concrete x is interpreted, the biblical narratives “con-
stitute the identity of the community that tells and retells the story, and they consti-
tute it as a narrative identity”.112 Even if one interprets this identity as a(n) (non-
Cartesian and non-physicalist) ipse-identity which requires the subject/community to 
continually reinterpret and refigure itself through the narratives which it seeks to 
appropriate, there is nonetheless a certain permanence and continuity(-in-
discontinuity) resulting from the ongoing process of internalisation.113 On this level, 
a tentative comparison with Abel’s interpretation1 seems tenable. One could thus say 
that Scripture constitutes and shapes the interpretative practice of a community on its 
 
111 What is at stake here is not a temporal, but a hermeneutical succession. 
112 P. Ricœur, Figuring the Sacred, 241, emphasis mine. 
113 M.I. Wallace, Introduction to Figuring the Sacred, 13. 
 
 
89
most basic level, limited by a specific interpretative horizon. Once again, what is at 
stake here is not the narrow, ‘hermeneutical’ understanding of interpretation such as 
scriptural interpretation, i.e. that which Abel calls appropriating-construing interpre-
tations3 (aneignend-deutend). Rather, the internalisation of Scripture by the commu-
nity builds up the most fundamental categories of interpretation which are always 
already entailed in every act of interpretation and in every perception of the world. 
Here too, I have touched upon questions that will be further discussed in part III. 
On the other hand, Scripture comes into play a second time in concrete acts of in-
terpretation in which s interprets (or sets) x as y. For according to Barth, divine 
speech occurs in the context of proclamation, i.e. a human sender talks about a par-
ticular x on the basis of a pericope taken from Scripture. Once again, it may seem 
problematic to emphasise so much that Church proclamation makes statements about 
concrete xs in the world. This is of course not the only, let alone the most plausible 
way of understanding the function of Church proclamation. Yet part II of this essay 
tries to take Barth at his word when he says that God always speaks a concretis-
simum, that he always says something specific to each addressee (KD I/1, 145).  
However, these concrete acts of interpretation cannot be separated from the level 
of interpretation1 discussed in the preceding paragraph. Rather, the most basic inter-
pretative categories on the level of interpretatition1 inform and shape all concrete acts 
of interpretation, even if they are mediated (‘a second time’, as it were) by scriptural 
exegesis – as in the case of Church proclamation. But there is of course a certain re-
ciprocity between these two levels insofar as text interpretation can very well alter 
and refigure the level of interpretation1. But in order for this to happen, a new and 
innovative interpretation must repeatedly occur and/or have a lasting effect on the 
interpretative community which the interpreter is part of.  
What is at stake here is the notion of pre-understanding (Vorverständnis) in text-
interpretation and the perennial hermeneutical question of how a text can be validly 
and adequately interpreted. However, the above account of the twofold use of the 
biblical text does not confusedly suggest that Scripture is the only factor which con-
stitutes the pre-understanding of Scripture – as it may seem at first glance. Rather, 
the process of internalising the Christian narratives on the level of interpretation1 is 
of course governed by elements that are not derived from Scripture itself. The 
Church prior to the Reformation rightly stressed that Scripture and Tradition form an 
inseparable whole. Nonetheless, the above remarks can be read as an attempt to un-
derstand the doctrine that Scripture interprets itself (sui ipsius interpres) – though it 
clearly deviates from the ‘classically’ Protestant view on this issue.  
In what follows, I shall analyse the second part of § 21 of the Prolegomena where 
Barth expounds his theological hermeneutics. Before that I shall give a brief over-
view of some hermeneutical theories that might help better understand Barth’s her-
meneutics. It is important to keep in mind the overall structure of this chapter: In the 
following reflections the focus will be on (the pragmatic aspects of) communication; 
more precisely, on the encoding of the message by the sender. Moreover, as outlined 
above, I shall pay particular attention to the ‘as-structure’ in the formula ‘s interprets 
x as y’.   
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Barth and contemporary hermeneutics 
The more determined textual meaning is, the less interpretation depends on the con-
text, the interpretative strategies and the aim(s) of its interpreter(s) – and vice versa. 
Moreover, if it is held that the ‘text itself’ is saturated with meaning, its extraction is 
normally thought of as mediated by some kind of method, i.e. by means of a rational, 
objective, neutral and publicly controllable procedure. Yet, despite this public char-
acter, access to the true meaning of the text is dependent on the mastery of this 
method and thus remains the privilege of a small group of experts. The still prevail-
ing dominance of the historical-critical method in many theological departments – 
which emerged relatively unscathed from post-modern and pragmatist challenges – is 
a case in point.114 Interestingly, fundamentalist movements in the US, which reacted 
against these guilds of biblical critics remained within a similar hermeneutical 
framework. By appealing to the common sense of the people and their ability to un-
derstand the plain sense of Scripture without the help of experts, they simply democ-
ratised the process of interpretation.115 In other words, the expert is replaced by the 
masses and the methodically controlled procedure by common sense and the alleged 
self-evidence of textual meaning. However, fundamentalism and biblical criticism 
are both Enlightenment ideologies insofar as they centre on the notion of a rational 
individual who is considered capable of interpreting the biblical text truthfully with-
out initiation into a specific community and its corresponding interpretative prac-
tice.116  
Yet some scholars associated with communitarian thought make the opposite mis-
take by reducing biblical interpretation to a kind of practical reasoning (phronesis) 
that only concerns directly interpersonal matters.117 They thereby ignore the dia-
chronic and synchronic complexity of text-interpretation. On the diachronic level, 
enquiry into a tradition’s Wirkungsgeschichte renders historical research not less but 
more important.118 Although it is no longer the historian’s aim to establish the text’s 
one and only true meaning hidden in the past, knowledge of its Wirkungsgeschichte 
is indispensable for every interpretative community. The fundamental difference 
between the classical historical-critical scholar and the theologically informed histo-
rian can be characterised as follows: the former seeks to overcome the perspectivity 
of every human act of interpretation by applying an allegedly objective and neutral 
method. His aim is to arrive at indisputable historical facts that can/must be accepted 
by everybody, wholly independent of a person’s world view. The latter, by contrast, 
fully accepts the inevitably perspectival character of his community’s basic presup-
positions (≈ interpretation1) but tries to heighten his tradition’s self-awareness. He 
investigates and critically evaluates the relationship between the biblical text and the 
cultural, social and political changes it gave rise to throughout the centuries. It goes 
 
114 Cf. J. Zumstein, Rettet die Bibel, 67ff. 
115 Hatch, The Democratisation of American Christianity, 179ff. 
116 Cf. S. Hauerwas, Unleashing Scripture, 35. 
117 See S.E. Fowl, Engaging Scripture, 178-206. 
118 Fowl does emphasise the importance of Wirkungsgeschichte (ibid., 128-160), but does not pay 
attention enough to the notion of a specifically theological discipline of history. 
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without saying that not all of his insights will be immediately relevant to contempo-
rary processes of decision-making. In any case, the theologically informed historian 
is as much an expert as the classical historical-critical scholar, even if his intellectual 
equipment differs significantly from that of the allegedly ‘neutral’ historian. 
So far as the synchronic level is concerned, the interpreter faces a wide variety of 
different questions today. Stephen Fowl’s understanding of practical reasoning 
(phronesis), for instance, is far too narrow and would not be suitable to tackle politi-
cal, social or scientific issues. That is to say, his use of the term phronesis may 
rightly highlight the perspectival, non-foundationalist and purpose-oriented character 
of underdetermined interpretation, as well as the need for the interpreter to acquire an 
interpretative hexis by repeated practice.119 However, there is very little room for 
differentiation.120 Of course, if the focus is on the common, basic presuppositions (≈ 
interpretation1), it is justified to speak of one ‘single’ phronesis. Yet it would be fal-
lacious to believe that there is only one field of activity that corresponds to this one 
interpretative perspective. Rather, on the diachronic as well as on the synchronic 
level, a tradition requires a great number of different types of expertise and author-
ity.121  
Let us now look at these processes of interpretation in greater detail. Frege’s well-
known distinction between sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung) highlights two of 
the dominant hermeneutical tendencies of modernity. Sense calls attention to the 
authorial intention, to that which the author had in mind, whereas reference concerns 
the external objects in the world, to that about which the author says something. J. 
Barr notes the corresponding trend in biblical studies which focused on the one hand 
on the biblical text as a manifestation of mental representations, and on the results of 
historical reconstructions of the ‘real events’ on the other.122  
Authorial intention: E.D. Hirsch  
E.D. Hirsch’s Validity in Interpretation, published in 1967, is a good example of a 
hermeneutics in which the ideal of scientific rigidity is approached on the basis of 
authorial intention.123 His hermeneutic theory is developed by analogy with the 
methodological apparatus of the natural sciences. It is an attempt, as it were, at trans-
ferring Popper’s theory of falsification to textual interpretation. As soon as we man-
age to form hypotheses about an author’s meaning or intention, these can be sub-
jected to rigorous testing. This enables us to draw probability judgments depending 
on the established degree of evidence. It is thus possible to reach “objective conclu-
 
119 Ibid., 56-61, 154-160, 190ff. 
120 I cannot pursue this question here any further, but part of the problem seems to be that Aristotle’s 
highly specific, namely ethical use of the term phronesis (see Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, VI.5) 
has been used as a general category for interpretation without the necessary modifications that would 
allow for differentiation within the phronesis paradigm. The use of Aristotle’s phronesis for text her-
meneutics goes back to H.-G. Gadamer’s Wahrheit und Methode, 295ff. 
121 Needless to say that the more one emphasises differentiation and the need for different types of 
authority, the less plausible it becomes to identify any of these kinds of authority with Church procla-
mation. 
122 J. Barr, The Bible in the Modern World, 175. 
123 E.D. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation. All page numbers in brackets refer to this work. 
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sions” (206). In other words, Hirsch collapses the Diltheyan distinction between ex-
planation and understanding, natural and human sciences, at the expense of under-
standing. He postulates the existence of fully determined verbal meanings in texts 
which he defines as “willed type[s]” (49). According to him, the determinacy of 
meaning cannot be maintained simply by virtue of particular groupings of signs. For 
even long and complex word sequences can still enter various contexts and situations 
and are thus never fully saturated with meaning. This is borne out by the fact that 
even competent and intelligent interpreters quite often disagree substantially about 
the meaning of a text. But if syntactics is incapable of safeguarding the self-identity 
and univocity of verbal meaning, there must be “some other discriminating force …” 
(47). This force Hirsch finds in the will of the author. It is only authorial intention 
which overcomes equivocity, as without it, it would be impossible to distinguish be-
tween what the author really tries to express by a word sequence and what he could 
have meant by it. Accordingly, whenever we seek to re-construe the meaning of an 
author’s discourse, there is no interpretative freedom at all. As the meaning of his 
discourse is the meaning he intends to convey, “we are completely subservient to his 
will …” (142). Whereas the word ‘willed’ stands for the indispensability of a con-
scious intending meaning, the term ‘type’ implies two things (49-51): first, it is an 
entity with clear boundaries, which unambiguously demarcate what belongs to it and 
what does not. Hirsch prefers the term ‘type’ to that of ‘class’, as the latter is nor-
mally thought of as an array of concrete instances, whereas the former can be entirely 
represented in a single instance. Determinacy is thus interpreted in terms of self-
identity, which Hirsch calls the “minimum requirement for shareability” (45). This 
leads to a second important feature of a type: its iterability. A type can be repre-
sented by an indefinite number of instances. Thus Hirsch’s understanding of verbal 
meaning as type is characterised by determinacy and shareability: “Verbal meaning 
is whatever someone has willed to convey by a particular sequence of linguistic signs 
and which can be conveyed (shared) by means of those linguistic signs” (31, italics 
mine).  
Drawing on the nineteenth century philologist Philip August Boeckh, Hirsch fur-
ther differentiates between verbal meaning and significance. Whereas verbal mean-
ing, characterised above as ‘willed type’, is a property of the text, i.e., ‘meaning-in’, 
significance is always ‘meaning-to’. That is to say, significance refers to the relation-
ship between someone’s verbal meaning and something else, something outside it. It 
follows that a text’s verbal meaning can in principle be applied to an indefinite num-
ber of state of affairs in past and present. However, each application is at the same 
time governed by the text’s verbal meaning. Hirsch’s radical distinction between 
meaning and its application flies in the face of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, where the 
three moments of understanding (Verstehen), interpretation (Auslegung) and applica-
tion (Anwendung) in the ‘hermeneutical situation’ are inseparable.124 Indeed, even 
though he admits that the theory of semantic autonomy “has long been victorious” 
(3), his own approach is designed as a meta-critique of the tradition initiated by Hei-
 
124 H.-G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 290-295. 
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degger and elaborated by Gadamer (2, 245-264). Hirsch aims at a revival of some of 
the basic insights of romantic hermeneutics, though these are now interpreted in 
terms of Husserlian intentionality (217ff). The question of how a theory of meaning 
can do justice to the determinacy of meaning on the one hand, and the obvious vari-
ability of any contingent act of consciousness on the other, is answered by resorting 
to Husserl’s distinction between the intentional act and the object-as-intended 
(noema).125 Different “intentional acts (on different occasions)” intend “an identical 
intentional object”, whereas verbal meaning is understood as a special kind of inten-
tional object (218). 
The difference between verbal meaning and significance re-occurs in Hirsch’s dif-
ferentiation between commentary, interpretation and criticism. Commentary is a 
summary term for all essays written about texts. Within this general class, Hirsch 
distinguishes between interpretation, which is concerned with meaning, and criti-
cism, which is a commentary about significance. This distinction does not coincide 
with different genres as every (really existing) “textual commentary is a mixture of 
interpretation and criticism, though usually a choice has been made as to which goal 
is to receive the main emphasis” (140). He even goes so far as to say that in practice, 
our understanding of a text is always related to something else. Under normal cir-
cumstances, the act of construing verbal meaning cannot be isolated from the act of 
relating it to external objects. Thus as far as concrete texts are concerned, the differ-
ence between criticism and interpretation seems to be one of degree. Finally, the 
above distinctions correspond to two different interpretative faculties. By under-
standing, Hirsch means the ability to perceive and construe the author’s verbal mean-
ing, whereas judgment refers to the capability of combining a meaning with either 
criteria of value or any other entity (143). 
External reference: W. Wrede 
Wrede’s famous essay, The task and method of New Testament theology, exemplifies 
a hermeneutics of the second type, which tries to reconstruct the ‘historical facts’.126 
According to him, already the term ‘New Testament theology’ is misplaced, as the 
New Testament is more concerned with ‘religion’ than with Christian theology. That 
is to say, Wrede’s ideal is to approach the New Testament from a (supposedly) neu-
tral, external perspective. He therefore suggests calling his project “history of early 
Christian religion and theology” (116). Consequently, the scope of this historical 
investigation can no longer be confined to the New Testament itself, but must com-
prise the non-canonical Christian texts as well. For New Testament theology to be a 
scientific undertaking, it has to be based on pure historical research and pursue the 
ideal of an utterly disinterested understanding of knowledge (70). This leads to a 
radical separation between dogmatics and biblical studies and rises the latter to the 
level of a ‘first theology’, whose objective and unbiased results can then be further 
processed by dogmatic theology and other disciplines. Wrede thus falls into the cate-
 
125 Cf. Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida, 139ff. 
126 W. Wrede, The task and method of New Testament theology. All the page numbers in brackets refer 
to this work. 
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gory of nineteenth century liberal theology which was so vigorously attacked by 
Barth after his ‘turn’ in 1915.127  
According to Wrede, New Testament theology must be purged of dogmatics, as 
facts speak for themselves: first, dogmatics cannot “correct the facts”, second, it 
cannot help us “to see the facts correctly”, and thirdly, it fails to legitimise them, be-
cause facts need no legitimisation as they are self-evident (69, italics mine). Wrede’s 
is thus a positivistic realism which is diametrically opposed to Barth’s theological 
thought. For Barth, the objective and the subjective aspects of human interpretative 
acts, i.e. that which is interpreted as well as how or as what it is interpreted are both 
divinely effected and lead to a Trinitarian hermeneutics.128 This also accounts for his 
well-known lack of interest in – rather than rejection of – the historical-critical ap-
proach in theology (cf. Röm II, XVIff).  
However, a closer look reveals that it is far from clear what the term ‘fact’ actu-
ally refers to in Wrede’s essay so that one should not too quickly brand him as a pro-
ponent of an outdated nineteenth-century historicism. Unlike Hirsch, he is not inter-
ested in authorial intention (86). At the same time he seems to distance himself from 
the mere reconstruction of external events as well: “Biblical theology has to investi-
gate something from given documents – it is not an external thing, still something 
intellectual” (69, italics mine). Elsewhere he admits “that we are […] generally in the 
dark about external events” (105). At times, Wrede seems close to a sort of phe-
nomenology of religion. This is borne out by his distinction between a type and its 
variants, which is not to be confused with Hirsch’s use of the (former) term. Inter-
preting Wrede’s essay as favourably as possible, one could say that he envisages the 
early Christian community to be shaped by certain linguistic ‘key images’. On this 
view, a ‘type’ would serve as a point of crystallisation for further linguistic imagery 
– its ‘variants’ in Wrede’s idiom.129  
A further consequence of Wrede’s approach is that the canon, a group of authori-
tative texts chosen according to internal criteria, loses its plausibility. The specifi-
cally Christian interest in whether a piece of writing is a truthful testimony to the 
divine revelation in Jesus Christ gives way to the question of the chronological order 
of early Christian writings. 
Pragmatic insights: S. Fish 
Post-structuralist and post-critical hermeneutics dismantles the illusion of an atempo-
ral and contextless rationality and points to the interdependence of methods and their 
underlying world views. Hence the focus is on patterns of interpretation embodied by 
communities and the prespectival, political and ideological character of all herme-
neutic approaches. The hitherto dominating notions of authorial intention and exter-
nal reference are abandoned or at least undergo significant modifications. Nor is 
meaning simply conceived of in terms of the ‘semantic autonomy’ of the text. 
Rather, it is believed that meaning remains to a large extent dependent on the inter-
 
127 Cf. B. McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology, 129ff. 
128 K. Barth, Schicksal und Idee in der Theologie, 381ff. 
129 However, such an interpretation certainly goes beyond the actual intellectual horizon of the author. 
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preter and his community, the context, and the interpretative aim governing the act of 
interpretation. 
Stanley Fish’s theory of interpretation as developed in Is There a Text in This 
Class? revolves around the notion of interpretative communities.130 What stands at 
the centre of attention is not a method by means of which the meaning of the text can 
be extracted but the effect a particular text has upon its reader. Accordingly, Fish is 
not interested in the question of what a sentence means, but rather what it does (to 
the reader) (25). Meaning is not a property which inheres in the text itself but must 
be thought of as an event, “something that is happening between the words and in the 
reader’s mind …” (28). The form of the reader’s experience, the formal units of the 
text and the structure of intention are only different perspectives on the same inter-
pretative act. Consequently, there is no isolatable interpretandum independent of or 
prior to the act of interpretation. Any attempt at pointing to unchangeable patterns in 
texts fails, since these patterns are contingent on the procedures by means of which 
they are being interpreted. In other words, these patterns are never simply observable 
facts but are themselves constituted by the interpretative act (165).  
Yet the question arises as to how this approach can account for the fact that, first, 
the same reader will perform differently when reading two different ‘texts’, and sec-
ondly, different readers will perform similarly when reading the same ‘text’. How-
ever, according to Fish, neither of these cases compels us to resort to the notion of a 
text that is independent of and prior to the interpretative act. Rather, stability as well 
as variety can be explained in terms of interpretative strategies (167f). If an inter-
preter reads two ‘different’ literary works differently, this is not because they possess 
different formal structures which give rise to different interpretative strategies but 
because the interpreter’s “predisposition to execute different interpretive strategies 
will produce different formal structures” (169). In other words, interpretative strate-
gies are not applied after reading but rather are the shape of reading. Consequently, 
they constitute the text rather than arise from them.  
However, even if one follows Fish’s account closely, it cannot be denied that the 
assignment of an interpretative strategy to a particular ‘text’ or genre is based on the 
‘text’. Although the interpretative strategy is text-constitutive, it is certain indices in 
the text which govern the interpreter’s selection. As Fish himself puts it, when I read 
Lycidas, I make right from the beginning two decisions, namely that this work is a 
pastoral and that it was written by Milton; and these decisions govern the whole act 
of interpretation. Yet these pieces of information are taken from the text – even if 
they are strictly speaking interpretations as well. It might well be that the interpreta-
tive strategy is the hermeneutically dominant factor in text-interpretation. Nonethe-
less, a non-arbitrary assignment of a strategy to a text or a genre requires that this 
text or genre is identifiable. As a result, the ‘text’ – even if its meaning is indeed 
 
130 S. Fish, Is There a Text in This Class, pp. 303ff. All page references in brackets refer to Fish’s 
work. 
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highly underdetermined and only emerges in the process of interpretation – herme-
neutically precedes the act of reading.131  
 Fish then turns to the second question raised above and tries to explain why dif-
ferent readers may perform the same interpretative strategy when faced with the 
‘same’ text. The answer is: because they belong to the same interpretative commu-
nity, i.e. they belong to a group of people who share the same interpretative strate-
gies. The notion of interpretative community also accounts for the “regularity with 
which a single reader will employ different interpretive strategies and thus make dif-
ferent texts …” (171). The answer to this question is: he belongs to different interpre-
tative strategies. This is also the reason why there can be disagreement on the inter-
pretation of a ‘text’: not because of the stability of the text, but because of the rela-
tive stability of interpretative communities. 
It follows from this that the terms interpretative community and interpretative 
strategy are used in different ways. First, an interpretative strategy can be text- or 
genre-dependent. Thus the fact that I realise that Lycidas is a pastoral and written by 
Milton predisposes me to read it in a particular way, i.e. guided by a particular inter-
pretative strategy. Secondly, interpretative strategies can differ even if the ‘text’ re-
mains the same. That is to say, different people read the same text differently be-
cause they follow different interpretative strategies. Thirdly, an individual interpreter 
belongs simultaneously to various interpretative communities (and will hence adopt 
different interpretative strategies) as regards one and the same text. In other words, 
the adoption of an interpretative strategy can be context-dependent. Furthermore, the 
various interpretative communities the interpreter belongs to may be incompatible 
with each other so that he has to negotiate between conflicting criteria.132   
Accordingly, interpretative strategies differ from one interpretative community to 
another, and there are no criteria by means of which they can be assessed. Thus there 
cannot be a universal consensus on which norms are the right ones. Yet this neither 
leads to relativism nor solipsism. It does not lead to relativism since no one can take 
a god’s-eye view and leave behind or transcend any interpretative presuppositions. 
As Fish puts it, “relativism is a position one can entertain, [but] it is not a position 
one can occupy. No one can be a relativist …” (319). In other words, everybody al-
ways already holds, consciously or unconsciously, certain beliefs and norms so that 
“there is never a moment when one believes nothing …” (ibid). Accordingly, the fear 
that a person could lack any basis for his actions is groundless, since whoever acts, 
acts in a particular way, and whoever acts in a particular way, has certain presupposi-
tions. That is to say, even in a world of differing and conflicting norms and values, 
the individual is always already situated in a particular interpretative community. 
Furthermore, as Fish points out, his approach does not lead to solipsism since inter-
pretative strategies are adopted and learned from the communities which the individ-
ual interpreter is part of. The interpreter thus only appropriates and internalises pre-
 
131 This is not to say that there is only one rule according to which text/genres and interpretative 
strategies can be related to each other. However, in order to avoid utter arbitrariness, there must be 
some kind of stability for specific interpreters or communities. 
132 S. Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally, 30f. 
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given values and norms of which he is not himself the origin. Accordingly, interpret-
ers must be regarded as “extensions of an institutional community” and do not act as 
individuals (321).  
Open and closed texts: U. Eco 
Fish’s focus on interpretative strategies results in a certain disregard for different 
genres of texts. Eco, by contrast, views the process of text interpretation in terms of a 
dialectic relationship between text, author and interpreter.133 Unlike Fish, he empha-
sises that a text does constitute a network of interpretative constraints, even if the 
degree of this guidance as well as the interpretative labour required to decode it, var-
ies greatly with the genre into which it falls. Eco thus distinguishes between closed 
and open texts.  
Closed texts are aimed at a clearly defined empirical reader and try to evoke an 
equally clear and unambiguous response. Yet it is exactly this type of text which is 
open to aberrant interpretations: “A text so immoderately ‘open’ to every possible 
interpretation will be called a closed one”.134 Texts which fall into this class are pre-
dictable insofar as every expectation elicited is followed by a corresponding satisfac-
tion. Their narrative structure follows a fixed pattern with little variation which can 
be analysed relatively easily.135 Yet problems arise if the addressee is not the ‘aver-
age reader’ the text was designed for by the author. That is to say, if the text is read 
by people with other interpretative presuppositions and a different background 
knowledge, misinterpretations are unavoidable.  
Open texts, however, do not allow for such an interpretative freedom: “You can-
not use the text as you want, but only as the text wants you to use it”.136 That is to 
say, open texts are, precisely because of their openness, more restrictive and do not 
allow for whatever interpretation. In other words, the more ‘open’ a text is, the more 
determined are the requirements the model reader should meet; and one could add, 
the more demanding is the interpretative labour to appropriately decode the text. Eco 
even goes so far as to say that the profile of a good reader of open texts can be ex-
trapolated from the text itself. According to him, “the pragmatic process of interpre-
tation is not an empirical accident independent of the text qua text, but is a structural 
element of its generative process”.137 Consequently, if an open text is read by an un-
suitable and incompetent interpreter, it becomes another text. For instance, nobody 
can be hindered from reading Kafka’s Trial as a trivial criminal novel, but one then 
grossly misreads this work.  
Despite obvious and considerable differences between Fish’s and Eco’s approach, 
these two theories do not need be viewed as diametrically opposed. Even if this is not 
fully acknowledged by the author, Fish does (implicitly) allow for the idea that tex-
tual signals help the reader select the appropriate interpretative strategy. But he does 
 
133 U. Eco, The Role of the Reader. 
134 Ibid., 8. 
135 Cf. ibid., 146f, 156-159. 
136 Ibid., 9. 
137 Ibid. 
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not use the term interpretative strategy univocally, i.e. there is not always a fixed 
relationship between a particular genre and an interpretative strategy. That is why 
one and the same text can be interpreted by means of different strategies. 
As for Eco’s statement that the model reader of an open text can be extrapolated 
from the text itself, one could argue – along with Fish – that this is only possible if 
one adopts specific reading habits. Eco accepts the prevailing hierarchy of interpret-
ers insofar as he considers readers which read Kafka’s Trial not just as a trivial 
criminal novel as the more appropriate ones. It follows from this that his sophisti-
cated semiotic analysis of open texts is based on this presupposition and can there-
fore be understood as an internal clarification; internal in the sense that the relation-
ship between a (pre-given) interpretative strategy and a particular text is the main 
focus. Eco simply does not see any reasons to overthrow the existing hierarchy and 
hence takes great pains at elucidating the character of the non-trivial reading. Fish’s 
reflections, by contrast, are of a more general or even ‘hypothetical’ kind. That is to 
say, in principle, Kafka’s Trial can be read as a telephone directory (or in any other 
way), i.e. by means of an interpretative strategy that differs completely from that 
considered appropriate by Eco. The only question is whether there are reasons to 
consider such a reading an intelligent and fruitful project.  
On the other hand, Eco has to admit that we can very well imagine a time in 
which no one sees in Kafka’s Trial more than a criminal story. Under such circum-
stances Eco’s questions would simply disappear. Put differently, it cannot be denied 
that the extrapolation of the model reader from the text is – strictly speaking – itself 
highly contingent and not a property of the text itself. Thus Eco’s analysis is cer-
tainly not presuppositionless. On the contrary, his investigation is based on the cur-
rent practice of reading. But it is precisely for this reason that the questions he raises 
are extremely relevant and interesting and deepen our understanding of this practice.  
I shall now turn to Barth’s own hermeneutics which will be interpreted in dia-
logue with the above approaches. 
Barth’s Hermeneutics  
Following the overall structure of the Prolegomena, Barth discusses the issue of 
scriptural interpretation on the basis of his distinction between the objective and the 
subjective aspect of revelation. Within the objective aspect, he differentiates between 
the direct, absolute and material authority of Scripture itself and the indirect, relative 
and formal authority of the Church, which is grounded in and limited by the former 
authority. Similarly, the subjective aspect divides into the direct, absolute and mate-
rial freedom of Scripture, which rules in the Church, and the indirect, relative and 
formal freedom of the Church, which is again grounded in and limited by the former 
freedom (KD I/2, 598ff, 741ff). The freedom of Scripture as the Word of God ‘com-
pletes’ its own authority since it is not a tyranny but a power which acknowledges 
the dignity of human beings and seeks their free response. Thus the Word of God, 
which itself possesses and exercises freedom, evokes human freedom (KD I/2, 750). 
Barth thus consistently follows his theocentric principle that even (seemingly) gen-
eral anthropological features and qualities must be theologically qualified.  
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Within these boundaries, there is room for human decisions, resolutions and de-
terminations and the responsibility which comes with all this (KD I/2, 742, 750). 
More specifically, there must be a willingness on the part of human beings to take 
responsibility for the correct exegesis and application of Scripture, which Barth calls 
the freedom under the Word (KD I/2, 779ff). What is at stake here is a theocentrically 
reinterpreted con-scientia, i.e. the human co-knowledge of that which God knows. 
Whereas this freedom under the Word is fundamentally an individual category, Barth 
had earlier defined the authority under the Word as the willingness and readiness to 
listen to each other in the reception and acceptance of Scripture (KD I/2, 652ff, 781). 
As far as the freedom under the Word is concerned, Barth again conceives this indi-
vidual consent to the divine Word – faith – in terms of an event. And even this event 
character of faith is not to be understood in terms of a phenomenon which can be 
perceived (within the spatio-temporal world) and subjected to scrutiny. Rather, Barth 
insists, its constitution as well as its perceptibility can only be thought of theocentri-
cally:  
Both it [i.e. faith in Jesus Christ] and therefore also those special events of faith as such are primarily 
and essentially to be regarded only from above, from Jesus Christ, because they are only real when 
seen in this way from above, from Jesus Christ (KD I/2, 793).  
In other words, the events of faith are subject to the contingencies of life and there-
fore, due to their relativity and ambiguity, cannot form part of a genuine Christian 
witness. By contrast, the really significant events in our life are “identical with our 
participation in the great deeds of God in his revelation” (KD I/2, 794). Although 
Barth originally intended to expound in the second part of § 21 the individual human 
reception of the Word, he all of a sudden returns to what he calls the objective aspect 
of revelation.  
As the Word of God, Scripture is clear in itself. It is only because it comes in the 
form of fragile human words that interpretation is indispensable, for the meaning of 
human words are – at least for the addressee – ambiguous. Barth defines meaning 
fundamentally in terms of speaker intention: successful communication is achieved if 
the intended meaning of the speaker can be identically transferred to the mind of the 
addressee (KD I/2, 799).138 What Barth has in mind here, is the authorial intention of 
the biblical writer – not that of the proclaimer. In this respect, Barth’s hermeneutics 
resembles that of Hirsch, although he does not embrace the latter’s hypothetico-
deductive approach. But how far is such a comparison really tenable? According to 
Hirsch’s definition of verbal meaning as willed type, there is no interpretative free-
dom whatsoever, since we are completely subservient to the will of the author. As 
indicated above, it is a willed type because authorial intention is based on the notion 
of a consciously intended meaning. And it is a willed type since its content can be 
delineated without any ambiguity and fully and self-identically represented in single 
 
138 The sense of human words „will unter den verschiedenen in Betracht kommenden Möglichkeiten 
als der vom Sprechenden beabsichtigte Sinn ermittelt und er will als der Sinn, den sie für den Spre-
chenden haben, in das Denken des Hörenden übertragen werden, so dass sie nun auch für ihn Sinn und 
zwar denselben, den vom Sprechenden beabsichtigten Sinn haben“ (KD I/2, 799). 
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instances. As a result, a type is indefinitely iterable. Thus Hirsch’s understanding of 
verbal meaning as type is characterised by determinacy and iterability.  
But it is not entirely clear whether Barth really shares Hirsch’s extreme notion of 
full determinacy. Although he emphatically points out that the interpreter has to sub-
ordinate his pre-understanding (Vorverständins) to Scripture, interpretation is not 
thought of in terms of a reception of fully determined meanings conveyed by the text 
that merely need to be retrieved by the interpreter. Rather, subordination concerns 
the direction and purpose (Richtung) indicated in the ideas, thoughts and convictions 
of the prophets and apostles, that which they wanted to bring about (ausrichten) (KD 
I/2, 806). It is particularly this last formulation which points in the direction of what 
Hirsch calls significance. Whereas verbal meaning, understood as ‘willed type’, is a 
property of the text, i.e. ‘meaning-in’, significance is always ‘meaning-to’. That is to 
say, it refers to the relationship between someone’s verbal meaning and ‘something 
else’. A brief look at Paul Ricœur’s hermeneutics may help to clarify this point.  
According to Ricœur, the mental meaning of the speaker manifests itself in dis-
course, i.e. the utterer’s meaning leaves its imprint on the utterance meaning, for ex-
ample through shifters, pointing back to the speaker, personal pronouns, tenses and 
adjectives of time, etc.139 What can be fixed in writing, however, is not the event of 
discourse, but only the ‘what’ of the event, the intentional exteriorization, the noema 
of the speech-act. Whereas it is unproblematic to communicate the propositional con-
tent of an utterance (locutionary act) through writing, it is somewhat more difficult to 
convey the illocutionary act, and very difficult to transmit the perlocutionary act. For 
the perlocutionary function “is less an intentional act, calling for an intention of rec-
ognition on the part of the hearer, than a kind of ‘stimulus’ generating a ‘response’ in 
a behavioural sense”.140 What cannot be fixed at all, however, is prosody, i.e. su-
prasegmental phonological features such as intonation and stress. Perhaps, Barth’s 
remarks about that which the apostles and prophets wanted to bring about could be 
interpreted in terms of the perlocutionary act.141  
Yet Ricœur’s stress on the dissociation of textual meaning and mental intention in 
written discourse clearly goes a step further than Barth. Whereas in spoken language, 
the subjective intention of the speaker and the meaning of discourse overlap, with 
written language, “… the author’s intention and the meaning of the text cease to co-
incide”.142 As there is no longer a situation common to the writer and the reader, the 
meaning of the text is open to an indefinite number of readers and interpretations: 
“The reader is absent from the act of writing; the writer is absent from the act of 
reading. The text thus produces a double eclipse of the reader and the writer. It 
 
139 P. Ricœur, Du texte à l’action, 104. 
140 Ibid., 106f. 
141 In a Barthian line of thougt, Van Hoozer suggests that Scripture on the one hand is the Word of 
God in the sense of divine locution and illocution and may become the Word of God in the sense of 
the perlocutionary effects it achieves, see K. Vanhoozer, God’s Mighty Speech-Acts, 178. Yet this 
statement does not entail the notion that the perlocutionary act can be conveyed by writing. 
142 P. Ricœur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 200. 
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thereby replaces the relation of dialogue, which directly connects the voice of one to 
the hearing of the other”.143  
According to Barth, the conveyance of meaning from author (i.e. the biblical au-
thor) to addressee falls into two different phases: exegesis (Auslegung) and applica-
tion (Anwendung). But who has the authority and competence to carry out this trans-
fer? Barth suggests that at times, the speaker (i.e. author) or the addressee might suf-
fice to accomplish this transfer of meaning successfully.144 As a result, not only 
Scripture as the Word of God but also as human word is to a certain extent self-
explanatory (KD I/2, 799f). But since this latter claritas is limited, a mediating third 
interpreter is nonetheless indispensable.145 A member of the Church is called to me-
diate between Scripture and the addressee. First, he needs to establish the meaning of 
the text, and second, to tell the addressee “that and how far the word of Scripture also 
has meaning to him [i.e. the addressee] …” (KD I/2, 800). This hermeneutical re-
sponsibility concerns all members of the Church and not just a small elite of scribes: 
the whole Church is the organisation of this service of mediation (KD I/2, 801). For 
this reason, there is no one in the Church who simply passively receives the interpre-
tation of the minister who mediates between Scripture and addressee.  
The pivotal principle of scriptural hermeneutics is for Barth that of subordination. 
Our pre-understanding, i.e. our ideas, thoughts and convictions need be freely subor-
dinated to the ideas, thoughts and convictions of the biblical witnesses. It is only then 
that the claritas of the Word can become an event (KD I/2, 805). But subordination is 
not to be confused with elimination or annihilation; that would be quite impossible. 
Rather, “[s]ubordination implies that the subordinate is there as such and remains 
there. It means placing oneself behind, following, complying as subordinate to supe-
rior” (KD I/2, 805). Furthermore, subordination is not simply a repetition of that 
which the apostles and prophets said. Rather, as we have seen above, it must be faith-
ful to the purpose of their witness, to that which they wanted to bring about by their 
words (KD I/2, 806).  
There is a clear correspondence between Barth’s hermeneutics and the central 
tenet of his theology that the eschatological reality of the risen Christ takes “onto-
logical and criteriological priority over the experiential reality which we share”.146 
Accordingly, “the text, or the meaning of the text is regarded as simply autonomous 
[…] that is, a semiotic world of its own, regardless of its reception”.147 This also ac-
counts for Barth’s emphasis on subordination and his reluctance to discuss what he 
calls ‘general hermeneutic’ theories. According to him, general hermeneutics sees 
the relationship between text and the pre-understanding of the interpreter as a dia-
 
143 Ibid., 146f. 
144 “Wie sollten die Propheten und Apostel nicht auch immer wieder direkt in der Erklärung gehört 
werden, die die Hörenden sich selbst zu geben vermögend sind? Und wie sollten sie nicht auch immer 
wieder in der Lage sein, sich selbst zu erklären?” (KD I/2, 799). 
145 What remains unclear is how this limited claritas is to be conceived and how it is related to the 
following reflections about the necessity of a mediator. Under what circumstances can the addressee 
rely on the self-explanatory character of the human words and therefore dispense with an interpreter? 
Is this notion plausible at all? 
146 I.U. Dalferth, Karl Barth’s eschatological realism, 22. 
147 H.W. Frei, Types of Christian Theology, 85. 
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logue inter pares. As far as the biblical text and its interpreters are concerned, how-
ever, it is a dialogue inter impares (KD I/2, 807). It is the nature of this asymmetry 
that now needs to be explored. Barth here obviously relapses into a time-eternity 
dualism which hinders him from developing a genuinely theological hermeneutics. 
For Christian theology has no difficulty accepting the finite conditions of all human 
acts of interpretation and this implies that the inevitability of a pre-understanding 
does not constitute a problem. Consequently, a theological hermeneutics has to make 
sure that not only the text but also the pre-understanding is theologically qualified. 
And since a pre-understanding is not just a set of principles and rules which the in-
terpreter ‘applies’ to the text, sociological, ecclesiological and institutional aspects 
need to be taken into account as well. As we have seen, the practice and horizon of 
interpretation1 is also highly relevant with respect to text interpretation.     
Barth accepts the “only seemingly tautological exegetical rule of the older Protes-
tant Orthodoxy, whereby an interpretation of Scripture is to be recognised as true or 
false by the fact that, if it is true, it is in accord with Scripture so far as this is the 
Word of God” (KD I/2, 807). Put differently, what guides exegesis is the content or 
centre of Scripture which is for Barth Jesus Christ in his gracious care for the sin-
ner.148 As I shall try to show below, Barth derives from this evidently theological 
dependence of man from the grace of God a hermeneutical theory which is supposed 
to safeguard the primacy of the biblical word but in fact fails to do this job.  
In his reflections on exegesis Barth distinguishes between three individual phases: 
observation (Beobachtung), reflection (Nachdenken) and appropriation (Aneignung) 
(KD I/2, 810ff). He follows here the threefold distinction between subtilitas intelli-
gendi, subtilitas explicandi and subtilitas applicandi, which goes back to the pietist 
J.J. Rambach.149  
1) Observation: this first interpretative phase is concerned with the sensus and the 
explicatio of Scripture. We first have to read the words of the apostles as documents 
of their concrete historical situation. Insofar as this first aspect of explicatio is the 
result of a literary-historical observation, it falls, according to Barth, within the range 
of a general hermeneutics. He first distinguishes between the literary(-historical) and 
the (literary-)historical side of this process of interpretation, which roughly corre-
sponds to the traditional differentiation between speaker intention (cf. Hirsch) and 
external reference (cf. Wrede). On the one hand, Barth considers the prophets and 
apostles themselves as speakers (KD I/2, 810). On the other hand, the image (Bild) of 
their words mirrors (spiegelt) the image (Bild) of an object (KD I/2, 811). However, 
as far as this latter aspect is concerned, Barth does not aim at reconstructing allegedly 
‘objective’ and indubitable historical facts which are supposed to replace the merely 
‘subjective’ and biased witness of the New Testament writers in the sense of a his-
torical positivism. Nonetheless, explication is dependent on historical research: 
 
148 “Erklären – im Dienst der Klarheit, die die Bibel als Gottes Wort sich selbst verschafft – können 
wir sie also grundsätzlich im Ganzen wie im Einzelnen nur, indem wir sehen und aufzeigen, wie das, 
was sie sagt, von jenem verhüllten und enthüllten Namen Jesus Christus her gesagt und also in Bezeu-
gung der Gnade gesagt ist, deren wir als Menschen bedürftig, von uns als Menschen aus unvermö-
gend, von Gott her aber teilhaftig sind“ (KD I/2, 808). 
149 J.J. Rambach, Institutiones hermeneuticae sacrae. 
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… I try to form a picture of what has taken place on the spot to which the words of the author refer, 
and of what has occasioned the author to use these particular words of his text. To form a picture of 
this happening means, however, that as it comes to me in the mirror of these words by means of the 
literary examination, I shall fit it into [einordnen] the series of other pictures which are at my disposal 
through reconstructing the objective historical situation of the author and of what he has seen. These 
will include pictures of his own time, its events and typical manifestations, its circumstances and aspi-
rations, its natural and intellectual conception, its objective and subjective assumptions and problems. 
They will also include pictures of the periods which immediately precede and follow, in the sequence 
of which the happening which he reports takes its place, and within the process of which it forms an 
essential member, linking what goes before with what follows (KD I/2, 811).  
Although this interpretative step certainly entails reference to extra-biblical material, 
Barth does not suggest a reductive approach which replaces the perspective of faith 
by an allegedly more objective one. Nonetheless, his use of the term ‘objective’ is 
somewhat misleading. In actual fact, he wants to highlight the inevitability of a par-
ticular pre-understanding for every interpreter. That is to say, Barth is fully aware of 
the perspectival character of every historical approach. Translating that into Abel’s 
terminology, one could say that there is the most fundamental level of interpretation1 
which shapes and governs all acts of interpretation2+3. Fish would call this an inter-
pretative strategy.150 Barth writes: 
It is not to be forgotten – and here the matter becomes critical: I have, of course, a more or less defi-
nite picture of historical realities generally, and of the whole epoch which forms the framework of the 
observable historical process in which the event referred to in the text has its special place. This gen-
eral picture will certainly determine my picture of the time in which the event referred to in the text 
falls, my picture of the preceding and succeeding periods, and of the whole historical process. And 
this applies necessarily also to the particular picture which I form of this event in the narrowest of 
those various circles (KD I/2, 812). 
Yet, according to Barth, also the obverse may occur: 
Alternatively, it is possible that this particular picture – not because it is my picture, but because it is 
the representation of the object spoken of to me – will be so strong that it will determine and modify, 
shatter and remould my previous picture of that time, then of the whole historical process and in the 
end perhaps even of the historical reality generally. Even within the framework of general hermeneu-
tics I shall obviously have to reckon with both possibilities (KD I/2, 812, italics mine). 
However, there seems to be a certain confusion in this last quotation which can be 
spelled out by drawing on Abel’s distinction between interpretation1 and interpreta-
tion3. It is of course possible that an interpreter discovers new truths in a text without 
changing his most basic interpretative presuppositions. That is to say, he only modi-
fies his views on the level of interpretation3, which leaves the level of interpretation1 
unaffected. He thus still inhabits the ‘same’ world. But in the above quotation, Barth 
suggests that the interpreter may modify his understanding of the historical reality in 
general while still remaining within the framework of a general hermeneutics. I take 
the expression ‘general hermeneutics’ to be a summary term for all hermeneutical 
approaches which are not explicitly based on Christian presuppositions. If this inter-
pretation is correct, it becomes difficult to make sense of the above quotation. To 
adopt a new understanding of the ‘historical reality in general’ is tantamount to 
changing one’s world-view – an alteration which clearly concerns the level of inter-
pretation1. Now if the reader comes to assume a new world view, this hardly takes 
place within the framework of general hermeneutics. Rather, he replaces his previous 
 
150 I am not suggesting that these different approaches do coincide, but they at least partly overlap. 
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interpretative framework for a completely different one. But perhaps Barth simply 
wants to say that even if the interpreter’s starting point is general hermeneutics, the 
process of reading might lead him to alter even his basic presuppositions on the level 
of interpretation1. If the latter is the case, the interpreter undergoes a conversion.     
Yet Barth’s reflections point in a different direction. According to him, general 
hermeneutics only allows for alterations of the prevailing interpretative presupposi-
tions within definite limits. That is to say, it self-evidently presupposes what is gener-
ally possible. This implies that changes on the level of interpretation1 are excluded. 
Yet Barth does not seem to be saying that only a Christian pre-understanding enables 
the reader to interpret Scripture appropriately. Rather, he claims biblical hermeneu-
tics to be more objective, since – unlike general hermeneutics – “it follows the way 
of strict observation to the very end” (KD I/2, 813). This statement is not to be inter-
preted in terms of a foundationalist hermeneutics but rather results from Barth’s ex-
plicitly theological realism. He does by no means deny that biblical hermeneutics is 
based on interpretative presuppositions. On the contrary, that which renders biblical 
hermeneutics more objective is its Christian presuppositions.151 The problem lies 
elsewhere: Barth resorts to the notion of ‘strict observation’ because his epistemo-
logical premises force him to conceive the conditions of possibility of an appropriate 
interpretation as being inherent in the text. What makes Barth’s reflections on sensus 
and explicatio confusing is the fact that he oscillates between two different and irrec-
oncilable positions.  
a) On the one hand, he does distinguish between general and biblical hermeneu-
tics, i.e. between different pre-understandings. Whereas biblical hermeneutics allows 
the picture of the object (Gegenstandsbild) in the text to exercise its challenging 
force, general hermeneutics imposes restrictions on the text which limit its theologi-
cal potential. In other words, it is possible to draw a distinction between appropriate 
and inappropriate pre-understandings. This in turn presupposes that there is a differ-
ence between text and pre-understanding – even if the text is never immediately ac-
cessible but always already located within a particular interpretative framework. If 
one follows this line of argument, the interpretative strategy/community (to use 
Fish’s terminology) clearly emerges as an ‘independent’ hermeneutical factor that 
needs to be taken seriously and which becomes sociologically graspable as well. 
Consequently, biblical hermeneutics is one of them – even if from a theological per-
spective the only appropriate one. However, such a view clashes with central state-
ments in the Prolegomena. According to Barth, God can only be known through 
God. But this by no means leads to the notion of a permanent, i.e. diachronic in-
dwelling of God in the ecclesiastical community. Yet such an indwelling is undoubt-
edly required in order to do justice to both, the principle that God can only be known 
through God, and the notion that a specifically ecclesial interpretative strat-
egy/community is required in order to understand Scripture adequately. As Milbank 
 
151 Biblical hermeneutics follows the way of strict observation: “Gewiss tut sie dies ihrerseits auf 
Grund einer bestimmten Voraussetzung. Es ist aber zu bemerken, dass diese ihre Voraussetzung ihr 
ermöglicht, als Hermeneutik konsequent zu sein, was man von jener Voraussetzung der allgemeinen 
Hermeneutik gerade nicht sagen kann” (KD I/2, 813). 
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puts it, there must be something “like a communicatio idiomatum between Church 
and Spirit, without an identifiable point of union in either nature or personhood”.152
 b) On the other hand, the necessity of an appropriate pre-understanding is denied 
altogether since the picture of the object (Gegenstandsbild) in the text, which Barth 
identifies with the name of Jesus Christ, exercises an irresistible force and unambi-
guously presents itself to the interpreter. This also accounts for Barth’s statement that 
“theological hermeneutics […] is not claiming for itself a mysterious special privi-
lege …” (KD I/2, 815). There is no such privilege because of the alleged self-
evidence of the picture of the object (Gegenstandsbild) in the text. If one follows this 
line of thought, it is not possible to draw a distinction between text and pre-
understanding or interpretative strategy/community. Rather, the interpreter’s pre-
understanding becomes in principle irrelevant, since the picture of the object (Gegen-
standsbild) is able to overcome all obstacles that might initially be opposed to its 
self-revelatory dynamics. As will be shown below, it is clearly this second approach 
b) which takes centre stage in the remaining pages of KD I/2, § 21.  
2) Barth proceeds in elucidating the meaning of what he calls “the act of reflection 
on what Scripture declares to us” (KD I/2, 815). This reflection occupies a place in 
between sensus and usus or explicatio and applicatio. However, in spite of this dif-
ferentiation, it does not constitute an independent and isolatable interpretative move 
which succeeds explicatio.  
Barth fully concedes that every interpretation of Scripture has a perspectival char-
acter. The simplest Bible reader as well as the most sophisticated exegete cannot but 
approach the text from the standpoint of a particular epistemology, logic and ethics, 
and inevitably possesses a certain pre-understanding of God, self and world. Accord-
ingly, the interpreter must first make use of his system of thought if interpretation is 
supposed to take place at all. Yet the question is how this use is to be thought of (KD 
I/2, 818ff).  
First, the interpreter has to be aware that no pre-understanding as such is appro-
priate to interpret Scripture. On the contrary, we can be sure that every pre-
understanding is inappropriate – even if it might become appropriate through the 
encounter with Scripture. Secondly, every interpretation of Scripture which is based 
on a particular pre-understanding can therefore only have the character of an essay or 
hypothesis. For this reason the possibility cannot be excluded that, under certain cir-
cumstances, other philosophies might be more appropriate than the one initially cho-
sen. Thirdly, every pre-understanding does constitute a threat to the authority of 
Scripture if it is not subordinated to the biblical word, but no pre-understanding is 
dangerous as such if it is subordinated to it. Fourthly, there is no reason to privilege 
one mode of thought to another, even if our choices are of course never just arbitrary. 
But in making specific selections, we do not follow a universal rule. Rather, our 
choices depend on particular situations and contexts. Fifthly, Barth writes: “The use 
of a scheme of thought in the service of scriptural exegesis is legitimate and fruitful 
when it is determined (bestimmt) and controlled (beherrscht) by the text and the pic-
 
152 J. Milbank, The Word Made Strange, 185. 
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ture of the object (Gegenstandsbild) mirrored in the text” (KD I/2, 823). Barth thus 
advocates a critical use of human schemes of thought, in which the latter is the object 
of this critique and Scripture the subject! For this reason, any philosophy can be 
criticised in order to serve the Word of God and subsequently fulfil a positive her-
meneutical function.  
There is much to be learned from Barth’s theological hermeneutics, provided one 
reads the above exposition eschatologically. In his reflections on dogmatics, Barth 
calls dogma an “‘eschatological concept’” (KD I/1, 284) and defines it as “Church 
proclamation, so far as it really agrees with the Bible as the Word of God” (KD I/1, 
283). He clearly conceives of dogma as a limit concept – to use Simon’s terminology 
– thus emphasising the diachronic dimension of this human activity and the need for 
infinite progress and perfectibility153: 
… the creaturely form which the revealing action of God assumes in dogmatics is never that of 
knowledge attained in a flash (Erkenntnis im Nu), which it would have to be to correspond to the di-
vine gift, but a laborious movement from one partial human insight to another with the intention 
though no guarantee of ‘advance’!” (KD I/1, 13).154
But it is almost exclusively in his exposition of the nature of dogmatics that Barth 
takes into account this diachronic dimension – which is otherwise strikingly absent in 
the Prolegomena. Perhaps it was the laborious business of writing the Church Dog-
matics which made it abundantly clear to Barth that this aspect could not be ignored! 
Furthermore, the content of the Church Dogmatics resulted from a painstaking, ecu-
menical dialogue with the Christian tradition. In other words, in spite of the original-
ity of Barth’s work, there is not only discontinuity but also a lot of continuity be-
tween his own thought and that of past thinkers. In his reflections on faith, by con-
trast, discontinuity is always (or most of the time) emphasised at the expense of con-
tinuity (KD I/2, 791ff; I/1, 231). This makes it very difficult to understand theology 
as a human activity which – as fides quaerens intellectum – is rooted in faith.  
  Now the same questions arise as regards the biblical text and its pre-
understanding(s). Strictly speaking, the notion of a completely appropriate pre-
understanding is an eschatological concept too. It follows from this that no pre-
understanding which is available at present can do fully justice to the biblical text. 
But the crucial question is which consequences one draws from this insight. One 
might say that every pre-understanding or interpretative strategy which is applied to 
the biblical text must be infinitely improved. Yet this need for infinite refinement 
always manifests itself in concrete acts of modification, which become necessary due 
to concrete insights into why the present interpretative practice is no longer fully 
convincing. Put differently, one needs reasons to modify a particular interpretative 
strategy, and these reasons always concern certain elements, but leave others unaf-
 
153 It is of course difficult to distinguish between (mere) synchronic difference and diachronic pro-
gress. That is to say, a re-actualisation or re-interpretation of a dogma in a new context does not nec-
essarily involve the notion of progress. On the other hand, the eschatological-teleological dimension is 
essential to Christian faith. 
154 “Die geschöpfliche Gestalt, die das offenbarende Handeln Gottes in der Dogmatik gewinnt, ist 
darum gar nicht die einer Erkenntnis im Nu, wie sie es der göttlichen Gabe entsprechend freilich sein 
müsste, sondern ein mühsames Schreiten von einer menschlichen Teileinsicht zu anderen, mit der 
Absicht, aber in keiner Weise mit der Garantie eines „Fortschrittes“!“ (KD I/1, 13). 
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fected. This is due to the fact that it is impossible, under finite conditions, to regard a 
hermeneutical approach as a whole, i.e. from an external viewpoint. If one follows 
this line of thought, theology has to pay the utmost attention to the structure of finite 
processes of interpretation. This also includes the study of a text’s Wirkungs-
geschichte. And although it is certainly imperative for theologians to develop a spe-
cifically theological hermeneutics, dialogue with general hermeneutics becomes in-
dispensable.  
However, Barth’s own reflections clearly do not follow this path. His notion of 
the subordination of the pre-understanding to the text does not allow for a gradual 
refinement of the current interpretative strategy. Rather, every pre-understanding is – 
even if unavoidable – in principle regarded as a hindrance to an appropriate under-
standing of the text and must therefore be done away with. This inevitably follows 
from statements such as ‘no philosophy must be a threat to the biblical word, but 
every philosophy can become a threat to the world of Scripture’. To be sure, read in 
isolation, this sentence can be understood in a diachronic-teleological way. But the 
decisive question is by which human activity the goal of subordinating the pre-
understanding to the text can be achieved. And Barth’s implicit answer is: by no hu-
man activity, but only by Scripture’s self-revelatory power which derives from the 
picture of the object (Gegenstandsbild), Jesus Christ. Since every pre-understanding 
can be ‘subordinated’ in this way, there is in principle no need to enter the current 
debate on hermeneutics. Human and divine agency is thus played off against each 
other.  
As outlined above, the alternative would be to conceive the relationship between 
text and pre-understanding in terms of an asymmetrical reciprocity. On the one hand, 
since human finitude need not and cannot be overcome, the pre-understanding must 
be accepted as a necessary constituent of every act or practice of interpretation. Thus 
interpretative strategies fulfil a positive function and should not be regarded as a hin-
drance to an adequate understanding of the biblical text. On the other hand, the pre-
understanding is subordinated to the text in the sense that – in the process of text 
interpretation – the ‘text’ may indeed question the interpretative presuppositions 
which led to particular interpretations. But it is of course not possible to ascribe 
agency to the ‘text itself’. Rather, it is the interpreters who consider and critically 
evaluate the interpretations (and their further consequences) which resulted from a 
particular interpretative strategy. If there is only one single interpretation that fails to 
conform to the interpretative criteria established by their community, this may be due 
to the incompetence of a single interpreter (≈ interpretation3). But if the community 
comes to the conclusion that a whole series of interpretations did not do justice to 
what Barth calls the Gegenstandsbild of the text, a refinement of the basic presuppo-
sitions may be required (≈ interpretation1).  
Yet some of Barth’s remarks are undoubtedly less extreme and seem to envisage 
something like a Christian ad hoc hermeneutics which is context- and purpose-
sensitive. But here too, one might ask: What does hold these different context- and 
purpose-dependent hermeneutical approaches together? Is there room enough for 
continuity? On the one hand it is certainly correct to say that we never follow a uni-
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versal and unchangeable rule when we interpret texts. On the other hand, one has to 
be aware that the most basic interpretative presuppositions are not consciously cho-
sen strategies but inextricably intertwined with patterns of action or habits.155 This in 
turn leads back to Fish’s notion of interpretative communities. It follows from this 
that – despite the need for context- and purpose-sensitivity – it is somewhat naïve to 
believe that we can (or should) change our interpretative strategies (on their most 
basic level) from one context or situation to another. In other words, Barth problem-
atically emphasises discontinuity at the expense of continuity. 
3) Barth finally turns to applicatio and the usus scripturae. He again points out 
that explicatio, meditatio and applicatio are in fact inseparable and constitute differ-
ent aspects of one single interpretative act (KD I/2, 825). Applicatio means assimila-
tion (Aneignung), i.e.:  
… that which is declared to us must become our very own, and indeed in such a way that now we 
really do become conscientes […] those who in virtue of what is said to them know themselves, and 
can, therefore, say to themselves and to others what is said to them – those who not only reflect on it 
but think it themselves. To think themselves: from inner impulse and necessity, just as we think some-
thing because we must, because we cannot not think it, because it has become a fundamental orienta-
tion of our whole existence (KD I/2, 826). 
Barth emphatically points out that the two preceding steps, explicatio and meditatio 
must not be seen as the theoretical part of interpretation which is now followed by 
the practical one, applicatio. This would lead to a highly problematic divorce be-
tween an ostensible “righteousness of faith and a suddenly triumphant righteousness 
of works” (KD I/2, 826). It is here that Barth comes closest to Gadamer’s statement 
that the three moments of the ‘hermeneutical situation’, understanding (Verstehen), 
interpretation (Auslegen) and application (Anwendung) are inseparable.156  
There are two interrelated questions that need be raised as regards Barth’s under-
standing of applicatio. First, how are we to think of the transition from one interpre-
tative perspective on the world to another brought about by the appropriation of the 
Gospel narratives (on the level of interpreation1)? Secondly, how far does this shift 
shed a new light on the many xs in the world (on the level of interpretation3)? As far 
as the first question is concerned, Barth points out that assimilation should not be 
taken in terms of a (mis)use of Scripture for our own purposes. Once again resorting 
to theocentric language, he stresses that the usus scripturae must be interpreted in the 
sense that Scripture is the subject and the hearer or reader the object, rather than the 
other way round (KD I/2, 827). Yet here too, as in the above discussion about the 
eschatological character of the appropriate pre-understanding, the question arises as 
to how the otherness of Scripture can be mediated under finite conditions. Taking 
recourse to theocentric language does not solve the problem but at best posits the 
practice and horizon of interpretation1, (potentially) represented by Scripture, as an 
ideal which the interpreters strive to realise. In other words, also the process of as-
similating Scripture is to be thought of in terms of a temporal process. For instance, 
 
155 In Abel as well as in Peirce’s work interpretation and action are inextricably intertwined. 
156 H.-G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 290-295. 
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attempts have been made to understand a human being’s gradual appropriation of the 
Gospel narratives in terms of the acquisition of certain virtues.157  
As far as the second point is concerned, there is a certain tendency to think of this 
appropriatio not as a transition from one interpretative perspective to another, but as 
a shift to different questions. Barth writes: 
Precisely in order that he may really appropriate what Scripture has to say, the reader and hearer must 
be willing to transpose the centre of his attention from himself, from the system of his own concerns 
and questions […] to the scriptural word itself. He must allow himself to be lifted out of himself into 
this word and its concerns and questions (KD I/2, 828f). 
To be sure, Christian faith does not just provide us with different answers to un-
changing questions, but indeed raises new issues which we could never have thought 
of without the event of revelation. Nonetheless, what must be avoided at any price is 
the notion that faith concerns only a separate realm cut off from non-religious or 
secular matters. Put differently, theology needs to be “‘more mediating, but less ac-
commodating’”158, i.e. continuity and discontinuity must be accentuated in the right 
place and in the right way. On the one hand, there is supposed to be a radical discon-
tinuity between the Christian perspective on the world and all other non-Christian 
perspectives. Yet even on this plane, there is no room for a simple dualism. Rather, it 
is possible to differentiate, from the Christian perspective, within the non-Christian 
realm, between elements that exhibit different degrees of affinity with the Christian 
Logos. Only thus can a crude fideism be avoided. On the other hand, there is sup-
posed to be a relative continuity as regards the many xs which are re-interpreted in-
novatively and creatively from a Christian perspective. That is to say, Christians 
share a great deal of their questions and problems with the non-Christian world. It is 
primarily their specifically Christian answers which differ from other, non-Christian 
answers.   
Conclusions  
In this last chapter on Barth’s hermeneutics, I was dealing with the question of how 
the sender encodes the message he conveys to the addressee. More specifically, I was 
interested in how far acts of interpretation of the kind s interprets (or sets) x as y to a 
in the context c are really informed by Scripture, which is supposed to come into play 
in the ‘as-structure’ of this formula. Yet, as I have tried to show, Barth’s understand-
ing of subordination (Unterordnung) is problematic since he fails to pay sufficient 
attention to the finite conditions of human interpretation. As a result, he disregards to 
some extent the need for a specifically theological qualification of the pre-
understanding (or interpretative strategy/community). This is due to his conviction 
that the ‘true meaning’ of the text (Gegenstandsbild) has the power to reveal itself 
without finite human mediation. But such a view inevitably has consequences which 
are directly opposed to Barth’s actual intention: The interpreter remains at the mercy 
of the prevailing interpretative practice. In consequence, there is a high degree of 
contingency as regards the encoded message. The interpretative act that sets ‘x as y’ 
 
157 Cf. R. Roberts, Narrative ethics, 473-480. 
158 J. Milbank, C. Pickstock, G. Ward, Suspending the Material, 2. 
 
 
110
                                                
and which is supposed to be informed by a specific interpretative perspective (inter-
pretation1), is to a large extent influenced by other, uncontrolled and arbitrary factors.  
b) The addressee 
In this chapter, the focus shall no longer be on the encoding of the message but on 
Barth’s idea of speech, i.e. on oral communication and the reception of the message 
by the addressee. A brief comparison with Husserl’s Logical Investigations will help 
us better understand Barth’s understanding of orality. Whereas in the above chapter 
on ‘knowledge and faith as meaning-fulfilment’ the anthropocentric perspective of 
faith stood at the centre of attention, I shall here take a sender-related pragmatic ap-
proach to Barth’s understanding of meaning. Husserl’s theory of orality, as outlined 
in the first Logical Investigation and famously criticised by Derrida in his Voice and 
Phenomenon, shows striking similarities to Barth’s idea of speech.159 Both Barth and 
Husserl exhibit a strong tendency to ignore the finite conditions under which human 
communication is taking place. As will be shown later in this chapter, any theory of 
communication must take into account that the background knowledge, i.e. the pri-
vate and communal codes of the sender and the addressee may differ considerably. 
As a result, the reception of the message by the addressee is to be seen as a creative 
act, or at least as an act which entails creative elements. Husserl and Barth however, 
try to show (Husserl) or simply presuppose (Barth) that oral communication enables 
us to bypass any contingent factors. Of course, as far as Barth is concerned, it is not 
just oral communication in general, but rather a highly specific and theologically 
qualified hermeneutical situation in which this goal can be achieved. In both cases, 
however, the sender is believed to be able to convey his message self-identically, i.e. 
without any distortions and risks of misunderstandings to the addressee. I shall first 
give an account of Derrida’s interpretation of Husserl’s first Logical Investigation 
and then compare the latter’s understanding of orality to that of Barth.  
Derrida on Husserl 
Expression and indication 
In his first Logical Investigation, Husserl famously points to the ambiguity in the 
sense of the word ‘sign’, distinguishing between expression (Ausdruck) and indica-
tion (Anzeichen). Although every sign is a sign for something, not every sign ex-
presses meaning or sense. And according to him, indications do not convey anything 
that could be called sense or meaning, only expressions do (LU I, § 1). Husserl gives 
the following examples of indications: a brand is a sign of a slave, or a flag a sign of 
a nation (LU I, § 2). The indicative function can therefore be described as a certain 
motivation to move mentally from something to something else. It effects a transition 
from an actual consciousness to a non-actual one which may take on the form of a 
conviction (Überzeugung) or presumption (Vermutung), and the elements linked by 
an indicative sign are either objects or state of affairs.  
 
159 J. Derrida, La voix et le phénomène. 
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Expression, on the other hand, is a voluntary, i.e. conscious and intentional exte-
riorization. It is inconceivable without a subject animating the sign, providing it with 
a Geistigkeit. In indication, this animation is limited, first, by the body of the sign, 
and secondly, by that which it indicates in the empirical world. In expression how-
ever, the voice which is animated may remain entirely internal since the expressed is 
an ideal meaning, which does not ‘exist’ in the empirical world (VPh, 34-36). All 
elements which constitute the empirical effectiveness of an utterance belong to indi-
cation and are foreign to pure intention and expression. Not only because this effec-
tiveness is part of the empirical world, but also because “it retains in itself something 
of the nature of an involuntary association” (VPh, 37). This last point is important: 
for Husserl, intentional consciousness and voluntary consciousness are synonyms 
(and cannot be found in purity in the ‘totality of speech’). Derrida thus interprets 
Husserl’s notion of intentionality in terms of a voluntaristic metaphysics.  
Everything which is not “pure spiritual intention” and “pure animation by Geist”, 
is excluded from meaning, and consequently, from expression (VPh, 37). The whole 
visual and spatial realm falls into this category, which entails “facial expression and 
the various gestures which involuntarily accompany speech without communicative 
intent …” (LU I, § 5). These elements cannot be called expressions as they lack ex-
plicit intention to evince something expressively. However, meaning is nevertheless 
latently present in indicative signs such as facial expressions, gestures and so on. But 
their hidden meaning becomes only manifest when they are interpreted and made 
explicit in discourse. In other words, it is oral interpretation which brings out the 
meaning implicitly present in them. Thus non-expressive signs only have meaning to 
the degree to which this interpretation can be carried out successively, for the telos of 
all language “is voluntary consciousness as meaning (comme vouloir-dire)” (VPh, 
38).  
Yet it would be inappropriate to regard oral discourse as the carrier of expression 
par excellence, for even after excluding all non-discursive and non-intentional signs 
from speech, “there still remains a considerable sphere of the non-expressive within 
speech itself” (VPh, 39f); cf. LU I, § 6). Hence even the non-physical part of speech 
needs still further ‘purification’. Husserl thus tries to eliminate everything in connec-
tion with the conveyance of mental experiences. As Derrida puts it: “All speech in-
asmuch as it is engaged in communication and manifests lived experience operates 
as indication” (VPh, 40). Only the suspension of communication allows pure expres-
sion to appear. For in communication, sensible phenomena are animated by a subject 
endowing them with sense, whose intention is supposed to be simultaneously under-
stood by the addressee. Yet this animation cannot be pure and comprehensive as it is 
directed at an opaque body with which it intermingles. For everything in speech 
which is supposed to convey an experience is necessarily mediated by the physical 
side of speech (LU I, § 7). Consequently, due to this unavoidable and irreducible 
mediation, every expression is involved in an indicative operation, as the manifesting 
function (kundgebende Funktion) is an indicative function. This brings us close to the 
origin of indication: “[T]here is indication each time the act of conferring sense, the 
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animating intention, the living spirituality of the meaning (vouloir-dire), is not fully 
present” (VPh, 41).  
The essentially indicative character of communication or intimation is due to the 
fact that we do not have primordial intuition of the other person’s lived experience. 
The signifier is always of an indicative nature if the immediate and full presence of 
the signified is hidden. Indication does not render anything manifest, if we under-
stand the term manifest in the sense of ‘evident’, ‘open’, and ‘presented in person’. 
Rather, Kundgabe reveals and conceals at the same time what it informs us about 
(VPh, 43). Pure expression, by contrast, is the pure active intention of an act of 
meaning, animating a speech whose content (Bedeutung) is fully present. But pure 
expression is solely present in consciousness, to an inner intuition or perception. 
Consequently, it becomes solely conceivable if the relation to the other is suspended; 
only thus mediation through the physical realm can be bypassed.  
It thus comes as no surprise that Husserl finally turns to expressions in un-
communicated, solitary mental life (im einsamen Seelenleben), where the physical 
event of language seems absent (LU I, § 8). In solitary mental life, Kundgabe as well 
as Kundnahme are suspended. Soliloquy does not imply the notion of speech to one-
self, employing words as signs, i.e. as indications of one’s own inner experiences. 
We no longer use real (wirkliche) words but only imagined (vorgestellte) words. And 
whereas in real communication existing signs can only indicate other existences 
which are probable, in monologue, where expression is pure, non-existent signs 
show significations (Bedeutungen) that are ideal (i.e. non-existent) and certain (i.e. 
presented to intuition) (VPh, 47f). That is to say, in the latter case, words only occur 
in imagination, without entering the empirical world.  
Expression and time 
Husserl’s notion of pure expression presupposes that ideal meanings, which only 
occur in solitary mental life, are not exposed to the contingencies of the spatio-
temporal realm. Hence expression is inconceivable without the notion of the undi-
vided unity of the temporal present. Accordingly, in Husserl’s reflections on time in 
The phenomenology of internal time-consciousness, the concept of punctuality plays 
a major role.160  
However, despite the emphasis upon the concept of presence as a punctual ‘now’, 
Husserl himself undermines the notion of the present as self-identity at various points 
in his writings. Derrida’s analysis reveals that the presence of the perceived present 
could not appear without continuous involvement with a non-present and non-
perception: primary memory and expectation, retention and protention. These non-
perceptions are by no means dispensable supplements which only occasionally ac-
company the present ‘now’, but are its essential constituents. Husserl even goes so 
far as to say that retention (primary memory) is still a perception.161 That is to say, 
there is perception which is not tied to the present now but related to a non-present, a 
‘past and unreal’ present.  
 
160 E. Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins. 
161 Ibid., § 17. 
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In other words, there is a certain continuity between the now and the not-now, be-
tween perception and non-perception. This is turn allows for the other (the non-
present) to be ‘received’ into the self-identity of the ‘blink of an eye’ (VPh, 73). The 
original punctuality of the instant begins to incorporate extension and duration. Al-
terity, far from concealing or distorting the presence of the primordial impression, 
even becomes the condition for presence, presentation and representation (as Vorstel-
lung) in general. Now the move from punctuality to extension and duration, the con-
tinuity between the present and the non-present seems to bring the mediatory role of 
signs back into play. 
Yet Husserl cannot accept the necessity of signs as that would question the very 
principle of phenomenology outlined above. This accounts for his sustained insis-
tence that retention and protention both belong to the sphere of the primordial (‘in 
the broad sense’), whereas secondary memory (Wiedererinnerung) does not. Accord-
ingly, absolute certainty can exclusively be ascribed to the former, whereas the latter 
only provides us with relative certainty. In Derrida’s view, the force with which he 
upholds the above distinctions betrays Husserl’s unease at this issue. It is due to his 
attempt to bring together two apparently irreconcilable strands of his thought. A) The 
living now cannot be the absolute perceptual source without reference to retention 
taken as non-perception. This is the insight Husserl gains by his analysis of experi-
ence. B) The source of certitude is fundamentally the primordial character of the liv-
ing now. Consequently, it is necessary to keep retention within the sphere of primor-
dial certitude so as to safeguard its epistemological significance. It follows from this 
that the boundary between the primordial and the non-primordial needs to be re-
drawn. It cannot pass between the pure present and the non-present – as that would 
diminish the epistemological status of retention. Rather, what needs to be distin-
guished are two different “forms of the re-turn or re-stitution of the present, re-
tention and re-presentation” (VPh, 75). As we have seen, it is only the latter which 
falls outside the category of the primordial.  
However, in his concluding remarks on Husserl’s understanding of time, Derrida 
underlines the common root of these two forms of return. This root – which he de-
scribes as “the possibility of repetition in its most general form” and “the trace in the 
most universal sense” – not only inhabits the actuality of the present but constitutes it 
(VPh, 75). The ideality of the form of presence implies an infinite repeatability, a 
return of the same ad infinitum that is inherent in presence itself. It is exactly this 
irreducible bending-back (ce pli) in presence/self-presence which prohibits to speak 
about a simple self-identity in the same instant (VPh, 76). Thus ‘solitary mental life’ 
is entangled with time right from the beginning. The concept of pure solitude needs 
refinement as the very condition of its self-presence, i.e. time, undermines its original 
definition (VPh, 76f).  
Speech and communication 
Derrida speaks of an indefectible complicity between idealisation and speech. An 
ideal object can be shown an indefinite number of times, as it is not under the con-
straint of mundane spatiality. It is pure noema and can be expressed without passing 
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through the spatio-temporal realm. This is precisely where the phenomenological 
voice comes into play, as the ‘phonē’ is inextricably intertwined with the history of 
the idealisation of objects. According to Derrida, metaphysics, (the traditional west-
ern) philosophy and the determination of being as presence “constitute the epoch of 
speech as technical mastery of objective being …” (VPh, 84).162 In order to under-
stand the unity of technē and phonē, we must examine the objectivity of the object. 
The objectivity of the ideal object consists in its independence of the hic et nunc acts 
and events of the empirical subjectivity which intends it. Its immediate presence to 
intuition is free from any entanglement with the empirical world so that the re-
establishment of its sense in the form of presence becomes a universal and unlimited 
possibility. Yet the object’s ideality can only ‘exist’ for a non-empirical conscious-
ness. Accordingly, it must be expressed in an element whose phenomenality has a 
non-empirical form too: The voice is this element.  
Phonic signs are heard and understood by the subject who utters them in the abso-
lute proximity of their present. That is to say, the subject does not have to pass be-
yond himself (passer hors de soi) to be immediately affected by his expressive activ-
ity. My words are “alive” (“vives”163) because they do not seem (semblent) to “leave 
me” (quitter); they do not seem to fall “outside me” (hors de moi), “outside my 
breath” (hors de mon souffle). There is no “visible distance” (éloignement visible) 
between myself and my utterances; they do not cease to belong to me (cesser de 
m’appartenir); they remain at my disposition “without accessory” (“sans acces-
soire”) (VPh, 85).  
But, asks Derrida, is this not characteristic of the phenomenological and ideal as-
pect of every signifier? In writing, for example, one can distinguish between the 
grapheme and the empirical body of the corresponding graphic sign. Whereas the 
former belongs to the realm of phenomenological consciousness, the latter is of an 
empirical or worldly nature. This applies to all visual or spatial signifiers. What then, 
is specific to the phonic signifier? Derrida argues that every non-phonic signifier 
implies a spatial reference, i.e. its being-outside (dehors) or being-in-the-world (dans 
le monde), is an essential component of its phenomenon. In speech however, we ap-
parently (en apparence) do not find anything like this. For the hypothesis of solilo-
quy sanctions the distinction between indication and expression only by presuppos-
ing an essential link between expression and phonē. There is a necessary bond be-
tween the phonic element – taken in the phenomenological sense and not as worldly 
sonouresness – and expression, interpreted as a signifier which is animated by the 
ideal presence of a meaning (Bedeutung). 
Derrida now tries to question this apparently unique phenomenological status of 
the voice as regards other types of signifiers. According to him, this transcendent 
character of the phonic signifier is an illusion, i.e. only appearance (VPh, 86). He 
argues that the seeming transcendence of the voice springs form the fact that the sig-
nified, i.e. the expressed meaning (Bedeutung) – which has always an ideal nature – 
 
162 « … sont l’époque de la voix comme maîtrise technique de l’être-objet … ». 
163 Quotation marks in original text. 
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is immediately present in the act of expression. This immediate presence results from 
the (apparently) self-effacing character of the phonic signifier (VPh, 86):  
… the phenomenological “body” of the signifier seems to fade away at the very moment it is pro-
duced. It seems already to belong to the element of ideality. It phenomenologically reduces itself, 
transforming the worldly opacity of its body into pure diaphaneity. This effacement of the sensible 
body and its exteriority is for consciousness the very form of the immediate presence of the signified. 
Why is there such a complicity between sound, or better, voice, and ideality? When I 
speak, I can hear myself at the same time that I speak. The signifier animated by the 
meaning-intention (Bedeutungsintention) remains wholly present to me. The live-
giving act (l’acte qui donne vie) which transforms the body of the signifier into a 
meaningful expression does not lose its self-presence. It does not lose its purity by 
animating the body of the signifier which belongs to the visible and spatial realm. 
Rather, it can show the ideal object or the ideal meaning (Bedeutung) to which it 
relates without falling outside the ideality and self-presence (VPh, 87).  
The event of ‘hearing-oneself-speak’ is thus a unique kind of auto-affection. First, 
it occurs in a universal sphere in which what appears as signified must be of an ideal 
nature, i.e. indefinitely repeatable and transmissible as the same. Secondly, the sub-
ject can speak and hear himself speak and being affected by what he says without 
passing through an external world which is not ‘his own’. In other words, the voice 
meets no obstacles in its going forth, precisely because it is pure auto-affection. It is 
this purity which makes it apt for universality, and it is the latter which determines 
that there is no consciousness without the voice. For the voice is present to itself in 
the form of universality and constitutes consciousness. Derrida even goes so far as to 
identify the voice with consciousness: “La voix est la conscience” (VPh, 89).  
Derrida then turns to colloquy which is particularly important for the purpose of 
this essay. It turns out that there is no ‘real communication’ at all. Here again the 
generation of signs does not seem to meet any obstacles as it only brings together two 
phenomenological origins of pure auto-affection. To speak to someone is to hear 
oneself speak. But at the same time, one is heard by another. Now, following 
Husserl’s understanding of speech, one must say that to speak to another “is to make 
the other repeat immediately in himself the hearing-oneself-speak in the very form in 
which I produced it. That is to say, the immediate repetition reproduces the auto-
affection without the help of anything external” (VPh, 89). This possibility of repeti-
tion and reproduction “gives itself out (se donne) as the phenomenon of mastery or 
limitless power (pouvoir sans limite) over the signifier since the signifier itself has 
the form of what is not external” (VPh, 89f).164 Put differently, if speech would 
really work as Husserl suggests, there were no distance between the signifier and the 
signified. Due to its absolute proximity to the signified – which is aimed at in intui-
tion and which carries the meaning –, the signifier would become perfectly diapha-
nous. Once again, this proximity would not occur if instead of hearing myself speak, 
 
164 „Parler à quelqu’un, c’est sans doute s’entendre parler, être entendu de soi, mais aussi et du même 
coup, si l’on est entendu de l’autre, faire que celui-ci répète immédiatement en soi le s’entendre-parler 
dans la forme même où je l’ai produit. Le répète immédiatement, c’est-a-dire reproduise l’auto-
affection pure sans le secours d’aucune extériorité” (VPh, 89). 
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I would see myself write or gesture, since then, the detour through the outward world 
would destroy the above outlined proximity and immediacy (VPh, 90).   
The Addressee in Barth  
I shall now discuss Barth’s understanding of speech and its reception by the ad-
dressee against the background of the above account of Derrida’s interpretation of 
Husserl’s first Logical Investigation. Similar to Husserl, Barth resorts to speech and 
orality in order to conceive of an ideal act of communication that is free from spatio-
temporal contaminations. Once again, from the perspective of the sender, to speak “is 
to make the other repeat immediately in himself the hearing-onself-speak in the very 
form in which I produce it. That is to say, the immediate repetition reproduces the 
auto-affection without the help of everything external” (VPh, 89). In Barth, this no-
tion is theologically motivated, and is supposed to solve the problem of how an infal-
lible God can infallibly speak to fallible human beings. Yet, since not just the ad-
dressee but also the speaker is fallible (i.e. finite and fallen), Barth faces an addi-
tional problem: It does not suffice just to envisage ideal speech-acts that convey ideal 
meanings. Rather, divine intervention must be thought of in such a way that also the 
human fallibility of the sender can be (temporarily) overcome. This latter issue was 
discussed in the preceding chapter which investigated the encoding of the message. 
For the sake of comprehensiveness it must be stressed that, for the purpose of this 
essay, nothing depends on whether Derrida’s account (and critique) of Husserl’s First 
Logical Investigation is correct.165 All that matters here is that the conception of 
speech set out by Derrida in his critique of Husserl helps to grasp the structure of 
Barth’s idea of revelation. Likewise, it is not necessary to accept Derrida’s radical 
claim that the whole western history of philosophy fell prey to a metaphysics of 
presence associated with logocentrism.  
Time: recollection and expectation 
The following key passage clearly recalls Husserl’s discussion about the undivided 
unity of the temporal present and the difference between protention and retention 
(primary memory) and representation (secondary memory). This is not to say, of 
course, that Barth’s own reflections on time and revelation can be equated with 
Husserl’s philosophy. On the contrary, Barth is to a certain extent an even more radi-
cal phenomenologist than Husserl. As Derrida points out, the fact that Husserl allows 
for non-presence and otherness to be internal to presence questions in principle the 
axiomatic principle of phenomenology.166 Accordingly, analysing Husserl’s idea of 
 
165 Jean-Luc Marion, for instance, denies this and criticises Derrida for wrongly subordinating the 
Sixth to the First Logical Investigation. Following Husserl, he points out that the Sixth Investigation is 
the most important one to understand phenomenology, J.-L. Marion, Reduction and Givenness, 10. 
Drawing a distinction between the categorical givenness of Being and presentifying intuition Marion 
argues that “the breakthrough of the Investigations completes the “metaphysics of presence” by 
broadening intuition to the point that it manages, in an echo of Nietzsche’s “great Amen”, to place the 
totality of beings in presence”, ibid., 19. 
166 “Am Prinzip aller Prinzipien: dass jede originär gebende Anschauung eine Rechtsquelle der Er-
kenntnis sei, dass alles, was sich uns in der “Intuition“ originär, (sozusagen in seiner leibhaften 
Wirklichkeit) darbietet, einfach hinzunehmen sei, als was es sich gibt, aber auch nur in den 
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time (primarily) in The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, he raises a 
number of questions all of which tend to undermine the very foundation of phe-
nomenology. If the presence of the present cannot be thought of without the bending-
back of a return and the movement of repetition, if difference (or ‘the trace’) always 
precedes presence, Husserl’s use of the terms ‘self-identity’ and ‘solitary mental life’ 
as well as his rigorous separation of indication from expression becomes obsolete 
(VPh, 76f). This, according to Derrida, seems to follow from Husserl’s distinction 
between primary and secondary memory. In the Prolegomena however, it is difficult 
to find signs of an equivalent development. Of course, Barth emphasises that revela-
tion (here understood as divine presence in the orally proclaimed Word) takes place 
ever and ever again so that we can always look backward (recollection) and forward 
(expectation) to past and future divine interventions respectively. But this is not to 
say that non-presence, difference and alterity are internal to presence, since in Barth, 
these acts of revelation are conceived in terms of the “self-identity of the now as 
point; as a ‘source-point’” (point-source) (VPh, 69). 
[Scripture as the] Word of God is present [in proclamation] in a way we cannot conceive: not as a 
third time between past and future, between recollection and expectation, but as that point between the 
two which we cannot think of as time, which when it is considered immediately becomes once more 
either before of after. In this way it is the being present of the eternal word, which is constitutive for 
its expectation and recollection, on which our time is based, just as the incarnation and resurrection of 
Jesus Christ as the centre of time is the basis of time in general (KD I/2, 589, cf. 534).   
The first question that needs to be answered is: In what way is the orally proclaimed 
Word of God (i.e. the tertiary sacrament) present in time so that this presence can be 
compared to the manner in which Jesus Christ (i.e. the primary sacrament) is the 
‘centre and basis of time in general’? So far as the latter is concerned, Husserlian 
punctuality is evidently not a suitable thought-category to describe the nature of di-
vine presence in the life of Christ. For Barth holds that in Jesus Christ, God as Deus 
praesens has time for us and this implies human and temporal, i.e. diachronic pres-
ence: “‘The Word’ became flesh also means: ‘the Word became time’” (KD I/2, 55). 
Revelation in Christ is – even though not exclusively – the lifetime of a man, i.e. the 
30 years of the life of Jesus of Nazareth, a section of world-history (KD I/2, 55, 64). 
As fulfilled time, the presence of God in Jesus Christ divides our time into old and 
new time. Revelation means the terminus a quo as well as the terminus ad quem of 
the event of Jesus Christ, the veiledness of the Word of God in him as well as the 
breaking through of this veil in virtue of his self-unveiling. The veil is the old or gen-
eral time insofar as Christ assumes it and transforms it into his new time – which is 
the act of unveiling (KD I/2, 61f). Revelation or fulfilled time is thus the transition 
from the old aeon, which ends with the cross, to the new aeon, which starts with the 
resurrection, and coincides with the transition from the New Testament to the Old 
Testament. The new time which already exists thereby triumphs over the old time 
which still exists. Consequently, the Old Testament time is qualified as the time of 
expectation and the New Testament time as the time of recollection.  
 
Schranken, in denen es sich da gibt, kann uns keine erdenkliche Theorie irre machen”, E. Husserl, 
Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie, § 24. 
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But how does that bear on Barth’s conception of divine presence in the orally pro-
claimed Word? How are we to understand that our time is based on the presence of 
the orally proclaimed Word “just as the incarnation and resurrection of Jesus Christ 
as the centre of time is the basis of time in general” (KD I/2, 589, italics mine)? For 
as Barth himself explains, the incarnate Christ does enter time, i.e. he is present in a 
diachronic mode. And it is precisely this diachronic mode which does not apply to 
the presence of the orally proclaimed Word. But perhaps the point of comparison lies 
rather in the structuring function of these respective presences, in the sense that they 
both give rise to recollection and expectation. Just as the incarnate Christ divides 
history into the period of expectation (the time of the Old Testament, which looks 
forward to the coming of the Messiah) and the period of recollection (the time of the 
New Testament, which looks back to the revelatory event in Jesus Christ), thus the 
preached Word of God points back to the preceding divine self-manifestation 
through human proclamation and evokes hope for future divine – but ecclesiastically 
mediated – revelation.  
And there is a further parallel between these two levels. One looks in vain for an 
account of the arrival of the ‘new aeon’, the ‘fulfilled time’, in which the unveiling of 
the old time in Christ coincides with a de- and restructuration of the existing cultural 
codes (cf. part I, 2, C). If this were the case, the (gradual) triumph of the new over 
the old time (which is still present) would then result in a new interpretative practice. 
But Barth explains that even if Jesus Christ is indeed the light of the new time in the 
midst of the old time, this “cannot mean that we are in a position to see through 
(durchschauen) and understand (verstehen) any part of this old time as new, fulfilled 
time” (KD I/2, 64, cf. 66). Consequently, God’s revelation in Jesus Christ does not 
really initiate into a new way of perceiving worldly phenomena on this macro-level 
of time, but at best points forward to a further divine intervention at the second com-
ing of Christ. It thus turns out that the diachronic-durative presence of God in the life 
of Jesus Christ is only an ‘extended punctuality’ and fails to establish a lasting divine 
indwelling in Church and creation mediated by human beings.  
Similarly, on the micro-level of time, recollections and expectations resulting 
from the tertiary sacrament could be interpreted within the framework of a dia-
chronic-durative approach. This would again lead to a directed serialisation of the 
kind x is y1, y2, y3, y4 and so forth, in the sense that the redemptive transition from y1 
to y2 to y3 to y4 etc. is the fruit of the new time. Thus the above statement that ‘the 
being present of the eternal word is constitutive for its expectation and recollection’ 
could be interpreted as follows: the old (and the new) time is ‘manifest’ when I look 
back from yn to yn-1 (recollection) and the new time when I look forward from yn to 
the next interpretation yn+1 (expectation). The strength of this diachronic-durative 
model is that creation is conceived of being in a continuous state of transformation 
and that it does do justice to human fallibility and finitude. As far as human fallibility 
is concerned, it is clear that this process of transformation does not imply the naïve 
view of a linear, eschatological ‘progress’ without twists and turns, but very well 
allows for shifts, breaks and detours. As far as human finitude is concerned, the 
sender who interprets x as y only requires limited, i.e. finite expertise in order to per-
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form his interpretation. That is to say, every interpretation can be infinitely refined, 
since diachrony opens up the possibility of improving on the initial interpretation of x 
as y. Furthermore, every construal of x as y, and every transition from y1 to y2 is phi-
losophically speaking perspectival and therefore does take into account that every 
interpretation is performed by a finite mind that is not able to perceive the world 
from a god’s-eye view. From a theological perspective, the provisional character of 
every act of knowledge and interpretation is due to the eschatological reserve which 
necessarily qualifies all human action. 
But the above quotation makes it abundantly clear that this is not what Barth has 
in mind. The speech-act is thought of as taking place in the ‘blinking of an eye’, i.e. 
without temporal extension, conveying an ideal meaning that remains self-identical 
in the act of communication and which is passively received by the addressee. This 
leads to the issue of mediation. 
Logocentrism and the question of mediation 
To be sure, according to Barth, divine presence is mediated by signs. The threefold 
form of the Word of God comprises a human being (Jesus of Nazareth), graphic sig-
nifiers (Scripture) and phonic signifiers (oral proclamation). Additionally, one could 
mention the two sacraments, baptism and the Lord’s supper, which do not play an 
important role in the Prolegomena compared to the extensive discussion of divine 
speech. This mediation by creaturely signs is supposed to overcome the dichotomy of 
realism and idealism, as Barth repeatedly points out, because mediation by signs 
does not mean that we only have the sign instead of the ‘thing itself’, since the ‘thing 
itself’ is present and active in the signs (cf. KD I/2, 555).  
Nonetheless, the ‘last’ link in the chain of signs, the site where divine revelation is 
supposed to unfold its innovative and transformative force is the orally proclaimed 
Word. Barth explicitly underlines the intellectual and spiritual nature of the divine 
Word: the Word of God “is primarily spiritual, and after that and in that form, in this 
its spirituality, for the sake of it and without prejudice to it, also a corporeal or natu-
ral event” (KD I/1, 139).  
Similar to (Derrida’s) Husserl, Barth’s ideal is that of a ‘pure expression’ – free of 
any spatio-temporal contingencies – that cannot dispense with the notion of an undi-
vided unity of the temporal present.167 In line with his predecessors in the Reformed 
tradition, he resorts to speech and privileges phonic signifiers, since their sensibility 
apparently fades away at the very moment of their utterance, thus seemingly giving 
way to an immediate presence of the signified. This preference for oral communica-
 
167 Apart from the quotation discussed above, there are innumerable other passages in the Prolegom-
ena where divine revelation is described in terms of a punctual event (Ereignis): Scripture (in the act 
of revelation) (KD I/1, 112, 116, 275; I/2, 514, 589); faith (KD I/1, 277; I/2, 791); Church doctrine: 
“Pure doctrine is an event” (KD I/2, 859); commanding and obeying (KD I/1, 290); Church proclama-
tion (KD I/1, 96f, 104); revelation in Jesus Christ: an unrepeatable and unique event of the past (KD 
I/1, 118; I/2, 54). Yet, as shown above, as far as divine presence in Jesus Christ is concerned, Barth’s 
use of the event-category does entail the notion of temporal extension; spiritual and physical events 
(Geschehen) (Jesus Christ, Scripture, proclamation) (KD I/1, 138f); as regards the ‘contingent’ con-
temporaneousness occurring between Scripture and addressee (KD I/1, 154). 
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tion is theologically motivated and seeks to answer the question of how the eternal 
divine will can be recognised within the spatio-temporal realm, without reducing 
God to a finite object. The nature of oral communication seems to solve this prob-
lem. Due to the apparent ideality and diaphaneity of phonic signifiers, an immediacy 
can be achieved which is supposed to bypass the contingent conditions of human 
communication in space and time. To quote Derrida once again: to speak to another 
“is to make the other repeat immediately in himself the hearing-oneself-speak in the 
very form in which I produced it. That is to say, the immediate repetition reproduces 
the auto-affection without the help of anything external” (VPh, 89). 
To be sure, the production of phonic signifiers is always tied to the preacher so 
that human mediation can never be entirely excluded; but the intention is to keep it at 
least to a minimum. For the function of this model of revelation is by no means just 
to guarantee that a human speech-act can be ideally conveyed, but that God’s com-
mand reaches its creaturely addressees without distortion. This last point is borne out 
by the fact that Barth often stresses the difference between the content of divine and 
human speech in the act of communication (see part II, 2). Yet as I shall try to show, 
to conceive of the relationship between divine and human action in such a way, leads 
to major problems, since the postulated ideality of the speech-act clashes with the 
scarcely deniable finitude and fallenness of the human sender and addressee. 
Barth’s preference for phonic signifiers also accounts for his reluctance to accept 
Tillich’s statements that “Verbum is more than oratio. That is what Protestantism has 
largely forgotten. Verbum, the Word of revelation, may (!) be in everything in which 
spirit expresses itself, also in the silent symbols of art, also in the works of society 
and law. And therefore a Church must be able to speak in all these forms” (cf. KD 
I/1, 64).168 Yet this way of thinking is nonetheless not entirely foreign to the Swiss 
theologian. In a lengthy small print section in which he discusses the nature of the 
sacrament as signum visibile and symbolum externum, Barth goes so far as to say that 
the sacrament is more suitable than the word to express the truth of the Johannine 
verse ‘the Word became flesh’ (Joh 1:14) (KD I/2, 251).169   
The best way of checking whether the above comparison between Barth and 
Husserl does make sense is to analyse the act of reception in greater detail. That is to 
say we need to take a closer look at receiver-related issues. To be sure, there is a 
pragmatic aspect in Barth’s notion of revelation. The only question is whether his 
pragmatics does do justice to the insights provided by Peirce and Eco. What are these 
insights? 
Pragmatic factors 
a) Interpretation:170 This first point recalls the diachronic aspect outlined in part I 
and is indispensable for the understanding of meaning in all pragmatic theories. Ac-
 
168 Barth quotes P. Tillich, Kirche und Kultur, 44f. Exclamation mark added by Barth. 
169 Yet here too, the question arises of whether Barth’s understanding of the sacramental sign does do 
justice to Peirce triadic understanding of semiosis. Cf. M. Vetter, Zeichen Deuten auf Gott, 149ff, 
248f. 
170 I am following U. Eco, The Limits of Interpretation, 212-219. 
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cording to Peirce’s notion of infinite semiosis, every expression must be interpreted 
by another expression ad infinitum (cf. CP 2.303, 2.92). Consequently, the content of 
an expression can only be defined in and through the activity of interpretation. This 
results in an accumulation of meanings due to the various contexts and circumstances 
in which expressions are interpreted – provided the meanings produced are socially 
recognised so that they become part of the code of a linguistic community. The com-
plete meaning of a sign is therefore “the historical record of the pragmatic labor that 
has accompanied every contextual instance of it”.171 Accordingly, the ideal inter-
preter of a sign foresees all the possible contexts and circumstances in which it can 
be inserted, thus doing justice to the accumulative and dynamic force of the sign. 
Every term is a potential text, and every text a potential argument.   
b) Contexts and circumstances: Contextual and circumstantial factors disambigu-
ate the polysemic meaning of a sememe and determine which denotations and conno-
tations apply under such and such circumstances and in such and such a context. The 
contextual aspect concerns those sememes which are contextually associated with the 
sememe under consideration, and which are therefore immediately relevant to its 
understanding. For instance, in the text /Two roads lead to John’s house. One way 
goes trough the woods. The other is shorter. Both are paved and he knows them very 
well/, /he/ refers to /John/, /them/ refers to /two roads/ and /way/ refers to /roads/, etc. 
Circumstantial factors encompass the relevant sign-vehicles that belong to other se-
miotic systems and/or other uncoded events or entities which occur along with the 
sign-vehicle under investigation.172 Although the actual disambiguation of a sememe 
takes place in real contexts and circumstances, the most important selections which 
are relevant to the process of disambiguation can often be foreseen. Accordingly, 
these selections can to a certain degree be represented in a compositional tree.173
c) Background knowledge: The above analysis of the interpretative act ‘s (= 
sender) interprets (or sets) x as y to a (= addressee) in the context c’, did not take into 
account sufficiently the ‘post-modern’ insight that communication and interpretative 
processes often suffer from the fragmentation and heterogeneity of our contemporary 
world, which may drive a wedge between sender and addressee. It cannot be denied 
“that the coincidence of codes between transmitter and transmittee is in reality possi-
ble only to a very relative extent”.174 If one adheres to the idea of an ideal transmis-
sion of invariant messages conveyed by an artificial language, this must represent a 
disturbing factor. Due to the non-identical codes of the encoder and decoder, there 
results a creative surplus of meaning in the act of reception which threatens the ideal 
of rigid communication. According to an alternative view however, “the creative 
function is a universal quality of language and poetic language is regarded as the 
most typical manifestation of language as such”.175  
 
171 U. Eco, The Limits of Interpretation, 214. 
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173 See the examples in ibid., 105, 113f, 118, 120. 
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Now to decide whether the reception of a message is to be considered negatively 
as ‘noise’ or positively as a ‘creative surplus’ depends on a number of factors such as 
the genre of the text/message, the circumstances in which the act of communication 
takes place, the interpretative community which the interlocutors belong to, the con-
sequences which follow from this interpretation and so forth. In any case, there can-
not be general rules to assess whether an act of communication has been successful 
or not. Nonetheless, it is imperative for the Christian community to establish specific 
guidelines for different interpretative aims, as well as to institute sophisticated pro-
cedures in order to assess the resulting interpretations on a meta-level. It goes with-
out saying that this second-order procedures are not anchored in an extra-linguistic 
reality but are themselves subject to the contingencies of all linguistic practices. 
Nonetheless, they enhance the complexity of the interpretative process and thus fulfil 
a control function which reduces the danger of misinterpretation.   
I shall now turn to a more detailed analysis of acts of communication, with par-
ticular attention to the often diverging background knowledges of the sender and 
addressee. In other words, I am taking up the discussion about Abel’s differentiation 
between interpretation1/2/3 insofar as these different levels can be regarded as back-
ground knowledges of communicative processes. For the sake of simplicity, I shall 
confine myself here to Eco’s distinction between private and communal codes.  
The background knowledge of a person consists, semiotically speaking, of a set of 
different codes and subcodes. The code, or hyper-code, links up various sub-codes, 
“some of which are strong and stable, while others are weak and transient, such as a 
lot of peripheral connotative couplings”.176  
In order to analyse processes of communication and interpretation, Eco distin-
guishes between the operations of overcoding and undercoding, which he interprets 
in terms of Peirce’s abduction (CP 2.623ff).177 In the case of logical deduction, a 
result is deduced from a rule and a case. For instance: all the beans from this bag are 
white; these beans are from this bag; these beans are white. In the case of induction, 
a rule is inferred from a case and a result. For instance: these beans are from this bag; 
these beans are white; all the beans from this bag are white (probably). In the case of 
abduction or hypothesis, a case is inferred from a rule and a result. For instance: all 
the beans from this bag are white; these beans are white; these beans are from this 
bag (probably). Now overcoding and undercoding can be seen as two different hypo-
thetical movements which Peirce subsumed under the heading of abduction. 
In the case of overcoding, a new subcode is proposed on the basis of a pre-
established code, which governs “a rarer application of the previous rule”.178 Eco 
refers to the following example of Peirce:  
I once landed at a seaport in a Turkish province; and, as I was walking up to the house which I was to 
visit, I met a man upon horseback, surrounded by four horsemen holding a canopy over his head. As 
the governor of the province was the only personage I could think of who would be so greatly hon-
oured, I inferred that this was he. This was an hypothesis (CP 2.625).  
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In analysing this quotation, it becomes clear that this abductional movement was 
based on an already existing sign-function. Peirce already knew that the sign-vehicle 
/canopy over the head/ meant «honour». Yet, what he did not know, was that a can-
opy was the ritual sign characteristic of a Turkish governor. Peirce therefore invented 
a general rule by assigning to /canopy/ the yet uncoded denotation «governor». This 
creative act can be seen as the first step in the production of a new sign-function 
which may alter or enrich the prevailing code. But it is only a first step, since the 
positive reception and repeated use of this new sign-function does not depend on its 
inventor but on the society and linguistic community which he is part of. However, 
very often, overcoded entities remain on the threshold between convention and inno-
vation. Undercoding, however179   
… may be defined as the operation by means of which in the absence of reliable pre-established rules, 
certain macroscopic portions of certain texts are provisionally assumed to be pertinent units of a code 
in formation, even though the combinational rules governing the more basic compositional items of 
the expressions, along with the corresponding content-units, remain unknown.  
Suppose somebody travels to a foreign country whose language he does not know. 
Step by step he will begin to understand some basic elements. To be sure, grammati-
cal and stylistic subtleties will remain unknown for a long time. Yet, after a while, he 
might be able to ascribe to certain linguistic expressions – often in connection with 
reoccurring patterns of behaviour, gestures, visual and (non-linguistic) acoustic signs 
– a very general meaning. Perhaps he will come to the conclusion that “when accom-
panied by a smile, an expression like /I love you/, /I like you/, /I am fond of you/, /I 
adore you/, /Hi man!/, /Hello my friend!/ and /How are you?/, roughly mean «friend-
ship»”.180 This kind of inference is an act of undercoding, i.e. the interpreter pro-
ceeds tentatively from non-existent codes to potential and/or rudimentary codes. Yet, 
as Eco points out, in most common cases of sign-production and interpretation, the 
activity of undercoding is closely intertwined with that of overcoding so that it is 
often very difficult to distinguish clearly between these two movements. For this 
reason he subsumes both of them under the umbrella term extra-coding. 
Now how far can the activity of extra-coding help us understand processes of 
communication and interpretation? Very often there are phrases or even discourses 
which one has already experienced in similar contexts and circumstances so that 
there is no need to interpret and decode them. In other words, communication would 
be inconceivable without certain redundancy rules. Thus the addressee “is continu-
ously anticipating expressions, filling up the empty spaces in a text with the missing 
units, forecasting a lot of words that the interlocutor may have said, could have said, 
will certainly say, or has never said”.181 This wide range of institutionalised knowl-
edge covers all elements which we take for granted in communicative interaction.  
But since there is a multiplicity of codes, subcodes, contexts and circumstances, 
one and the same message can often be decoded from different perspectives and ac-
cording to different interpretative conventions so that the text must be regarded as an 
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“empty form to which can be attributed various possible senses”.182 Thus the peren-
nial hermeneutical question arises according to which criteria it is possible to distin-
guish between acts of creative reception and aberrations. I shall later come back to 
this issue. 
Sometimes the basic denotations may be conveyed successfully, whereas the con-
notations inferred from the text by the addressee may deviate from those of the au-
thor. However, Eco gives an extreme example in which even the basic denotations 
differ for sender and receiver, even if the message is meaningful in both cases: the 
sentence /i vitelli dei romani sono belli/ can either be read in Latin and then means 
«Go Vitellius, to the sound of war of the Roman god», or in Italian as «the calves of 
the Romans are beautiful».183 Although contextual and circumstantial factors should 
normally enable the addressee to determine whether the sentence is to be decoded in 
Latin or Italian, the above quotation nonetheless exemplifies the polysemic nature of 
every message. As the message articulated by the sender represents a selection of 
equiprobable symbols out of a sign-system, it then becomes itself in turn a source or 
expression of equiprobable contents. In other words, due to the various possible read-
ings of the sememes along with the range of contextual and circumstantial interpreta-
tions, the addressee faces multiple choices to follow a path in the compositional tree. 
Consequently, the information of the messages is only reduced when the addressee 
selects one particular interpretation out of a wide variety of different possibilities. 
Aesthetic messages constitute an exception in this respect, as they “require the simul-
taneous grasping of multiple senses” so that the “informational quality of the mes-
sage remains unreduced”.184  
Furthermore, as already outlined in the first chapter, it is helpful to distinguish be-
tween the private and communal codes of the sender, and the private and communal 
codes of the addressee. The communal codes stand for a person’s world-view, ideol-
ogy,  or religious orientation etc., the private codes cover the individual differences, 
which occur among people who share a common world-view or ideology, etc.185 
Divergences between interlocutors on the level of communal codes, and divergences 
on the level of private codes give rise to quite different communicational problems 
and aberrations. On the level of communal codes, divergences remain irreducible and 
irreconcilable – if one abstracts from the possibility of ‘conversion’, i.e. from the fact 
that the addressee can change his world-view or religion on the basis of the message 
addressed to him. However, some clarificatory work may be necessary to reach the 
interlocutors’ ‘bedrocks’, i.e. their most fundamental beliefs. This might be impor-
tant in order to distinguish real disagreements from merely apparent disagreements. 
The interlocutors may thus reach a point where they can see clearly why they cannot 
understand each other, or why they do not agree.  
d) Context-change and transformation of the sign-system: So far the emphasis was 
placed on the question of how the message emitted by the sender can be decoded 
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intelligibly by the addressee – in a context which may differ considerably from that 
of the sender. The context within which the transmitted message is interpreted (by 
the addressee) was thereby regarded as something more or less static. However, in 
actual fact, every context is in a state of constant flux, i.e. the utterance/text whose 
meaning depends on the context, also alters the context. So much so that the contex-
tual changes induced by an utterance not only affect the interpretation of the follow-
ing utterances but also the “overall meaning of the very utterance responsible for the 
contextual change”.186  
Furthermore, the notion of context remains rather fuzzy, for it is in principle the 
whole sign-system (Eco) or interpretative practice and horizon (Abel) against which 
an utterance/text is interpreted, bordering on sociolinguistics, social science and cul-
tural studies. Now so far as the transformation of a sign-system is concerned, one has 
to distinguish between the genres of text, discourses, artefacts and institutions which 
initiate and give rise to transformation, and the wide variety of genres of text, com-
municative practices, artefacts and institutions that result from this transformation. 
The former category is highly specific and its hermeneutical function is to change the 
semantic system, i.e. “to change the way in which culture ‘sees’ the world”.187 Yet 
the question of which hermeneutical devices can best fulfil this function leads away 
from an understanding of divine speech as a concrete act of interpretation. Hence 
discussion of this issue will follow in part III.  
After this brief survey of logocentrism and pragmatics, it is now time to analyse 
the divine speech-act as it occurs on the basis of Church proclamation in a more 
comprehensive way, by relating all of the factors outlined above to each other. I shall 
try to show that Barth’s conception of divine revelation and human reception tends 
towards a dangerous subjectivism.  
c) Divine presence and authority 
On the one hand, Barth analyses the divine speech-act from a theocentric perspective 
and points out that the divine address and its reception by the addressee are two as-
pects of one single divine act. Within human speech it is possible to distinguish be-
tween act and ‘mere words’. Whereas a ‘mere word’ is only the self-utterance of a 
person, an act also entails “the relative alteration in the environment which proceeds 
from it” (KD I/1, 149). A mere word is passive, an act, however, actively participates 
in history. Yet these distinctions do not hold as regards the Word of God, for God’s 
words are never simply ‘mere words’ but always acts. Whenever we speak of the 
Word of God, we must speak of its power, its might, its operations and the changes it 
effects (KD I/1, 157). 
This theocentric statement about the infallible efficacy of the divine Word corre-
sponds to Barth’s anthropocentric presupposition that knowledge of God is always 
certain and clear (KD I/1, 256). “True knowledge of God is not and cannot be at-
tacked; it is without anxiety and without doubt” (KD II/, 5). On the one hand, this 
 
186 F. Recanati, Pragmatics, 627. 
187 U. Eco, A Theory of Semiotics, 274. 
 
 
126
                                                
quotation can be taken as a statement about the ‘existential certainty of faith’. This 
would amount to saying that faith is the belief in the non-arbitrary, i.e. specifically 
Christian interpretability of the world on the synchronic and diachronic level that 
cannot be lost however many times we come to realise that we misinterpreted it. In 
this sense, knowledge of God is indeed without anxiety and without doubt. But this 
conviction does not imply that there is a particular type of context, namely Church 
services, within which single speech-acts performed by a single sender become an 
infallible mouthpiece of God by a mysterious divine intervention. In other words, if 
we read the above quotation in connection with Barth’s account of divine speech as a 
‘concrete act of interpretation’ (which is admittedly unfavourable, but nonetheless 
tenable), serious problems arise which require further discussion.188 To put it 
crudely, it remains unclear how ‘infallible’ speech-acts can be received by ‘fallible’ 
human addressees. It seems inevitable that Barth’s theocentric statement about the 
unity of God’s words and acts, as well as his anthropocentric point about the cer-
tainty and clarity of every experience of God come to serve as criteria for the recog-
nition of the Word of God as Word of God – as opposed to mere human words. Thus 
from the perspective of the addressee, the union between word and act takes on the 
form of a self-evident presentation to his or her mind that is free of any ambiguity 
and therefore acceptable without reserve (KD I/1, 148, cf. 256, II/1, 5).189 As a result, 
divine presence can in principle be inferred from this experience of evidence, pro-
vided it occurs within the context of Church proclamation. But the question is 
whether these two criteria discussed by Barth (experience of evidence and context of 
Church proclamation) really suffice to guard against the danger of subjectivism. This 
is clearly not the case, as I shall try to show.    
Of course, following Simon, Peirce and Eco, there are no ‘objective’ criteria ac-
cording to which the chain of interpretations can be brought to an end. Consequently, 
the transition from a sign to an action-sign remains inevitably ‘subjective’ insofar as 
the interpreter (or addressee) acts if he believes he has understood correctly. And it 
would be unintelligible and nonsensical to look for a more secure foundation for de-
cision-making. Thus the event of coming to understand something one has hitherto 
not understood (fully) always occurs in the form of an experience of evidence, which 
enables the addressee to act. Yet in order to avoid arbitrary interpretations and sub-
jectivism, more attention needs to be paid to the context within which these experi-
ences of evidence happen. To be sure, unlike Wolterstorff for instance190, Barth does 
define this context very narrowly. Divine speech understood as a tertiary sacrament 
is always based on the secondary sacrament of Scripture, which is in turn based on 
 
188 If one interprets this statement in terms of the unshakable existential certainty of faith, however, it 
leads away from what I called a ‘literal’ understanding of divine speech. This second interpretation 
will not be considered here but is the main theme in part III of this essay. 
189 “We might, for example, hear Christian sermons preached and ask ourselves: what happens in 
virtue of the fact that this thing happens? To what do all these words refer to in reality? A question 
that most certainly needs raising! We might listen to Holy Scripture and hear only words, a man’s 
words, which we do or do not understand, but along with which invariably the corresponding event is 
still wanting. It is then sure that in the proclamation as in the Bible what we heard was not the Word 
of God” (KD I/1, 148). 
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the primary sacrament of the incarnate Logos, and the interconnection between these 
three elements is only guaranteed in Church proclamation. Yet a closer analysis re-
veals that Barth’s criteria do not suffice to avert the danger of subjectivism.  
It is possible to distinguish between different types of ‘hermeneutical situations’, 
some of which may entail a greater risk of misunderstanding than others. This is not 
to mistakenly adopt the view that an observer can assume an external standpoint 
from which he can assess whether speaker-intentions are successfully communicated 
to the addressee. It is not possible for finite minds to compare the background-
knowledge of the sender with that of the addressee so that we know in advance if 
communication will be successful or not. Nonetheless, it is possible to develop (fur-
ther) criteria – on the basis of a detailed contextual analysis – by means of which we 
can judge the likelihood of successful communication. In paying close attention to 
these contextual factors, the risk of misunderstanding can at least be minimised. 
Once again, this is not to say that the inevitably ‘subjective’ element in any process 
of decision-making will be eliminated. The addressee always acts when a particular 
interpretation of x as y has become evident to him or her.    
Recalling the short list of pragmatic factors in the preceding chapter, it is evident 
that the unavoidably active and creative character of most acts of decoding poses a 
threat to successful communication. To be sure, what really counts as a misunder-
standing depends on the genre of text. As outlined above, the aesthetic text, for in-
stance, is not designed to be completely disambiguated but requires “the simultane-
ous grasping of multiple senses”.191 At the other end of the spectrum there are ele-
ments of institutionalised knowledge, i.e. phrases or discourses which follow redun-
dancy rules so that they do not need to be decoded each time they are uttered. But 
‘concrete acts of interpretation’ do not fall into either of these two categories. They 
need to be decoded. But in what way can different contextual factors or types of 
communication influence the result of a communicative act? Consider the following 
example. In the case of a monologic address, the likelihood that the addressee de-
codes the message sent by the sender /i vitelli dei romani sono belli/ correctly, is ex-
actly fifty percent. Furthermore, if the latter only knows either Italian or Latin he 
will undoubtedly interpret the received message either as «Go Vitellius, to the sound 
of war of the Roman god» or as «the calves of the Romans are beautiful», without 
having the slightest doubts about the correctness of his interpretation. That is to say, 
it will be most evident to the addressee that his decoding is correct. For if he knows 
only Italian, he simply cannot imagine that the same message could mean something 
completely different in Latin and vice versa. By contrast, in the case of a dialogue, a 
mutual exchange of messages or texts, the possibility of a misinterpretation can be 
eliminated by one single question and answer.192 Surely, Eco’s example is extreme 
and hardly representative of the subtle nuances of everyday communication. But it 
nonetheless shows nicely how often hidden presuppositions can influence the decod-
ing of a message. And it is precisely these hidden presuppositions that Barth’s her-
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128
                                                
meneutics does not take into account sufficiently. According to him, divine revela-
tion is so powerful that it effects its own ‘infallible’ and ‘passive’ reception on the 
part of the addressee. All questions regarding active reception become irrelevant. But 
the Christian understanding of revelation does not require that general pragmatic 
insights are disregarded in such as way. In actual fact, Barth’s emphasis on passive 
reception backfires in the sense that his theological authoritarianism turns into an 
anthropological subjectivism. Yet for a consistently Trinitarian and Christological 
theology it is neither possible nor necessary to bypass the inevitably contingent fac-
tors of every act of reception in the way conceived by Barth. Quite the reverse: In-
carnation means that divine presence restructures all aspects of human life, i.e. it 
does not upset the finite conditions of interpretation and communication.  
It is important to mark off the ‘passivity’ referred to above, from passivity under-
stood in the sense of inactivity, or lack of response. Barth often emphatically rejects 
the idea of a partial or total passivity as regards the reception of the divine Word and 
underlines the need for obedience (KD I/1, 209). Only the doer of the Word of God is 
its real hearer (KD I/2, 886, cf. 898f, 945). “… [T]he man who really knows the 
Word of God […] can only regard himself as one who exists in his action, in his self-
determination“ (KD I/1, 209). The Word of God comes as a summons to the Chris-
tian and no neutral attitude is possible besides the right hearing of obedience and the 
wrong hearing of disobedience.  
Yet even an order must be considered a ‘question’, to which obedience and non-
obedience are two possible answers. If an order would not be viewed as a question, it 
would fall into the category of causality, i.e. the order would be a cause and the 
change brought about by it an effect. Yet an order is only understood as an order if it 
is first understood as a question.193 Thus the rule that every message is an “empty 
form to which can be attributed various possible senses”, also applies to this type of 
communication.194 Here too, the private and communal codes of the addressee come 
into play, which may be very different from that of the sender. Barth does not say 
that the recipient is not supposed to respond to the divine call. Rather, as already 
indicated above, the ‘passivity’ that is problematic concerns his neglect of the ad-
dressee’s background knowledge, which – if one takes into account the whole con-
text within which the speech-act occurs – may lead to a theologically legitimised 
subjectivism. This assertion now needs to be further substantiated.  
a) The encoding of the message by the sender: Due to his belief in the self-
explanatory and self-authenticating character of the divine Word, Barth does not pay 
sufficient attention to the hermeneutical pre-understanding of the sender and the 
community which he belongs to (see part II, 3, B, a). As indicated above, the encod-
ing of the message conveyed by the sender can be understood according to the for-
mula s interprets x as y to a in the context c, and Scripture comes into play in the as-
structure (x as y). Yet for the interpretation of x as y to be genuinely Christian, not 
just the text which informs this interpretative act (i.e. it needs to be Scripture and not 
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another text) but also the pre-understanding embodied by the interpreter needs to 
meet certain theological criteria. Barth’s neglect of the latter aspect, which is due to 
his idea of a self-revealing text, leaves the interpreter (i.e. the encoder of the mes-
sage) at the mercy of the prevailing ideology. In other words, precisely because 
Scripture is implausibly supposed to ‘interpret itself’, the encoder will always end up 
uncritically adopting the currently dominating, but often hidden interpretative pre-
suppositions, which may well run counter to the basic beliefs of the Christian com-
munity. As with the reception of the divine Word, Barth’s seemingly most radical 
and uncompromisingly theological approach to hermeneutics relapses into a liberal 
model of text-interpretation. 
b) The decoding of the message by the addressee: Barth is not sufficiently atten-
tive to the background knowledge of the addressee. The notion of self-evidence is 
closely linked up with the theocentrically conceived unity between the divine Word 
and its effects. An experience of evidence precipitates the production of an answer-
sign in the addressee, whose adequacy cannot be tested by any external and socially 
embodied criteria. According to Barth, such an interpersonal meta-discourse, well-
known to the tradition, would threaten the absolute authority and sovereignty of God. 
After all, self-evidence it not regarded as a merely psychological category but rather 
as the locus par excellence of divine intervention – provided it occurs within the con-
text of Church proclamation. However, Barth to a certain degree disregards the fact 
that every experience of evidence – even if it does occur in the ‘blinking of an eye’ – 
is not just constituted by the message communicated by the sender, but depends to a 
large extent on the communal and private codes of the addressee on the basis of 
which it is decoded.  
Proclamation, as conceived by Barth, consists of one sender speaking to a large 
number of addressees with different background knowledges, and each recipient is 
supposed to be ‘personally affected’ in the sense that he is able to perform an action: 
… wherever and whenever God speaks to man its content [i.e. the content of God’s Word] is a concre-
tissimum. God always has something specific to say to each man, something that applies alone to him 
and to him alone (KD I/1, 145).  
Nothing can be made of these commands if we try to generalise and transform them into universally 
valid principles […] Their content is purely concrete and related to this or that particular man in this 
or that particular situation (KD II/2, 750, cf. 741). 
It goes without saying that the distinction between the ‘literal’ and the ‘non-literal’ 
understanding of divine speech is somewhat simplistic and does not really exist in 
pure form. For instance, even communication that aims at formation and inculcation, 
and which is supposed to ‘introduce into the Christian perspective on the world’, still 
talks about ‘something’, i.e. about a particular x, since the Christian perspective or 
horizon of interpretation as a whole cannot be the subject of any talk. For instance, a 
sermon is dedicated to the Christian understanding of love, and the preacher tries to 
spell out the basic grammar of the Christian use of this term. On the other hand, the 
most particular interpretation of a highly specific x as y to a can to a certain extent be 
viewed as an introduction into the Christian perspective and horizon of interpreta-
tion, since every x could in principle be interpreted in a different way. Nonetheless, it 
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seems tenable to heuristically differentiate between these two kinds of communica-
tion since they clearly pursue different goals.  
Now even the first mode of communication (introduction into the Christian per-
spective and horizon of interpretation) aims at a personal appropriation of the sent 
message so that on this level too, the content of the Word of God is to a certain de-
gree a concretissimum. That is to say, all of the addressees will interpret the message 
or text conveyed by the sender in a different way, and will decode it within their in-
dividual interpretative framework. This general pragmatic insight pertains to all 
communication. Accordingly, it would be nonsensical to argue that this type of 
speech entails a particularly high risk of misunderstanding. Moreover, what distin-
guishes the ‘non-literal’ understanding of divine speech from the ‘literal’ one is that 
the former does not precipitate immediate action – but rather aims at a reorganisation 
of the addressee’s most basic interpretative categories. This will of course, in the 
long run, influence the nature of the addressee’s individual acts of interpretation as 
well. But the relationship between this kind of speech and single acts of interpreta-
tion is an indirect one. The danger of subjectivism is minimal since the reorganisa-
tion of the addressee’s interpretative categories cannot be achieved by one single 
speech-act anyway but requires inculcation and reiteration (see part III, 2, A). Due to 
this diachronic dimension, it can easily be intersubjectively controlled.      
It is therefore only the second mode of communication which entails an unneces-
sarily high risk of misunderstanding. For here, a highly specific action follows imme-
diately from one single speech-act, and under conditions which do not sufficiently 
disambiguate the potentially ‘dangerous’ polysemy which lies concealed in the ad-
dressees background knowledges. But – as already indicated – since these two modes 
of communication do not exist in pure form, one could perhaps say that the more 
concrete an act of interpretation is, the greater the risk of a misapprehension and vice 
versa. 
c) The danger of subjectivism: It is this double-contingency (see a and b), danger-
ously coupled with the notion that the reception of the the divine Word is always 
clear and certain, which renders Barth’s understanding of divine speech prone to sub-
jectivism. Whereas Husserl’s exploration of orality and communication in the first 
Logical Investigation remains purely philosophical, Barth’s concept of revelation 
must be read as a kind of commentary on Church practice. It therefore amounts to a 
kind of invitation to the addressees, to accept uncritically their spontaneously gener-
ated interpretations and to ascribe to them the status of an infallible divine inspira-
tion.  
In the following chapter I shall try to sketch an alternative understanding of au-
thority which avoids the problems mentioned above. 
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4 An alternative understanding of authority 
A) From monologue to dialogue 
At the beginning of part II I defined ‘literal speech’ as that type of speech which ter-
minates the chain of interpretation on the synchronic level and characterised the ba-
sic structure of this kind of communication as follows: s (= sender) interprets (or 
sets) x as y to a (= addressee) in the context c. Yet Barth’s understanding of divine 
revelation, even if the focus is on the correspondence between divine and human 
speech (what I called the ‘soteriological approach’), does not lead to a satisfactory 
result but rather tends towards a subjectivism. In this chapter I shall make some ten-
tative suggestions about how the aforementioned problems could be overcome.  
a) Beyond Husserl 
As shown above, there are striking parallels between Barth’s conception of divine 
revelation in the Prolegomena and Husserl’s reflection on the human voice and ex-
pression. Once again, the basic structure of this understanding of communication can 
be summarised as follows:  
In colloquy, the propagation of signs does not seem to meet any obstacles because it brings together 
two phenomenological origins of pure auto-affection. To speak to someone is doubtless to hear one-
self speak, to be heard by oneself; but at the same time, if one is heard by another, to speak is to make 
him repeat immediately in himself the hearing-oneself-speak in the very form in which I effectuated it. 
This immediate repetition is a reproduction of pure auto-affection without the help of anything exter-
nal (VPh, 89). 
The fourth chapter of Voice and Phenomenon is particularly important to understand 
Derrida’s critique of what he calls Husserl’s ‘metaphysics of presence’ – which he 
takes to be representative of the whole western history of philosophy. Presence has a 
threefold meaning in Derrida.195 First, it denotes the presence of that which is over 
and against the experiencing subject and concerns object and form, i.e. that which is 
iterable. This first type could be called ‘objective presence’. Secondly, presence 
means “the proximity of the self to itself in its acts …”196 and concerns the subject 
and some intuition or content.197 This second type could be called ‘subjective pres-
ence’. Finally, Derrida uses presence – in the sense of the ‘living presence’ – as a 
term which comprises both the objective as well as the subjective aspect, and which 
is mediated by the human voice. This understanding of presence is called into ques-
tion by Derrida.  
In soliloquy, the locus of pure expression, I do not communicate anything to my-
self, i.e. I indicate nothing to myself.198 And it would be purposeless for words to 
assume the function of indicating the existence of mental acts. Rather, in soliloquy, 
 
195 L. Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl, 2. 
196 Ibid. 
197 “… by the ‘content’ we understand the self-identical meaning that the hearer can grasp even if he is 
not a percipient” (LU I, § 14). 
198 And as we have seen, Husserl understands colloquy on the basis of soliloquy, rather than the other 
way round. 
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the acts are themselves experienced by us at that very moment. Thus, “… one merely 
conceives of (man stellt sich vor) oneself as speaking and communicating” (LU I, § 
8). This statement leads Derrida to differentiate between three different meanings of 
representation (VPh, 54): 
(a) Vorstellung, in the sense of imagining something. It is this understanding of 
representation which, according to Husserl, is characteristic of expression in 
soliloquy. 
(b) Vergegenwärtigung, in the sense of a representation, repetition or reproduc-
tion of a presentation. 
(c) Stellvertreter, Repräsentation, Repräsentant, in the sense that something 
stands for a Vorstellung. 
According to Husserl, expression and inward language is merely Vorstellung and 
therefore bears an ideal character. It is only effective communication (indication), 
which is real. However, it is Derrida’s aim to show that this distinction collapses. 
The use of words and signs always implies the threefold notion of representation 
outlined above. A sign is never a unique event, i.e. an “irreplaceable and irreversible 
empirical particular” (VPh, 55), because a sign which took place only once would not 
be a sign. Every signifier must be recognisable despite the many different contexts it 
may enter and despite the modifications and deformations it may undergo. Although 
signs are indeed different each time they are involved in an utterance or inscription, 
there must nevertheless be a continuity of identity throughout all these various occur-
rences. This identity is to be thought of as ideal and necessarily implies representa-
tion in all three forms (VPh, 55f): 
(a) as Vorstellung: the requisite for ideality in general 
(b) as Vergegenwärtigung: the possibility of reproductive repetition in general 
(c) as Repräsentation: insofar as each signification is a substitute for the signified 
as well as the ideal form of the signifier. 
Once it is acknowledged that speech in general is inconceivable without representa-
tion, the difference between imaginary (expressive) and real communication (indica-
tive) becomes problematic. By virtue of the fundamentally repetitive structure of 
signs in general, effective language seems to be as imaginary as imaginary speech 
and imaginary speech just as effective as effective speech.199 The boundaries be-
tween the binary oppositions reality/representation, veridical/imaginary and simple 
presence/repetition become blurred in indication as well as in expression. But it was 
exactly this differentiation which gave western philosophy and history its grounding. 
The classical philosophy of intuition sought to save presence and attributed to the 
 
199 As Lawlor points out, it is incorrect to say that Derrida’s “… rejection of the metaphysics of pres-
ence and of the belief in meanings as ideal unities leads him to move beyond the tradition of Husser-
lian phenomenology”, D. Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology, 474. Rather, “Derrida departs from 
the tradition of phenomenology not because he rejects the belief in meaning as ideal unities but be-
cause he believes in meaning as ideal unities. For Derrida, everything depends on the Husserlian con-
cept of the noema”, L. Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl, 236, fn 8. 
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sign – and with it the notions of representation and repetition – a secondary and de-
rivative character. This move eliminated the sign and led to its obliteration.  
Now Derrida aims at restoring the original and non-derivative character of signs – 
in opposition to classical metaphysics (VPh, 56f). His attempt to deconstruct the dif-
ference between real presence and presence as Vorstellung implies the questioning of 
the difference between the represented and the representative in general. Thus the 
following distinctions are rendered problematic: the difference between 
(a) the signified and the signifier 
(b) simple presence and its reproduction 
(c) presentation as Vorstellung and representation as Vergegenwärtigung (for 
what is represented in the representation is a presentation as Vorstellung). 
Thus, Vorstellung itself becomes dependent on the possibility of representation (Ver-
gegenwärtigung). The ‘presence of the present’ turns out to be a derivation from 
repetition rather than the other way round.  
These insights lead to a deconstruction of Husserl’s idea of presence. Presence 
can no longer be thought of without representation (Vergegenwärtigung) and now 
entails openness to exteriority, i.e. it is submit to division and delay (différance). Put 
differently, for every present element (that appears on the scene of presence) to be 
itself, an interval must separate it from that which it is not. But the same interval that 
constitutes it as present at once divides the present in and of itself, and along with it, 
everything that is contingent on the present, i.e. every being, above all substance and 
the subject. This interval which constitutes itself but also divides itself, Derrida calls 
spacing: “… the becoming-space of time or the becoming-time of space (temporiza-
tion). And it is this constitution of the present, as an […] irreducibly non-simple […] 
synthesis of marks, or traces of retentions and protentions (to reproduce analogically 
and provisionally a phenomenological and transcendental language that soon will 
reveal itself to be inadequate), that I propose to call archi-writing, archi-trace, or dif-
férance”.200 The reason why retention and protention cannot be equated with the 
trace (or différance), lies in the fact that retention and protention denote past and 
future presents respectively, whereas the term trace stands for a ‘past’ that has never 
been and which never will be present. Consequently, the trace cannot be thought of 
“on the basis of the present, or of the presence of the present”.201
Derrida’s critique of Husserl has far-reaching consequences for communication 
theory and changes our understanding of the utterance as well as the reception of the 
speech-act.202 What needs to be abandoned is the idea of an exhaustively determined 
context which traditionally entails the notion of the “… conscious presence of the 
intention of the speaking subject in the totality of his speech act … [and the] com-
 
200 J. Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 13. 
201 Ibid., 21. 
202  The following account of Derrida’s position is based on his dialogue with J. Searle (and J. Austin). 
However, as Derrida himself points out, there is a close connection between Husserl’s and Searle’s 
understanding of intentionality, J. Derrida, Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion, 120f. 
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munication of an intentional meaning …”.203 According to Derrida, it is neither plau-
sible to believe that the sender ever says fully what he intended to say, nor that the 
addressee understands fully what the sender tried to communicate. That is to say 
there can never be a full adequation between intending and saying, saying and under-
standing, and intending and understanding. The structure of the mark (be it a written 
or oral sign) excludes even the hypothesis of an idealisation. It is nonsensical to pre-
sume that there could ever be an act of communication in which the ‘author says 
what he means and the addressee understands what he says’. That is to say, the no-
tion of ideal communication, in which the intention of the sender, the meaning of the 
sent message and the meaning extracted from the message by the addressee coincide, 
is unintelligible.204  
Rather, for Derrida, there is a close interrelation between idealisation and iterabil-
ity which leads back to the above discussion of representation as Vorstellung (imagi-
nation) and Vergegenwärtigung (repetition). On the one hand, iterability makes pos-
sible idealisation, i.e. “… a certain identity in repetition that is independent of the 
multiplicity of factual events …”.205 On the other hand, iterability limits the very 
idealisation it makes possible, thus “broaching and breaching it at once”.206 It is pre-
cisely the sign as type, i.e. that which enables us to use it as a token in various con-
texts which at once fractures and divides the ideality and self-presence of intention 
and the uttered meaning. Put differently, the idea of iterability requires a minimal 
remainder and a minimum of idealisation; otherwise the identity of the self-same 
would not be repeatable and identifiable in the different occurrences of a mark. Itera-
tion thus always entails both identity and difference.  
However, iterability not only divides the identity of individual elements. Rather, 
this identity could neither determine nor delimit itself without differential relations to 
other elements. Because iterability is differential with respect to each individual ele-
ment as well as between elements, the remainder cannot be that of a full presence. As 
a consequence, iterability “leaves us no choice but to mean (to say) something that is 
(already, always, also) other than what we mean (to say), to say something other than 
what we say and would have wanted to say, to understand something other than … 
etc”.207  
Yet as Derrida emphatically points out, this is not to say that the idea of intention-
ality is done away with altogether.208 Rather, the remainder is a differential structure 
that overcomes the opposition of presence and absence. As he puts it: “… I never 
proposed “a kind of ‘all or nothing’ choice between pure realization of self-presence 
and complete freeplay or undecidability””.209 Accordingly, Derrida also rejects the 
 
203 J. Derrida, Signature Event Context, 14. 
204 J. Derrida, Limited Inc, 60f. 
205 Ibid., 61. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid., 62. 
208 J. Derrida, Signature Event Context, 18. 
209 J. Derrida, Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion, 115. “The relation of “mis” (mis-
understanding, mis-interpreting, for example) to that which is not “mis-,” is not at all that of a general 
law to cases, but that of a general possibility inscribed in the structure of positivity, of normality, of 
the “standard.” All that I recall is that this structural possibility must be taken into account when de-
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accusation that his philosophy implies relativism, scepticism and nihilism. In actual 
fact, one of the aims of deconstruction is simply to pay utmost attention to context 
and the inexhaustible possibilities of re-contextualisation. Also, the oft-cited phrase il 
n’y a pas de hors-text can be construed as there is nothing outside context, and need 
not be read as a statement which affirms the notion of total freeplay and undecidabil-
ity. However, what has to be done away with is the idea of neutrality. Precisely be-
cause the context is so decisive as regards the constitution of meaning, even the no-
tion of ‘scientific objectivity and truth’ is only intelligible against the background of 
a vast, extremely complex and traditional, but nonetheless conventional context. Der-
rida even goes so far as to say that the entire “real-history-of-the-world” 210 can be 
called a context, which clearly indicates that his understanding of text and context 
does not exclude the world, reality and history.211  
b) Beyond Derrida 
Due to this relative stability of the context, the polysemy of individual utterances is 
limited – otherwise understanding and meaningful behaviour would not be possi-
ble.212 However, despite occasional remarks to the contrary, Derrida’s view is to a 
certain extent parasitic upon the idea of full-presence in the sense that he commits 
the opposite mistake. He rightly rejects the notion of communication as an imposi-
tion of self-identically conceived meanings on the addressee. It is not possible “… to 
make the other repeat immediately in himself the hearing-oneself-speak in the very 
form in which I produced it” (VPh, 89). Such a view of communication implies the 
problematic idea of a transcendental subject according to which subjectivity is con-
ceived of in terms of an atemporal unity of thinking. “It contains the thought that 
others be ‘only empirical’ subjects of the same thinking. It is the thought of the trans-
latability in principle from the thinking of one ‘empirical subject’ into the thinking of 
another ‘empirical subject’. Language is thus understood as a merely ‘external’ des-
ignation ‘of the same’ thoughts”.213 Equally problematic is the belief in the possibil-
ity of an external, uninvolved observer who is capable of checking whether the 
meaning intended by the sender has been successfully, i.e. self-identically conveyed 
to the addressee.  
Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that at times the addressee does understand that 
which the sender says. Under certain circumstances at least, the concatenation of 
signifiers does come to an end since the addressee has understood the sign produced 
by the sender sufficiently and therefore performs an action. This action is itself a 
sign, an answer-sign, which is open to further interpretation. As indicated above, 
even an order must be considered a question to which the addressee can respond 
obediently or disobediently. Unless the order is taken to be a question, and the ad-
 
scribing so-called ideal normality, or so-called just comprehension or interpretation, and that this 
possibility can be neither excluded nor opposed”, ibid., 157, fn. 9. 
210 Ibid., 136. Quotation marks in the original text. 
211 Ibid., 137. 
212 Cf. P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, 40-65. 
213 J. Simon, Philosophie des Zeichens, 105. 
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dressee’s reaction to it an answer, the relationship between order and reaction is 
thought of in terms of causality. The order is reduced to a cause and the reaction to 
an effect.214
The reason why Derrida’s position is parasitic upon the metaphysical approach to 
meaning is that he disregards the phenomenologically observable occurrence of ‘un-
derstanding’ between interlocutors which is manifest in the addressee’s production of 
answer- or action-signs. On the one hand, human beings do act, something that can 
hardly be denied, on the other hand they have to act for human life to be possible. 
Derrida however, when asked whether it is not obvious that communication really is 
successful at times, answers with an ambiguous “[p]erhaps”.215 It is here that decon-
struction and Peircian Pragmaticism part ways. For Simon, the chain of interpretants 
needs to come to an end since human beings always operate under finite conditions. 
As outlined in the first part of this essay, the question about the meaning of a sign 
can be raised with respect to every sign. Thus the concatenation of interpretation 
could in principle be continued ad infinitum so that reference to reality would lie in 
infinity.  In real life, however, this is not possible and we have to confine ourselves to 
a limited series of interpretation. If the sign is sufficiently understandable with re-
spect to possible actions, or if there is simply no time left for further deliberation and 
reflection, true reference to reality is achieved. Hence reference must be understood 
pragmatically.216  
In Simon’s philosophy of the sign, the termination of the concatenation of signifi-
ers, that is the transition from ‘mere’ interpretation to action, is consistently con-
ceived of from the internal perspective of the interpreter/agent. According to him, it 
is always an individual subject that comprehends – or is in need of further clarifica-
tion.217 Nonetheless, it is very well possible that a second person intervenes and 
points out that the interpreter/agent has in actual fact not understood, although he 
believes to have done so. However, such an intervention is only plausible if the sec-
ond person has specific reasons to express this doubt. And this presupposes that the 
latter is somehow involved in the subject’s context and acts of interpretation. What is 
not possible, however, without relapsing into a quasi-metaphysical position, is to 
question the possibility of understanding in the abstract. But this is precisely what 
Derrida seems to do.  
Once again, the question about the meaning of a sign can only be legitimately 
raised if there is a particular interpreter, in a particular context who does not under-
stand a particular sign. “The only thing about which one can ever seriously ask is the 
 
214 Ibid., 99. 
215 J. Derrida, Signature Event Context, 17. Quotation marks in original. However, it is important to 
keep in mind that the above quotation is taken from a text in which Derrida explores whether it is 
plausible to distinguish between successful and unsuccessful performatives, as Austin contends. Der-
rida raises the following rhetorical question: “You cannot deny that there are also performatives that 
succeed, and one has to account for them: meetings are called to order […] people say: “I pose a ques-
tion”; they bet, challenge, christen ships, and sometimes even marry. It would seem that such events 
have occurred. And even if only one had taken place only once, we would still be obliged to account 
for it. I’ll answer: “Perhaps””, ibid. 
216 J. Simon, Philosophie des Zeichens, 60f. 
217 J. Simon, Zeichenphilosophie und Transzendentalphilosophie, 83. 
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meaning of the sign that one does not understand right now, in the context that is 
there […] and the answer can only be another sign”.218 Derrida, by contrast, raises 
the question about the meaning of signs from an external, uninvolved and context-
less perspective, without there really being a question of what these signs mean. 
From the perspective of Pragmaticism, deconstruction is therefore as ‘metaphysical’ 
as the metaphysics of presence Derrida so vehemently criticises, since it equally im-
plies the possibility of an external perspective on the sign and its referent, i.e. that 
which the sign represents. On a metaphysical view, there is a one-to-one correlation 
between the sign and what it stands for, in the case of deconstruction, presence is 
replaced by absence. That is to say, it is believed that, due to the infinite deferral of 
meaning, reference is excluded. According to Simon, however, a sign refers to real-
ity if it is immediately understood. The chain of signs has to come to an end since 
human beings are finite and because we cannot live without acting. Here too, Der-
rida’s deconstruction fails to do justice to the ‘human condition’. “‘Postmodern’ po-
sitions evade ‘theoretically’ the seriousness of having to act or of having to refrain 
from acting that is required at all times, and, to this extent, persist in the position of 
metaphysics”.219 In other words, deconstruction in principle retains the ideal of full-
presence aimed at by the metaphysician, but then adds that this goal can never be 
achieved. As a result, the agent always lacks a reasonable foundation for his actions 
since the meaning of signs is infinitely deferred.  
c) Terminating the chain of signifiers 
Dialogue 
In his reflections upon the termination of the concatenation of signs, Simon does not 
primarily focus on communication. In principle, every material or non-material entity 
in the world can provoke a thought process in which we ask about the meaning of a 
sign we do not understand fully, thus distinguishing between the sign and its mean-
ing. Yet communication – which stands at the centre of this essay – raises specific 
questions, in addition, but not in contradiction to the framework provided by Simon. 
I shall argue that, so far as communication is concerned, the chain of interpretation 
comes prototypically to an end in a situation of dialogue, rather than monologue. But 
why and in what sense is dialogue preferable to monologue?  
In part II of this essay, communication is understood according to the model s in-
terprets (or sets) x as y to a in the context c. Now the addressee’s reception of the 
sender’s message, which interprets x as y to him, is itself an act of interpretation, i.e. 
it must be thought of as an active appropriation. This is not to say that the ad-
dressee’s creative reception of x as y is necessarily opposed to the preceding interpre-
tation – although counter-interpretations can of course occur at any time; it is rather 
the addressee’s personal appropriation of the sent message. On the other hand, the 
addressee’s creative reception is related to and dependent on the preceding interpre-
tation of x as y and not just something arbitrarily new that is in no way connected to 
 
218 J. Simon, Philosophie des Zeichens, 49. 
219 Ibid., 61. 
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the initial address. This at least is the way we should understand the occurring ‘inno-
vation’ if the focus is on the ‘synchronic’ aspect of appropriation.220  
Now even if the addressee has an experience of evidence, i.e. if he immediately 
grasps the meaning of the sender’s statement, he may nonetheless give a ‘report’ of 
his way of appropriating the sender’s interpretation. That is, the addressee will him-
self produce signs which can then again be assessed by the sender and so on. In other 
words, the addressee often sets up a hypothesis about what the sender could have 
meant, which he then has to revise and refine in the course of the ensuing conversa-
tion. Perhaps the first response of the addressee to the sender suffices because it 
seems a satisfactory answer to the latter – so that there is no need for a further dia-
logue – or the exchange ends in a drift that can only be arbitrarily interrupted under 
the pressure of time. Such a deadlock can easily occur if the interlocutors have a fun-
damentally different background-knowledge (on the level of interpretation1), often 
without being aware of it. 
If the chain of signs does come to an end, however, then only because both the 
sender and the addressee agree that the latter has understood correctly. This does not 
imply the view that they come to understand it in the same way – if ‘the same’ is 
understood in the metaphysical sense. That is to say, there is no such thing as a self-
identical intention of the sender which can be ‘preserved’ by being successfully con-
veyed to the addressee. It is only that no other or further criteria than mutual agree-
ment about the addressee’s understanding of the sender’s statement are required or 
conceivable to end the dialogue between them. Reference to reality must be under-
stood pragmatically and coincides with the termination of the chain of signifiers.  
To be sure, even in dialogue the transition from (mere) interpretation to action is 
still based on a ‘subjective’ experience of evidence. However, in dialogue this ex-
perience is inter-subjectively controlled, which of course presupposes that there is a 
common practice and horizon of interpretation (in the sense of Abel’s interpreta-
tion1+2) which both the sender and the addressee are part of.  
It goes without saying that there are many situations of monologic address, where 
communication is successful and without a high risk of misunderstanding – inde-
pendent of whether the sender speaks to one or a large number of addressees. To give 
a famous example, under certain circumstances, the mere utterance of the word 
‘hammer’ may be enough to successfully communicate the meaning: ‘please give me 
the hammer now’. Likewise, the command of an officer to his soldiers may lead to 
immediate action, without the slightest misunderstanding. In both cases Eco’s redun-
dancy rules apply, even if, as Simon stresses, obedience to an order is also an act of 
‘free’ interpretation. It is only that these two examples do not fall into the same cate-
gory of communication as Church services.  
The ‘Sitz im Leben’ of the termination  
The fact that the chain of interpretants comes prototypically to an end in a situation 
of dialogue, has consequences for the question of the Sitz im Leben of this termina-
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tion. Evidently, the paradigm of communication which governs the Church service is 
not dialogical – or at least not dialogical in the sense that it leads to immediate ac-
tion.221 For this reason, it does not constitute the locus where the concatenation of 
signs is terminated. And it is not the aim of this essay to advocate that Church ser-
vices should become ‘more dialogical’ as some theologians suggest – at least not in 
the way discussed above. Rather, its primary task is that of formation, i.e. it intro-
duces the addressee into the Christian perspective on the world and thus enables him 
or her to acquire specifically Christian interpretative skills. The acquisition of theses 
skills is based on and mediated by communication as well – but requires a very dif-
ferent form of communication. Within the context of the Church service, the focus is 
on the internalisation of the Gospel narrative which constitutes the very basis of all 
Christian decision-making, be it personal or rather institutional and political. Accord-
ingly, what takes centre stage is the non-dualistically conceived transition from a 
non-Christian perspective (sin) to a Christian perspective on the world (sanctifica-
tion) on the most basic level, without the acquisition of specific, subject-related in-
terpretative skills, which lead to expert knowledges. As will be further spelled out in 
part III, in this type of communication polysemy plays an important part and remains 
‘unreduced’ without threatening the successful conveyance of the messages. 
But let me return to the subject of this second part: communication which termi-
nates the chain of interpretants leading to immediate action. This termination does 
not (in the first place) occur in the Church service but rather in the wide variety of 
different situations in everyday life. For this reason it is advisable to distinguish be-
tween different fields of authority, and different types of competence. Furthermore, it 
is important to keep in mind that the dialogical structure of this type of communica-
tion is not restricted to the interpersonal level, but is a general characteristic of proc-
esses of decision-making.  
B) Fields of authority 
a) Competence and authority  
According to Bochenski, competence is a dyadic and authority a triadic relation. He 
introduces the following terminology:222  
–  s is the bearer of authority (sender) 
–  a is the subject of authority (addressee) 
–  f is the field of authority of which x is an element  
It is important to notice that s and a may be institutions, committees, or political bod-
ies and need not be individual human beings. The dyadic relation of competence and 
the triadic relation of authority can be defined as follows:  
– s is competent in the field  f if s has sufficient knowledge in f  
 
221 A different kind of active reception will be discussed in part three of this essay. 
222 Cf. J.M. Bochenski, The Logic of Religion, 162-169;  cf. J. Tarkki, Questioning Religious Authority, 10-122. I 
have adjusted the variables to the formula used in this essay. 
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– s is an authority for a in the field f, if a accepts in principle every statement of the 
kind x is y, made by s, provided x lies within the field f 
However, these definitions should not be taken for granted. First, it is questionable 
whether competence is really a dyadic relation. For one might argue that s is only 
competent in the field f with respect to highly specific questions and problems. 
Nonetheless, the above definition is certainly acceptable insofar as this aspect may 
already be covered by the variable f. For instance, in everyday language we might 
say that s1 and s2 both know Britain very well. Suppose s1 is a historian who knows 
all the important historical sights in Britain but is ignorant about public footpaths and 
breeding grounds for wild gees. S2 by contrast, is a passionate rambler who cares 
more about nature than culture and therefore does not even need a map to walk from 
York to Cambridge, but is utterly uninformed about castles and battlefields. Accord-
ing to the above definition, their competence lies in different fields. Secondly, a is 
supposed to accept every statement of the kind x is y if x lies in the field f. Yet it 
seems advisable to add further criteria (some of which are in principle covered in the 
above formula by the context c) such as:  
– a has reasons to believe that s really is an authority in the field f. In other words, a’s 
blind trust and submissiveness does not render s an authority. Since human authority 
is always context- and community-dependent, this criterion can only be fulfilled if a 
relies on the judgement of the community (or certain members of that community) 
which pursue(s) the same goal or good as himself. This is also implied as regards in-
stitutional authorities. The addressee who listens to the sender’s advise presupposes 
that the latter was (legally and) justifiably appointed to the position he holds and 
presumes that he or he really is an authority in the field f. This dependence on other 
people is inevitable, for as a non-expert, a lacks the necessary experience and exper-
tise to assess s’s competence in the field f.   
– there is not another person present (s2) with greater competence in the field f whose 
views weigh more than that of the first person s. Here too, the non-expert is utterly 
dependent on other people’s judgment, for he cannot know himself whether s or s2 is 
more competent, and accordingly, more trustworthy. Strictly speaking, however, the 
non-expert is of course never totally ignorant and therefore always actively involved 
in evaluation and judgement. This will be taken into account in the next paragraph. 
– a himself does not come up with an alternative interpretation ‘x is z rather than y’, 
which is accepted by s and/or the community (that pursues the same goal or good 
represented by the field f and which recognised hitherto the competence and author-
ity of s) as the better and more convincing interpretation of x. This is a common 
situation in living traditions that is nonetheless not always easy to cope with. First, it 
presupposes that what I have called loosely ‘the community’, really embodies the 
necessary skills to make an informed judgment on which of the two interpretations 
is preferable with respect to the goals or goods that the community aims at. Sec-
ondly, this situation constitutes a challenge for s. For s’s behaviour will inevitably 
reveal what matters more to him: his own prestige or the good pursued by the com-
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munity which he is part of. He either admits that the interpretation of x as z is a real 
progress regarding the good his community is striving for (insofar as he really is 
convinced about the superiority of the interpretation of x as z), or narcissistically 
yields to self-glorification and insists on the correctness of his own interpretation (x 
is y). Of course, a single incidence of this kind will not undermine s’s authority. 
However, it should be the aim of every devoted teacher to raise his pupils to a 
higher level of expertise than he himself represents. Only thus is ensured that the 
tradition and its quest for truth takes centre stage and not the corrupt human craving 
for self-deification. The community of (theological) researchers thus not only has to 
uphold high intellectual standards but must also exhibit the virtue of humility.  
b) Synchronic contingency  
Sender 
On the one hand, s can interpret x in the same context c as y1 to a1 and as y2 to a2 
without there being a problem regarding the identity of the object x, i.e. without suc-
cumbing to post-modern relativism. That is to say, such a situation may occur even if 
s, a1 and a2 inhabit the same interpretative perspective and horizon and s does not 
change his interpretative perspective between the two acts of interpretation. In other 
words, the distinction between the context c (which does not change) and the ad-
dressees a1, a2, a3, a4 etc., takes into account the different background knowledges of 
the addressees. This is not to say that this level of differences is always the most im-
portant one, for that would amount to embracing a problematic philosophy of the 
subject. Yet, depending on the issue at stake, this dimension of interpretation none-
theless has to be paid attention to. For instance, a teacher explains a particular phe-
nomenon to two students with a similar cultural background and a similar world-
view, who acquired different degrees of competence in the course of their studies. 
For this reason, the teacher also has to provide two different interpretations to ex-
plain one and the same phenomenon to a1 and a2 respectively. As we have seen, this 
level of interpretation corresponds to Abel’s interpretation3. 
Addressees 
Furthermore, since a1 and a2 are actively involved in the reception of s’s address (cf. 
Peirce’s interpretant), they will surely interpret this address in different ways even if 
s interprets x as y to both of them. That is to say, a1 will interpret y – i.e. s’s interpre-
tation of x presented to both a1 and a2 – as y1 and a2 as y2. In other words, there might 
be differences despite an ‘identical’ context, an ‘identical’ speech-act, and an ‘identi-
cal’ interpretative perspective (interpretation1). This is the situation of a public talk, a 
lecture or Church proclamation, where various addressees are exposed to one speech-
act. A more comprehensive analysis of the addressee’s active involvement in the 
reception of a message was carried out in part II, 3, B.  
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Context 
On the other hand, a change of the context c may affect s’s interpretation of x, even if 
x, a and s’s interpretative perspective (interpretation1) do not change. Whereas be-
fore, s interpreted x as y to a in the context c, s will now interpret x as y2 to a in the 
context c2. For instance, a professor of theology who moves from Britain to the 
United States, taking some of his students with him, will explain to them the nature 
of secularism in a different way than in his home country. Even if both, the old and 
the new analysis are Christian interpretations of this phenomenon. This roughly cor-
responds to Abel’s interpretation2. 
c) Innovation  
The notion of innovation leads back to what was discussed in a) under the heading 
‘competence and authority’. Innovation inevitably entails a certain risk, for an un-
conventional interpretative move may lead to a clash with the prevailing interpreta-
tive practice: “The stronger the ‘move’, the more likely it is to be denied the mini-
mum consensus, precisely because it changes the rules of the game upon which con-
sensus had been based”.223  
This leads to a further issue that will be discussed at greater length in part III: 
every genuinely new interpretation of x as y may concomitantly change the context 
within which the act of interpretation was carried out. The degree, to which such a 
transformation of the context is possible, varies with the type of interpretation that is 
performed. Some interpretative acts are specifically designed to alter not just the 
‘immediate’ context of the utterance, but the semiotic system of a culture (what Lyo-
tard calls the rules of the language game224). In principle, this type of interpretation 
can still be conceived of according to the formula, s interprets (or sets) x as y to a in 
the context c. However, as will be seen in part III, it differs in many respects from the 
‘literal understanding’ of speech outlined above.  
d) Synchronic and diachronic competence  
In order to interpret x as y to a in the context c, s needs specific skills. First, as the 
interpretandum x always already comes in the form of an interpreted x (i.e. x as p, q, 
r, etc.) s has to know all the relevant interpretations of x on the diachronic 
(Wirkungsgeschichte) and synchronic level (culture studies). This is at least required 
as regards very complex acts of interpretation, such as performed by academics. In 
other words, s needs certain knowledge about x. S then has to critically relate these 
various interpretations to each other and evaluate them in a complex process accord-
ing to the criteria embodied in the practice of interpretation which he is part of. Sec-
ondly, s needs to be informed about the context c and the addresses a in order to per-
form his act of interpretation successfully.  
 
223 J.-F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 63. 
224 I am not suggesting that the terms ‘language game’ (as understood by Lyotard) and ‘semiotic sys-
tem’ are interchangeable. But they are both hermeneutical categories whose rules or structure can be 
altered and modified. 
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e) Interpretative perspective  
The interpretation of x as y is not just determined by the context c and the addressee 
a, but most fundamentally by the interpretative perspective that s ‘inhabits’. Hypo-
thetically, at least, we can say that even if s, x, a and c remained the same, but s in-
habited a different interpretative perspective, s would interpret x as z and not as y. 
Needless to say that such an experiment could not be carried out in real life.  
Furthermore, it is important to notice in what way Peirce’s triadic understanding 
of the sign is used in this essay. Peircian categories have been employed in various 
ways in theology: for a hermeneutics of Scripture225, the sacraments226, liturgiol-
ogy227 and so forth. In this investigation however, at least so far as ‘concrete acts of 
interpretation’ are concerned, it is not Scripture or the liturgical sign that is taken as 
the ‘dynamical object’, but objects in the world, be they of a sensible or intelligible 
nature. Given that it is primarily the Christian narratives that shape the ‘topography’ 
of the Christian perspective on the world, one could say that Scripture comes into 
play in the as-structure of the interpretative act (provided one abstracts from the 
variability of all the other factors). Naturally, there is an immensely complex process 
of interpretation mediating between the biblical text and statements of the kind ‘x is 
y’. It is never simply an individual that establishes a link between the Christian narra-
tives and a particular x. Rather, already on the most basic level of scriptural interpre-
tation, s is part of an interpretative practice, i.e. part of a tradition.   
C) The attunement of the interpreter  
Apart from the shift from monologue to dialogue and the division into different fields 
of authority and competence, there is a third aspect of authority which should not be 
overlooked: that of the attunement of the interpreter. This last point is closely related 
to the dynamical character of Christian faith which is neglected in Barth’s Prolegom-
ena. In actual fact, the notion that every finite object possesses an inexhaustible se-
mantic depth belongs to the very essence of Christian faith. The eschatological ful-
filment of creation is not to be thought of as the arrival of a definitive and rigid uni-
vocity, but as a dynamical process in the sense of an ever deeper understanding of 
God, world and self. Knowledge of God, knowledge of the world, and knowledge of 
the self form an indissoluble whole. To the same extent that God remains hidden, the 
world remains hidden, and I remain hidden to myself. Revelation and creation – 
which cannot be separated – are so rich ut nunquam reapse exhauriatur.  
Drawing on a Neoplatonic thought-model, Patristic theology distinguishes be-
tween purification, illumination and perfection. In spite of the aforementioned inter-
relationship regarding knowledge of self, world and God, in the first phase the em-
phasis is on the purification of the individual believer (self), in the second on the 
perception the divine logoi of creation (world) and in the third on deification 
(God).228 It is worth noticing that the third step does not entail a distantiation from 
 
225 P. Ochs, Peirce, pragmatism and the logic of scripture. 
226 M. Vetter, Zeichen deuten auf Gott. 
227 G. Hughes, Worship as Meaning. 
228 D. Staniloae, Orthodox Spirituality, 77ff, 195ff, 303ff. 
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creation, but rather constitutes its ultimate fulfilment and completion through the 
mediatory work of man.  
The illumined believer reaches the state of natural contemplation (fusik¾ qewr…a), 
which enables him to partly recognise the ‘essential principles’ in creation. By par-
ticipating in the incarnate Christ, man realises his capacity to perceive divine pres-
ence in the sensible as well as intelligible aspects of the world and comes to see God 
as origin (¢rc¾), middle (mesÒthj) (i.e. as sustainer) and transcendent end (tšloj) of 
all beings. According to St Maximus, it is only through ascetic struggle, man’s active 
response to God’s kenotic self-emptying in Jesus Christ, that true judgment about 
reality can be achieved.229 That is to say, natural contemplation is only possible in 
and through the incarnate Christ. Deploying Chalcedonian terminology, St Maximus 
explains that the one Logos, the second person of the Trinity, re-establishes the union 
among the nature of things without confusing them.230 Yet man is actively involved 
in this process:231
What man does in his mediating activity is that he grasps and perceives the created world in all its 
orders through his senses as well as through his mind […] and holds it together in its pure relationship 
to the Logos Creator in virtue of his pure mind and his purified sense, which excludes any misuse of 
the created things. Thus he is free to perform his mediation as a liturgical function in the world before 
God who has created it out of nothing … 
Within the framework of a philosophy of interpretation, the patristic understanding 
of human beings as microcosmoi and mediators can be deepened by intepreting man 
as homo interpretans. As is evident, the logoi are not conceived by Maximus as self-
evident facts, which can be detected by the uninvolved observer. St Maximus’ is not 
a ‘natural theology’ in the sense of Enlightenment theism, and his cosmology does 
not serve the purpose of demonstrating the existence of God by ‘reason alone’.232 
Natural contemplation is necessarily preceded by praxis (pr©xij), a process in which 
the Christian cooperates with divine grace and acquires virtues, must notably love 
(¢g£ph), which re-enables him to perceive God’s presence in the world (gnîsij).233 
Thus St Maximus’ ontological and ethico-spiritual terminology can be translated into 
hermeneutic idiom. The recognition of the logoi in creation is mediated by Church 
practice into which the believer is initiated, i.e. it is philosophically speaking, first, a 
specific interpretation of the world, and second, based on interpretative skills that 
must be acquired. Natural contemplation is “the result of a long term exercise of rea-
son guided by faith and sustained by striving in a virtuous life”.234 What is required 
is a continuous “effort to direct our lives, and to explain things in the world, in the 
light of faith”.235 Consequently, without this process of purification and the appro-
priation of divine grace, creation remains opaque.  
 
229 Maximus Confessor, Ambiguum 10 (MPG 91, 1108A). 
230 Ibid., 7 (MPG 91, 1077C-1080A). 
231 L. Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 403. 
232 This is not to say that Christian antiquity did not develop a natural theology. See J. Pelican, Chris-
tianity and Classical Culture, 184-199. 
233 Maximus Confessor, Capita de caritate, I, 86f, 95-99 (MPG 90, 961A-B, 980C-D, 981C-D). 
234 D. Staniloae, Orthodox Spirituality, 217. 
235 Ibid., 214. 
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On the synchronic level, the incarnate Logos recapitulates the many logoi of crea-
tion in himself (cf. Eph 1:10). But this unification is not a conflation of disparate 
perspectives on the world leading to the one universal Logos: Jesus Christ. The unity 
which is aimed at can only be realised through a particular (ecclesiastical) practice 
and is not to be understood as a speculative theory about the nature of the world. Fur-
thermore, Maximus does not teach a total discontinuity between old and new crea-
tion. Thus it is the right interpretation of x as y – or the right use (crÁsij) of intelligi-
ble and material natures, as Maximus puts it236 – which renders the world transparent 
as God’s good creation. Moreover, the recognition of the one Logos in the many 
logoi is not achieved by moving from the particular to the universal, or from the con-
crete to the abstract. Each created thing “is unmistakably unique in itself and its iden-
tity remains distinct (¢sÚgcutoj) in relation to other things”.237  
According to St Maximus, the recognition of the logoi in creation occurs in the 
blinking of an eye. The Christian, who has spiritually matured, immediately refers 
everything to God or sees everything in the light of divine presence. There are two 
interrelated reasons why this gift of discernment (di£krisij) can neither be interpreted 
in terms of a phenomenological intuition (Wesensschau), nor as the (merely passive) 
reception of a divine speech-act.238  
a) The believer’s experience of evidence is only reliable because it occurs within a 
particular interpretative community into which he has been initiated and whose prac-
tice of interpretation he shares. Abel explains the occurrence of such experiences on 
the basis of the interplay between interpretation3 and interpretation1+2 and with refer-
ence to Wittgenstein’s distinction between saying and showing.239 If something 
‘shows itself’, we do not understand it without the mediation of signs, but rather a 
sign without the help of other signs. “The evidence is insurpassably high, and the 
showing of the signs is directly, i.e. without further epistemic mediators compre-
hended”.240 Instances of ‘showing’ can only occur if there is a well-functioning prac-
tice of interpretation so that the complex interplay between different levels of inter-
pretation remains concealed. As Simon puts it, from the perspective of the addressee, 
something is perceived without interpretation. Thus, from a philosophical perspec-
tive, Maximus’ approach clearly transcends the distinctions between realism and 
idealism, intuitionism and rationalism. However, there might be an important differ-
ence between the above outline of ‘showing’ and the contemplation of the logoi in 
Maximus, insofar as the latter is not in the first place a single event, or a series of 
events, but the perception of a ‘sparkling’. That is to say, from the viewpoint of the 
purified Christian, the beings in the world are continuously suffused with divine 
meanings.  
b) As already indicated, the state of natural contemplation requires a long effort of 
spiritual preparation, resulting in the acquisition of virtues. It thus does not suffice 
 
236 Maximus Confessor, Capita de caritate, II, 17, 73, 78, 82; III, 3, 4, 86 (MPG 90, 989A-B, 1008A-
B, 1009A, 1017C-D, 1044B). 
237 Maximus Confessor, Ambiguum 7 (MPG 91, 1077C). 
238 Cf. D. Staniloae, Orthodox Spirituality, 217. 
239 G. Abel, Sprache, Zeichen, Interpretation, 169-208. 
240 Ibid., 176. 
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just to emphasis that the interpreter is part of an interpretative practice, it is also im-
perative to distinguish between different degrees of familiarity with this practice. The 
degree, to which somebody is able to judge things and actions correctly, depends on 
the degree of his spiritual maturity. Thus the lightning intuition of the logoi, is only 
free of subjectivism if it results from a previous purification of our nature, which 
requires a long-term struggle. Furthermore, lightning-like contemplation does not 
replace discursive reasoning, since Maximus does not know a nature-grace distinc-
tion in the way developed by Barth. Grace does not effect knowledge of the logoi in 
creation by itself, but uses the ‘natural’ powers of man which are always already di-
rected to the knowledge of the divine:241  
Neither does divine grace produce the illuminations of knowledge if someone is not in the state to 
receive the illumination by his natural faculty, nor does this capacity of his produce the illumination of 
knowledge, without the grace that grants it. 
Maximus’ is therefore a middle-voiced understanding of the reception of divine grace 
(see part III, 1, B, e). There is no distinction between nature and grace insofar as the 
development of certain predispositions to perceive the logoi by grace is itself brought 
about by grace.242
Due to the two points mentioned above, the danger of subjectivism, which looms 
large in Barth’s theology, can be drastically reduced. For in Maximus, the reliability 
of any experience of evidence can be inter-subjectively controlled. An interpretation 
of x as y performed by a sender s is only credible if the addressee has reasons to be-
lieve that s is a reliable sender (see II, 4, B, a). And these reasons can only be pro-
vided by the community to which he and the sender belong. It is the community’s 
collective memory which determines whether it is likely or not that this particular 
sender is going to perform an act of interpretation which does justice to the good the 
community pursues.  
Furthermore, this kind of discernment is highly context- and addressee-sensitive. 
John Climacus, for instance, pondering on how a monk can recognise whether a par-
ticular human endeavour corresponds to God’s will or not, points out that the experi-
ence of great troubles and distractions, as well as unexpected success, can be a sign 
of divine approval.243 Naturally it follows from this that both, troubles and success, 
can also mean the opposite, namely God’s disapproval. Consequently, only the per-
son who was bestowed upon the gift of discernment is able to decide whether a par-
ticular undertaking falls into the first or the latter category.  
Moreover, the gift of discernment enables the believer to terminate the concatena-
tion of signs under the pressure of time – “things requiring immediate action” – as 
well as to successfully bring to an end a prolonged period of decision-making – 
“things […] that take time”.244 This adds further evidence to the aforementioned ob-
servation that the tradition did not think of grace as something extrinsic to human 
nature. In Barth, however, divine presence cannot really enter the spatio-temporal 
 
241 Maximus Confessor, Quaestiones ad Thalassium 59 (MPG 90, 617B). 
242 Ibid., 63 (MPG 90, 672B-D-676A-C). 
243 Johannes Climacus, The Ladder of Divine Ascent, step 26 (MPG 88, 1057D-1060A). 
244 Ibid., 1060A; cf. part I, 1, F. 
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realm. Divine intervention (on the level of the tertiary sacrament), takes on the form 
of punctual events, which can be recognised by the believer in terms of fleeting ex-
periences of evidence. In John Climacus, by contrast, a long period of decision-
making can be accompanied by grace, in which divine presence uses the ‘natural’ 
faculties of man.  
The gift of discernment is also to a very high degree addressee-sensitive. As out-
lined above, there is the case that s speaks to a1 and a2, in the ‘same’ context, from 
the ‘same’ interpretative perspective, about the ‘same’ x (though not exactly at the 
same time, of course), but nonetheless interprets x as y1 to a1 and as y2 to a2. Thus it 
is the difference regarding the personal background knowledges, the private codes of 
a1 and a2 that accounts for these divergent interpretations. Yet such a practice may 
cause puzzlement in everyday life.245  
It follows from all this that besides the shift from monologue to dialogue, the at-
tunement of a person is a further criterion that must be taken into account for a theo-
logical understanding of authority.  
There is a twofold relationship between the attunement of the interpreter and the 
diachronic dimension of the logoi. For these divine principles are not only united and 
held together by the one Logos, without confusion, they also fulfil a dynamical and 
teleological function. Drawing on an expression coined by Pseudo-Dionysius, 
Maximus calls the logoi ‘divine wills’ or ‘divine intentions’ (qe‹a qel»mata).246 As 
regards protology, these terms are significant as they mark off the Christian under-
standing of creation out of God’s good will from the neo-Platonic notion of emana-
tion.247 Whereas this first aspect concerns the divine act of bringing creatures into 
being (tÕ enai), the ‘divine wills’ also determine the development of creatures in the 
sense of a permanent movement towards God. This state of well-being (¢eˆ enai) 
requires the free co-operation of human beings.248  
On the one hand, the attuned person lives in accordance with his logos, i.e. he re-
alises his potential as God’s ‘image’ through a dynamical process and turns it into 
‘likeness’. On the other hand, the attuned person is restored to fulfil his mediatory 
function in the world and assists other creatures in adopting a mode of life that corre-
sponds to their logos. Natural contemplation according to Maximus is not a visio of 
eternal forms but something dynamical, an active co-operation with divine provi-
dence. Although Maximus, as a 6th/7th century theologian and philosopher, does of 
course not have the historical awareness of modern thinkers, the contingent character 
of human existence is nonetheless taken into account in his thought insofar as the 
 
245 “Hearing the confessions of two women who came one after the other to speak of an incident in 
which they had both been involved, he [i.e. Father Anthony] concentrated on the needs and motives of 
each of them and came out with two entirely different sets of comments …”, G. Crow, ‘This Holy 
Many’, 197. After the end of confession, however, the women unwisely told each other what advise 
they had got “and burst out with indignation: ‘Father Anthony! We’ve both come to you about the 
same matter and you’ve said different things to us. Don’t you know what you meant to say?”, ibid. 
246 Maximus Confessor, Ambiguum 7 (MPG 91, 1085A); Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names, V, 8 
(MPG 3, 824C). 
247 Maximus Confessor, Ambiguum 7 (MPG 91, 1077C). 
248 Ibid., 10 (MPG 91, 1116B). 
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divine logoi (also) structure individual beings.249 And because individual beings al-
ways exist in a particular context and under certain historical circumstances, realisa-
tion of their specific logoi cannot be achieved by following an eternal and immutable 
principle. But this is not to say, of course, that there are no trans-subjective rules 
whatsoever, which govern this process. Rather, in order to avoid both ossification 
and subjectivism, continuity and discontinuity must be kept in a balance. In any case, 
as innumerable examples from the Christian tradition illustrate, the gift of discern-
ment is the skill to recognise the living divine will at a particular time and in a par-
ticular context, i.e. under the contingent conditions of everyday life. And it is not at 
all the case, as one might think, that the scope of this type of knowledge is limited to 
the inter-personal and pastoral. Quite the reverse: The history of Christianity is lit-
tered with stories and reports about exceptional Christian personalities who made 
wise political judgements250 or even had (specifically Christian) physical or physio-
logical insights.251  
The limit of this kind of knowledge is not its scope, but the fact that it is only con-
cerned with the particular and individual. The gift of discernment may enable a per-
son to recognise what is to be done at a particular time, but it is difficult to see how it 
could lead e.g. to the development of a theory that seeks to make statements about 
reality on a more general level.252 However, a consistently icarnational theology can-
not neglect this aspect of human life. Thus in the following chapter, the relationship 
between the one Logos and the many logoi will still be the main focus. Yet, recalling 
the aforementioned ‘fields of authority’ and the notion of ‘expert knowledge’, I shall 
reflect on how the relationship between the one Logos and various human disciplines 
or domains is to be thought of.  
D) The one authority and the many authorities 
a) The Radical Orthodoxy Project 
If Christian theology aims at a comprehensive (re-)interpretation of reality, it cannot 
build upon a notion of ‘wisdom’ that is exclusively concerned with the knowledge of 
the individual and particular. Rather, in order to be effective and relevant, it has 
somehow to categorise reality according to non-arbitrary criteria, which are them-
selves derived from the Christian Logos. Yet this is not to say that there is only one 
legitimate way of categorising. As with the (re)interpretation of particular entities, 
here too, a high degree of context-sensitivity is required.  
In the Middle Ages, the three transcendentals, the good, the beautiful and the true 
coincided or were at least interdependent. What is good is also true and beautiful.253 
In Kant’s three Critiques, by contrast, the transcendentals form three discrete fields 
of enquiry. Right action, which presupposes the freedom of the intelligible realm, is 
 
249 “By his Word an by his Wisdom he made all things and is making all things, universal as well as 
particulars, at the proper time”, ibid., 7 (MPG 91, 1080A). 
250 Cf. N. Zernov, The Russians and their Church, 38-43. 
251 Elder Porphyrios, Wounded by Love, 176f. 
252 This is not to say that the more general level of the (scientific) theory is no longer perspectival. 
253 Jan A. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 360ff. 
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independent of cognition as analysed in the first Critique. Likewise, judgments of 
taste, i.e. aesthetic judgments, are neither of cognitive nor of ethical value but are 
merely subjective. In the history of ideas since Kant, almost every aspect of human 
life has been elevated to the status of a first philosophy from which all other aspects 
of human reality can be derived: economics (Marx), subconscious desire (Freud), 
biology (Darwin), aesthetics (Adorno), ethics (Levinas), language (Wittgenstein), 
signs (Eco), etc.  
Christian theology reacted in different ways to these challenges and often failed to 
articulate its specific message accurately and uncompromisingly. Yet it is appropriate 
to say that there is almost unanimous agreement among contemporary theologians 
that Christian theology is not to be identified with any of these aspects but is related 
to all of them. This at least is the impression one gets from the great interest in inter-
disciplinary work in Anglo-Saxon theology. Some years ago, Radical Orthodoxy has 
characterised its own theological agenda as follows: compared with Barthian neo-
Orthodoxy, it tries to be “… ‘more mediating, but less accommodating’ – since, 
while it assumes that theology must speak also of something else [than God], it seeks 
always to recognise a theological difference in such speaking”.254 Accordingly, the 
first collection of essays published in 1999 comprises contributions about knowl-
edge, revelation, language, desire, friendship, erotics, aesthetics, perception, etc. 
Evidently, such an approach has far-reaching consequences for the question of au-
thority.  
If Radical Orthodoxy wants to be more mediating but less accommodating than 
Barthianism, this means, first, that the Christian Logos is not supposed to be subor-
dinated to secular, non-theological thought, and secondly, that theology is not to be 
considered a discipline confined to a limited realm among other realms which are 
governed by non-theological logoi. As far as the first criterion is concerned, it was 
Barth’s avowed aim not to accept any other starting point or foundation for his theol-
ogy than God’s Trinitarian self-revelation in Christ (KD I/1, 35-43).255 However, as 
e.g. Adriaanse has shown, even if a direct influence of Husserl on Barth can be ex-
cluded, there are striking parallels between the notion of revelation in dialectical the-
ology and Husserl’s early phenomenology.256 This does not constitute a problem as 
such but simply shows that both thinkers struggled with similar questions at the be-
ginning of the twentieth century and resorted to similar thought-categories to answer 
them. Yet a theological assessment reveals a pneumatological deficiency in Barth’s 
 
254 J. Milbank/G. Ward/C. Pickstock, Suspending the Material, 2. Cf. J. Milbank, Being Reconciled, 
120. 
255 One has to keep in mind that Barth tried to distinguish between, first, the event of revelation itself, 
secondly, the statement or statements about this event (in the form of the biblical text) and statements 
about the Trinity of God. The doctrine of the Trinity is a “work of the Church” and thus an analysis of 
statements about revelation and the event of revelation. “The text of the doctrine of the Trinity is 
throughout related to the texts of the biblical witness to revelation, it includes also certain concepts 
taken from that text, but it does so just as an interpretation does, i.e. it translates and expounds that 
text, and that entails that it makes use of other concepts than those in the text before it. That means 
that it not only repeats what is there, but it confronts what is there with something new, to explain 
what is there”, KD I/1, 325, cf. 327. 
256 H.J. Adriaanse, Zu den Sachen selbst, 1, 187-194. 
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theology which manifests itself semiotically as a disregard for the syntagmatic and 
paradigmatic dimension of meaning. And it is due to this deficiency that Barth’s the-
ology fails to be culturally relevant and falls short of penetrating the symbol-system 
of a society by changing its codes. Thus, even if the first criterion – undoubtedly one 
of the main features of Barth’s theology – is (in principle) met, his notion of God’s 
self-revelation does not fulfil the second criterion, which ultimately renders the ful-
filment of the first criterion at least incomplete. Milbank and his allies write: “by 
refusing all ‘mediations’ through other spheres of knowledge and culture, Barthian-
ism tended to assume a positive autonomy for theology, which rendered philosophi-
cal concerns a matter of indifference. Yet this itself was to remain captive to a mod-
ern – even liberal – duality of reason and revelation, and ran the risk of allowing 
worldly knowledge an unquestioned validity within its own sphere”.257  
On Milbank’s view, there are tendencies in Barth’s work to understand theology 
as a science among other sciences, with its own specific and limited object. Thus 
theology is regarded a positive science which checks whether the Church’s God-talk 
conforms to the being of the Church: Jesus Christ (KD I/1, 2f). “And, indeed, since 
the exegetical check on the Church’s talk of God is in some sense measurable, theol-
ogy, in the strict sense as reflexive science, is itself ‘secular’ (and so, presumably 
teachable in secular universities)”.258  
But the problem is not that Barth conceives theology in terms of a general sci-
ence, thus subordinating it to non-theological, secular standards of rationality. To be 
sure, theology is a science among others insofar as it has, like them, an object, a 
methodology and a way of rendering its claims accountable. Yet this is a merely for-
mal similarity. On the material level, no such correspondence occurs. In actual fact, 
Barth emphasises so much theology’s radical difference from other disciplines, as 
regards its material aspects, that it becomes questionable to call it “science” at all.259 
And if it comes to a clash between the conventional, secular understanding of ‘sci-
ence’ and the theological one, it is the latter which is normative.260
 However, as already indicated, the problem why the first criterion is nonetheless 
only partly met lies in the fact that the boundary of the field of theological investiga-
tion is drawn too narrowly. Milbank thus rightly points out that in Barth, the ‘object’ 
of theology cannot call into question the methods and supposed ‘objects’ of other 
sciences and thus remains captive to liberal thought. In line with the approach taken 
in this essay, Milbank writes that because theology “is an all-inclusive (but not fully 
 
257 J. Milbank/G. Ward/C. Pickstock, Suspending the Material, 2. Milbank elaborates on this state-
ment in Knowledge, 32-34, fn 1, where he quotes Barth: “Philosophie aber ist eine strenge und weit-
schichtige Wissenschaft für sich, und es steht dem Theologen nicht an, so zu tun, als befinde er sich in 
der Lage, gleichsam im Nebenamt auch noch eine Philosophie vorzutragen and ausgerechnet einem 
Kant etwas am Zeug flicken zu können”, K. Barth, Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert, 
274. 
258 J. Milbank, Knowledge, 33. 
259 “Der Ausrichtung auf […] ihre eigene Aufgabe hat sie vielmehr schlechterdings jede Rücksicht auf 
das, was sonst “Wissenschaft” heisst, unterzuordnen und nötigenfalls zu opfern […] Sie hat metho-
disch nichts bei ihnen zu lernen” (KD I/1, 6). 
260 “Die Theologie hat keinen Anlass, sich den Namen einer Wissenschaft verbieten zu lassen. Wer 
weiss denn, ob sie es nicht mehr ist als viele oder alle der unter jener Konvention vereinigten „Wis-
senschaften“? (KD I/1, 9). 
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graspable) perspective, not just one perspective among many, other disciplines, espe-
cially philosophy, would become theological when they were utterly transfigured, 
when the infinite transformed their sense of their finite objects and methods, and in 
ever unpredictable ways”.261   
1) Radical Orthodoxy’s reluctance to accommodate to secular thought means that 
theology is answerable to the bishop and the Church rather than to academic stan-
dards embodied in secular universities – although it must face the “abyss of self-
reflexivity” as well.262 This can hardly be contested but at the same time oversimpli-
fies the highly complex character of the genesis and formation of Milbank’s own 
theology and of theology in general. As he himself points out, the Christian Logos is 
never simply ‘given’ and then, in a second step, ‘applied’ to the questions of a par-
ticular time but only ‘appears’ in the act of interpretation. Consequently, the task of 
re-discovering and re-articulating Christian faith is never over and done with but 
rather to be thought of in terms of a continuous process. This raises the question as to 
how we are to conceive the relationship between the Christian and the non-Christian 
perspective(s). Consider the following statement:263
Given that the notion of a contextless reason [reason1], without presuppositions and affective practical 
commitments, is a fiction (as recent philosophy, both analytic and continental, has tended to con-
clude), then it is with and not contrary to reason [reason2] to suggest that a well-established commu-
nity and tradition may undertake to articulate its own implicit reasonings [reason3]. 
The insight that there is no contextless reason as conceived by Enlightenment phi-
losophy (reason1) is itself a contextless insight, i.e. it is based on a contextless reason 
(reason2). Unless reason1 and reason2 are (regarded as) two different things, the 
above quotation is nonsensical. That is to say, the rejection of the notion of a ‘con-
textless reason without presuppositions and affective practical commitments’ by ana-
lytic and continental philosophy means that a contextless reason cannot serve as a 
foundation for life-orientation and its psychological, political, aesthetical etc. as-
pects. In other words, reason1 stands for the theologically heretical and philosophi-
cally implausible Enlightenment attempt to accept as reasonable only that which is 
ideologically neutral, universal and publicly defensible. Yet the critique of this un-
derstanding of reason, i.e. the acknowledgement that the notion of reason1 is an illu-
sion, is not just a theological but also a philosophical insight. That is, it is an insight 
based on reason2. And it is precisely because of this reason2-based insight that the 
attempt by a well-established community and tradition to articulate its own implicit 
reasoning (reason3) is perfectly reasonable. In other words, the transition from rea-
son1 to reason2 can be understood as an inner-philosophical critique. 
What needs to be clarified, then, is the relationship between the specifically theo-
logical reason3 and the philosophical reason2. This leads back to the hermeneutical 
question of in what way the Christian Logos is ‘given’ or ‘manifest’ in Christian acts 
of interpretation. 
 
261 J. Milbank, Knowledge, 33. 
262 J. Milbank, Being Reconciled, 109, 126, 133. 
263 Ibid., 109. 
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Milbank approves of George Lindbeck’s and Hans Frei’s metanarrative real-
ism264, which aims to situate the world within the Christian narrative, rather than the 
Christian narrative within the world. Yet he criticises the former for emphasising the 
paradigmatic setting of narratives at the expense of their syntagmatic development. 
As a result, Lindbeck’s account of metanarrative realism is dangerously ahistorical 
since it ‘hypostasises’ narratives in the sense of atemporal categories which serve as 
organising schemas for diverse cultural contents. These fixed narratives are to a cer-
tain extent ‘applied’ or transferred to in principle neutrally conceived cultural situa-
tions and contexts. Due to this historical insulation of Christian narratives from their 
historical genesis, Lindbeck’s metanarrative realism is converted into a “narratologi-
cal foundationalism”.265 A “genuine metanarrative realism”, on the other hand, 
“would have to pay attention to the play between the paradigmatic and the syntag-
matic”.266 This means that267
 … we do not relate the story of Christ by schematically applying its categories to the empirical con-
tent of whatever we encounter. Instead, we interpret this narrative in a response which inserts us in a 
narrative relation to the ‘original’ story. First and foremost, the Church stands in a narrative relation-
ship to Jesus and the gospels, within a story that subsumes both.  
Hence one cannot understand what the meta-character of this metanarrative realism 
consists in unless the interpretation of history on the basis of, or better, from within 
the gospel story is already performed. Hence salvation is to be thought of as the in-
corporation of us and the whole world into the community founded by Jesus Christ, 
which is at once our response to Christ, made possible by the response of the Spirit to 
Christ. This response can only arise after the earthly presence of Christ and locates 
the community of believers within the narrative manifestation of divine presence. 
“Hence the metanarrative is not just the story of Jesus, it is the continuing story of 
the Church, already realized in a finally exemplary way by Christ, yet still to be real-
ized universally, in harmony with Christ, and yet differently, by all generations of 
Christians”.268  
This takes us back to the synchronic level, for the diachronic development of 
Christian faith cannot be separated from its synchronic presentation but becomes 
only graspable in and through concrete acts of interpretation. For there is no such 
thing as an ‘essence’ or ‘core’ of Christianity which is then applied to a particular 
context so that one could distinguish between contingent contextual manifestations 
 
264 Metanarrative realism is here not be understood as “a story based on, or unfolding foundational 
reason (Lyotard’s sense) but in the sense of a story privileged by faith, and seen as the key to the in-
terpretation and regulation of all other stories”, J. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 385f. 
265 Ibid., 386. 
266 Ibid. 
267 Ibid., 387. However, Milbank here subordinates Christology to Pneumatology which amounts to a 
kind of idealism. The story of Christ is no longer regarded as the dynamical object whose continuous 
interpretations lead to an accumulation of meanings which finally form the biblical text’s Wirkungs-
geschichte. But perhaps Milbank simply wants to emphasise the relative continuity between Israel and 
the Church. This one-sidedness is avoided in The Word Made Strange, 162, where he writes: “ … 
unless the textual and ecclesial representation of Jesus – and so its relationship to Jesus, which must 
be a kind of ‘incarnation’ of the procession of the Holy Spirit – is in some sense ‘perfect’, how could 
Jesus’s perfection be at all conveyed to us?” 
268 J. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 387. 
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and a timeless and self-identical core. Now this synchronic presentation of Christian 
faith often draws on philosophical models or insights which are not explicitly derived 
from the theological tradition but which nonetheless become a constituent of the pre-
sent Christian interpretation of the world. For instance, the philosophical and there-
fore general insight (reason2) that there is no such thing as a contextless reason (rea-
son1), but only a plurality of perspectival reasonings (reason3) is fundamental to Mil-
bank’s interpretation of Christianity.269 And even a critique of post-modern and post-
analytic philosophy which emphasises that “… a descriptive observer-pluralism is in 
itself no less aporetic than a descriptive observer-monism”270, remains a philosophi-
cal and hence general insight. However, this statement not only implies that perspec-
tival reason (reason3) is possible and legitimate but that it is necessary and unavoid-
able, i.e. that nobody cannot not ‘choose’ (philosophically speaking) his or her life-
orientation which is always bound to a particular world-view and tradition.271 Thus 
one could say that contemporary philosophy always already points beyond itself in 
the sense that the notion of non-involvement and disinterestedness is unmasked as a 
philosophical impossibility.  
In what way, then, are reason2 and reason3 related to each other?272 The following 
tentative remarks all revolve around the distinction between the historico-
hermeneutical and the normative-authoritative aspect of this question. What needs to 
be investigated is on the one hand the historical conditions of the genesis of a par-
ticular Christian interpretation of the world (or practice of Christian interpretation), 
and the hermeneutical formation of the interpretative strategies used in these inter-
pretations (or practices of interpretation). Yet this aspect is to be distinguished from 
the issue of according to which criteria the selection of interpretative models is gov-
erned, which leads to questions of normativity and authority.  
a) The above philosophical statement – that one cannot not, under finite condi-
tions, indwell a particular perspective on the world – is not altered or refined in any 
way if it is accepted by the Christian theologian and ‘incorporated’ into a theological 
approach. There might well be total formal agreement about this philosophical in-
sight between the theologian and a proponent of a different world-view, but total 
material disagreement about which perspective is really worth indwelling. In other 
cases, however, the adoption of a philosophical model or terminology may signifi-
cantly alter its very structure so that discontinuity prevails over continuity. The de-
velopment of the doctrine of the Trinity in the fourth century, on the basis of the two 
 
269 This is fully acknowledged when he writes, referring to Theology and Social Theory that “the pre-
sent book would not have been conceivable without the writings of Gilian Rose, Alasdair MacIntyre, 
Stanley Hauerwas, Gilles Deuleuze, Michel Foucault and René Girard”, ibid., acknowledgements. 
Among these thinkers, it is only Stanley Hauerwas who is a theologian in the ‘traditional’ sense. 
270 I.U. Dalferth, Gedeutete Gegenwart, 179. My translation. 
271 The philosophical statement that one ‘chooses’ – due to the lack of neutral intellectual standards – 
one particular perspective on the world does by no means clash with the theological statement that 
God chooses the believer. Nor does the term ‘choice’ imply that one cannot give reasons for a particu-
lar decision – in a non-foundationalist way. Furthermore, ‘choice’ is to be understood as relative 
choice, since we always already inhabit a particular perspective on the world and because there always 
remains a blind spot that eludes our conscious grasp. 
272 By reason3 I do not mean here perspectival reasoning in general, but theological reasoning. 
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terms ØpÒstasij and oÙs…a is a case in point, since it constituted a major break with 
Greek metaphysics. However, at that time, theology and philosophy were not consid-
ered two different disciplines with distinct domains so that one can either speak of a 
theological transformation of (Greek) philosophy or simply of an inner-philosophical 
shift of paradigm. After the Christianisation of pagan Hellenism, not just the theolo-
gian could be called a true ‘philosopher’, a true lover of wisdom, but also the simple 
and uneducated Christian. That is to say, ‘Christian philosophy’, had an intellectual 
as well as a practical and ethical aspect.273  
b) It seems that there is not always a clear-cut boundary between these two disci-
plines in contemporary theology and philosophy either. Bultman, for instance, ‘de-
formalised’ and hence ‘re-Christianised’ Heidegger’s existential analytic which the 
latter had developed on the basis of thought-categories derived from the historically 
specific tradition of Christianity.274 Even if one holds that theology and philosophy 
are two distinct disciplines, it cannot be denied that there is a certain cross-
fertilisation in the history of ideas. This reciprocity, but also the ambiguity that 
comes with it, can be seen in Milbank’s essay The Linguistic Turn as a Theological 
Turn.275 As the title suggests, Milbank embarks on the “experiment”276 to read the 
linguistic turn as a theological turn. On the one hand he concedes that “… patristic 
and mediaeval thought was unable entirely to overcome the ontology of substance in 
the direction of a view which sees reality as constituted by signs and their endless 
ramifications”.277 Yet he finds in Berkeley, Hamann, Herder and Vico, eighteenth-
century Christian thinkers who overcame the rationalist residues inherited from their 
predecessors. However, the expression ‘linguistic turn’ is normally associated with a 
general trend in the philosophy of the twentieth century, and I presume it would be 
somewhat more difficult to explain this later development with reference to explicitly 
Christian thinkers. This seems to be Milbank’s view as well, for he does not endeav-
our to find theologians who might have initiated philosophy’s increasing interest in 
language in the twentieth century. Thus whereas in the eighteenth century, the Chris-
tian thinkers Berkeley, Hamann, Herder and Vico constituted a kind of counter-
weight to the great Enlightenment philosophers such as Kant, who did not pay atten-
tion to the phenomenon of language, in the twentieth century, it was ‘secular phi-
losophy’ which precipitated the ‘linguistic turn’. Accordingly, post-modernity’s 
“embracing of radical linguisticality” was not in the first place something called forth 
from within the Christian tradition but rather constituted a challenge to theology.278 
According to Milbank, however, this stress on language does not constitute a prob-
lem for Christian thought since traditional Christianity “has always been secretly 
promoted by it”.279 It follows from this that “Christian theology has been able, like 
 
273 J. Pelican, Christianity and Classical Culture, 179-183. 
274 J. D. Caputo, Heidegger and theology, 275. 
275 J. Milbank, The Word Made Strange, 84-120. 
276 Ibid., 97. 
277 Ibid., 85. 
278 Ibid. Milbank does not use the term challenge but I use it here to make my point that theology had 
to face something external, something that it did not develop from within itself. 
279 Ibid. 
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sceptical postmodernism, to think unlimited semiosis”.280 But Milbank’s argument 
takes a final turn when he writes that only for theology, “… difference remains real 
difference since it is not subordinate to immanent univocal process or the fate of a 
necessary suppression” – unlike postmodern nihilism.281
The zigzag character of Milbank’s argumentation, far from being inconsistent, 
clearly shows how intricate the interrelationship between theology and philosophy is. 
However, it is difficult to understand statements of the kind ‘only theology can think 
…’. To be sure, theologically motivated insights can be relevant for philosophy and 
have been relevant in the history of philosophy. But philosophy’s task remains to 
abstract from the particular and to focus on that which can be held independently of 
any world-view. But whereas in the past, philosophy was itself a ‘way of life’ (Plato, 
Aristotle, Stoa, Neoplatonism etc.), it has now become so formal that it cannot di-
rectly compete with Christianity. Thus the statement that ‘the notion of a contextless 
reason, without presuppositions and affective practical commitments, is a fiction’ is a 
philosophical, and hence a general and trans-perspectival statement which is unprob-
lematic for Christian theology. Thus even if theology provides thought-models, de-
rived from the historically specific tradition of Christianity which are subsequently 
adopted by ‘secular philosophy’, this does not mean that statements of the kind ‘only 
Christianity can think …’ are acceptable. For the philosopher, who is only interested 
in the general, e.g. in the ‘meaning of meaning’, but not in the particular circum-
stances under which a theory of meaning was developed, will – in the blinking of an 
eye – differentiate between the content of particular linguistic unit and its form (e.g. 
narrative, metaphor, utterance, etc.).  
Very often, however, it is the other way round, i.e. theology draws on philosophi-
cal insights to present its understanding of reality. In the latter case, the instrumental 
use of philosophical theories in theology does not really alter those models (philoso-
phically). This, once again, does not exclude the possibility that a philosophical ap-
proach (‘instrumentally used’ by theology) has originally Christian roots, i.e. is not 
really a ‘new’ insight. Milbank’s theological critique of philosophy, however, rejects 
the possibility of general statements about reality that are not tied to a particular tra-
dition – even if they provide theology with genuinely Christian insights that it might 
have lost. This seems to be the case regarding Milbank’s discussion of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer.282  
… because Gadamer seeks to articulate […] an original, necessary and ongoing supplementation 
which is yet not violent and subversive in relation to the original. However, it is specious as philoso-
phy, because nothing ‘justifies’ such a peaceful transmission, such a nomadic Sittlichkeit. That it ex-
ists, cannot be presented as a universal transcendental claim about how transmission works, but only 
as a claim of faith and experience that that is how this particular tradition works, and that this is the 
clue to how things really are. And in fact, Gadamer’s transcendental hermeneutics presents itself […] 
as a secularization of the aesthetics implicit in the Christian doctrines of the Trinity and incarnation: 
the Father is only present through the image, the presentations, and representations of Christ through 
time.  
 
280 Ibid., 112. 
281 Ibid., 113. 
282 J. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 417. 
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Yet, historically speaking, it cannot be denied that this – according to Milbank – spe-
cifically theological insight was presented to the intellectual world of the twentieth 
century as a philosophical theory. On the other hand, there are also philosophical 
critiques of Gadamer’s understanding of tradition, which must be distinguished from 
Milbank’s theological remarks.283    
More importantly, the difference between the Christian understanding of reality 
and other non-Christian ones, on which Milbank rightly places the stress, can ulti-
mately only be maintained if there are points of contact. At least in Theology and 
Social Theory, Milbank’s takes great pains to demonstrate the primacy of narrativity 
over other philosophical thought-models.284 But narrativity is a philosophical 
thought-category as well, and only does the job so well (i.e. it marks a theological 
understanding of reality off from secular understandings) because it is of a general 
nature.      
c) Thus one needs to ask: Are the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation the cri-
teria on the basis of which theology assesses secular thought-models as an ultimate 
arbiter, or is the Christian tradition rather assisted by secular thought to discover the 
hitherto incompletely comprehended (and inexhaustible?) depth of meaning residing 
in these doctrines? The differentiation between a historico-hermeneutical and a nor-
mative-authoritative aspect might help clarify things to a certain degree. On the his-
torico-hermeneutical level, theology may very well, (re-)discover its very centre by 
taking on board – in extreme cases – thought which at first glance appears to be out-
right anti-Christian (e.g. Nietzsche). The still ongoing debate about Christianity and 
post-modernity, the attempt to articulate a post-metaphysical understanding of Chris-
tian faith as well as the question about the origin of metaphysics and its relationship 
to Christianity, is a case in point. At times the Church mistakenly resists a widely 
accepted, so-called ‘secular truth’ over a long period of time, which may finally turn 
out to be perfectly compatible with Christian theology or even the decisive remedy to 
purge Christian faith from contaminations.285 Yet one should nonetheless refrain 
from describing such occurrences as ‘theology’s failure to meet the prevailing intel-
lectual standards’. For even if theology is – in some cases – faced with certain phi-
losophical insights, i.e. challenged by something external, these insights nonetheless 
only become normative for Christian faith if they are accepted by theology and the 
Church. This is not to deny that these ‘truths’ are of a general nature in the sense that 
they can be regarded as logoi which are true even without an explicitly Christian per-
spective on the world. Nonetheless, on the normative-authoritative level, the doc-
 
283 J.D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, 110f. According to Caputo, there is still a kind of ‘conver-
gence theory’, which does not allow for real difference and perspectivity. However, this is not what 
Milbank criticises him for. Rather, Milbank’s point is that every allegedly general statement about 
reality is an expression of a secular immanentism. But at times he relativises this extreme view: “The-
ology […] must entirely evacuate philosophy, which is metaphysics, leaving it nothing (outside 
imaginary worlds, logical implications or the isolation of aporias) to either do or see, which is not – 
manifestly, I judge – malicious”, The Word Made Strange, 50. Now if one puts the emphasis on his 
remarks in brackets, there seems to be room for philosophy understood in the sense of Abel and 
Simon. 
284 J. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 259-277, 382-388. 
285 Very often, of course, it is the other way round. 
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trines of the Trinity and Incarnation constitute the ultimate arbiter for even the most 
abstract philosophical theories. That is to say, the genesis and normativity of a par-
ticular intellectual insight must be kept apart.  
2) If Radical Orthodoxy tries to be more mediating than Barthianism, this means 
that a consistently Trinitarian and incarnational theology always has to talk about 
something else but seeks “to recognise a theological difference in such speaking”.286 
And there is no public or private aspect of human life that does fall outside the do-
main of theology. Now if the focus is on the non-accommodating character of theol-
ogy, the Christian perspective on the world is viewed as a highly specific way of 
symbolising reality – which differs from other perspectives on the world. Conse-
quently, one will resort to thought-categories which are formally general and pre-
cisely for this reason suitable to set out the specifically Christian (material) differ-
ence.287 Although these categories must also allow for difference within the Christian 
perspective, they in the first place constitute a point of contact between the most di-
verse world-views. If the focus is on mediation, by contrast, theology needs to spell 
out the inner architectonics of its way of categorising, structuring and differentiating 
the world. Needless to say that already the categorising itself and not just the way the 
world is interpreted ‘within’ these categories must be based on and derived from the 
Christian Logos.  
This issue becomes even more pressing on the level of institutions and organisa-
tions.288 Here the question arises as to what function the Church fulfils, whether it 
can be called an institution (among other institutions), and if yes, how it is related to 
other institutions. More concretely, the issue needs to be tackled of what kind of 
competence and authority the minister/priest/bishop represents, if theology is an-
swerable to him – as John Milbank argues. In this respect, Milbank’s reflections on 
Church hierarchy leave (too) many questions unanswered. For instance, it remains 
unclear what kind of ‘good’ or ‘excellence’ it is that underlies his notion of ‘Church 
hierarchy’.289 One should at least differentiate between the following types of author-
ity:290
theology1 as the discipline which descriptively and normatively reflects upon the 
Christian tradition and tries to establish the grammar, root metaphors, narratives, etc. 
which form its hermeneutical core. Unlike the philosophy of religion, it tends to 
place the emphasis on the material aspect of these hermeneutical devices rather than 
the hermeneutical devices themselves. That is to say, it is interested in a Trinitarian 
grammar, the root metaphor of the cross or Love, or the Gospel narratives, etc. The-
ology in this sense is an intellectual and historical discipline.  
 
286 J. Milbank/G. Ward/C. Pickstock, Suspending the Material, 2. 
287 The Gospel narratives as opposed to other, non-Christian narratives; the Christian virtues faith, 
hope and love as opposed to other, non-Christian virtues; Christian root metaphors as opposed to non-
Christian root metaphors, etc. 
288 For a rough definition of institutions and organisations see R. Clouser, The Myth of Religious Neu-
trality, 228f. 
289 See J. Milbank, Being Reconciled, 126ff. 
290 The following distinction between theology1/2/3 is not directly related to Abel’s differentiation be-
tween interpretation1/2/3. 
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theology2 as the discipline which introduces people into the Christian perspective 
upon the world by inculcating them with the basic texts of the Christian faith. It does 
not elucidate the grammar of Christian faith but rather recites texts which are gram-
matically particularly dense and hence apt to fulfil this introductory function; it does 
not reflect upon root metaphors but rather poetically and playfully performs texts 
which are littered with Christian root metaphors; it does not analyse the Gospel nar-
ratives but liturgically enacts them.  
theology3 as the expertise to interpret a particular x in a specifically Christian way. It 
is that which was called above the skill ‘to bring the chain of interpretation to an 
end’. Recalling the two aspects mentioned above (that theology is supposed to be 
less accommodating but more mediating than Barth), one can either place the empha-
sis on  
a) that which all Christian interpreters have in common (as opposed to non-
Christian interpreters), i.e. a kind of basic interpretative skill that is manifest, for in-
stance, in the three central Christian virtues faith, hope and love (cf. part III). 
b) different fields of competence/authority, or different classes of x, all of which 
require Christian interpretative skills, but which at the same time call for field-
specific expertise. Thus b) is strictly speaking not a sub-class of a). Rather, as out-
lined above, a) regards Christian interpretative practice as opposed to other, non-
Christian practices, whereas b) focuses on the internal architectonics of Christian 
interpretative practice.  
Now what kind of competence/authority does the minister/priest/bishop represent? 
One is tempted to say authority/competence 1) and 2) as well as author-
ity/competence in certain but surely not all fields of authority/competence 3). Given 
the complexity of modern society and the expert knowledge required to perform 
highly specific interpretative acts in differentiated spheres of reality, it is impossible 
that these various skills could be mastered by a single person, office or institution. 
This is not to say that the present differentiation of modern society must necessarily 
be accepted by Christian theology in its present manifestation. What is at stake here, 
is the more general insight that if Christianity wants to be less accommodating but 
more mediating (than Barthianism), the question of differentiation has to be taken 
seriously: „Es geht nicht darum, den Klerus vom apostolischen Dienst am Wort, von 
den Altären und dem Gebet abzukoppeln und sie in zweitrangige Politiker, Koopera-
toren, Ärzte und Agronomen zu verwandeln, sondern darum, dass alle diese gesell-
schaftlichen Mitarbeiter, sofern sie Söhne der Kirche sind, im Rahmen ihres Faches 
zur planmässigen Durchsetzung des christlichen Ansatzes dort einbezogen werden, 
wo die heidnischen und sogar antichristlichen Anschauungen herrschen“.291   
Furthermore, every tradition which aims at the realisation of a concrete good, will 
distinguish between proponents who embody this good to a higher or lesser degree. 
This inevitably leads to the development of aristocratic-hierarchic structures – which 
 
291 A. Kartašov, Kirche, Geschichte, Russland, 246, 250, quoted in K. Kostjuk, Der Begriff des Politi-
schen in der russisch-orthodoxen Tradition, 324. 
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may be counterbalanced by democratic elements in the sense that the truth first and 
foremost resides in the Church as a whole. 
The combination of these two factors, i.e. differentiation (‘theology’1-3a/b) and the 
aristocratic-hierarchic element makes it impossible to speak of one hierarchy within 
the Church. For instance, the main skills required of clergy is theology2 (and to a 
certain extent theology1), but as for instance the Donatist controversy made clear, 
theological excellence in the sense of theology3a is not indispensable for a valid exer-
cise of Church ministry – let alone theology3b. Furthermore, the Church has always 
accepted charismatic authority, understood in terms of theology3a, outside the 
boundaries of Church hierarchy and canonised people not only for a virtuous way of 
life (in the sense of interpersonal sensitivity and love) but also for various achieve-
ments in the service of the Church (which fall into the category of theology3b). 
This is not to question the usefulness and indispensability of the episcopate and 
the traditional Church hierarchy, or to replace the traditional understanding of hierar-
chy by another one. Rather, it is an attempt to elaborate on the already existing rich-
ness of Church life and its internal differentiation, which could be described in terms 
of a complex, interrelated network of different hierarchies which mutually intersect. 
To give an example, there could be a hierarchy exclusively based on theology3a, pro-
vided that the three basic virtues faith, love and hope are interpreted in the broadest 
possible sense and are not viewed as dispositions which merely regulate the interper-
sonal aspect of human life.292 For it is in principle possible to regard all other types 
of theology as instances of theology3a. As already mentioned, theology3a is strictly 
speaking not one type of authority among others (within the Christian perspective on 
the world), but rather comprises any specifically Christian interpretative skill viewed 
over against other, non-Christian interpretative skills. Accordingly, the most diverse 
Christian skills have a point of contact or a common centre, namely their specifically 
Christian character. For this reason, they can to a certain extent be ‘assessed’ accord-
ing to a common standard, the Christian Logos, despite their diversity, which allows 
for the establishment of something like a hierarchy. 
It follows from this that if the issue of differentiation is taken seriously, the con-
ceptions of hierarchy set forth by Christianised Neoplatonists such as Nicholas of 
Cusa or Pseudo-Dinoysius Areopagita, on which Milbank is drawing, are insuffi-
cient.293 To be sure, there is much to be learned from these thinkers on the level of 
theology3a. But their Trinitarian reworking of Neoplatonic monism remains incom-
plete so that the unity-in-difference always goes at the expense of real difference-in-
unity. In any case, many questions about how these traditional models of hierarchy 
can be refined so as to allow for real differentiation remain unanswered in the writ-
ings of Radical Orthodoxy. 
Now the insight that a genuine Christian existence is not limited to a clerical or 
monastic vocation was reemphasised by the reformers of the sixteenth century. And 
 
292 Thus in extreme cases and under highly specific circumstances, even the successful completion of 
a military campaign can be interpreted as an act of charity. 
293 See J. Milbank, Being Reconciled, 126ff. 
there is one tradition which deserves particular attention as regards the question of 
differentiation: Neocalvinism. To this I shall turn now. 
b) The Neocalvinist contribution 
Neocalvinism rejects any hierarchical view of society as a whole and advocates an 
order which is structurally pluralistic. No social community includes the other as 
part so that the idea of a single all-encompassing community is excluded. Conse-
quently, no institution can rightfully claim to have an all-encompassing authority 
either. Rather, there is a plurality of types of communities and each of these social 
spheres has its own distinctive structural purpose and internal organisation. Likewise, 
each community is entitled to establish its own rules of operation and to make its 
own decisions about how it wants to achieve its structural purpose. Thus each com-
munity enjoys sphere sovereignty, a principle designed to protect a community 
whose structural purpose is defined by one aspect of reality from interference from 
other communities who are qualified by a different aspect.294
All aspects of reality are distinct, mutually irreducible but at the same time insepa-
rable. “On our view, then, there is no single social institution or authority which is 
supreme over all the rest”.295 According to Clouser, this principle already governed 
Calvin’s theology in the sixteenth century and was invoked to resolve the theologico-
political deadlock over whether the state or Church was the supreme authority. Cal-
vin tried to overcome this impasse by saying that while Church and state are sup-
posed to exercise authority in different spheres, most aspects of private or public life 
are not governed by either one. This opened up space for further differentiation. 
According to Clouser, it is impossible to illustrate the nature of a society organ-
ised by the principle of sphere sovereignty with a two-dimensional diagram. Hence 
he provides us with two different schemas. In the first diagram (see Figure 1296), the 
centre of the circle represents the individual person who is related to all of these as-
pects, wholly independent of whether or not this person actively takes part in the 
communities centrally qualified by these aspects. 
Social Fiduciary 
Biological 
Psychological Logical 
Economic
Justitial Aesthetic
Ethical 
Historical
Figure 1 
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294 R. Clouser, The Myth of Religious Neutrality, 249. 
295 Ibid., 257. 
296 Figure 1 is a slightly altered version of the diagram in ibid., 259. 
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Justitial:  State 
Economic: Business, Labor Union, Stock Market 
Social: Caste, Peerage, Social Register, Club 
Historical: Museum, Archive 
Logical: School 
Psychological: Counselling Service, Therapist, Asylum 
Biological:  Hospital, Clinic, Gym 
Fiduciary: Church, Synagogue, Mosque, Political Party 
Ethical: Marriage, Family, Foundation, Orphanage 
Aesthetic: Orchestra, Art Gallery, Dance Troupe, Theatre, Sports Team 
 
This first diagram clearly brings to expression that sphere sovereignty is based on the 
notion of non-subordination and genuine pluralism: Each slice of the circle is on the 
same level. However, there is nonetheless a certain ‘hierarchy’ which is not satisfac-
torily represented in the first diagram. The second diagram is therefore designed to 
bring out this second dimension of sphere sovereignty and contains “a view of sev-
eral social communities as they range across aspects, from their foundational to their 
leading functions, according to their type laws”.297 Let me briefly discuss the key 
terms used by Clouser.  
Negatively speaking, what underlies the principle of sphere sovereignty is the tra-
ditional Christian understanding of evil as the attribution of a divine, self-existent 
status to something non-divine, i.e. to an aspect of creation.298 As a consequence, the 
status of the remaining aspects (of creation) is reduced: either they are viewed as 
being dependent on those/that aspect(s) which are/is regarded as divine, or they are 
eliminated altogether in favour of the latter. In both cases the power and importance 
of the divinised aspect(s) is overestimated and the power and importance of the cor-
responding aspects which are non-divine underestimated. Now Clouser puts forward 
two principles in order to guard against the danger of the aforementioned reduction-
ism. On the one hand, there is the principle of pancreationism: “Everything other 
than God is his creation and nothing in creation, about creation, or true of creation 
is self-existent”.299 On the other hand he adduces the principle of irreducibility: “no 
aspect of creation is to be regarded as either the only genuine aspect or as making 
the existence of any other possible”.300  
This non-reductionist approach allows Clouser to heuristically distinguish be-
tween different ‘laws’ which he interprets as the divine orderliness embedded in 
creation.301 However, there is a certain tension in his thought: on the one hand this 
orderliness almost has the status of an ‘ontological structure’ within the framework 
of a theology of creation. Yet Clouser at the same time points out that the working 
list of laws he provides is not supposed to be final or complete but can be supple-
 
297 Ibid., 258. 
298 Rom 1:25; S. Weil, Gravity and Grace, 61: “Man always devotes himself to an order. Only, unless 
there is supernatural illumination, this order has as its centre either himself or some particular being or 
thing (possibly an abstraction) with which he has identified himself (e.g. Napoleon, for his soldiers, 
Science, or some political party, etc.) It is a perspective order”. 
299 R.Clouser, The Myth of Religious Neutrality, 202. 
300 Ibid. 
301 For a list of these laws see Figure 2 below. 
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mented or modified if this turns out to be necessary. This however raises the question 
as to whether these two statements can be held together consistently. What ‘ontologi-
cal status’ does this divine orderliness have and how can we distinguish between 
contingent and non-contingent elements? There are some brief remarks which indi-
cate that Clouser – similar to Abel and Peirce – wants to transcend the distinction 
between objectivism (e.g. Aristotle) and subjectivism (e.g. Kant), which could be 
interpreted in Trinitarian terms. However, this project is not really carried out. All he 
says is that “both objects and subjects are governed and connected by being governed 
by the same divinely ordained law framework”.302   
Now the below list of aspects – read from bottom to top – is supposed to represent 
the pre-theoretical order in which these aspects appear in things we experience. This 
is also where the aforementioned ‘hierarchical’ element comes into play. Pretheoreti-
cal experience reveals that there is a certain order to the way things exhibit these as-
pects, i.e. the lower aspects are the preconditions for the higher ones. For instance, 
whereas the historical aspect of creation is inconceivable without the biotic, the sen-
sory and the logical, the fiduciary aspect stands at the top of the list since it presup-
poses all of the other aspects (see Figure 2).303 Clouser therefore articulates a third 
principle which is related to the aforementioned statement, namely that of aspectual 
inseparability: “This means that aspects cannot be isolated from one another; their 
very intelligibility depends on their connectedness”.304  
As regards human artefacts, Clouser further distinguishes between the founda-
tional and the leading function of aspects.305 The qualifying aspect of a thing is “the 
aspect whose laws guide and regulate the internal organization or development of 
the thing considered as a whole”.306 For instance, we consider a rock as a ‘physical’ 
thing or a plant as a ‘living’ thing because it is the physical and biotic aspects respec-
tively which primarily govern the internal organisation of this object/organism. It is 
not that the rock and the plant are only physical or biotic, but the laws of their quali-
fying aspect are the predominant factors as regards their internal organisation and 
development.307 However, the notion of the qualifying aspect is insufficient to ex-
plain the genesis and structure of human artefacts. Whereas stones have a physical 
qualifying function, the transformation of stones into a house can only be achieved 
by following highly complex procedures according to a certain plan. The qualifica-
tion of human artefacts thus entails three different aspects: first, the natural material 
used for its production, second, the process by means of which this transformation is 
carried out, and thirdly, the plan according to which this process is conducted. Now 
the first two aspects Clouser calls the foundational function of an artefact and the 
third one its leading function. Put differently, the foundational functions consist of 
 
302 Ibid., 209. 
303 Clouser explicitly points out that his understanding of preconditionality has nothing to do with the 
historical unfolding of these properties through time, ibid., 210. 
304 Ibid., 217. 
305 There is no room here for a comprehensive account of Clouser’s extremely sophisticated theory of 
reality, see ibid., ch. 11. 
306 Ibid., 218. 
307 Ibid. 
the qualification of the natural material and of the qualification of the process of 
formation resulting in a particular artefact. In most cases the latter, i.e. the second 
foundational function, assumes the form of a ‘historical’ or ‘cultural’ process.  
For instance, the style in which a house is designed is always informed by a par-
ticular historical period and culture and/or contributes to the development of a new 
cultural epoch. Thus the (second) foundational function of a house is historical. 
Clouser then turns to a house’s leading function. Although a house undoubtedly does 
serve human biological needs, its leading function is not biological. Unlike the lodge 
of a beaver for instance, a house, as a human artefact, is more than just biological 
shelter. Its ground plan, the design and seize of its rooms as well as the furnishings 
make it a place for various kinds of social exchange and also indicate the owner’s 
social status. Unless the erection of a building is governed by such social purposes, 
we do not call it a house. Thus Clouser concludes that the leading function of a house 
is social.  
Let me now return to the question of authority and the relationship between the one 
Logos and the many logoi. Figure 2 shows the foundational and leading functions of 
the family, business, state and Church or synagogue. However, in what follows I 
shall confine myself to the Church and the fiduciary aspect which is its leading func-
tion. The term ‘fiduciary’ refers to the reliability or trustworthiness of a thing or per-
son. But because it stands for all kinds of trustworthiness and certitude, it is also re-
lated to religious faith. The fiduciary aspect therefore immediately concerns that 
which is self-existent and all-sustaining with respect to everything else; that which is 
unconditionally reliable due to its unconditioned existence.308 In Christian faith, this 
divine status is assigned to the Trinitarian God. And the Church, with its fiduciary 
leading function, is supposed to inculcate the central beliefs or practices of Christian 
faith.309  
Figure 2 
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On the one hand, as Figure 1 shows, the fiduciary sphere is one among others. 
Looked at from this perspective, activities related to Church life are activities like 
any others. The believer, who goes to Church, is present at a particular site where he 
spends a certain amount of time; and he cannot be at another place at the same time – 
but he could have gone to another place, and he could have spent some time there. 
Similarly, the priest/minister takes up a certain occupation after the completion of a 
certain training, And this occupation makes it impossible for him to pursue another, 
alternative career. In this sense, theology1 and theology2 are activities among other, 
non-theological ones. However, according to the principle of aspectual inseparabil-
ity, even activities that fall into the fiduciary sphere could not be carried out without 
the other aspects. This is expressed in Figure 2 and leads back to Clouser’s distinc-
tion between the foundational and the leading function.  
On the other hand, the fiduciary sphere, which is the leading function of the 
Church, is not just one among others, but the most important one. For this reason it is 
at the top of Figure 2. It is that sphere which is supposed to determine how Christians 
understand all aspects of human life from biology up to ethics (although it is at the 
same time dependent on the lower spheres, according to the principles of inseparabil-
ity and irreducibility). In this sense, theology1, theology2 (and theology3a) belong to 
the fiduciary sphere and are the conditions of possibility for theology3b. Without the-
ology1 and theology2 the Christian tradition would cease to exist, i.e. it would be im-
possible to develop a specifically Christian understanding of ethics, justice or aes-
thetics, etc.310 Without theology1 and theology2 there could be no theology3a, and 
hence no theology3b either. As indicated above, the relationship between theology3a 
and theology3b is as follows: they do not constitute two different realms of activities 
but theology3a is that aspect of theology3b which makes the latter specifically Chris-
tian. For this reason it belongs to the fiduciary sphere. With respect to Clouser’s ter-
minology, one could say that the spheres correspond to activities which fall into the 
category of theology3b (even if the fiduciary sphere comprises theology1 and theol-
ogy2). But although theology3b is dependent on theology1 and theology2, one cannot 
infer from this that a person who acquired competence in theology1 and theology2 
automatically possesses competence in a discipline belonging to theology3b.   
 
309 According to Neocalvinism, the fiduciary sphere comprises not just the Church but also other reli-
gious institutions such as the mosque or synagogue. However, this aspect of the theory is of no impor-
tance for the present considerations. 
310 The same cannot be said of theology3b. In totalitarian and anti-Chritian states, for instance, the 
believers may neither have the financial nor the intellectual resources to embark on a comprehensive 
(re-)interpretation of the world (theology3b). But even if the orientational function of Christian faith is 
severly limited at times (quantitatively as well as qualitatively) this does not mean that the Christian 
tradition has come to an end. 
 
 
165
                                                
Part III: Divine speech: the ‘non-literal’ 
understanding 
As repeatedly emphasised throughout part II, divine speech in Barth need not neces-
sarily be understood in terms of a ‘concrete act of interpretation’ that terminates the 
chain of signifiers leading to the performance of an action. There are many passages 
in the Prolegomena which point in a different direction. For instance, Barth writes 
that human beings can and must be determined through the Word of God in their 
existence, i.e. in the “totality of their self-determination” (KD I/1, 224, emphasis 
mine), and that our lives are supposed to participate in the events recorded in the 
Gospel narrative (KD I/2, 794). This approach was further developed in KD IV in the 
direction of a narrative theology (which served as the starting point for the Yale 
school). Here divine speech is neither (directly) related to the interpretation of a par-
ticular x as y, nor to the interpretation of a field of xs. On the one hand the above 
considerations lead to anthropological questions as regards the narrative identity or 
self of the human interpreter, on the other to that element which all acts of interpreta-
tion of a person with a particular world-view have in common.1  
 In line with this ‘non-literal’ interpretation of divine speech, it has been pointed 
out by theologians working in the wake of Barth that the experience of faith should 
not be conceived of by analogy with an act of perception.2 Rather, as these thinkers 
argue, divine speech is to be viewed as the paradigmatic experience of Christian faith 
in which a human being experiences Jesus of Nazareth as God’s address and there-
fore as Jesus Christ. This address has a paradigmatic character as it organises the 
total experience of Christians from a particular viewpoint. Accordingly, it is to be 
understood as an “experience with experience”3, rather than a specifically religious 
or Christian experience besides other, non-religious experiences. In other words, 
“God is a discovery which teaches us to see everything with new eyes”.4 As Dalferth 
puts it: “[I]t is one thing to have experiences in the light of the paradigm, quite an-
other to have the paradigmatic experience itself”.5 Applying the terminology used in 
the first part of this essay, one could construe this paradigmatic experience either as a 
transition from one perspective upon the world to another, what the Christian tradi-
tion calls ‘conversion’, or as a shift to a deeper understanding of an already ‘inhab-
ited’ perspective. 
 
1 Nicholas Wolterstorff places the stress on the anthropological aspect of this alternative understand-
ing of divine speech but comes to the conclusion that the meaning of the word ‘speech’ is stretched to 
its very limits: “That which God said in Jesus Christ and is presented to me by Scripture and contem-
porary proclamation – that must be made “to grab me”. God must so act on me that I am “grabbed” by 
the content of what God has already said. I see no reason to call this action “speech””, N. Wolterstorff, 
Divine Discourse, 72f. 
2 I.U. Dalferth, Kombinatorische Theologie, 154f. 
3 E. Jüngel, Gott als Geheimnis der Welt, 225, 40f, 137, 246, 381, 517. 
4 E. Jüngel, Metaphorische Wahrheit, 149. 
5 I.U. Dalferth, Religiöse Rede von Gott, 472. My translation. 
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Accordingly, this second type of communication leads to completely different 
hermeneutical questions than speech which is supposed to bring the concatenation of 
signs to an end. In part II, the issue was how a particular being or phenomenon is 
construed at a particular time, within a particular context, and from a particular per-
spective. This hermeneutical situation was characterised by the formula s (= sender) 
interprets (or sets) x as y to a (= addressee) in the context c. In this third part, it is 
the ‘as-structure’ itself, as it were, that which underlies all acts of interpretation per-
formed from the same viewpoint, which takes centre stage. For this reason, it is nec-
essary to abstract from any concrete x or class of xs and to focus on that which is 
common to all acts of interpretation. More specifically, what is analysed is the ‘her-
meneutical tools’ by means of which the transition from one or several interpretative 
perspective(s) to another perspective is accomplished. On the one hand this kind of 
communication must introduce the addressee to a new perspective and is therefore 
fundamentally innovative; on the other hand it has to mediate between the old and 
the new perspective(s) and thus fulfils a mediatory function.   
Within a theological context, this is clearly – unlike the questions discussed in 
part II – the hermeneutical paradigm of Church proclamation par excellence. What is 
far from self-evident, however, is the belief that speech and address, as conceived of 
by Barth and other Protestant theologians, is the most suitable mode of communica-
tion to fulfil this task of initiation and mediation. In what follows I shall examine 
Eberhard Jüngel’s account of divine speech as an ‘experience with experience’, in 
which Barth’s theology of the Word is combined with elements of Heidegger’s later 
philosophy. In order to get a clearer grasp of Jüngel’s theological intention, I shall 
first address the issue of the ‘experience with experience’ from an ontological point 
of view.  
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1 The ‘experience with experience’: Eberhard 
Jüngel 
A) The ontological basis 
Jüngel points out that from the beginning of metaphysics, actuality was assigned on-
tological priority over possibility.6 For Aristotle, being can only properly be attrib-
uted to that which is actual – but not to the possible. Although he rejects the view 
that only the actual is possible, and maintains that things which are not, are certainly 
possible, he nonetheless holds that the possible does not exist, that it has no being. 
Being and actuality can thus be equated. According to Jüngel, however, even if 
Christian eschatology was often wrongly conceived in terms of a (mere) actualisation 
of (inherent) possibilities, a consistently Christian theology has to do away with the 
Aristotelian primacy of actuality over possibility. Arguing on the basis of the doc-
trine of the justification by faith, Jüngel stresses that in biblical usage, ‘righteous-
ness’ depends on a divine imputation rather than on actuality.7 We do not become 
righteous by acting righteously, i.e. by acquiring a particular habitus (or ›xij), but 
rather first become righteous and are made righteous, and are thus enabled to act in a 
way which corresponds to this righteous state. Put differently, a new way of life is 
based on and preceded by a change of being, which means that the transition from 
homo peccator to homo iustus is thought of in ontological terms. This (re)constitutio 
ex nihilo implies the notion of the totality of the fall, which deprived creation of all 
being so that a divine intervention is required to make human beings exist (again).  
In Jüngel’s view, the distinction between the possible and the impossible is more 
fundamental than the difference between the actual and the ‘not-yet-actual’, since it 
concerns the difference between God and the world. It is God who distinguishes be-
tween the impossible and the possible, but the fallen world constantly identifies the 
impossible with the possible and thus denies the fact that it is created. In the event of 
the Word, God relates to the world by making the impossible to be impossible and 
the possible to be possible. To put this in theological language, the Word of God oc-
curs as a “word of promise and judgment”.8  
Similar to Barth, Jüngel adheres to a theory of total discontinuity between old and 
new creation: The ex nihilo facere is always (theologically) preceded by an in nihi-
lum redigere.9 The divine judgment annihilates the sinner’s actuality but at the same 
constitutes him as a sinner whose hope is exclusively set on God. The way this tran-
sition is thought of leads to a dichotomy between divine action and human passivity. 
This is most evident when Jüngel writes that the justified person does not hope “for 
 
6 I am following E. Jüngel, Die Welt als Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit.. 
7 Cf. E. Jüngel, Das Evangelium von der Rechtfertigung des Gottlosen als Zentrum des christlichen 
Glaubens, ch. 2 and 3. 
8 E. Jüngel, Die Welt als Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit, 223. 
9 Ibid., 224. 
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any particular future worldly actuality, but only for God’s creative Word”.10 He con-
tinues:11  
From a theological point of view, ‘hope’ in a particular future worldly actuality is the exact opposite 
of the kind of hope in God alone which hopes for a future for the world [italics mine]. The future 
actuality of the world is not a matter of hope; it is made. It belongs to the context of worldly action; it 
is a matter of calculation and cannot do with hopes any more than we can work with hope in con-
structing an aeroplane or in pursuing historico-critical inquiry into the past. The future actuality of the 
world is something which can be made … 
By maintaining that the distinction between the possible and the impossible is more 
fundamental and more necessary than the distinction between the actual and the pos-
sible, Jüngel tries to emphasise the radical newness brought about by divine revela-
tion. If the focus is on the distinction between the possible and the actual, no such 
radical newness is conceivable since the actual then merely results from the realisa-
tion of possibilities from a pre-given and immanent range of possibilities. The future 
that ‘can be made’, as Jüngel calls it, on the basis of past and present, does not count 
as a genuinely new, i.e. eschatological possibility. Rather, it merely represents that 
which is not yet realised and actual, and therefore belongs to the realm of (immanent) 
actuality. By contrast, the world’s real, eschatological possibility is “external to its 
actuality”.12  
Now the question arises as to how this external possibility is related to the (inter-
nal) actuality of the world. According to Jüngel, it is the event of the Word, which 
fulfils this mediatory task and renders the possible concrete. The concept of the word 
event is supposed to solve the epistemic problem of how the (externally) possible can 
‘verify’ its possibility in the actuality of the world. For Jüngel, there are two dangers 
which need to be avoided. On the one hand, the external possibility is not supposed 
to be determined by the actuality of the world. Given that the possible is actuality’s 
ultimate concern, verification of the possible in the actual cannot mean conformity 
with the conditions of actuality, for this would merely turn (external) possibility into 
(immanent) actuality. For Jüngel this happens if the coming of the Kingdom of God 
is wrongly interpreted in terms of a “revolutionary postulate or as a sanctioning of 
the present order”.13 This is problematic because the actual is only a conditional and 
not an absolute and ultimate concern of actuality. On the other hand, if any determi-
nation of possibility by actuality is denied, no ‘verification’ is possible at all. Possi-
bility then becomes completely irrelevant to actuality. Furthermore, such a view 
would inevitably lead to a kind of authoritarianism, replacing verification by submis-
sion. Yet, according to Jüngel, the authority of the Word of God avoids authoritarian-
ism “by giving itself […] to be understood”.14  
Jüngel elaborates on this last statement by interpreting the authority of the possi-
ble as the authority of given freedom, an authority which creates a space of freedom 
in actuality. Within this space, time is given to develop trust in that which is possible. 
 
10 Ibid. Italics mine. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 227. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 228. 
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Consequently, the presence of the possible in the actual mediated by speech-events 
cannot assume the form of a command requiring immediate obedience, but must 
rather be seen as a divine plea. For Jüngel, it is the parables told by Jesus, which 
most authentically represent the aforementioned type of discourse. With his emphasis 
on time and freedom, Jüngel seems to have overcome Barth’s actualism that con-
ceives revelation in terms of a series of punctual events. However, a closer look re-
veals that he remains relatively close to his teacher’s theology of the Word. For the 
time granted to the hearer of the word event is basically limited to the time required 
to narrate the parable, and his freedom culminates in, but also ends with the climatic 
point of the parable.15 That is to say, freedom is viewed as the empowerment of the 
hearer to make the right decision; a decision which is no longer possible to postpone, 
or to avoid altogether. When the climax of the parable is reached, the hearer has to 
make a decision ‘within actuality’, and he has to act.  
Since the parable, which Jüngel interprets as a ‘narrative metaphor’, is for him the 
genre par excellence regarding ‘the experience with experience’, it now needs to be 
examined at greater length.  
B) Parables as ‘narrative metaphors’ 
In the fourth part of his book God as the mystery of the world, Jüngel reflects on the 
speakability of God. After a detailed critique of the tradition’s understanding of 
God’s ineffability and incomprehensibility in the Middle Ages (Pseudo-Dionysius 
the Areopagite, John of Damascus)16, he turns to a discussion of the problem of 
analogous talk about God.17 What is rejected is not the notion of analogy as such, 
but only the concept of analogy set out by thinkers such as Kant and Aquinas. The 
details of this critique are of no concern here.  
In § 18, Jüngel develops his own approach to the speakability of God by interpret-
ing the Gospel as analogous talk about God. This leads to what he calls an analogy of 
advent. According to him, the human being Jesus can be considered the divine par-
able par excellence, and enables us to speak authentically of God; a quality which 
human language as such, does not possess. Yet the proclamation of Jesus as the par-
able of God, i.e. as Christ, was preceded and made possible by Jesus’ own proclama-
tion of the parables about the kingdom of God. For this reason Jüngel calls the par-
able the genre which is most representative of Jesus’ proclamation and interprets it as 
an “extended metaphor” – and metaphor as “abbreviated parable”.18 Whereas a par-
able narrates, a metaphor summarises the narrative in one single word. Furthermore, 
both parable and metaphor are addressing speech: “What is expressed in the form of 
metaphor and parable, addresses one (spricht an)”.19  
 
15 E. Jüngel, Gott als Geheimnis der Welt, 401. 
16 Ibid., 316-357. 
17 Ibid., 357ff. 
18 Ibid., 396. 
19 Ibid. 
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a) The relationship with the rhetorical tradition 
Jüngel’s theory of metaphor differs from that of the rhetorical tradition, which tended 
to reduce metaphorical talk to a mere illustration of something that can in principle 
be said literally.20 Consequently, he also rejects the notion of a tertium compara-
tionis that is known right from the beginning and emphasises the genuinely innova-
tive character of this trope.21  
In accordance with his ontological reflections outlined above, Jüngel points out 
that religious language assigns to reality more than it seems to be and relates to the 
actual by going beyond it. Judgements of faith do justice to reality by augmenting its 
being, thus leading to a new conception of reality. According to Christian faith, these 
new possibilities are not inherent in reality but are to be thought of as donum and 
potentia aliena, even if they nonetheless belong to the being of the real.22  
Now the rhetorical tradition viewed metaphorical talk in terms of a deviation from 
ordinary linguistic usage: “A metaphor is the application of a noun which properly 
applies to something else …”.23 The noun which assumes a metaphorical meaning 
signified a different state of affairs in ordinary language usage. It comes to signify a 
new state of affair by transference and hence constitutes a deviation from conven-
tion. Yet, according to Aristotle, metaphor must be considered ‘luxury’ in the sense 
that it has a place in rhetorical speech, but is unsuitable and inappropriate for dialec-
tical speech, which is concerned with truth. Here Jüngel’s interpretation of metaphor 
deviates from that of the rhetorical tradition. Speech which addresses, as it is charac-
teristic of metaphor and parable, is considered proper speech, and not merely a de-
viation from statements that are concerned with the logos and truth. Jüngel under-
lines the fundamentally metaphorical quality of all language, which is not opposed to 
truth but rather allows us to think of truth in terms of event and discovery, and which 
he associates with the transfer of being into language: “Metaphors expand the hori-
zon of understanding by abolishing the fixation upon actuality with that which is 
possible, thus intensifying the Being of beings (das Sein von Seiendem)”.24  
Thus on the one hand, Jüngel’s metaphorology constitutes a break with the rhe-
torical tradition insofar as metaphorical speech is attributed a genuinely innovative 
character, and is no longer reduced to mere illustration of something that can be said 
in a literal way as well. On the other hand, Jüngel follows the rhetorical tradition in-
sofar as (this genuine) innovation is still inextricably bound to orality, the concept of 
event (or language event, as he calls it following other proponents of the Herme-
neutical Theology) and address.  
Jüngel seeks to develop Barth’s conception of God’s self-revelation by drawing 
on Heidegger’s later philosophy. As far as Barth is concerned, the event-character of 
the divine word, which dominates the Prolegomena, seems to a certain extent to re-
appear as the point, punch line or climax of the parable, which Jüngel compares to 
 
20 E. Jüngel, Metaphorische Wahrheit, 107, 112, 132f. 
21 Ibid., 402, cf. E. Jüngel, Paulus und Jesus, 138. 
22 E. Jüngel, Metaphorische Wahrheit, 103. 
23 Aristotle, Poetics, 1457b: „metafor¦ dš ™stin ÑnÒmatoj ¢llotr…ou ™pifor¦…“. 
24 E. Jüngel, Metaphorische Wahrheit, 154. 
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that of a joke which makes us laugh: “Jesus’ parables about the kingdom of God are 
events whose points are supposed to ‘ignite’ in the hearer himself […] And with the 
point the kingdom of God arrives itself at the hearer …”.25 Let me discuss the spe-
cific aesthetics of Jüngel’s understanding of the parable in greater detail.  
b) The aesthetics of metaphor and parable 
The aesthetics of metaphor and parable brings about the arrival of new possibilities 
of meaning. If metaphor and parable are successful, they have a characteristic, grip-
ping effect on the hearer, which is due to the mysterious and ungraspable analogy 
between the unfamiliar and the familiar. Something too alien would not be equally 
appealing to the hearer and hence more difficult to appropriate. It is only the skilful 
combination of the familiar with the unfamiliar, as it is characteristic of metaphor 
and parable that is able to playfully and effortlessly evoke acceptance of the new on 
the part of the hearer: “In metaphorical language, that which is to be learnt is passed 
on to the one who is addressed as it were in a game”.26 And human beings take 
pleasure in quick (tace‹an) and easy (·vd…wj) learning, which leads to an immediate 
increase in knowledge (m£qhsij). More precisely, a metaphor is fitting and gratifying 
if it is neither too obvious, so that no scrutiny at all is required to understand it, nor 
completely incomprehensible. It must either convey information at the very moment 
it is uttered – without being too obvious, i.e. without being absolutely plain to every-
body – or at least be understood soon after it has been stated.27  
This brings us back to Jüngel’s insistence on the ontological primacy of possibil-
ity over actuality. In metaphor and parable, a certain reality is expressed through pos-
sibilities. Interestingly, Jüngel nonetheless points out that theses possibilities lead 
forcefully (zwingend) “to the discovery of a new dimension of reality and to greater 
precision in talk about what is real”.28 But how can a divine plea, which grants time 
and freedom to the human addressee, zwingend precipitate a new understanding of 
reality? At the same time we are told that the speaker as well as the addressees of a 
successful metaphor or relevant parable exercise creative freedom: the speaker by 
freely creating the metaphor, the addressees by letting themselves be addressed (an-
sprechen lassen) and gripped (fesseln lassen) by that which was said by the speaker. 
As far as the speaker, the creator of metaphor is concerned, Aristotle points out that 
the appropriate use of metaphor is something that cannot be learned from someone 
else, because it is a natural talent that one either possesses or not.29  
This last statement raises the questions of whether it is reasonable that Church 
proclamation relies almost exclusively on the proclamation of the Word of God by 
one person, the minister. If the genre of the sermon is closer to poetry than to prose, 
and if artistic talent is rare, can the individual preacher really bear the whole weight 
 
25 E. Jüngel, Gott als Geheimnis der Welt, 401f. 
26 E. Jüngel, Metaphorische Wahrheit, 127f. 
27 Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1410b, 10-25. 
28 “In solcher Rede wird vielmehr eine bestimmte Wirklichkeit durch Möglichkeiten so ausgesagt, 
dass gerade die Möglichkeit zwingend zur Entdeckung einer neuen Dimension der Wirklichkeit und 
zu einer Präzisierung der Rede vom Wirklichen führt“, E. Jüngel, Gott als Geheimnis der Welt, 398. 
29 Aristotle, Poetics, 1459a. 
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of this task? Is it not too risky to make the ‘success’ of proclamation dependent on 
something as contingent as the minister’s artistic gifts? And does not the liturgy con-
stitute a configuration of collectively and historically accumulated ‘metaphors’, 
which relieve the celebrant from this heavy burden?  
Furthermore, it is worth noticing that even if both speaker and addressee share in 
the same creative freedom, Jüngel uses passive language to describe the act of recep-
tion on the part of the addressee. But he insists that there cannot be a contradiction 
between this creative freedom and the aforementioned forcefulness (das Zwingende) 
of language. Quite the reverse: the essence of analogy precisely consists in the unity 
between freedom and forcefulness.30 The reception of (a successful) metaphor is at 
once an act and an experience.31
It goes without saying that this complex combination of forcefulness and freedom, 
act and experience, is a specifically aesthetic thought-category. In the following sec-
tion the focus shall be on the interrelationship between the passive and the active 
aspect.  
c) Passivity and activity in the act of reception 
As mentioned above, Jüngel – unlike Aristotle – closely links the rhetorical and lin-
guistic aspect of metaphor with ontology and the question of truth. The transfer of 
being to language is an event: the event of truth mediated and accomplished by 
metaphorical and parabolic speech. Jüngel’s main influence in this respect is Hei-
degger, to whom his article Metaphorical Truth is dedicated. He explicitly refers to 
two of his writings: Being and Time, and On the Essence of Truth.32 In what follows 
I shall first analyse the type of ‘passivity’ involved in this arrival of Being or truth on 
the part of the addressee. More specifically, what will be investigated is the Heideg-
gerian meaning of the term (¢po)fa…nesqai and the well-known idea of truth as un-
concealment (¢l»qeia). This analysis will revolve around the concept of the middle 
voice, which is an apt hermeneutical tool to pinpoint imbalances between active and 
passive aspects in the act of the reception. In the second place, I shall relate the re-
sults of this examination to Jüngel’s theory of metaphor and parable. 
The middle voice is a linguistic and grammatical notion that refers to a third voice 
beside the active-passive dichotomy and which is significant for a philosophical 
hermeneutics which tries to go beyond the traditional object-subject divide. It is 
therefore related to Peirce’s triadic understanding of the sign, which equally bypasses 
the distinction between object and subject, or realism and idealism. In the middle 
voice, the focus is neither on the subject nor on the object of an action, neither on the 
agent who acts upon the patient, nor on the patient who is acted upon by the agent, 
but on “the subject in his or her relation to the process the verb expresses”.33 On the 
 
30 “Die ursprüngliche sprachliche Einheit von Freiheit und Zwingendem ist aber nichts anderes als das 
Wesen der Analogie”, E. Jüngel, Gott als Geheimnis der Welt, 399. 
31 Cf. P. Ricœur, The Rule of Metaphor, 252. 
32 See E. Jüngel, Metaphorische Wahrheit, 142, fn 100: M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit; Vom Wesen der 
Wahrheit ( = Wegmarken, 177-202). 
33 P. Eberhard, The Middle Voice in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, 2. 
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one hand, the subject is exposed to an event of which he or she is not in control. On 
the other hand, it is nonetheless actively involved in this event. “In the middle voice, 
the focus is on the process that takes place around the subject acting within it and not 
on the extent to which the subject is affected. The locality and not the affectedness of 
the subject is at stake […] He or she is part of a process that encompasses himself or 
herself“.34
According to Scott, Heidegger’s use of the middle voice in Being and Time runs 
counter to the active transcendental character which dominates this work.35 It has a 
rupturing and de-structuring effect on his own philosophical project of a fundamental 
ontology and thus constitutes the starting point for his later philosophy. The middle 
voice can be found, for instance, in his idea of ‘language as event’ and the ‘self-
disclosure or concealment of Dasein’. In order to disrupt the dominance of subject-
oriented language in philosophical discourse about Being, Heidegger uses the middle 
voice with regard to showing/disclosing (fa…nesqai) and concealing (yeÚdesqai). The 
point of the middle voice is that it is a verb form which cannot simply be replaced by 
a noun and pronoun since otherwise its specific meaning is lost. For if one resorts to 
a reflexive structure such as ‘that which shows it-self’, this form no longer denotes 
the occurrence of self-showing and thus distorts what was expressed by the middle 
voice. That is to say, the ‘it’ as well as the ‘self’ obscure the signification of an event 
that is neither active nor passive nor (necessarily) reflexive.  
Scott therefore suggests translating Heidegger’s fa…nesqai as ‘bringing to day-
light’, ‘daylighting’, or ‘brightening’: verbs which are supposed to indicate self-
showing without the agency of a ‘who’ or ‘what’ in the event of self-showing. In 
speech, something comes to light but always has the double meaning of ¢pÒfansij 
and apofa…nesqai. As ¢pÒfansij speaking shows that which is spoken of; as 
apofa…nesqai “speaking shows itself coming to light as its own occurrence …”.36 
Heidegger seeks to hold both aspects together. If ¢pÒfansij is taken in isolation, the 
specific function of the middle voice – the process of self-showing – is lost, and 
speaking is reduced to making present, representing and designating. Yet if both 
functions are taken into account, speaking not only addresses “what is shown but a 
showing itself with the self-showing of what is shown”.37 The speaker fulfils the 
function of a medium and the speaking lets us see that which is talked about.  
In his essay On the Essence of Truth38, Heidegger calls the true, be it a true matter 
or a true proposition, that which accords: the accordant (das Stimmende). This can be 
taken to mean two different things: either truth is the correspondence of the matter to 
knowledge, or the correspondence of knowledge to the matter. But propositional 
truth (Satzwahrheit) is always based on material truth (Sachwahrheit), rather than the 
other way round. However, in both cases truth is conceived of in terms of a conform-
ing to (Sichrichten nach) and hence as correctness (Richtigkeit). Reflecting on the 
 
34 Ibid., 16. Italics mine. 
35 C. Scott, The Middle Voice in Being and Time, 159-173. 
36 Ibid., 162. 
37 Ibid. 
38 M. Heidegger, Wegmarken, 177-202. 
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inner possibility of accordance, Heidegger raises the question of how a statement can 
be in accordance with a thing, given that the two relata are manifestly different in 
their appearance. Evidently, there cannot be a thing-like approximation between the 
former and the latter. Yet the statement must relate to the thing, presenting (vorstel-
len) it in such a way that the presenting statement presents the thing as it is. This can 
be accomplished if the activity of presenting is conceived of in terms of a letting the 
thing stand opposed as object (Entgegenstehenlassen des Dinges als Gegenstand). 
This is only the beginning of a complex exposition of how the presenting of a thing 
is passively affected by that which is opened up (offenbar) and present (anwesend), 
namely Being.  
Heidegger continues by describing the relation of the presenting statement to the 
thing as comportment (Verhalten); an attitude which is characterised by adhering to 
something opened up as such: “Comportment stands open (offenständig) to be-
ings”.39 Accordingly, the correctness of a statement is dependent on the openness of 
comportment (Offenständigkeit des Verhaltens). It is only through the latter that what 
is opened up can become the standard for the presentative correspondence.  
This openness of comportment, which is called the inner condition of the possibil-
ity of correctness, has a ground: freedom. Heidegger thus says that the essence of 
truth is freedom, which he defines – using again passive language – as letting beings 
be the beings they are. But although he insists that this should not be misunderstood 
as a kind of neglect or indifference, but rather as an (active) engagement with beings, 
he quickly returns to passive language so that the nature of this positive receptivity 
remains unclear. A few lines later this engagement with beings is called an engage-
ment with the open region (das Offene) and its openness (Offenheit) into which every 
being comes to stand, and this open region is then famously interpreted in terms of 
the etymological root of ¢l»qeia, as unconcealment (Unverborgenheit). This en-
gagement with the disclosedness of beings is viewed as a “withdrawal in the face of 
beings in order that they might reveal themselves with respect to how and what they 
are …”.40
Now from the perspective of the middle voice, there is an imbalance as regards 
Heidegger’s use of (apo)fa…nesqai and ¢l»qeia. In both cases, the occurrence or 
process tends to occlude and eclipse the subject. In (Scott’s interpretation of) Being 
and Time, the happening of the event is emphasised at the expense of the recipient or 
addressee so “that the subject dwindles”.41 Scott rightly stresses that the idea of a 
middle-voiced event dispenses with the traditional dichotomies between ac-
tive/passive and subject/object. Something just happens and the stress is placed “on 
the bringing and coming to light as such”.42 Yet it is one thing to do away with a 
simple (philosophically no longer plausible) dichotomy between subject and object, 
quite another to jettison the subject and to abolish the subject-object distinction alto-
gether. In Scott’s interpretation of Heidegger, there is no room left for the subject, 
 
39 Ibid., 184. „Das Verhalten ist offenständig zum Seienden“. 
40 Ibid., 188f. Italics mine. 
41 P. Eberhard, The Middle Voice in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, 25. 
42 Ibid., 27. 
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i.e. he fails to involve the subject in the medial event. Even if the stress is placed on 
the occurrence itself, the subject must still be considered as located within this proc-
ess.  
The same holds for Heidegger’s essay On the Essence of Truth. Truth is here 
identified with unconcealment (¢l»qeia) and the subject is passively exposed to this 
self-revelatory process. This leads to a rather problematic understanding of truth, 
much criticised by commentators and later called into question by Heidegger him-
self.43 From the viewpoint of a middle-voiced philosophy of the self, there is an im-
balance since heteronomy is emphasised at the expense of autonomy and passivity 
prevails over activity. By contrast, a more consistently middle-voiced approach 
would underline that the “self as the who of action lives between autonomy and 
heteronomy, active and reactive force, pure activity and pure passivity. The gram-
matical voice of action is the middle voice, neither a sovereign active voice nor a 
subordinated passive voice”.44  
Yet it is easy to find counterexamples in Heidegger’s immensely rich and com-
plex work, which avoid the aforementioned one-sidedness. The beginning of his Let-
ter on Humanism, for instance, is middle-voiced, where he reflects on the nature of 
thinking. In thinking, as he points out, Being comes to language and language is the 
‘house of Being’: “In its home man dwells. Those who think and those who create 
with words are the guardians of this home”.45 On the one hand, the essence of action 
is conceived of in terms of accomplishment, rather than causation of an effect. This 
means that the speaking and thinking subject does not create something ex nihilo, but 
only accomplishes what already is: Being. On the other hand, the subject, as the 
guardian of his home, is nonetheless actively involved in this process and does not 
just passively receive Being. Accordingly, thinking is at the same time engagement 
by Being and engagement for Being (l’engagement par l’Être pour l’Être). Put dif-
ferently, it is engagement of Being (penser, c’est l’engagement de l’ Être), and the 
‘of’ must be interpreted in terms of both subjective and objective genitives. Thus any 
interpretation of language which simplistically distinguishes between ‘subject’ and 
‘object’ is inappropriate and derived from metaphysics.46  
In another famous essay, On the Way to Language (1959), in which Heidegger re-
flects on the relationship between language and Being, he comes to similar conclu-
sions.47 It is basically an exposition of the statement that language is saying by show-
ing and that the latter be understood as a kind of event/propriation.48 On the one 
 
43 See E. Tugendhat, Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Hussel und Heidegger, 259ff; M. Heidegger, Zur Sache 
des Denkens, 76. 
44 C.O. Schrag, The Self after Postmodernity, 61. 
45 M. Heidegger, Wegmarken, 313. 
46 Ibid., 313f; cf. P. Eberhard, The Middle Voice in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, 28. 
47 M. Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache, 229-257. 
48 „Das Wesende der Sprache ist die Sage als die Zeige“, ibid., 242. „Das Regende im Zeigen der Sage 
ist das Eignen“, ibid., 246. Heidegger’s use of the terms eignen, er-eignen and Er-eignis all have the 
double meaning of to happen/event and to propriate/propriation or to own/owness and suggests a 
coming-into-its-own which is lost in any English translation. The verb to propriate is taken from the 
English translation of this essay but does not figure in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. Cf. 
M. Heidegger, Basic Writings, 395f, 422. The translator probably did not want to use the verb to ap-
propriate in order to avoid an anthropological reductionism. 
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hand, showing cannot exclusively and definitively be attributed to human beings, 
even if it is accomplished by our saying, but is always preceded by a thing’s letting 
itself be shown. For this reason, speaking and hearing occur simultaneously, in the 
sense that when we speak we at the same time listen to the language we speak. “Wir 
sprechen nicht nur die Sprache, wir sprechen aus ihr”.49 On the other hand, Heideg-
ger is aware of the danger of hypostasising language to a phantasm and self-
subsistent essence which exists wholly independently of any human discourse. 
Therefore he adds that language “does remain unmistakably bound up with human 
speech”.50 What is implied here is again a middle-voiced approach which transcends 
any subject-object dichotomy.  
Yet other commentators develop Heidegger’s thought in the opposite direction 
and reinforce the asymmetry in his work discussed above, which run counter to a 
middle-voiced interpretation. For Jean-Luc Marion, for instance, a philosophy of the 
self has to start with the claim that interpellates me, summons me and isolates me, 
before I have said ‘I’. The claim makes me say ‘Here I am!’ and thus constitutes a 
me, leaving no room for an ‘I’. This idea of the ‘me’ as the interlocuted is then 
spelled out in terms of four characteristics: convocation, surprise, interlocution and 
facticity, all of which express the utter passivity of the interlocuted and the primor-
diality of the interlocutionary event.51 The details of Marion’s sophisticated approach 
are of no concern here. Yet it is clear that the ideal of passive reception is central to 
his thought. He explicitly points out that “the response literally says nothing other 
and nothing more than that which the call or appeal said in the first place …”.52  
d) Immediacy, Evidence and Innovation  
These short reflections on passive and active reception in Heidegger bring us back to 
Jüngel’s use of Heideggerian thought in his theory of metaphor and parable. As out-
lined above, Jüngel defines the essence of his ‘evangelical analogy’ in terms of a 
unity between freedom (Freiheit) and forcefulness (das Zwingende), which at first 
glance seems to be close to a middle-voiced approach. Yet a closer examination re-
veals that this is not the case and that his theology of the word stresses the passivity 
of the addressee at the expense of his active involvement. Jüngel’s statement that the 
creative freedom of the recipient consists in his ‘letting himself be addressed’ (an-
sprechen lassen) and gripped (fesseln lassen), will serve as the starting point for a 
more detailed analysis and critique.  
The reception of a successful metaphor can be described as an experience of ‘evi-
dence’, in the sense that the uttered sentence is immediately, i.e. without any further 
interpretation understood. The addressee is either instantly affected by the metaphor 
or not at all and no (conscious) interpretative labour is required. This is most evident 
in Jüngel’s example of the joke. Provided the addressee possesses the necessary 
background knowledge, the point of the joke or parable triggers the addressee’s 
 
49 M. Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache, 243. 
50 Ibid., 244. 
51 J.-L. Marion, Étant donné, 369-373. 
52 J.-L. Marion, The Final Appeal of the Subject, 103. 
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laughter almost like a mechanical stimulus. The ‘active’ interpretative involvement 
of the addressee comes only to light if children or people from a different culture are 
present, who lack the necessary background knowledge to feel amused 
As the preceding paragraph suggests, the concepts ‘immediacy’ and ‘evidence’ 
need not be related to the idea of an ‘ideal’ speech-act and a metaphysics of presence 
but can be reinterpreted within the framework of a philosophy of interpretation. As 
set out in the first part of this essay, immediate understanding and an experience of 
evidence occur if the concatenation of signs is brought to an end. Consider the fol-
lowing quotation from Heidegger’s The Way to Language:53  
Event/Propriation (das Ereignis), espied in the showing of the saying, can be represented neither as an 
event nor as a happening; it can only be experienced in the showing of the saying as that which grants. 
There is nothing else to which propriation/event reverts, nothing in terms of which it might even be 
explained. Propriating is not an outcome (result) of something else; but it is the bestowal whose giving 
reaches out in order to grant for the first time something like a ‘There is/It gives’, which being too 
needs if, as presencing, it is to come into its own. 
The termination of the chain of signifiers eludes representation precisely because it is 
a termination. Whereas in part I the emphasis was placed on the relationship between 
the end of the chain of signifiers and the resulting action, here Heidegger’s main in-
terest is ontology. Yet the question remains the same. ‘Propriation/Event’ is not rep-
resentable but ineffable because it designates successful communication, or the suc-
cessful, i.e. unquestioned showing of something as something. This presupposes a 
well-functioning practice of interpretation as well as interpreters which are well-
acquainted with this practice. At a particular point in time, the signifying function of 
a sign becomes evident, i.e. it is directly understood so that no further mediation is 
required. This is not to be confused with the idea of isomorphy, a direct correspon-
dence between a proposition and an extra-linguistic reality. Rather, evidence and 
immediacy occur on the level of the performance of signs. It follows that ‘propria-
tion’ can only be experienced but not explained since it does not denote anything else 
than the occurrence of the end of interpretation. From Heidegger’s ontological per-
spective, these endpoints of conscious interpretation reveal beings as beings, for the 
showing of saying in ‘propriation’ coincides with statements such as ‘there is’ (an 
x,y,z).  
Not only metaphor and humour, but also the performing and visual arts fall into 
the category of ‘immediate perception’. In the arts, something unique is shown, 
which could not equally be said in a non-artistic way, i.e. in conceptual language.54 
This gives the aesthetic experience an ineffable character, for the density of meaning, 
which is characteristic of metaphor/parable and works of art, does not allow for an 
easy translation into another symbol system. Nelson Goodman’s distinction between 
analogical and digital signs and symbol systems tries to grasp this significant differ-
ence. Whereas the former class comprises metaphorical language and other nonver-
 
53 M. Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache, 247. 
54 Cf. G. Abel, Sprache, Zeichen, Interpretation, 169-208. Abel is here operating with Wittgenstein’s 
distinction between saying and showing („Was gezeigt werden kann, kann nicht gesagt werden“, 
Tractatus 4.1212) which cannot be equated with Heidegger’s use of these terms. In a nutshell, in Hei-
degger, saying and showing are two aspects of one and the same event, in Wittgenstein they are di-
rectly opposed to each other – as the above quotation reveals. 
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bal art forms, the latter constitutes the realm of linguistic statements.55 On the basis 
of this distinction it is easy to see that a verbal description of a picture, for instance, 
simply cannot grasp the fullness and density of meanings contained in the work of art 
and therefore inevitably amounts to a kind of reductionism. Similarly, a metaphor is 
experienced as fitting even if it is impossible to fully account for its fittingness.  
Yet the tricky question is how the above outlined (and non-metaphysically con-
ceived) immediacy and evidence is linked up with innovation. It is plausible to em-
phasise the immediate effect of metaphor/parable (or other, non-linguistic works of 
art) as opposed, for instance, to a philosophical text. Yet if one takes the innovative 
aspect of metaphor and parable into account as well, it is questionable whether there 
is nothing else to say about its reception than that the addressee must let himself be 
addressed and gripped. In other words, the immediacy which is characteristic of the 
aesthetic experience should not be confused with passivity. But does not Jüngel’s 
characterisation of the aesthetic experience as the unity between forcefulness and 
freedom precisely avoid this mistake? What is obviously lacking in his theology of 
the Word is a hermeneutical reflection on how the experience of a successful ‘narra-
tive metaphor’ really brings about transformation, how it can change the codes of an 
existing culture, how it really introduces into a new perspective upon the world, 
namely a Christian understanding of reality. To be sure, the Sitz im Leben of the 
word or language event in God as the mystery of the world is the proclamation of the 
Gospel, and the Church service itself is not the place in which Christian cultural work 
is carried out. Rather, the latter would lead back to the questions discussed in part II. 
However, it is the place which is supposed to initiate into Christian cultural work on 
the most general level, in the sense that that which is ‘hermeneutically’ common to 
all Christian acts of interpretation must be appropriated and internalised. What is 
needed is a conception of faith which, right from the beginning, entails a creative 
human response to the divine address. To put this differently, the ideal of passive 
reception is only left behind if the newly acquired or deepened faith leads to, or 
rather is, a new way of life and a new way of interpreting the world.     
  It follows from this that even if the focus is exclusively on Church proclamation 
– and not on the cultural work to which it is supposed to give rise – the active recep-
tion of the divine Word must be paid greater attention to. This is not at all to deny the 
usefulness of the distinction between ‘showing’ and ‘saying’ (in Wittgenstein’s 
sense), nor to reject the idea that the experience of metaphor/parable and non-verbal 
art forms fall into the former, rather than the latter category. Hence the following 
considerations should be read as an elaboration of the above account of metaphor and 
aesthetics. First, I shall elucidate the concept of active reception in connection with 
the idea of the ‘open work’. This will, secondly, lead to a reflection on the unlimited 
fullness or inexhaustive depth of meaning in a work of art, to which only an explic-
itly diachronic interpretative practice can do justice. Thirdly, I shall try to show that 
this continual interpretative effort must change the interpreter in the sense that he 
 
55 N. Goodman, Languages of Art, 159-164, 170ff. 
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acquires a new interpretative habitus. These three points will be elaborated on in 
chapter two. 
Active reception  
In a chapter called the Poetics of the Open Work, Eco considers the active participa-
tion of the performer/addressee in the act of interpreting works of art and the ‘open-
ness’ of the work of art itself. The time between the Baroque era and modern Sym-
bolist poetics reveals an ever-increasing sensibility for the fact that a work of art is 
susceptible to various interpretations. Eco’s analysis is based on specific modern 
artists such as Karlheinz Stockhausen, Stéphane Mallarmé or James Joyce, whose 
artistic styles deviate considerably from ‘classical’ art in the sense that more room is 
given to indetermination and openness. Their artistic products remained literally 
speaking ‘unfinished’. Yet the following reflections do not address questions related 
to a particular period in the history of art but are rather concerned with the interpreta-
tion of works of art in general. In other words, what Eco calls the ‘open work’, is 
taken to be an extreme case of all artistic production. 
Mallarmé says that “nommer un objet c’est supprimer les trois quarts de la juis-
sance du poème, qui est fait du bonheur de devenir peu à peu …”.56 Consequently, 
during the receptive process, the interpreter has to refrain from imposing upon the 
work a single sense, for this would problematically reduce the infinite suggestive 
possibilities represented by the work of art. Referring to an ‘open’ musical composi-
tion Eco makes the following remarks:57
 Every performance explains but does not exhaust it [i.e. the work of art]. Every performance makes 
the work an actuality, but is itself only complementary to all possible other performances of the work. 
In short, we can say that every performance offers us a complete and satisfying version of the work, 
but at the same time makes it incomplete for us, because it cannot simultaneously give all the other 
artistic solutions which the work may admit. 
Yet Eco does not embrace the radical view that the pre-understanding completely 
swallows up the work of art, as Stanley Fish seems to suggest. According to the Ital-
ian semiotician, even an ‘open’ work of art always constitutes a network of interpre-
tative constraints which limit the possible interpretative moves of the performer or 
interpreter. On the one hand, there is room for a wide variety of different creative 
interventions on the part of the interpreter, on the other hand this invitation to com-
plete the ‘open work’ does not allow for arbitrariness and amorphous participation. 
The appropriateness of the interpretation can be inter-subjectively controlled, but 
– given that what is at stake here is a genre of ‘text’ which introduces into a particu-
lar interpretative perspective on the world – the process of assessing an interpretation 
is of utmost complexity. For the term ‘appropriate interpretation’ here comes to mean 
appropriate way of life. These considerations lead to anthropological issues such as 
how the appropriated work of art shapes the interpreter and his behaviour in the 
world. I shall address some of these questions below. First, however, it needs to be 
defined what genre of ‘text’ it is that possesses the hermeneutical potential to intro-
 
56 Quoted in U. Eco, Das offene Kunstwerk, 37. 
57 Ibid., 49. 
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duce into a particular perspective on the world. Following Eco, I shall give a brief 
outline of his conception of the aesthetic text.58
Creative ambiguity 
The aesthetic text is ambiguous since it violates the rules of the code. But not all de-
viations from the norm, be they phonetic, lexical, syntactical, semantic or stylistic, 
produce an aesthetic effect. For instance, the Latin expression /Paulum Petrus amat/ 
carries a connotation of ‘excessive elegance’, whereas the phrase /Amat Paulum 
Petrus/ simply sounds odd. Now in the former case, the addressee will not in the first 
place be interested in the fact that a man with the name Petrus loves another man 
called Paulus. Rather, he will pay attention to the aesthetic surplus the expression 
may entail. Semiotically speaking, such nuances can be explained in terms of stylis-
tic sub-codes, which are cases of over-coding. The ambiguity of an aesthetic text is 
crucial to the aesthetic experience. It is never just an arbitrary deviation from the 
norm causing pure disorder, but rather focuses the attention of the addressee, moti-
vates him to make an extraordinary interpretative effort and suggests ways of decod-
ing the text.  
The significance of the continuum 
In the aesthetic sign-vehicle, matter plays a crucial role and becomes semiotically 
relevant to the sign-function. For instance, in everyday language, the alteration of the 
pronunciation, stress or intonation of a word is normally of no significance whatso-
ever. What matters is only whether the absolute phonological identity of a phoneme 
can be recognised or not, i.e. there are no degrees of similarity, as with phonetic 
identity. By contrast, in aesthetic discourse, every variation in stress, intonation, etc., 
can be of utmost importance. In other words, even those features which pertain to the 
continuum (matter, stuff) and which need not normally be taken into consideration 
for a semiotic approach here become semiotically meaningful. “In the aesthetic text, 
the matter of the sign-vehicle becomes an aspect of the expression-form”.59  
Eco gives another, non-linguistic example. In order to recognise a cross as a 
cross, it is enough to cross two sticks of any material, size and colour. In order to 
create a cross for the royal treasury of a medieval king however, only a select range 
of materials such as gold and precious stones was considered suitable. And not just 
the material mattered, also size, weight, transparency and so on formed part of the 
aesthetic value of the object. On the one hand, gold and jewels played such an impor-
tant role since they could be manipulated according to the design of the craftsman. 
On the other hand, these materials were themselves carriers of cultural signification 
and could hence not be replaced arbitrarily.  
 
 
58 U. Eco, A Theory of Semiotic, 261-276. I shall confine myself to those features which are particu-
larly relevant for this essay. 
59 Ibid., 266. 
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Aesthetic over-coding: expression and content     
The aesthetic experience can be semiotically conceived of in terms of an ongoing and 
in principle infinite process of over-coding. That is to say, a pre-established code is 
refined by introducing sub-codes which in turn can be divided into further sub-codes 
ad infinitum. More precisely, there is “a strong relation between the further segmen-
tation of the token matter of a given sign-vehicle and the further segmentation of the 
expression plane of an entire semiotic system”.60 In other words, since semiotic 
analysis proceeds by segmenting the continuum in ever more subtle ways, it continu-
ally increases our understanding of it.  
A more complex organisation within an expression-continuum also leads to an in-
crease of complexity within the content-continuum. Looking at a piece of art, the 
addressee faces a twofold challenge. On the one hand he presumes that there is a 
surplus of expression in the artistic text that he may not be able to analyse satisfacto-
rily. On the other hand the surplus on the expression plane, though not exhaustively 
grasped, gives him a vague feeling of a surplus of content as well.  
The aesthetic text and code-changing 
The contemplation of a work of art requires an extraordinary interpretative effort of 
the addressee. But at the same time, the hypothetical tension that is build up by ex-
ploring the various possible interpretations, elicits strong and complex feelings such 
as pleasure, enjoyment, excitement, fulfilment, etc. Yet Eco rejects all attempts at 
reducing aesthetic experience to the emotive level and emphasises that art does have 
a cognitive dimension as well; that is, it also produces further knowledge. As soon as 
the addressee commences his interpretative labour, the artistic text forces him to re-
consider the prevailing codes and their possibilities. “Every text threatens the codes 
but at the same time gives them strength; it reveals unsuspected possibilities in them, 
and thus changes the attitude of the user toward them”.61  
While contemplating a work of art, new semiotic possibilities are opened up 
which compel the addressee to rethink the whole linguistic practice bequeathed to 
him, shedding a new light on past, present and possible future utterances. The aes-
thetic experience is an invitation to challenge and re-structure the prevailing organi-
sation of the content that may lead to a modification and renewal of the whole se-
mantic system. “But to change semantic systems means to change the way in which 
culture ‘sees’ the world”.62  
Every interpretation of a work of art is definitive in the sense that it is for the in-
terpreter the work itself and not just an aspect or part of it. Yet at the same time every 
interpretation is provisional insofar as the interpreter must be aware that the pro-
duced interpretation falls short of grasping the fullness of meanings entailed in the 
 
60 Ibid., 268. By ‘token matter’, Eco means the following: a sign-function consists of a correlation 
between an abstract element of the expression system and an abstract element of the content system. 
Hence a code is to be seen as a general type which establishes the rules generating concrete tokens, i.e. 
the signs used in discourse. Now the ‘token matter’ of a sign-vehicle denotes the matter of which a 
concrete sign is made of. 
61 Ibid., 274. 
62 Ibid. 
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work of art. It thus becomes clear that he has to deepen his understanding of the 
work.63 On this view, the individual acts of interpretation should not be seen as a 
series of unconnected punctual events but rather form a directed serialisation which 
lead to an ever deeper understanding of the work. And the anthropological correlate 
of this process of interpretation is the transformation of the interpreter. These ques-
tions will be discussed in the following sub-chapters.  
‘Inexhaustive’ depth of meaning and ‘diachrony’ 
It follows from this that the immediacy which is characteristic of the experience of 
parable and works of art cannot be played off against a prolonged, ‘diachronic’ effort 
to understand them. Quite the reverse: the true lover of art lives with Bach’s fugues, 
Dostoyevsky’s novels and Tarkovsky’s films. To be sure, each time an interpreter 
exposes himself to these works of art, he indeed experiences an immediate affection, 
which few would ascribe, for instance, to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Yet only 
by a continual interpretative effort, real familiarity with a work can be achieved. This 
is not to deny that the concentration and attentiveness required to ‘read’ a work of art 
differs significantly from that of reading a philosophical text. Thus without question-
ing the usefulness of the hermeneutical distinction between ‘showing’ and ‘saying’, 
the diachronic dimension of the interpretative endeavour is to be emphasised.  
This does not exclude the possibility that even a genuinely great work of art, 
which the interpreter pays utmost attention to, after a while fails to stimulate his in-
tellect and imagination. His senses are so accustomed to it that it looses its surpris-
ing, challenging effect and no longer re-organises the interpreter’s interpretative 
schemes by means of which he sees the world. Its form is temporarily exhausted and 
a certain saturation point is reached so that “the enjoyment we now draw out of it 
[i.e. of a piece of music] is merely the memory of the pleasure we once felt while 
listening to it”.64 As Eco suggests, in order to make it reverberate again, it needs to 
be put in quarantine for some time. This gives the interpreter’s sensibility time to 
rejuvenate and allows us to perceive a work again in its original vividness and sur-
prising originality. The life experience gained in the meantime enables him to see 
hitherto ignored aspects of the work, which not necessarily contradict but rather sup-
plement earlier perceptions. This reopens a new refreshing dialogue with the work 
and constitutes the beginning of a personal Wirkungsgeschichte.   
In the next section I shall examine how this diachronic practice of interpretation 
can change the interpreter.  
Interpretative habit(us) 
Jüngel, following the later Heidegger, places the stress on the relationship between 
being and language, but to a certain extent neglects the close connection, analysed 
e.g. by Wittgenstein, Peirce and others, between language/meaning/interpretation and 
action or (interpretative) habit(us). As Ricœur succinctly points out, Heidegger de-
 
63 Cf. L. Pareyson, Estetica, 194ff., quoted in U. Eco, Das offene Kunstwerk, 58. 
64 U. Eco, Das offene Kunstwerk, 82. 
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veloped an “ontology without ethics”.65 However, if this anthropological dimension 
of interpretative processes is taken seriously, the appropriation and internalisation of 
the text, the inculcation of the addressee with a new understanding of God, self and 
world cannot be neglected. This of course raises the question of which type(s) of 
communication are most suitable to fulfil this task. It thus becomes at least question-
able why address or language event, as conceived by Jüngel and other proponents of 
the Hermeneutical Theology, should be considered the mode of discourse par excel-
lence in this respect. If the main aim is the acquisition of a new interpretative habit 
on the part of the addressee, other forms of communication may be preferable. Once 
again, what is at stake here is an interpretative habit(us) that is common to all inter-
preters which inhabit the same perspective on the world – as opposed to differentia-
tion, which was the main concern in the preceding part.  
From the perspective taken in this essay, the idea of (interpretative) habit(us), or 
disposition is central because it constitutes the link between (the internalisation of) 
the basic ‘texts’ of the Christian community and Christian cultural work. At least a 
theology which conceives of faith right from the beginning in terms of ‘enacted char-
ity’ cannot dispense with this thought-category.  
Moreover, it is worth noticing that twentieth century philosophy’s rediscovery of 
the importance or even indispensability of the concept of habit(us) is by no means 
exclusively motivated by ethical or moral interests – as e.g. in the case of Alasdair 
MacIntyre. As we have seen in the first part, Peirce, as a semiotician, was primarily 
interested in the question of meaning, but came to the conclusion that what he called 
the ‘ultimate logical interpretant’ must be viewed as a “habit of conduct” (CP 5.504). 
Likewise, Merleau-Ponty, reflecting on the relationship between the visible and the 
invisible, sees the human body as flesh, “a general thing, midway between the spa-
tio-temporal individual and the idea, a sort of incarnate principle …”.66 In an earlier 
work, he talks about the self-movement of the human body, which he interprets in 
terms of auto-production of schemes which give our life “the form of generality and 
prolongs our personal acts into stable dispositions”.67 Finally, the concept of habitus 
is one of the central tools in the work of the great social scientist Pierre Bourdieu.68
As particularly the last reference reveals, to highlight the importance of habitus 
does not mean to deny the trans-subjective character of faith. It is rather Jüngel’s 
theology of the Word which fails to account for how the power of the Word can 
really transcend the individual believer and penetrate all levels of human society and 
culture. But “without Christian culture […] there is only a nominal, not a mediated 
grace, which must remain uncomprehended and without real effect”.69 To put it 
crudely, the point of the parable is like a spark which lights up for a split second, but 
then goes out again without having kindled a fire or fanned an already burning fire.70 
 
65 P. Ricœur, On Life Stories, 167, 
66 M. Merleau-Ponty, Le visible et l’invisible, 184. 
67 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phénonénologie de la perception, 171. 
68 P. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 72-95. 
69 J. Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 13. 
70 Ironically, Jüngel’s hermeneutics of the parable seems almost to encourage the reaction of “the one 
who hears the word and immediately (eÙqÝj) receives it with joy (met¦ car©j)” (Mat 13:20). Every-
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Even if Jüngel insists that in the point of the parable freedom and forcefulness coin-
cide, the pendulum clearly swings toward a passive reception – even if this passivity 
is less extreme than in Barth’s Prolegomena.  
The above reflections on the middle voice and active reception are inseparably 
linked up with theological questions and lead directly to the discussion about nature 
and grace.   
e) Esse and Venire: nature and grace, activity and passivity 
Activity and Passivity 
According to Jüngel, in the point of the parable, the kingdom of God is closer to the 
hearer than he is to himself. However, Jüngel reinterprets the Augustinian tu autem 
eras interior intimo meo by substituting venire for esse. In his view, a proper under-
standing of the Gospel as analogy excludes the notion of divine presence in terms of 
an always already being-present of the creative ground in being. Rather, it is to be 
conceived as a dynamic event, an arrival of God in the sense of a divine self-
communication.71  
Once more actualistic thought-categories prevail. Why, one wonders, can divine 
presence not assume the form of ‘esse’ and ‘venire’? Put differently, is it not theo-
logically and hermeneutically desirable to conceive of God’s presence in both 
modes? As is most evident in KD § 27, the notion of a total discontinuity between 
old and new creation amounts to the (unintelligible) view that that which mediates 
linguistically between ‘old’ and ‘new’ is strictly speaking only a sign-vehicle with 
two completely different meanings (or two different semantic fields), which remain 
utterly unrelated. This inevitably follows from Barth’s statement that the pre-
understanding (Vorverständnis) of a term is completely irrelevant to grasp its revela-
tory meaning (KD II/1, 260). Jüngel clearly rejects this view on various levels. First, 
as outlined in part II, he embarks on a lengthy discussion of the meaning of the term 
love in its pre-theological usage(s), which he considers a prerequisite in order to un-
derstand the meaning of divine agapē.72 Secondly, he points out that the innovative 
character of metaphor and parable depends on the interplay between the familiar and 
the unfamiliar.73 But does this view not imply God’s presence as esse (pre-
understanding) and as venire (Christological transformation of the pre-
understanding)?  
In an essay explicitly dedicated to this question, Jüngel strongly stresses that there 
is radical discontinuity between the theologically ‘new’ and its relationship with the 
 
body who listens to the parable like a ‘joke’, may well be able to grasp its point – unlike the one who 
hears “the word of the kingdom and does not understand it” (13:19) – but he nonetheless has not un-
derstood properly. For “such a person has no root, but endures only for a while (prÒskairÒj), and when 
trouble or persecution arises on account of the word, that person immediately falls away” (13:21). 
This is the Lord’s commentary on the seeds which fell on rocky ground, “where they did not have 
much soil, and they sprang up quickly, since they had no depth of soil” (13:5). Any hermeneutics of 
parable must pay attention to the act of reception and that which is effected by its reception. 
71 E. Jüngel, Gott als Geheimnis der Welt, 404, fn 26. 
72 Ibid., 430ff. 
73 E. Jüngel, Metaphorische Wahrheit, 130. 
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‘old’. Not only can the ‘new’ not be extrapolated from the old, the old needs to be 
annhihilated to make room for the new.74 The old retains its significance only as 
‘language material’, as analogate, type and parable for the new – as we have seen. It 
is only at the very end of his essay that Jüngel briefly suggests refining his view of 
the old as an antithetical concept to the new, by pointing out that the old is not nec-
essarily hopeless, “for it also belongs to the good order of creation”.75 Yet this line 
of thought is not dominant in Jüngel’s work. It thus comes as no surprise that there 
are further dualistic tendencies in his thought. In an important essay on secularism, 
written in 1972, he operates with an ontological dichotomy, distinguishing between 
the realisation of the eschatological essence of the world in the Church and the world 
extra ecclesiam which is non-essential. The ‘old’ world fades away in the light of the 
‘new’ world, rather than being transformed and completed by it.76 As Stoellger re-
marks: “Vermieden werden muss […] der hier die Eschatologie dominierende Dua-
lismus, der das Alte der Vernichtung überlässt, statt es der Verwandlung zuzufüh-
ren“.77  
These questions are related to the perennial theological debate about the relation-
ship between nature and grace. If nature is emphasised at the expense of grace, there 
is the danger of immanentism, which often manifests itself in an uncritical evangeli-
cal sanctioning – rather than sanctification – of the present culture. The power of the 
Gospel is stripped of its specifically Christian content and no longer challenges and 
transforms a particular order but rather bestows on it (additional) legitimacy and au-
thority, which is often problematically resorted to in case of conflict. This type of 
theology is emphatically rejected by Barth and Jüngel alike. Barth’s liberal Protestant 
predecessors adhered to positions of this kind. If grace is emphasised at the expense 
of nature, the result is a kind of actualism, a dualism between ‘old’ and ‘new’ crea-
tion, which comes close to Gnosticism. One of the characteristic features of this type 
of theology is the idea of passive reception of grace on the part of the human ad-
dressee (as in Barth’s Prolegomena), or at least the relative neglect of the human 
response (as in Jüngel’s work).  
Both of these positions are one-sided and problematic. Christian theology has to 
reject any nature-grace dualism and confess that nature is always already graced but 
also in need of completion and restoration. Consequently, the fundamental theologi-
cal distinction is that between sin and holiness, which by no means coincides with 
that of nature and grace. Ontologically speaking, nature is that which is always al-
ready directed towards its fulfilment by grace and therefore cannot be separated from 
grace in any way. From this ontological perspective, nature is strictly speaking itself 
nothing other than a manifestation of God’s grace so that it is more appropriate to 
distinguish between different modes of divine grace, rather than between nature and 
grace. As a further consequence, it is no longer tenable to associate grace exclusively 
with the ‘new’ (and nature with the ‘old’) – even if these terms are used in an es-
 
74 E. Jüngel, Das Entstehen von Neuem, 140. 
75 Ibid., 149f. 
76 E. Jüngel, Säkularisierung, No 32f. 
77 P. Stoellger, Metapher und Lebenswelt, 441. 
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chatological fashion. I shall elaborate on these remarks below. Pragmatically speak-
ing, the term nature denotes the present state of creation, which comprises both sin 
and holiness, and grace is the divine presence which fulfils (or re-establishes) crea-
tion (as creation) by annihilating the sinful. From this perspective, grace is primarily 
associated with the ‘new’, because it is experienced as that power, which distin-
guishes between sin and holiness and overcomes the former in a transformative proc-
ess that takes time. Thus grace is perceived as the arrival of the new.  
I shall now give an example of how the rejection of a (crude) nature-grace distinc-
tion is related to a middle-voiced approach which goes beyond an active-passive di-
chotomy in the sense that God acts and human beings passively receive.  
Maximus the Confessor, reflecting upon the Aristotelian question of ‘being as be-
ing’, differentiates between three different ontological modes, which can also be con-
strued in terms of three different modes of grace. These three modes are “being” (tÕ 
enai), “well-being” (tÕ eâ enai) and “eternal (well-)being” (tÕ  ¢eˆ (eâ) enai). ‘Being’ 
is given by God to everything that exists and constitutes the essence of every created 
being right from the beginning of its existence. It is the natural principle of a crea-
ture’s movement and encompasses its capacities and faculties independent of their 
directedness. Yet without free will and free choice it cannot possess in fullness the 
activity and operation toward which these capacities and faculties naturally tend.78  
Whereas God is the sole origin of a creature’s ‘being’, ‘well-being’ is conditional 
on the positive qualification of its powers and capacities, i.e. on their orientation to-
wards the good, which is God himself. ‘Being’ corresponds to the natural logos of a 
created being and ‘well-being’ to its mode of existence, and the latter can only be 
realised if the mode of existence conforms to the natural logos. If the powers and 
faculties are used against the natural logos, and if a creature strives for something 
else than its divinely instituted telos, it is in a state of ‘bad-being’ (feà enai). Fur-
thermore, ‘being’ corresponds to the inalienable ‘image of God’ in man, ‘well-being’ 
to the ‘likeness of God’ which must be seen as an actualisation of man’s powers and 
capacities by acquisition of virtues.79    
Finally, like ‘being’, ‘eternal (well-)being’ can only be accomplished by God 
alone, because a finite creature cannot become its own end.80 But even if ‘eternal 
(well-)being’ does not result from human effort, the mode of ‘well-being’ is its pre-
condition. On the one hand, this process of divinisation leads ‘beyond nature’81 in 
the sense that nature does neither posses the capacity or power, nor the energy to 
reach this state. Rather, ‘eternal (well-)being’ or divinisation is only achieved if the 
operations of all the powers of man’s nature are renounced, if he forgoes all natural 
movement in order to abandon himself ecstatically to God’s will and his energies by 
which he is taken charge of. “Face à Dieu qui accomplit activement, par Son énergie, 
sa divinisation, l’homme est donc passif”.82 On the other hand, this ‘passivity’ does 
 
78 Maximus Confessor, Ambiguum 10 (MPG 91, 1116B). 
79 J.-C. Larchet, St Maxime le Confesseur, 148. 
80 Maximus Confessor, Ambiguum 10 (MPG 91, 1116B). 
81 Here nature is used in the ‘pragmatic’ sense. 
82 J.-C. Larchet, St Maxime le Confesseur, 186. Italics mine. 
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not entail an abolishment of human faculties, but rather requires a human being’s 
active consent that these faculties may be used as receptacles and instruments for 
God’s energies. Human energy and operation is not suppressed but radically re-
directed toward God in order to become worthy and receptive to him, who is alone 
capable to bring about divinisation. Freedom is thus by no means denied. Rather, a 
human being’s voluntary renouncement of its natural operations, which pave the way 
for divine operation, “correspond à sa volonté la plus profonde, à son choix, et à ce à 
quoi il tend de tout son être”.83 Accordingly, deification only constitutes a change as 
regards man’s “mode of existence” (trÒpoj Øp£rxewj) but in no way alters his “natu-
ral principle” (lÒgoj fÚsewj), which clearly indicates that nature (here used in the 
strictly theological sense) is right from the beginning, first, always already shot 
through with grace, and secondly, primordially designed to find its completion and 
fulfilment in a perpetual progress and striving toward God.84 Thus what is required is 
a “willing surrender” (™kcèrhsij gnwmik»)85, “a complete handing-over of our self-
determination to God; and this is not its destruction but its perfect fulfilment accord-
ing to the capacity of its nature”.86   
It will now be shown how the differentiation between these three ‘modes of grace’ 
is connected with the middle voice and the question of active/passive reception. The 
following investigation is based on two key terms in Maximus’ thought as regards 
the interrelationship between divine and human action: (divine) activity, energy or 
operation (™nšrgeia), and (human) comportment or habitus (›xij).87 The concepts 
™nšrgeia and ›xij fall into the sphere of what Greek philosophy called metaxÚ, the 
realm ‘between’ God and creation. In order to analyse the encounter between God 
and man, which leads to deification, both ™nšrgeia and ›xij need to be taken into ac-
count. On the level of the second ‘ontological mode’, ›xij constitutes the realisation 
of a specific human possibility according to his nature, which qualifies his ‘being’ as 
‘well-being’ and which is manifest in virtuous living. On this plane, ›xij is closely 
connected with the exercise and formation of the human “faculty of judging” 
(gnèmh) and therefore related to ascetic struggle and praxis (pr©xij).88  
On the level of ‘eternal (well-)being’ and divinisation, divine ™nšrgeia actualises 
the union with God toward which ‘being as being’ naturally tends, and ›xij consti-
tutes the human condition of this process.89
 
83 Ibid., 187. 
84 This is not to say that Maximus does not know the term “super-natural” (Øpr fÚsin), which he uses 
occasionally, cf. Ad Thalassium 60 (MPG 90, 621C-D). Nonetheless, on an ontological level, there 
cannot be a difference between nature and grace or philosophy and theology according to the Confes-
sor. Cf. H.-U. von Balthasar, Kosmische Liturgie, 121. 
85 Maximus Confessor, Ambiguum 7 (MPG 91, 1076B). 
86 P. Sherwood, St. Maximus the Confessor, 59. 
87 See the excellent study which revolves around these two terms: P. Renczes, Agir de Dieu et liberté 
de l’homme. 
88 Ibid., 271-292. The translation of gnèmh as “faculty of judging” is taken from Renczes, ibid., 282. 
89 Maximus Confessor, Ad Thalassium 6 (MPG 90, 281A-B). On the basis of the above exposition of 
the relationship between “natural principle” (lÒgoj fÚsewj) and “mode of existence” (trÒpoj 
Øp£rxewj), it is clear that divinisation does not mean de-humanisation. Rather, as Grillmeier puts it: 
“Je mehr der Mensch Gott geeint wird, desto mehr wird er selber Mensch“, A. Grillmeier, Die Wir-
kung des Heilshandelns Gottes in Christus, 382. 
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With those undergoing the birth, the Holy Spirit takes the whole of their free choice and translates it 
completely from earth to heaven, and through the true knowledge acquired by divine energy (kat' 
™nšrgeian), transfigures the mind with the blessed light-rays of our God and Father, such that the mind 
is deemed another god, insofar as in its habitude (kat¦ t¾n ›xin) it experiences, by grace that which 
God himself does not experience but is in his very essence. 
Divinisation is exclusively initiated by the divine ™nšrgeia, which alone can transform 
a human being and is in no way just an actualisation of an inherent human capacity.90 
It is due to God’s free gift of grace based on Incarnation and redemption through 
Christ in the Holy Spirit.91 Yet an analysis of the complex interrelationship between 
™nšrgeia and ›xij shows clearly that there is no simple dichotomy between divine ac-
tion and human passivity; precisely because there is no simple nature-grace distinc-
tion. On the one hand, ›xij must be understood as the capacity to receive the gifts of 
the Holy Spirit, although it is of course itself a gift of grace.92 That is to say, grace is 
needed to receive grace, which again amounts to a distinction between different 
modes of grace.93 On the other hand, ›xij is needed to actively preserve and nurture 
the gifts received by the Spirit.94 But ›xij is neither just the capacity bestowed upon 
the believer by God to receive spiritual gifts, nor simply that which enables him to 
preserve these gifts, but itself something that must be ‘energised’ and ‘actualised’ in 
order to perform certain divinely instituted acts.95 It follows from this that the pre-
condition for the reception of the gift is a certain preparedness and attunement, and 
that the gift is only properly received if it is itself ‘enacted’ by the recipient, i.e. if it 
is used to advance the union with God.  
Maximus’ conception of the relationship between divine action and human re-
sponse is much closer to Eberhard’s reflections on the middle voice and Christian 
theology than Jüngel’s still too actualistic ‘theology of the advent’. What Eberhard 
says about Gadamer’s theological thinking, which flies in the face of his extraordi-
nary and ground-breaking insights in philosophical hermeneutics, equally applies to 
Jüngel – in spite of the latter’s attempt to keep a balance between ‘freedom’ and 
‘forcefulness’. Eberhard writes: “The way Gadamer describes Christian faith, par-
ticularly in its Protestant form, answers the conundrum of the division of labor be-
tween God and humans by making God active and putting humans at the passive, 
receiving end”.96 On the other hand, a middle-voiced approach which overcomes the 
subject/object and active/passive mode of thinking does by no means lead to an un-
derstanding of faith which excludes the subject. “The middle voice does not outright 
cancel the distinction between the giving and the receiving end as far as faith is con-
 
90 It is therefore not to be confused with an Aristotelian ™ntelšceia, P. Renczes, Agir de Dieu et liberté 
de l’homme, 150-154, 322f. 
91 Ibid., 329-349. 
92 Maximus Confessor, Ad Thalassium 59 (MPG 90, 605B). 
93 However, the starting point of this process is not the ‘natural grace’ which remained after the fall. 
That which enables human beings to respond, is the new birth received in the sacrament of baptism. 
Yet the baptismal grace entails two dimensions. First, the grace of adoption is bestowed upon the 
believer, which is fully present in potency. Secondly, baptism commences the actualisation of that 
grace which must grow and develop through the believer’s active co-operation with divine grace, Ad 
Thalassium 6 (MPG 90, 280C-281B). 
94 Ibid., 63 (MPG 90, 676A-C). 
95 Ibid., 29 (MPG 90, 365A-B). 
96 P. Eberhard, The Middle Voice in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, 204. 
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cerned, but it shifts the attention from faith as an object to faith as a process”.97 In 
other words, “[f]aith, like art and marriage […] are things we engage in and that en-
gage our whole being”.98  
Every experience of grace and its subsequent ‘enacting’ response, though genu-
inely new and entirely without human capability, is nothing other than the actualisa-
tion and realisation of man’s logos. Maximus talks about the return (™p£nodoj) of the 
believers “to the principle according to the end” (prÕj t¾n ¢rc¾n kat¦ tÕ tšloj), and 
this return is at the same time the fulfilment (pl»rws…j) of their desire.99 However, a 
circular or anti-finalist reading of this passage would be inappropriate, for the end of 
man (tšloj) and his principle (¢rc¾) only coincide with regard to “the ultimate divine 
goal of creation”.100 In order to understand this, it is helpful to keep in mind that in 
Maximus, the pre-lapsarian state is considered a potency rather than a actuality, since 
the fall is thought of as practically instantaneous with creation (¤ma tù genšsqai).101 
It follows from this that the ¢rc¾ kat¦ tÕ tšloj is the principle according to which 
Adam was supposed to live, but failed to adhere to. Yet life in accordance with his 
principle would have been a dynamical movement towards God, from which he de-
viated, rather than a ‘state’ in the literal, ‘static’ sense. Thus in ‘equating’ the end 
with the principle, Maximus only says that deification, i.e. the realisation of man’s 
ultimate end, is nothing other than the accomplishment of God’s original plan for 
man. And not only the principle, also the goal is not simply a ‘state’, but rather, as 
Maximus puts it paradoxically, an “ever-moving repose” (¢eik…nhtoj st£sij).102 The 
return to the principle is thus the return to an infinite progress in the love and knowl-
edge of God and creation, from which Adam deviated. And it is this infinite progress 
which at the same time constitutes the ultimate goal of man. 
This emphasis on a free, active and therefore also ‘creative’ response to the ex-
perience of divine grace leads back to the above reflections on the open work. As 
John Milbank reminds us, there is indeed an “analogy between grace and art”.103 It 
is worth noticing in this respect that the pre-Christian use of the word grace (c£rij) in 
Greek antiquity comprises the meaning of a grace, kindness or goodwill done by an 
agent or doer, as well as the sense of favour, thankfulness and gratitude expressed by 
the receiver.104 The notion of grace as art, or grace as beauty, highlights the fact that 
the beautiful and concomitantly grace can only be known in and through an appro-
priate response. It is thus able to cross the boundaries between nature and grace, the 
natural and the supernatural, and the immanent and the transcendent.105  
 
97 Ibid., 206. Italics mine. 
98 Ibid., 212. 
99 Maximus Confessor, Ad Thalassium 59 (MPG 90, 608D); see P. Renczes, Agir de Dieu et liberté de 
l’homme, 150-154. 
100 P. Renczes, Agir de Dieu et liberté de l’homme, 152. 
101 Maximus Confessor, Ambiguum 42 (MPG 91, 1321B). 
102 Ibid., 67 (MPG 91, 1401A). 
103 J. Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 53. 
104 H. Liddell/R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, 1978f. 
105 D. Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite, 20. Hart draws on H.-U. von Balthasar’s The Glory of the Lord, 
Vol. I, 34. 
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Constitution 
From a theological perspective, it is clear that a middle-voiced approach is incon-
ceivable without the idea of an always already ‘graced nature’. But this is not to deny 
that nature is in need of redemption. As we have seen in Maximus, God’s interven-
tion always precedes any human action; a fact which is grounded in the extra nos 
character of the Christ event. It would be wrong to believe that Maximus pays more 
attention to the anthropological appropriation of grace than to its Christological ba-
sis. In fact his theology is consistently Christocentric. Jean-Claude Larchet, in his 
major study of deification in Maximus, dedicates three chapters to the Christological 
foundation of theosis: (i) Salvation as precondition of deification. (ii) The mode of 
divinisation of the human nature of Christ. (iii) The relationship between divinisation 
of the human nature of Christ and the divinisation of human beings.106  
The appropriation of the benefits of the Christ event in baptism implants in the be-
liever the fully potential grace of adoption and at the same time begins its actualisa-
tion.107 It is worth noticing that Maximus, unusual for a Church father of the Eastern 
tradition, strongly emphasise the severity of the fall and its consequences. For this 
reason it has been suggested that there is some Augustinian influence. However, this 
claim cannot be substantiated and a detailed analysis reveals that Maximus’ view of 
the fall differs significantly from that of Augustine.108 Nonetheless, Maximus 
stresses that according to the law which came to rule life after Adam’s transgression, 
nothing is exempt from sin (¢nam£rthtoj), and he even goes so far as to use the ex-
pression generic sin (genik» ¡mart…a).109  
Yet, as Larchet points out, despite this, “Maxime ne considère pas que la volonté 
de l’homme déchu soit totalement mauvaise et impuissante”.110 Although the totality 
of man is affected by the consequences of the fall, postlapsarian man is in a state of 
weakness rather than total corruption. What ultimately matters is the question of 
whether there is – at least after the reception of baptismal grace – a point of departure 
for a theologically meaningful human response. Such a position is still compatible 
with a hamartiology that emphasises the severity of the fall. Negatively speaking, 
even if such a point of departure exists, the distance between believer and God can 
still be infinite – infinite with respect to human sinfulness and the Christologically 
mediated divine holiness (and not with respect to a dichotomy between time/space 
and eternity). Positively speaking, this infinite distance between believer and God 
allows for an infinite progress in the love and knowledge of God.111  
Now according to Barth and Jüngel, the divine constitution of the believer as a 
person is the precondition for any human response to God’s call. And it is character-
 
106 J.-C. Larchet, La divinisation de l’homme selon saint Maxime le Confesseur, 221-382. 
107 Maximus Confessor, Ad Thalassium 6 (MPG 90, 280C-281B). 
108 J.-Larchet, Maxime le Confesseur, médiateur entre l’Orient et l’Occident, 120-124. 
109 Maximus Confessor, Ad Thalassium 21 (MPG 90, 312B-313B). 
110 J.-Larchet, Maxime le Confesseur, médiateur entre l’Orient et l’Occident, 122. 
111 P. Blowers, Maximus the Confessor, Gregory of Nyssa, and the concept of “perpetual progress”, 
159ff. 
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istic of reformational theology in general to emphasise this aspect.112 Yet the issue of 
constitution is by no means neglected in pre-reformational thought. As mentioned 
above, Maximus distinguishes between three modes of being: “being” (tÕ enai), 
“well-being” (tÕ eâ enai) and “eternal (well-)being” (tÕ ¢eˆ (eâ) enai), which corre-
spond to three different ‘births’. First, there is bodily birth, i.e. our coming-into-being 
(gšnesij), where we are bestowed upon “being”. Second, there is our baptismal birth 
which confers upon up us the grace of “well-being”. Third, there is the ultimate birth 
of resurrection, through which we attain the grace of “eternal (well-)being”113 It is 
the second birth that fulfils the function which Barth and Jüngel call the constitution 
of the believer as a person, establishing the condition of possibility for an active re-
sponse. Baptism, the incorporation of a believer into the body of Christ is, like 
Christ’s death and resurrection, a once-and-for-all event. Yet it seems that in Barth 
and Jüngel, the issue of constitution has become the all-dominating concern. On the 
one hand, it is no longer seen as an event that takes place only once but is in principle 
infinitely prolonged. On the other hand, divine speech, coupled with the idea of pas-
sive reception, comes to a certain extent to replace the sacrament of baptism. At least 
as far as Barth is concerned, the result is a continual re-constitution of the believer. 
This leads to an impoverishment of the Church life since all aspects of Christian faith 
related to human response are pushed aside.  
Barth distinguishes between baptism in water and baptism in the Holy Spirit, and 
the latter undoubtedly leads back to divine speech in the sense that the constitution of 
the believer as a person coincides with his being addressed by God.114 Baptism in 
the Holy Spirit is a work of God, and exclusively a work of God. It is that aspect of 
the divine economy in which the benefits accomplished by Christ, illic et tunc, are 
applied to to the hic et nunc of the individual believer (KD IV/4, 29f). Baptism in the 
Holy Spirit is more than reference (Hinweis) or indication (Anzeige) by means of 
image and symbol. What cannot be said about human decision and response and bap-
tism with water, does fully pertain to baptism with the Holy Spirit: it is an effective, 
causative and creative divine action on and in man, which purifies, renews and 
changes him truly and totally. It is, in the most literal sense, a sacramental act that 
takes place, and its effects must be understood realistically and not just significantly 
and figuratively (KD IV/4, 37f).  
Although baptism with the Spirit is conceived as a once-and-for-all event, which 
bestows on the believer the fullness of grace – to which he can look back gratefully 
for the rest of his life – it is difficult to see how the baptismal event could be marked 
off from other, following experiences of divine address (KD IV/4, 38). That baptism 
with the Holy Spirit is mediated by divine speech can hardly be contested given the 
central role this mode of divine presence plays in Barth’s thought throughout the 
whole Church Dogmatics. And since, according to Barth, every act of divine revela-
 
112 KD II/1, 22; KD IV/1, 837; E. Jüngel, Der menschliche Mensch, 194-213; I.U. Dalferth/E. Jüngel, 
Person und Gottebenbildlichkeit, 70-86, esp. 75f, 85. See also I.U. Dalferth, Glaube: systematisch-
theologisch, 200f; Über Einheit und Vielfalt des christlichen Glaubens, 124f, 126f, 129-131. 
113 Maximus Confessor, Ambiguum 42 (MPG 91, 1316A, 1325B). 
114 See KD IV/4, 3-44, 45-234; P. Rosato, The Spirit as Lord, 114, 123. 
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tion is a full revelation of God’s grace and love, there is in principle only the tempo-
ral factor that may serve as a criterion to distinguish between the reception of bap-
tismal grace and following confirmations of this initiatory sacrament.115 That is to 
say, baptism with the Holy Spirit is simply the first experience of grace. This does by 
no means diminish the importance of the baptismal event, since Barth, in line with 
the reformational tradition, even speaks of the believer’s acquisition of a “new be-
ing” (KD IV/4, 38). It is rather the other way round: it remains unclear as to how the 
process of transformation initiated by baptism (with the Spirit) can be marked off 
theologically and hermeneutically from baptism itself. 
Baptism with water, by contrast, even though it relates to the one divine work in 
Jesus Christ and the one divine Word spoken in him, is not itself a divine work and 
word; “it is the work and word of men who have become obedient to Jesus Christ and 
who put their hope in him” (KD IV/4, 112, italics mine). Baptism with water takes 
place in the light of the baptism of the Spirit and with a view to it, but is not itself the 
baptism of the Spirit; it is an active recognition of and response to the one mystery 
and sacrament – 
the story of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ and the outpouring of the 
Holy Spirit – but is not iself a sacrament and mystery. Baptism with water is “not the 
bearer, means or instrument of grace” (KD IV/4, 102).    
Interestingly, Barth distinguishes between these two types of baptism, the divine 
initiative and the human response, in order to avoid docetism (KD IV/4, 112)! If bap-
tism with the Holy Spirit and baptism with water coincide, he argues, we are faced 
with the following problem. Either the human response to God’s preceding action is 
overshadowed and obscured by an immanent divine action and hence cannot be iden-
tified as distinct element in the divine-human encounter. In this case, water baptism 
is integrated into the baptism with the Spirit and the former is thus rendered super-
fluous. Or baptism with water, i.e. human action, is equated with divine action. In 
this case, baptism with the Spirit is integrated into the baptism with water and thus 
renders the the former superfluous (KD IV/4, 112).     
It is not difficult to see why this distinction is inevitable, given Barth’s theological 
presuppositions. First, since the sacrament of baptism (i.e. baptism with water) can 
only be administered by a human being and hence too evidently entails human ac-
tion, it cannot mediate divine action. Divine and human agency are once again played 
off against each other. It is inconceivable for Barth that divine presence could be 
mediated in and through human action – apart from the incarnate Christ himself. 
Second, the performance of a sacramental act that involves matter and first and 
foremost concerns a human being as a body, runs counter to Barth’s declared ‘intel-
lectualism’ and privileging of phonic signifiers.116 Baptism with the Holy Spirit is 
undoubtedly the effect of a sovereign divine speech-act, which is supposed to solve 
the problem of mediation by keeping human involvement to a ‘minimum’. The 
 
115 „Der Inhalt der Offenbarung ist Gott ganz […] Entweder Gott spricht, oder er spricht nicht. Er 
spricht aber nicht mehr oder weniger, nicht teilweise, nicht in Quanten, hier ein bisschen, dort ein 
bisschen”, K. Barth, Unterricht in der Christlichen Religion, 110f. 
116 KD I/1, 136f. 
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model of divine speech is thought to pave the way for an ‘immediate’ presence of 
God which bypasses the (alleged) opacity of sign-vehicles other than phonic signifi-
ers. Yet it is questionable whether such a division between baptism with water and 
baptism with the Holy Spirit is theologically and hermeneutically desirable as re-
gards the question of the constitution of the believer as a person.    
a) Hermeneutically speaking, baptism, the incorporation into the body of Christ, is 
the introduction into the Christian life-world that consists of a whole network of 
communication. And this introduction into a way of ‘being-in-the-world’, which is 
pretheoretical and precognitive, and which founds all acts of cognition and conscious 
communication, clearly does entail passivity. There is always a blind spot that makes 
it impossible to conceptualise a particular mode of existence as a whole. This ‘being-
in-the-world’ hermeneutically precedes the sending and receiving of individual mes-
sages and is always already implied in all acts of communication. According to this 
model, the constitution of the believer as a person coincides with his entry into the 
Christian community. Accordingly, the practice of infant baptism, provided it is ac-
companied by Christian socialisation, makes clear that God’s grace is indeed a pure 
gift that reaches us long before we are able to consciously grasp it, let alone respond 
to it. Baptism thus precedes (theologically and hermeneutically, though not necessar-
ily temporally) any experiences of evidence – which Barth construes in terms of ‘be-
ing-addressed-by-God’. In actual fact, baptism, understood as the initiatory sacra-
ment which introduces into the Christian life-world, is the condition of possibility of 
such experiences of evidence. That is to say, without minimal familiarity with the 
Christian ‘way of life’ from the internal perspective of the believers, they cannot 
occur.  
Accordingly, there is no need to divide baptism into a passive (baptism with the 
Holy Spirit: divine action) and an active aspect (baptism with water: human re-
sponse). The constitution of the believer is not achieved by means of a divine address 
which is conceived of by analogy with (or on the basis of) a human speech act. 
Rather, it is brought about by his entry into a whole network of communication in 
which the perspectives of senders, addressees and uninvolved bystanders are mutu-
ally intertwined. Grammatically speaking, this network of communication corre-
sponds to the system of personal pronouns (‘I’, ‘you’, ‘he/she’, etc.). The competent 
interlocutor who has mastery of this communicative practice knows how to adopt the 
prespectives of the first, second and third person, etc., and how they can be trans-
formed into each other.117  
To be sure, the introduction into the Christian life-world through baptism is in-
conceivable without human speech. But it is not the speech-acts performed by the 
minister or priest at the administration of the sacrament of baptism, consciously re-
ceived by the one who is baptised, which leads to his constitution as a person. For in 
the case of infant baptism, no such conscious reception takes place at all. Strictly 
speaking, the incorporation into the body of Christ, the introduction into the Chris-
tian life-world, cannot be thought of as a punctual event. One does not enter a (new) 
 
117 J. Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne, 346f. 
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life-world as one enters a room occupying physical space; i.e. one does never inhabit 
it either fully or not at all. Rather, one’s life is always more or less moulded by a 
particular life-world. Furthermore, life-worlds, as Abel’s internal pluralism suggests, 
do not exist in isolation, but are interconnected. Yet despite this, the introduction into 
the Christian life-world can and must be symbolically and ritually represented by the 
initiatory sacrament of baptism which coincides with the constitution of the believer 
as a person.  
The term ‘symbolical’ does not exclude here the notion of real presence. Quite 
the reverse: it is Barth who reduces baptism with water to a human response that 
(merely) witnesses to divine interventions which preceded this response. On the one 
hand baptism with water refers back to baptism with the Holy Spirit, the hic et nunc 
application and actualisation of the benefits accomplished by Christ. On the other 
hand it refers back to the illic et tunc of the Christ-event itself. In the above ap-
proach, however, the sacrament of baptism does introduce into divine real presence, 
for God is present in the life-world which underlies and shapes all acts of communi-
cation performed by Christians. Accordingly, God can be experienced in the acts of 
communication themselves.118    
b) The inhabiting of a life-world is related to the bodiliness of human existence. 
Every event that happens to my body (Leib), happens to me, and is henceforth part of 
my life (story). My body is not only object, i.e. something I have, but also subject, 
something I am; it is something which defines me as a human being. “Nulle expé-
rience de soi ne peut mettre le corps entre parenthèses, et mettre alors entre parenthè-
ses les relations de proximité dans lesquelles le corps nous engage; l’expérience de 
soi est coexpérience du lieu autant qu’elle est coexpérience du temps”.119 When we 
look at the world, for instance, we do not see things which are first self-identical and 
then, secondly, offer themselves to our view; nor are we first empty viewers who 
then open ourselves to the things in the world. Rather, there seems to be something 
like a “pre-established harmony” between the look and the visible things; it is as if “it 
knew them before knowing them …”.120 The same holds for tactile experiences. 
There is a ‘kinship’ between the touching and the touched.  
This affinity is due to the fact that my hand can be felt from within as well as from 
without. When my right hand touches my left hand which is palpating things, for 
instance, the ‘touching subject’ turns into the ‘touched’ object, i.e. it becomes itself 
tangible and thus belongs to the things it touches: it becomes one of them. Similarly, 
he who sees can only possess the visible if he is also possessed by it, if “he is of 
it”.121  
 
118 However, this model needs to be qualified further. In order to avoid any kind of immanentist com-
munitarianism, God must be thought of as the one who keeps the interpretative process going. God is 
at once immanent and transcendent in the sense that his presence is manifest in the transition from the 
interpretation of x as yn to x as yn+1. This is implied in the biblical imagery of Christ as the head of his 
body – the Church: Christ on the one hand is the Church but at the same time remains transcendent to 
it (cf. Eph 4:15f; Col 1:18; 2:10.19). 
119 J.-Y. Lacoste, Expérience et Absolu, 9. 
120 M. Merleau-Ponty, Le visible et l’invisible, 175. 
121 Ibid., 177f. 
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In order to express this double aspect Merleau-Ponty uses the term flesh (la 
chair), which is neither matter, nor mind nor substance, but denotes the body insofar 
as it allows for an equivalence of sensibility and sensible thing: “[T]he body sensed 
and the body sentinent are as the obverse and the reverse, or again, as two segments 
of one sole circular course which goes above from left to right and below from right 
to left, but which is just one sole movement in its two phases”.122 On the one hand, 
since the sensed body is part of the sensible world, everything we say about the for-
mer also pertains to the latter. On the other hand, the body incorporates into itself the 
whole of the sensible. Thus the view according to which the body is in the world and 
the seer in the body as in a box is not tenable. Nor is it possible to hold that the world 
and the body are in the one who sees. Rather, the visible world contains vision and 
the body as a visible thing, but the seeing body at the same time subtends this visible 
body together with everything visible. “There is a reciprocal insertion and intertwin-
ing of one in the other”.123   
Following this decidedly non-dualistic approach, it not only holds that none of my 
experiences can bracket off the body, but also that every experience my body under-
goes involves ‘myself’. Thus the bodily character of the initiatory sacrament of bap-
tism, which constitutes the believer as a person by incorporating him into the body of 
Christ – or hermeneutically speaking, introduces him into the Christian life-world – 
averts any Gnostic tendencies. The same cannot be said of Barth’s and Jüngel’s 
logocentrism. 
f) The question of anthropomorphism 
Finally, Jüngel’s understanding of the Gospel as analogous talk about God is sup-
posed to avoid both a ‘dogmatic anthropomorphism’ as well as a ‘symbolic anthro-
pomorphism’.124 A dogmatic anthropomorphism destroys the difference between 
God and man by speaking of God as if he were a human being raised to his highest 
form (in seine Höchstform gesteigert), which makes it impossible to distinguish be-
tween God and human beings concretely. But because dogmatic anthropomorphism 
thinks of God like a man rather than as God, it inevitably provokes the attempt at 
protecting the deity of God. Yet such a counter-reaction equally fails to do justice to 
the Christian idea of God since it replaces ‘dogmatic anthropomorphism’ by a no less 
dogmatic critique of anthropomorphism, which amounts to what Jüngel calls sym-
bolic anthropomorphism. In the latter case, God is dehumanised in such a way that 
he becomes altogether unspeakable. Here too, God and human beings cannot be dis-
tinguished concretely. But whereas a dogmatic anthropomorphism immanentises 
God, a dogmatic critique of anthropomorphism introduces an excessive hermeneuti-
cal distance between God and human beings so that human striving for God con-
comitantly leads to an alienation from humanity.125 It is only the idea of the parable 
 
122 Ibid., 182. 
123 Ibid. Emphasis mine. 
124 E. Jüngel, Gott als Geheimnis der Welt, 405ff. 
125 In a footnote Jüngel suggests that the so-called ‘God-is-dead-theology’ may be considered the 
ultimate consequence of ‘dogmatic anthropomorphism’, ibid., 406, fn 27. 
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as analogous talk about God which avoids both these shortcomings, thus safeguard-
ing the concrete difference between human beings and God.  
According to Jüngel, Christian faith bypasses the aporias of both dogmatic and 
symbolic anthropomorphism by conceiving God as the one who came into the world 
in Jesus Christ and does not cease to come into the world. In order to elucidate this 
theological point, Jüngel resorts to the metaphorology outline above, in which he 
emphasises the event- and address-character of metaphorical speech. God’s coming 
into the world, his identity with the human being Jesus, does not reduce God to a part 
of creation, because this coming into the world and this identity with the human be-
ing Jesus is to be conceived of as an event (Ereignis).126 All our words, including the 
word ‘God’ (in the case of idolatry), first and foremost refer to and are predicated of 
worldly beings. It follows from this that no human speech of God as such will appro-
priately designate the difference between world and God, for this difference can only 
be preserved if we speak of God metaphorically. Yet metaphorical speech of God 
differs from ‘ordinary’ metaphorical speech insofar as the ‘strange word’ is trans-
ferred to a ‘strange state of affairs’, which does not lie on the same immanent level, 
but “whose strangeness is total”.127 And the only reason why this divine alterity does 
not lead to a complete inability to speak of God at all is due to the fact that God’s 
coming to the world is at the same time a coming to (metaphorical) speech. In meta-
phorical language “God lets himself be discovered as the one who comes”.128 Yet the 
discovery of God is not to be understood as the discovery of a worldly being among 
other beings. Rather, “God is a discovery which teaches us to see everything with 
new eyes”.129  
Yet according to Jüngel, it does not suffice to simply underline the metaphorical 
and address-character of the divine Word. In order to avoid misuse of the name of 
God we need material criteria as well. Thus the ultimate norm for the formation of 
theological metaphor is that event in which God came once for all to the world, ren-
dering himself linguistically accessible by addressing us. It is the life, death and res-
urrection of Jesus Christ and that which follows from this for a Christian anthropol-
ogy: the justification of the sinner. This event is at once the condition of possibility 
for the formation of theological metaphor and its critical limit.130    
Yet the question arises as to whether Jüngel’s own approach really overcomes the 
problems outlined above. I shall argue that his hermeneutico-theological theory of 
the parable as analogous talk about God is itself a kind of dogmatic anthropomor-
phism. How can this critique be substantiated?  
Jüngel develops a sophisticated model of divine speech, which is supposed to 
safeguard God’s fundamental relatedness to creation without blurring the difference 
between God and creation. Yet as shown above, he fails to think together divine and 
human action in a non-competitive way, since the ideal of human passivity still lin-
 
126 E. Jüngel, Metaphorische Wahrheit, 145. 
127 Ibid., 146. 
128 Ibid., 149. “In ihr [d.h. in der metaphorischen Sprache] lässt Gott sich als den Kommenden entde-
cken”. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid., 150. 
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gers in his theology, though in a slightly mitigated way compared to Barth’s Prole-
gomena. And the construal of the relationship between divine and human action in 
terms of an active-passive dichotomy is nothing other than one of the most funda-
mental tenets of a dogmatic anthropomorphism, where God is conceived of as if he 
were a human being raised to his highest form (in seine Höchstform gesteigert). Not 
the notion of divine speech as such is problematic, but Jüngel’s (anthropomorphic) 
understanding of it, i.e. the way he relates (his conception of) divine speech to human 
processes of communication. Theologically speaking, Jüngel’s active-passive dichot-
omy corresponds to a reduction of God to an ontic agent who addresses another ontic 
agent, namely a human person. As in a ‘conventional’ situation of communication 
between two interlocutors, the addressee ‘listens’ (passively) when the sender 
‘speaks’ (actively).131 The climax or point of the parable, which he compares to the 
punch line of a joke, is just a variant of Barth’s actualism and similarly tries to mini-
mise human involvement in the act of reception. The addressee’s response only con-
sists in ‘letting himself be addressed and gripped’ by that which was said by the 
speaker. Any further human involvement would threaten Jüngel’s radical distinction 
between divine action and human passivity and turn divine redemption into a hu-
manly mediated actuality.132  
The same dichotomy between divine and human action also dominates Jüngel’s 
reflections on the encoding and sending of the message. On the one hand, hermeneu-
tics, i.e. the discipline that guides the encoding of the message, is called the “diligent 
handmaiden of the Holy Spirit”, even if it is only the Holy Spirit itself that can trans-
form the (human) text into a (divine) sermon.133 But Jüngel at the same time em-
phatically points out that the work of God and the work of man in the act of procla-
mation need to be strictly kept apart.134 Thus the latter becomes at best the condition 
of possibility for the former to occur. But to conceive of the relationship between 
divine and human action in such a way is again a characteristic of a dogmatic an-
thropomorphism insofar as divine presence is hermeneutically restricted to that 
which cannot be accomplished by a ‘mere’ human being. It remains unclear in what 
way hermeneutics, the ‘diligent handmaiden of the Holy Spirit’, is of theological 
importance at all, since, according to Jüngel, it is merely a human work.135 If it is of 
theological significance, and this seems to be Jüngel’s view, then it must be at the 
same time a work of God. For if it is of theological significance without being at once 
a work of God, one is forced to believe that there is a kind of nature-grace distinc-
tion, i.e. a realm where human beings operate autonomously and which is then sup-
plemented by grace. 
In fact, the writing of the New Testament texts, the formation of the canon, the 
encoding of the message which forms the sermon, as well as its reception on the part 
 
131 Although this is not even the case as regards human communication. 
132 Cf. R. Spjuth, Redemption without Actuality. 
133 E. Jüngel, Was hat die Predigt mit dem Text zu tun?, 113. 
134 Ibid., 114. 
135 Jüngel does give a specifically theological explanation for why the historical-critical method is 
necessary for a Christian hermeneutics. But it is nonetheless regarded as a merely human endeavour. 
Ibid., 114-119. 
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of the addressees, all these hermeneutical steps are at once divine and human work 
and it is not possible to attribute certain acts to human beings and others to God if 
one really wants to avoid a crude anthropomorphism. It is wrong to establish an ac-
tive-passive dichotomy in order to distinguish clearly between human and divine 
work, since “the most active human action is passive in relation to God”.136 As we 
have seen in Maximus, there cannot be a contradiction for a human being to be 
drawn beyond itself by divine grace and self-construction or self-realisation.137 Or to 
put it the other way round: “Our ‘autonomy’ and openness is in fact the counterpart 
of a radical receptivity which renders even our own action at a higher level utterly 
passive”.138    
What is required is a theological thought-model which allows us to think of the re-
lationship between divine and human action in a non-competitive way so that the 
human response, through Christ and in the Holy Spirit, can at the same time be re-
garded a work of God. It is the Christological and Trinitarian dogmas that constitute 
these thought-categories, both of which provide the basis for the idea of analogy. 
This leads us back to the reciprocity between ™nšrgeia and ›xij in Maximus the Con-
fessor. It is here that the Christo-pneumatological character of his theology becomes 
most evident. On the one hand there is the Christological dogma of the unity of the 
unconfused divine and human nature in Christ, on the other hand the pneumatologi-
cal doctrine that the one Spirit is present in a multiplicity of particular gifts. On the 
basis of these two dogmas, ™nšrgeia and ›xij can be grasped as analogical concepts 
insofar as they express at the same time “une identité et une différence de l’être d’un 
étant d’avec l’être d’un autre étant. Cette analogie exprime finalement la relation 
même entre Dieu et l’homme qui s’articule en ces deux pôles d’™nšrgeia et d’›xij”.139 
Precisely because divine action is not on the same level as human action, but consti-
tutes an entirely different mode of operation, Maximus can say that the divinisation 
of man is nothing other than the realisation of his very nature.140 Only thus a dog-
matic anthropomorphism is really overcome.141
 
136 J. Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 105. 
137 “…[T]he only way in which creative love can hope to achieve its end of a free response from those 
created for love is by making creatures make themselves”, I.U. Dalferth, Becoming Present, 170. 
138 J. Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 53. 
139 P. Renczes, Agir de Dieu et liberté de l’homme, 368. Italics mine. 
140 Ibid., 349-354. 
141 If God is conceived of as “the poet of the possible, not the maker of the actual”, there cannot be a 
dichotomy between divine action and human passivity, I.U. Dalferth, Becoming Present, 82. Rather, 
such an approach makes it possible to think of a kind of synergy. If a human being realises a possibil-
ity which was played in his way by God, God and man can be considered co-workers. At the same 
time, there is no danger of conflating divine with human action. 
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2 Mystagogy 
In the first chapter of part III I have tried to show that if the introduction into a new 
perspective on the world is at stake, which is tantamount to a new way of life, the 
conception of divine speech or address, as conceived by Barth and Jüngel, is not nec-
essarily a suitable mode of discourse to accomplish this goal. Thus in what follows I 
shall elaborate on some of the points touched upon in chapter one and develop them 
in the direction of a mystagogy. I shall reflect on which hermeneutical elements are 
relevant if the introduction into a new perspective on the world is the primary aim of 
communication.  
A) Reiteration and the acquisition of an (interpretative) 
habit 
Henceforth the terms ‘aesthetic text’ or ‘work of art’ will be exclusively used in the 
sense of Christian art that introduces into the Christian perspective on the world or 
Christian interpretative practice, leaving it open whether it is expressed through ver-
bal communication or not. Now as far as the genre of the ‘aesthetic text’ is con-
cerned, it seems tenable to argue that there is a correlation between the inexhaustible 
interpretative depth of the work of art and the infinite perfectibility of the interpreter. 
That is to say, the better the ‘aesthetic text’ is ‘understood’ by the interpreter, the 
more he embodies the way of life represented by it and vice versa. Yet the ‘aesthetic 
text’ can only fulfil this task because it possesses a high degree of polysemy so that 
the same interpreter at different times, or different interpreters at the same time, can 
be affected and transformed by it. The example of the joke, however, is diametrically 
opposed to any kind of synchronic or diachronic polysemy, for it seems that when 
people laugh about a joke, they all laugh about exactly the same (which excludes 
synchronic polysemy), and they laugh only once, namely the first time they hear the 
joke (which excludes diachronic polysemy). 
Now the ‘aesthetic text’s’ inexhaustible depth of meaning and its in principle infi-
nite transformative power can only be actualised if the interpreter continually ex-
poses himself to a ‘work of art’, leading to the appropriation, internalisation and 
inculcation of an ‘aesthetic text’ or a whole world of ‘aesthetic texts’ by the inter-
preter. This appropriation, internalisation and inculcation of a world of ‘aesthetic 
texts’ leads gradually to the acquisition of an interpretative habit(us). According to 
Peirce, whose words could be read as a critique of Jüngel, “surprise is very efficient 
in breaking up associations of ideas … [but] … no new association, no entirely new 
habit, can be created by involuntary experiences” (CP 5.478, italics mine). What 
does lead to the acquisition of a new habit(us), are reiterations: “multiple reiterated 
behaviour of the same kind, under similar combinations of percepts and fancies pro-
duce a tendency – the habit – actually to behave in a similar way under similar cir-
cumstances in the future” (CP 5.487, cf. 5.477). It is reiteration, on the macro as well 
as on the micro level, which is the most basic prerequisite for this process to be suc-
cessful.   
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But the life of every human being is always already shaped by certain patterns of 
behaviour, in the sense that no one cannot not possess some kind of habit(us) – even 
in a time in which postmodern arbitrariness prevails over directedness and long-term 
commitment. For this reason Peirce often reflects explicitly upon habit-change, 
rather than just upon the acquisition of a habitus (CP 5.476f).  
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that the term ‘habit/habitus’ does not 
denote here a specific technique, expertise or skill, but is that which corresponds to 
the Christian interpretative perspective on the world on the anthropological level; 
that which guides all our acts of interpretation wholly independently of a particular x 
or field of xs.  
Although operating within the intellectual framework of Greek antiquity, already 
Aristotle was addressing a similar question.142 As is evident, he argues, not all as-
criptions of goodness to a particular person or action refer to the moral goodness of 
that person or action. For instance, a ‘good shoemaker’ is a person who is good at 
handling shoes, but not necessarily a person who is morally good, and a bad doctor 
or actor is not necessarily a morally bad person.143 One is thus tempted to infer from 
these remarks that Aristotle aims at drawing a clear distinction between the posses-
sion or exercise of ‘technical’ goodness and that of moral goodness. A good shoe-
maker is a man who is able to skilfully and efficiently make shoes, who has mastered 
the specific technique of shoe-making. By contrast, if a man is good, or morally 
good, he does not possess expertise or skills by means of which he can reach a spe-
cific goal, i.e. moral goodness cannot be compared to the goodness of a shoemaker in 
this respect. And since Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics is concerned with the ‘su-
preme good’ and the ‘good for man’, one is tempted to conclude that his work is not 
dealing with the question of how man can acquire techniques or skills.  
However, Aristotle repeatedly rejects such a distinction between technical and 
moral goodness. He points out that as an artist’s goodness and proficiency lie in the 
performance of his specific function or activity as artist, thus man’s goodness lies in 
the fulfilment of his function or activity as man.144 Logically speaking, there is no 
difference between a ‘good artist’ and a ‘good man’. The ‘good man’ is an expert in 
‘being-man’, and in order to arrive at the highest moral goal, to which Aristotle’s 
Ethics provides the instruction, a person must develop his skills to the best of his 
ability. Accordingly, man is defined in terms of a specific function or task, and Aris-
totle even uses a verb, ‘to man’, or ‘to live as a human being’ (¢nqrwpeÚesqai) – as 
the verb ‘to play the harp’ denotes the activity of the harpist.145  
According to Jonathan Barnes, it is therefore wrong to read the Nichomachean 
Ethics in the first place as work reflecting on the morally good man, for Aristotle 
rather attempts to give instruction about how to life appropriately and successfully as 
a human being. To be sure, the question of how to live as a ‘good man’ leads back to 
 
142 For the following see J. Barnes, The Nichomachean Ethics, xxvff. 
143 Aristotle, On Interpretation, 20b31-40; Nichomachean Ethics, 1148b7-9. 
144 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1097b, 25-1098a, 18. 
145 Ibid., 1178b7-8. 
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more concrete issues, such as happiness, moral life and contemplation, but it is none-
theless more fundamental than moral reflection.146 The answer which Aristotle gives 
to the question of what the function and activity of man consists in is of no concern 
here. But what can be used for the purpose of this essay is the notion of a unity-in-
difference, not as regards ‘being man’ but with respect to ‘being Christian’. To put 
this more formally, “if X and Y are both successful as Fs, then there must be some 
one thing […] which accounts for both successes – namely, whatever amounts to 
performing well as an F”.147  
The Christian tradition in East and West alike, considered faith, hope and love to 
be the basic virtues which every Christian should strive to acquire, independent of 
what kind of occupation or activity he pursues. In the terminology of this essay, these 
three virtues are that which underlies, or is supposed to underlie every act of interpre-
tation or action performed by a Christian, whether ‘consciously’, after a period of 
deliberation and/or dialogue, or ‘unconsciously’, in the sense of an internalised prac-
tice. In what follows I shall, first, clarify the meaning of the term habitus, and sec-
ondly, elaborate on the relationship between the one habitus and the various different 
actions which it generates and structures.  
a) The term habitus is the translation, or rather one possible translation, of the 
Greek word ›xij, which has a number of interrelated meanings.148 It is helpful to keep 
in mind that the noun ›xij is a substantivisation of the verb œcein, which can be taken 
in the transitive or intransitive sense. If ›xij is translated following the transitive 
meaning of the verb œcein, it denotes ‘possession’ as oppose to ‘acquisition’ (i.e. 
something is not yet possessed) or ‘privation’ (something is no longer possessed). If 
one follows the intransitive meaning, ›xij can be translated as a ‘state’ in the sense of 
a ‘permanent condition’, which is opposed to an unstable situation (i.e. continual 
movement). This ‘state’ or ‘manner of being’ can – if ›xij is used with respect to hu-
man beings – refer to the body and then means ‘attitude’, or to the mind denoting a 
‘state of the soul’ or ‘disposition’. In the latter case, it loses its neutrality and comes 
to mean a ‘good’ or ‘appropriate state’. There is a third principal meaning, which can 
be rendered into English as ‘personal capacity’, ‘natural capacity’ or ‘capacity ac-
quired through experience’. This acquired capacity is at the same time a ‘possession’ 
or ‘manner of being’. And it is particularly this third meaning – which entails both 
the transitive and the intransitive meaning mentioned above – that proved exception-
ally fruitful for philosophical reflection on human action and practice.   
In Aristotle, the noun ›xij – like the middle-voiced verb fa…nesqai – occupies a 
middle position.149 It is in a sense an activity (™nšrgeia), something like a practice or 
 
146 J. Barnes, The Nichomachean Ethics, xxxvii-iii. 
147 Ibid., xxxviii. To be sure, Aristotle does not identify the fulfilment of the function or activity of 
‘man’ with one particular virtue, but rather embarks on a highly complex examination of different 
classes of virtues, happiness, contemplation, friendship, etc. 
148 The following exposition refers equally to pre-Christian as well as Greek patristic thought. See P. 
Renczes, Agir de Dieu et liberté de l’homme, 191f. See also the definitions in H. Liddell/ R. Scott, A 
Greek-English Lexicon, 595; W. Pape, Griechisch-Deutsches Wörterbuch, 882f; G.W. Lampe, A Pa-
tristic Greek Lexicon, 497f. 
149 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1022b, 4-10. 
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movement of the one who ‘has’ or ‘possesses’ the activity (tij toà œcontoj) and of 
that which is ‘possessed’ (toà ™comšnou); as the creation is between (metaxÚ) the artist 
and the work of art, or as between a man who wears a vestment and the vestment 
which is worn, there is the wearing (›xij) of the vestment. And the Stagirite adds that 
the habitus cannot itself have a habitus, for this would lead to an infinite regress.  
The meaning of the word habitus does not coincide with that of virtue (¢ret»). At 
the beginning of the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle famously states “that the good 
for man is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue (¢ret»), or if there are 
more kinds of virtue than one, in accordance with the best and most perfect kind”.150 
Distinguishing between three different aspects within the human soul, the passions, 
the faculties and the habitus, Aristotle places the virtues into the category of the habi-
tus – for it is here that human freedom and moral choice play a key role.151 Accord-
ingly, habitus is a neutral term in the sense that it simply denotes a ‘state’ of the hu-
man soul that is either determined by virtues or vices. It thus corresponds to what 
Maximus calls the ‘mode of existence’ and is related to human deliberation, choice 
and decision – at least so far as its acquisition is concerned.  
This last reserve becomes necessary if one follows Aristotle’s further reflections 
on the nature of habitus and virtue. On the one hand, virtue – i.e. a positively quali-
fied habitus – is a power rather than an actuality, since a man can very well possess a 
virtue without exercising it. But one has to add that, even if it is a power, the virtuous 
man, if he acts, always acts virtuously. A person who possesses the virtue of justice, 
for instance, is able to perform just actions, but cannot use this virtue for unjust ac-
tions, for his habitus makes him want justice and act justly. Yet the same does not 
apply to sciences and faculties, for “both members of a pair of contraries are held to 
be the concern of the same science or faculty …”.152 A nuclear physicist, for in-
stance, can use his skills either to destroy the world by developing an atomic bomb 
or to supply the world with energy by designing a nuclear reactor. 
Moreover, the relationship between habitus and action (™nšrgeia) is reciprocal: on 
the one hand, a habitus can only be acquired by continually carrying out the same 
action. As Aristotle puts it, “like activities produce like dispositions”.153 On the other 
hand, the habitus is that which enables an agent to perform actions of a particular 
quality. This leads back to the question of how this unity-in-difference can be 
thought of. To this I shall turn now.  
b) The model of unity-in-difference tries to explain how a single person can per-
form different actions in different situations, which are governed by one single habi-
tus. According to Pierre Bourdieu, a habitus is a system of dispositions, and a dispo-
sition a structure or the “result of an organizing action”, “a way of being, a habitual 
state (especially of the body) and, in particular, a predisposition, tendency, propen-
sity, or inclination”.154 It is a generative principle which produces regulated improvi-
 
150 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1098a, 17ff. 
151 Ibid., 1106a, 11. 
152 Ibid., 1129a, 11-16. 
153 Ibid., 1103b, 20. 
154 P. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 214, fn 1. 
 
 
203
                                                
sations in particular situations. In other words, there is unity insofar as practices are 
generated by one single generative principle, and there is difference insofar as these 
practices are improvisations, i.e. non-identical and situational manifestations of this 
principle.  
The generative principle is durably installed, and acquired through inculcation 
and internalisation that starts in early childhood. The habitus can therefore be under-
stood as “history turned into nature” and constitutes the basis for the individual and 
collective unconscious, without which conscious communication would be impossi-
ble.155 This of course recalls Abel’s distinction between interpretation1 and interpre-
tation3. Interpretation3 is dependent on interpretation1 and the latter remains uncon-
scious, i.e. it always already presupposed in all acts of interpretation3. From 
Bourdieu’s anthropological viewpoint this amounts to saying that actions performed 
by human beings always have more meaning than those who perform them are aware 
of. And like Peirce’s and Abel’s approach, his theory of practice goes beyond ideal-
ism and realism insofar as he states that it is impossible to account for practices ei-
ther from the conditions which determined the generative principle or from the ob-
jective conditions which trigger certain actions. Consequently, in order to arrive at a 
satisfactory theory of practice, both aspects must be taken into account.  
Now according to Bourdieu, the habitus “produces practices which tend to repro-
duce the regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of their 
generative principle …”.156 This of course raises the question of how we are to un-
derstand these ‘objective conditions’. Due to his Marxist background, Bourdieu’s 
theory of practice is developed on the basis of a materialist world-view. In other 
words, the generative principles are shaped by the material conditions of human exis-
tence and religion is reduced to an epiphenomenon.157 However, this presupposition 
is not acceptable for the present investigation and must be corrected. The most fun-
damental level of human existence is Christian faith (and not just ‘religion’), and it is 
the Gospel narrative which is supposed to inform the generative principles.158  
So far the stress was placed on the ‘idealist’ aspect of human practice, i.e. on that 
element which agents ‘possess’ when they carry out actions. What now needs to be 
analysed is, first, the ‘realist’ aspect, i.e. that which precipitates a certain action in a 
particular situation, and secondly, the process of mediation between the ‘idealist’ and 
the ‘realist’ aspect. With respect to these questions Bourdieu writes that the habitus 
adjusts “to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation, as de-
fined by the cognitive and motivating structures making up the habitus”.159 This last 
quotation brings the ‘realist’ aspect into play but at the same time shows how closely 
the ‘realist’ and the ‘idealist’ aspect are intertwined.  
 
155 Ibid., 78. 
156 Ibid. 
157 See e.g. ibid., 157. 
158 In order to exclude any kind of dualism, it is important to emphasise that Christian faith does not 
leave the material conditions of human existence behind; in the sense of an unhealthy spiritualism. It 
is only that Christian faith fulfils the leading function which determines all aspects of human life. 
159 Ibid., 78. 
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On the one hand, the habitus meets a certain situation which it has not created or 
constituted itself and which can be described in terms of objective potentialities. On 
my reading, the term ‘objective’ here stands for the ‘realist’ aspect and underlines 
that the limited range of possible ways of (re)action which the habitus meets in a 
particular situation is grounded in something external to itself. And the habitus has to 
adjust to the demands constituted by a situation insofar as these are unique, and 
hence do not permit a mechanical application of self-identical schemes. To deny this 
‘realist’ or ‘objective’ dimension of human action would amount to pure idealism.  
On the other hand, the habitus is faced with objective potentialities, which means 
that the action is not just mechanically triggered by external stimuli. The ‘external’ 
situation limits the range of possible (re)actions, but still allows for a wide range of 
different options. This is confirmed by the statement that the process of adjustment is 
defined by the cognitive and motivating structure of the habitus. Although the agent 
meets with something external, he is never a tabula rasa completely determined by 
outer circumstances. In Bourdieu’s words, the habitus is “a system of lasting, trans-
posable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment 
as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions and makes possible the 
achievement of infinitely diversified tasks …”.160 To deny this ‘idealist’ aspect 
would amount to embracing a mechanistic world-view according to which every-
thing is determined by cause and effect.  
However, it is worth noticing that what is defended here is not strictly speaking 
the notion of ‘free will’ or ‘choice’. To be sure, an agent is to a certain extent ‘free’ 
which world-view he adopts and which habitus he acquires. But it is not Bourdieu’s 
aim in Outline of a Theory of Practice to analyse the process of how human beings 
come to select a particular understanding of reality rather than another. Rather, the 
focus is on how the habitus itself engenders certain practices and actions in particular 
situations. As far as this aspect is concerned, the agent is not free. Aristotle famously 
points out that the just person cannot act but justly and Augustine believes that there 
will be a state where it is impossible to sin (non posse peccare). In other words, a 
person who has successfully acquired a certain habitus is no longer able to act freely. 
This is not to say of course that there is necessarily only one way of acting in a par-
ticular situation. Nor is it impossible that external events change the nature of the 
habitus; i.e. there is room for reciprocity.   
B) The Incarnation of the Logos, orality and the  
‘material continuum’ 
Besides the issues of active reception, reiteration and the acquisition of a habitus, 
there is another aspect which is of utmost importance as regards ‘aesthetic texts’ or 
‘works of art’, whose hermeneutical function is to introduce into the Christian per-
spective on the world. To put it semiotically, it is the question of which material con-
tinua, or which types of material continua, can be manipulated and organised in such 
a way that they become sign-vehicles which represent divine presence and the Chris-
 
160 P. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 82f. 
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tian Logos. Let me briefly recall the meaning of the terminology used above: the 
sign-vehicle, the bearer of meaning in a sign-function, is that which results from giv-
ing a specific shape to a particular channel, and is made of a certain stuff or matter 
that constitutes the continuum.161 This question is not to be confused with the issue 
of how certain material continua, which proved appropriate for this purpose, need be 
moulded to fulfil this function.  
Christian theology has to emphasise for soteriologial reasons that no expression-
continuum or channel is excluded from signifying the Christian Logos. That is to say, 
all types of channels, be they optical, tactile, acoustic or olfactory, etc., can come to 
represent divine presence. It goes without saying that a liturgical enactment of the 
Gospel narrative comes closer to this ideal than Barth’s and Jüngel’s exclusive stress 
on the spoken word. What is a stake here is of utmost theological importance, be-
cause Church proclamation – understood as the introduction into Christian practice – 
always points beyond itself. In other words, if the penetrative power of the Christian 
Logos is already on the level of Church proclamation semiotically restricted to 
phonic signifiers – and, as shown above, this selection is clearly motivated by the 
ideal of passive reception – how can its truly all-encompassing and cosmic dimen-
sion be regained in the interpretative acts of everyday life? How can there be non-
liturgical, or non-cultic, but Christian art? How can the Christian truth be related to 
science or matter? How can there be Christian cultural work at all?  
 To put this the other way round, if (the ideal of) passive reception is given up, a 
one-sided privileging of orality loses its plausibility. Or more precisely, at least the 
wrong reasons for privileging orality – the aforementioned ideal of passive reception 
– must be given up. Furthermore, the end (of the ideal) of passive reception, which 
opens up the possibility of humanly mediated cultural work, allows for the use of 
different types of continua.  
Eco’s notion of ‘invention’ illustrates well how cultural change can be conceived 
of semiotically and how it is related to the creation of new sign-functions in which a 
non-physical reality is innovatively mapped into a physical continuum. In order to 
grasp Eco’s understanding of ‘invention’, one has to start with his critique of icons 
and iconicity. According to Peirce, an icon is a sign “which stands for something 
merely because it resembles it” (CP 3.362); it partakes “in the characters of the ob-
ject” (CP 4.531); or its “qualities resemble those of that object, and excite analogous 
sensations in the mind for which it is a likeness” (CP 2.299). For Eco, however, 
“similarity does not concern the relationship between the image and its object but 
that between the image and a previously culturalized content”.162 After a lengthy 
exposition of why the traditional notion of iconicity is not tenable, Eco rejects any 
attempt at establishing a typology of signs and replaces it by a theory of modes of 
 
161 U. Eco, A Theory of Semiotics, 266. 
162 Ibid., 204; emphasis mine. Yet already Peirce had stressed the pragmatic dimension of iconicity: 
“Any two objects in nature resemble each other, and indeed in themselves just as much as any other 
two …” (CP 1.365). 
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sign production.163 Within this new framework, the opposition between arbitrariness 
and motivation reoccurs in terms of a differentiation between ratio facilis and ratio 
difficilis. In a sign production by ratio facilis, an expression token is accorded to an 
expression type according to a pre-existing code; the sign production is facilis be-
cause it is predictable, following the rules of an already conventionalised code. By 
contrast, in a sign production by ratio difficilis, neither the expression nor the content 
are yet coded but need to be invented. This latter mode of sign production replaces 
the notion of iconicity insofar as “the nature of the expression is motivated by the 
nature of the content”.164 Eco gives the following definition of invention:165  
We may define as invention a mode of production whereby the producer of the sign-function chooses 
a new material continuum not yet segmented for that purpose and proposes a new way of organizing 
(or giving form to) it in order to map within it the formal pertinent element of a content-type. Thus in 
invention we have a case of ratio difficilis realized within a heteromaterial expression; but since no 
previous convention exists to correlate the elements of the expression with the selected content, the 
sign producer must in some way posit this correlation so as to make it acceptable. 
The material continuum mentioned in the above quotation refers to the ‘matter’, or 
‘stuff’ which the expression is made of: for instance, the canvas and oil paint used by 
an artist, or the marks on the paper produced by a writer. Eco further distinguishes 
between moderate and radical inventions, depending on to what degree the process 
of mapping follows already established rules – for the notion of absolute newness is 
unintelligible. A cultural paradigm change, for instance, must be viewed as a radical 
invention. Eco gives the following example. When the era of impressionism started, 
the addressees were unaccustomed to perceiving reality in the way proposed by im-
pressionist painters and thus initially unable to recognise their subjects. Needless to 
say that genuine Christian art, in whatever time it is produced, must be equally per-
plexing to the untrained eye – for it mirrors the strangeness of the cross (cf. 1Cor 
1:22-24).  
However, all this does nonetheless not exclude the possibility of privileging or 
prioritising certain channels. It is only that this prioritising and privileging has to be 
done according to appropriate criteria. Thus neither the belief that language is not 
just one means of communication among others, but rather the very foundation of 
human culture in relation to which all “other systems of symbols are concomitant or 
derivative”166, nor the conviction that oral communication exhibits certain unique 
features, does constitute a problem for Christian theology. For what was criticised in 
Barth, and to a certain extent in Jüngel, was only a particular understanding of oral-
ity. But this critique does by no means deny that there are real differences between 
oral communication and other types of communication.  
Thus the question needs to be tackled of how oral communication and address are 
related to the ‘aesthetic text’ and the ‘work of art’. Since these latter terms are used 
here semiotically, they are not tied to a specific channel or continuum so that they in 
 
163 U. Eco, A Theory of Semiotics, 191-220, esp. 217. Eco discusses and refutes various theories of 
iconicity, as for instance: that the iconic sign has the same properties as the object it stands for; that 
the icon is similar to the object; that it is analogous; that it is motivated, etc., ibid., 191ff. 
164 Ibid., 183. 
165 Ibid., 245. 
166 R. Jakobson, Selected Writings. Vol. 2, 556. 
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principle encompass oral communication too. Accordingly, what was said above 
about the infinite depth of meaning and reiteration may apply to certain types of oral 
communication as well. So far as Church proclamation is concerned, there is the li-
turgical text – a kind of ‘theological poetry’. It is designed for recital, and hence falls 
into the category of oral communication but nonetheless possesses an ‘infinite depth’ 
of meaning and therefore calls for repeated recital (reiteration). And although liturgy 
is in the first place a common prayer, representatively celebrated by the priest, i.e. an 
act of worship of the whole congregation, it does nonetheless at the same time ad-
dress the very same people. Thus orality and address are not necessarily opposed to 
the characteristics of the ‘aesthetic text’ or ‘work of art’.  
To be sure, Protestant theology has long moved away from Barth’s understanding 
of Church proclamation and divine speech. Various attempts have been made to in-
terpret not just the liturgical text, but also the sermon in terms of an ‘open work of 
art’.167 This can to a certain extent be regarded as a development of Jüngel’s ap-
proach – at least with respect to homiletics. Although such a move towards greater 
‘openness’ is certainly a step in the right direction, its importance should not be 
overestimated. With regard to the overall structure of (a large part of) Protestant the-
ology it is not more than cosmetics, for homiletics cannot be separated from the most 
basic tenets of an ecclesiastical tradition. In other words, (a large part of) Protestant 
theology is suffused with the ideal of passive reception, which is manifest in Chris-
tology, pneumatology, ecclesiology, Mariology and the three pivotal formulas sola 
fide, sola gratia and sola scriptura. To reinterpret the sermon and divine speech in-
novatively as an ‘open work of art’ without reconsidering the overall architectonics 
of Protestant thought, amounts to putting new wine into old wineskins. But if one 
does take the notion of the sermon as an ‘open work of art’ as the starting point for a 
more comprehensive reconsideration of Protestant theology, it is very difficult to see 
which of the elements that are regarded to be characteristic of Protestantism will ac-
tually survive.  
For instance, as exemplified in the work of Jüngel, much attention has been paid 
recently by Protestant theology to metaphor and poetic language. But if this path is 
taken, there is no reason not to go a step further and to allow for non-phonic signifi-
ers to represent divine presence.168 For as Ricœur, drawing on Hester points out, 
there already is a sensible moment to metaphor.169 Whereas in non-poetic language, 
due to the arbitrary and conventional character of the sign, meaning and the sensible 
are kept apart, poetic language fuses the meaning/sense and the sensible. “In poetic 
language, the sign is looked at, not through. In other words, instead of being a me-
dium or route crossed on the way to reality, language itself becomes ‘stuff’, like the 
sculptor’s marble”.170 The aim of poetic language is to arouse images, which can be 
understood as sensorial impressions evoked in memory. On the one hand, the image 
 
167 G. Martin, Predigt als “offenes Kunstwerk”?; E. Garhammer/ H.-G. Schöttler (eds.), Predigt als 
offenes Kunstwerk. 
168 A large number of Protestant theologians have already done so. See T. Hart, Protestantism and the 
Arts, 268-286. 
169 P. Ricœur, The Rule of Metaphor, 245-254; cf. M. Hester, The meaning of poetic metaphor. 
170 Ibid., 247. 
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neutralises and suspends ‘natural’ reality; on the other hand, it projects a new world. 
Yet, Ricœur remarks, it is difficult to use the terms ‘image’ and ‘imagery’ to develop 
a metaphorology, for this introduces a sensible, i.e. non-verbal factor into semantic 
theory. He tries to solve this problem by drawing on a Wittgensteinian idea: “‘Seeing 
as’ is the sensible aspect of poetic language. Half thought, half experience, ‘seeing 
as’ is the intuitive relationship that holds sense and image together”.171 Put differ-
ently, ‘seeing as’ fulfils the role of the schema which connects the empty concept and 
the blind impression and thus unites the verbal and the non-verbal.  
Needless to say that it is just a small step from such an understanding of poetic 
language to an ‘iconic turn’, which allows for non-verbal signifiers to represent di-
vine presence. However, Jüngel, despite his interest in metaphor and poetic language, 
refrains from crossing this boundary. In an essay with the title Even the beautiful 
must die, he sets out the reasons why beauty and art cannot play a significant role in 
Christian theology.172 Following Heidegger’s reflections on art, Jüngel points out 
that the beautiful “appears in the light of its own being”.173 Accordingly, the truth of 
a work of art cannot be grasped in terms of a correspondence between intellectus and 
res, for it asserts itself in a more primal way. “In the beautiful appearance of the 
work of art the truth shines, it illuminates”.174 But he immediately adds that Christian 
theology has to distinguish this kind of self-revelation, in which something appears 
in the light of his own being, from the self-revelation of God. The tradition, however, 
saw a close connection between God’s self-revelation and the shining forth of beauty 
and truth in creation and believed that God endowed being with light so that it can 
appear in its own light. The divine mind was regarded as the eternal and inexhausti-
ble source of creative light, which everything created proceeds from and participates 
in. Consequently, with its creation, being brings the light of its own origin.  
Jüngel rejects this view and explains that, in a fallen creation, creatures, like the 
creator, are usually concealed in their createdness. The same holds for humanly pro-
duced realities: their earthly appearance is only an appearance in the light of the 
world, which is to be distinguished from the creative divine light that overcomes 
nothingness. Thus, for something to appear and shine in its own light in our world, 
“special revelatory events” are required.175 Jüngel does not hesitate to call these 
events aesthetic events. But since every revelatory light is outshone by the light of 
this (fallen) world, no epiphany can be an immediate appearing of the truth. Put dif-
ferently, in the beautiful, truth is only manifest in a mediated way, but at the same 
time points to a truth to come, to an immediate encounter with truth. The beautiful 
can thus be called the pre-appearance (Vorschein) of truth. 
From the perspective of Christian faith, there is only one appearance of truth: the 
revelation of God in Jesus Christ. In it, the origin of all light appears. Yet unlike the 
epiphany of the beautiful, the revelation of God does not radiate in the light of the 
 
171 Ibid., 252. 
172 E. Jüngel, „Auch das Schöne muss sterben“. 
173 Ibid., 388. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid., 391. 
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world but rather appears hidden sub contrario. “Therefore the event of revelation 
cannot fall into the category of the beautiful”.176 This radical statement is grounded 
in Jüngel’s theology of the cross. It is the ugliness of human sin exposed by the cruci-
fied Christ that makes it impossible to conceive of revelation in terms of beauty. 
God’s revelation in Jesus Christ does away with all beautiful appearance. We no 
longer have to do with a mere pre-appearance (Vorschein) of truth, but with truth 
itself. And this truth manifests itself in a krisis. In looking at the crucified Christ, we 
see only sin and ugliness, and the soteriological meaning of Christ’s death on the 
cross, the live-giving power of his resurrection for all people remains hidden. “As the 
event of God’s love, the death of Jesus Christ is the opposite of what it appears to 
be”.177  
Because the soteriological significance of the cross is not self-evident, a new com-
ing of the one who first appeared sub contrario specie is required. For this reason, the 
resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead is necessary, which is nothing other than 
the appearance of the Lord in his own glory, i.e. in the unmitigated light of his own 
being. And in and through Christ, we are promised to participate in this resurrection 
so that we too will shine in the light of our own being, which was hitherto concealed. 
All appearance will vanish and be replaced by being in glory. We shall cease being 
perceivers (Wahrnehmende). “…[I]t will mean that our life will then be a wholly 
uninhibited life, a life heightened in its truth; then, together with our being, being as 
such in totality will itself be present and lucid. Then truth and beauty will be identi-
cal”. 178  
In his concluding remarks, Jüngel explains that only that which makes a claim to 
truth deserves being called beautiful and only that which represents beauty a work of 
art. But despite this, art and beauty must be considered dangerous though nonethe-
less welcome competitors with the Christian kerygma. Both art and beauty anticipate 
in the beautiful appearance that which faith, without any beautiful appearance and in 
contrast to beautiful appearance has to announce: “namely the hour of truth”.179
In what follows, I shall argue that a theology which is consistently grounded in 
Christology comes to quite different conclusions, in the sense that the ‘aesthetic text’ 
and the ‘work of art’ can be considered the genre par excellence for the representa-
tion of the Christian Logos.  
a) Jüngel repeatedly points out that the beautiful is a historically conditioned ap-
pearance and is therefore only beautiful as a transitory appearance. It can be re-
garded as the point of a finite and transient world and is therefore itself finite and 
transient.180 Moreover, the enjoyment of art and beauty depends on perception, and 
perception, i.e. knowing something as something, or knowing it as true, is inconceiv-
able without mediation. In the beautiful, the truth is graspable indirectly but at the 
same time points to an immediate encounter with truth in the future.181 Accordingly, 
 
176 Ibid., 394, italics mine. 
177 Ibid., 395. 
178 Ibid., italics mine. 
179 Ibid., 396. 
180 Ibid., 389, 392f. 
181 Ibid., 391f. 
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because the beautiful appearance is only a pre-appearance (Vorschein) of the truth, 
the former must disappear and give way to an immediate presence of truth; a state 
which coincides with the eschatological fulfilment of creation.  
Thus for Jüngel, art and beauty cannot play a significant role in Christian theology 
because it is always tied to contingent and transient historical conditions. And he 
also says that these contingent, transient historical conditions will be overcome when 
truth itself reveals itself, which also constitutes the end of perception (Wahr-
nehmung). For Christian theology this is view is scarcely acceptable. Christian faith 
states that Jesus Christ is the truth (Joh 14:6; cf. 18:38) and this statement equally 
applies to his earthly appearance, the resurrected Christ, and the Christ of the second 
coming.182 And in all three ‘modes’ of his presence he is man and God, i.e. the his-
torically conditioned Jesus of Nazareth and God. It follows from this that the infinite 
is always mediated by the finite so that there can never be an opposition between 
finite and infinite or the finite and truth. Accordingly, it is not possible to conceive of 
the eschatological fulfilment of creation in terms of an immediacy that does away 
with creaturely mediation. To put it semiotically, the end of sin is not the end of crea-
turely and finite semiosis but the end of any interpretative ambiguity.183  
 There is thus a close relationship between Christology and the ‘aesthetic text’ or 
‘work of art’. As Jesus Christ, was, is and always will be the truth in his two natures, 
the human and the divine, to use traditional Christological terminology, thus the 
‘work of art’ and ‘aesthetic text’ does not allow for a separation between form and 
content. As Ricœur emphasises with respect to poetic language, and Eco regarding 
art in general, in aesthetic communication, the specific matter and manipulation of 
the sign-vehicle becomes semiotically relevant for the sign-function. “In the aesthetic 
text, the matter of the sign-vehicle becomes an aspect of the expression-form”.184 
This also accounts for the untranslatability of great works of art. The meaning or 
truth of a work of art is so inextricably intertwined with its matter that any attempt at 
establishing its ‘essence’ independent of its concrete and particular embodiment will 
result in its destruction. Similarly, whenever theology attempts to define the ‘essence 
of Christianity’ by bypassing the particularity of Christ in order “to extract a univer-
sally valid wisdom from the parochialism of the Gospels, a gnosis begins to take 
shape at the expense of the Christian kerygma”.185 There cannot be a dualism be-
tween beauty and truth in Christian theology because Incarnation does not allow for a 
division between form and content.186  
To be sure, it is part of Christian faith to hope that the eschatological fulfilment of 
creation will bring about an immediacy from “face to face” (1 Cor 13:12), but as 
mentioned above, this immediacy must not be understood as a termination of crea-
 
182 S. Bulgakov, Philosophy of Economy, 88. “Christ retains the flesh that he took upon himself for-
ever; he was resurrected with this flesh and will retain it at the Second Coming – such is the teaching 
of the church”. 
183 I.U. Dalferth, Gedeutete Gegenwart, 228-231. 
184 U. Eco, A Theory of Semiotics, 266. 
185 D. Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite, 22. 
186 Already John Damascene viewed iconoclasm as Docetism. G. Florovsky, Byzantine Fathers of the 
Sixth to Eighth Century, 280. 
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turely mediation. Furthermore, although Jüngel does not explicitly privilege oral 
proclamation at the expense of other ‘channels’ in the above discussed essay, one 
wonders why what he says about the inevitability of mediation in aesthetics should 
not equally apply to oral proclamation. Is not oral communication to the same extent 
subject to contingent and historically conditioned circumstances as aesthetics, and is 
the former not equally transient as the latter? Put differently, if Jüngel only wants to 
underline the eschatological reserve as regards all human endeavours ‘in this age’, 
why does he place the emphasis so strongly on the fact that the beautiful must die? 
To be sure, Jüngel does not say that only the beautiful must die but that even the 
beautiful must die. But it is nonetheless an essay that is particularly dedicated to the 
question of beauty and art. And in his concluding remarks, he clearly does construct 
a direct contrast between beauty, art and the Christian kerygma. In the beautiful ap-
pearance, beauty and art anticipate that which faith without any beautiful appearance 
has to announce, and has to announce in contrast to beauty and art: “namely the hour 
of truth”.187 But why is there a contrast between beauty and that which faith an-
nounces without beautiful appearance? One is tempted to think that the eschatologi-
cal immediacy of truth, as envisaged by Jüngel, once more privileges the kerygma 
(i.e. oral proclamation and phonic signifiers) because it promises to anticipate this 
immediacy. But is it not more convincing, and more Christologically consistent, to 
conceive of the eschatological fulfilment of creation in terms of a maximal embodi-
ment of the Logos in creation? If one follows this line of thought, the genre of the 
‘work of art’ occupies a predominant place in Christian theology. Only thus is guar-
anteed that there is no gnosis-like dualism between truth and beauty. For according 
to Christian faith, the incarnate Christ is himself at once truth and beauty. And if the 
emphasis is placed on the eschatological reserve, it applies equally to truth and 
beauty, pointing to the fact that before the eschatological fulfilment of the world our 
understanding of self, world and God (through Christ) is still fragmentary and in-
complete.  
b) Yet, as outlined above, Jüngel himself refers to Christology in order to show 
that divine revelation cannot be conceived in terms of beauty and aesthetics. He ad-
duces the Lutheran argument that on the cross, God’s presence remains hidden sub 
contrario. What we see when we are looking at the crucified Christ is only the ugli-
ness of sin and hence neither God, nor God’s beauty.188 Yet I would argue that all 
Christian art must certainly start with the risen Christ who realises as the first fruits 
(¢parc»), the beginning of the new creation (1 Cor 15:20-23).189 Certainly, the cross 
 
187 E. Jüngel, „Auch das Schöne muss sterben“, 396. 
188 Cf. E. Jüngel, Die Offenbarung der Verborgenheit Gottes, 171. „Die präzise Verborgenheit des 
Gottes, der selber Licht und in dem keine Finsternis ist, unter dem Dunkel des Kreuzestodes Jesu ist 
kein Widerspruch zur Gottheit Gottes. Verborgenheit Gottes unter dem Gegensatz, wie Luther das 
nannte, kann also nicht heissen, dass Gott sich in dieser präzisen Verborgenheit widerspricht, sonder 
muss heissen, dass Gott sich in dieser präzisen Verborgenheit selber entspricht“. 
189 However, one has to keep in mind that, since Christ is our salvation as person (and not just through 
or ‘after’ his work), he is also truth and beauty as person. The idea of a ‘progressive divinisation’ of 
Christ’s humanity must be rejected (cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Epistle III, 16 (MPG 46, 1020C-D)). Con-
sider e.g. the following verse from 1 Cor 15:20: “Nunˆ d CristÕj ™g»gertai ™k nekrîn ¢parc¾ tîn 
kekoimhmšnwn (™gšneto)”. The addition of ™gšneto in minor sources suggests that Christ did become the 
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does stand for God’s radical otherness, which is a stumbling-block to Jews and fool-
ishness to Gentiles (1 Cor 1:23), and it does make clear that what saves us is alone 
God’s intervention in Jesus Christ (since we cannot overcome sin and death by our-
selves). Also, it is important to guard against any tendency to instrumentalise the 
cross and to prevent it from being reduced to a mere means to fulfil wishes which 
spring from our fallen nature.190 Nonetheless, the Christian tradition rightly calls the 
cross the ‘Tree of Life’ or the ‘Live-Giving Cross’, for it cannot be separated from 
the resurrection, restoration, renewal and recapitulation of creation in Christ, which 
also restores its beauty. In this specifically theological sense, the cross is ‘only’ a 
means to an end, for it is God’s means to the salvific restoration of his good but 
fallen creation.  
The problem with Jüngel’s model is that cross and resurrection are considered two 
separate aspects of God’s salvific intervention which remain unconnected. By con-
templating the crucified Christ we come to know that we are sinners, whereas the 
resurrection of the crucified Christ reveals to us the redemptive significance of the 
cross. i.e. that we are redeemed sinners. But this redemption remains without actual-
ity insofar as there is supposedly a total discontinuity between the old and the new 
creation. Although Christ has been raised from the dead as the first fruits of those 
who have died (1 Cor 15:20), he does not initiate an ecclesiastically mediated trans-
formative process in space and time in which all creation is led to its ultimate telos. 
Rather, the resurrection of Christ points forward to our own resurrection (cf. Rom 
6:5), which is conceived of in terms of a future event; then God will once again act 
on the world; then an immediate presence of truth will be attained. Yet such a sote-
riology and eschatology is highly reductive to say the least. Once again, this is due to 
the fact that the idea of the Christological constitution of the believer is considered 
the only relevant issue. As outlined above, such a reductionism must be avoided by 
emphasising that the once-and-for-all constitution of the believer (which corresponds 
to the once-and-for-all event of Christ’s death and resurrection) cannot be divorced 
from the dynamical process which this constitution initiates.    
The belief in a total discontinuity between old and new creation corresponds to 
Jüngel’s gnosis-like separation between beauty and truth. To be sure, he does neither 
say that beauty cannot at all be a genuine (though only partial) embodiment of truth, 
nor that beauty (which does fulfil this criterion) cannot be of theological signifi-
cance. But the merely fleeting presence which Jüngel grants to beauty in space and 
time makes it abundantly clear that truth cannot really permeate and transform crea-
 
first fruits through his resurrection. However, the original version simply reads: “But now Christ has 
been raised from the dead, the first fruits of those who have died”. And this second reading can be 
interpreted in the sense that Christ already was the first fruits before he was raised from the dead. 
Nonetheless, it is the resurrection that reveals (to us) who Christ really is. For this reason it seems 
tenable to say that the starting point for Christian reflection on beauty must be the risen Christ. 
190 Yet here too it is important to emphasise that there is never total discontinuity between our fallen 
wishes and our redeemed wishes. Even somebody’s (at first) not explicitly Christian desire for immor-
tality can be a possible starting point for a genuine interest in Christian faith, provided this interest 
leads to an ever deeper appropriation of the Christian truth which gradually clarifies the specifically 
Christian meaning of cross and resurrection. Surely, if no such dynamical process is initiated it does 
not deserve being called faith. 
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tion: “Hier und jetzt aber bleibt das Schöne nur erst der – aufleuchtende und wieder 
verblassende – Glanz des Wahren, von dem mit Schopenhauer zu sagen ist, dass er 
den Menschen “nicht auf immer, sondern nur auf Augenblicke” erlöst”.191 As is evi-
dent, Jüngel remains dangerously close to Barth’s understanding of revelation, which 
was analysed in the preceding part. 
To underline the importance of transformation does not mean that the divine 
otherness which the cross represents is watered down. Cross and resurrection form 
the very centre of the new constitution of the Christian, but are at the same time the 
guiding principle of this transformative process. Both aspects have biblical roots 
which are well-known. On the one hand, the constitution of the believer as a person 
takes place in baptism. The biblical writers interpret it as a dying with Christ, a par-
ticipation in his death, which cannot be separated though, from the new life with 
Christ, a participation in his resurrection (Rom 6:1-11; Col 2:12; Gal 3:27). Thus the 
new constitution of the believer in baptism corresponds to the once-and-for-all event 
of Christ’s death and resurrection. With Christ, we have died on the cross once and 
for all. The new life however, the bodily resurrection of Christ’s followers is hoped 
for as a future event. This is confirmed by the fact the St Paul often uses aorist forms 
to express that we have died (once and for all) with Christ on the cross and future 
tense to talk about the expected resurrection of the believers: “But if we have died 
(¢peq£nomen) with Christ, we believe that we will also live with him (suz»somen 
aÙtù)” (Rom 6:8). 
On the other hand, martyrdom, i.e. the dying with Christ, is taken as the basic 
category to think of the transformation of the Christian and is here too, coupled with 
the resurrection and the new life of Christ. But in this use both aspects, dying as well 
as being raised to a new life, take on a diachronic meaning. The followers of Christ 
are supposed to take up their cross daily (Lk 9:23), and St Paul writes to the Corin-
thians that he dies every day (1 Cor 15:31). Similarly St Clement of Alexandria 
points out that the true Christian “will be a martyr by night, a martyr by day, a martyr 
in his speech, his daily life, his character”.192 Also the acquisition of the new life, 
which comes through the gradual death of the old self, is conceived in terms of a 
process: “Even though our outer nature is wasting away, our inner nature is being 
renewed day by day” (2  Cor 4:16). In the same letter St Paul clarifies the relation-
ship between the dying of the old and the gift of the new self when he points out that 
the dying and suffering in Christ should be willingly and voluntarily endured so that 
(†na) the life of Jesus may be made visible (fanerèqÍ) in the mortal flesh (2 Cor 
4:10f). This last thought was taken up by early monasticism which coined the fol-
lowing saying: “Give your blood and receive the Spirit”.193 Furthermore, it is worth 
noticing the anti-Gnostic thrust of St Paul’s statement that the new life is made visi-
ble (fanerèqÍ) in the mortal flesh.  
 
191 E. Jüngel, „Auch das Schöne muss sterben“, 395. Jüngel quotes A. Schopenhauer’s Die Welt als 
Wille und Vorstellung, 372. 
192 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata II, 20 (Stählin Edition 170, 10f). 
193 Apophthegmata Patrum, MPG 65, 257B: “DÕj aŒma, kaˆ l£be Pneàma”. 
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Florensky reminds us that a “spirit-bearing person is beautiful, beautiful in a two-
fold way. This person is beautiful objectively, as an object of contemplation for those 
who are around. This person is also beautiful subjectively, as the focus of a new, pu-
rified contemplation of what is around. In a saint the beautiful original creature is 
revealed to us for contemplation. For the saint’s contemplation, the original creature 
is separated from its corruption”.194 It is the second aspect which overcomes a nar-
row anthropocentrism and opens up room for a cosmic transfiguration through 
beauty, for in Christ, man is not only the beautified but also the beautifier; he not 
only sees the original beauty of creation but himself brings it about. For Orthodox 
thought, the deification of man cannot be separated from the transfiguration of the 
world.195
Yet also with respect to man’s own creative work, the cross remains the guiding 
rule par excellence. Jüngel’s scepticism about the theological significance of art is 
perhaps due to the fact that his understanding of art lacks a proper theological basis. 
That is to say he is rightly hesitant to assign theological significance to an under-
standing of art which has no proper theological foundation, but fails to develop an 
alternative approach to art which does do justice to the Christian tradition.  
Beauty is reduced to a pleasant illusion and poetry to fantasy “… if art itself is no 
more than a stimulus and an enticement towards the beautiful in the midst of an un-
beautiful world, if it entertains but does not transfigure”.196 Art is constantly faced 
with the dilemma that the true beauty of the world which is revealed to it stands in a 
stark contrast with the ugliness and distortion of the concrete reality. It thus has con-
tinually to resist the temptation to merely please and amuse, to provide the fallen and 
deformed world with a cheap comfort, a temporary flight from reality – that leaves 
everything as it is. For if art is admired in its own right, if it only serves an immanent 
end, the desperate situation of the artist and of human existence in general become 
even more palpable. By contrast, genuine art is characterised by its real transforma-
tive power which requires spiritual sobriety and self-awareness of the artist.197 Once 
again we are lead back to the cross:198
Creativity is a stony path, where the weight of the cross is laid on the shoulders of Simon of Cyrene, 
whether he wills it or not. It is possible to break free from this tragic destiny, to cast aside the cross of 
Christ, to refuse the destiny it imposes of a self-crucifixion of the worldly, unenlightened ego, but 
only at the cost of a total spiritual paralysis of the personality. Instead of beauty, mere attractiveness 
will come to seem sufficient; and once the artist has fallen in love with this, he becomes deaf to the 
real imperatives of creativity.  
If the cross is accepted, however, human artistic endeavour can assume a theurgic 
character, mediating God’s action in the world. It then becomes an extension of the 
incarnation, represents Christ’s unceasing presence in the world (cf. Mt 28:20), and 
 
194 P. Florensky, The Pillar and Ground of the Truth, 234. 
195 L. Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 142f, 331-432. 
196 S. Bulgakov, Towards a Russian Political Theology, 153f. 
197 This is by no means something specifically Orthodox. Cf. R. Girard, The Anthropology of the 
Cross, 284; G. Thibon in S. Weil, Gravity and Grace, xi: “She firmly believed that creation of real 
genius required a high level of spirituality and that it was impossible to attain to perfect expression 
without having passed through severe inner purgation”. 
198 S. Bulgakov, Towards a Russian Political Theology, 154f. 
 
 
215
                                                
accomplishes the working out of salvation. And it is Pentecost which constitutes the 
ultimate foundation for theurgy, where the apostles received the Holy Spirit (Acts 
1:8). First and foremost we find theurgic activity in the liturgy of the Church. All 
liturgical action has a sacramental character, for God’s grace “flows out in every di-
rection”.199 These remarks about the liturgy lead back to the starting point of this 
chapter, where the question was raised which channels are able to represent the di-
vine Logos.  
It was argued that there is an obvious parallel between the presence of the infinite 
in the finite in the person of Christ and the way form and content are inextricably 
intertwined in a work of art. For this reason, art and artistic modes of sign-
production, where the ‘stuff’ of the sign-vehicle and every nuance of its manipulation 
are intrinsic parts of the newly established sign-function, are suitable hermeneutical 
means to represent divine presence. It thus becomes clear that the ‘work of art’ and 
the ‘aesthetic text’ are apt tools to introduce into the Christian perspective on the 
world. It is particularly liturgy which unites all of the aspects discussed above: active 
reception, reiteration, inculcation, the acquisition of an (interpretative) habitus, as 
well as wide variety of different channels. On the one hand, liturgy is itself a theurgic 
work of art, in the sense that here, form and content cannot be separated.200 On the 
other hand, as a configuration of ‘aesthetic texts’ which introduce into the Christian 
perspective, it gives rise to further theurgic activity in the world. It is at once rule-
governed, as it follows the innovative power of the cross, and rule-changing, as it 
should lead to a comprehensive re-interpretation of the world. 
 
199 Ibid., 156, italics mine. 
200 “Liturgie ist Kunst”, M. Mosebach, Häresie der Formlosigkeit, 99, cf. 66. „In den von Liedern 
bestimmten Gottesdiensten tritt der Gläubige beständig in neue ästhetische Welten ein. Er wechselt 
die verschiedensten Stile, er beschäftigt sich mit überaus subjektiven Dichtungen höchst 
unterschiedlichen Niveaus. Er wird gerührt und ergriffen – aber nicht von der Sache selbst, der 
Liturgie, sondern von dem gefühlvoll dazu vorgetragenen Kommentar. Demgegenüber ist das Band, 
das der gregorianische Choral zwischen liturgischer Handlung und Gesang webt, so eng, dass sich 
Form und Inhalt nicht mehr lösen lassen“, ibid., 35, italics mine.  
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